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ABSTRACT
Whether or not unilateral humanitarian intervention should be considered 
“legal” in public international law remains unresolved, and is apparently 
unresolvable. (Unilateral humanitarian intervention here refers to 
international military intervention by one or more countries in the territory 
of another, in the absence of clear Security Council mandate, and designed 
to protect a population under immediate threat of violence.) This article 
argues that, when seen from the point of view of the world’s most 
vulnerable populations, the humanitarian intervention question is in fact the 
most significant question in contemporary international law. Its resolution is 
also key to the consistent and coherent functioning of the international legal 
regime. Especially when comparing recent events in Libya to other long 
running—but neglected—conflicts, international law seems to have 
contented itself with an ad hoc, even arbitrary, approach to the question of 
when military intervention on behalf of a besieged population is permitted. 
By contrast, a disproportionate amount of intellectual energy is directed at 
post-conflict criminal tribunals, which are far less important to the 
 * Professor of Law, Suffolk University. 
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international rule of law than a strong, positive doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention would be. 
The article reviews the history of U.N. Charter “dysfunction,” in that the 
international military force intended to meet threats to international peace 
and security was never created, and the problem of gridlock on the Security 
Council—although certainly less acute now than during the Cold War—was 
never fully resolved. The result, as the article details, has been a string of 
tragedies, in which vulnerable populations are often left to fend for 
themselves in the face of brutal violence. The article pays particular 
attention to those situations, as in Uganda, where populations have been 
terrorized by small, low tech military bands, whose violent activities would 
have been quite easy to put a stop to, but where the international community 
has felt no compulsion to step in. Such conflicts often run for many years. 
The article discusses in detail the evolution of international thought on 
the matter of unilateral humanitarian intervention. In particular, it notes 
recent attempts to reframe the concept as an international “responsibility to 
protect.” The argument is made that this change is attractive in the sense of 
linking military intervention with the idea of “rights” belonging to those 
under threat; however, it might prove less effective than the more robust 
notion of a unilateral right of nations to intervene on an as-needed basis. 
The article makes the further argument that it is a grave mistake to treat 
the issue of unilateral humanitarian intervention as just another thorny issue 
in international law; whereas in fact a viable legal system simply cannot 
allow genocidal events to run their course. The article also reviews the old 
arguments as to whether international law is in fact “law” as we understand 
that term, and suggests that a negative response to that question might 
refocus the scholarly mind on revamping the Charter system to ensure clear 
protective responses to genocidal threats. 
I. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: WHY IS THIS KEY ISSUE LEFT OPEN-
ENDED?
The question of whether or not international law “allows” for 
humanitarian intervention has been left up in the air for decades.1
 1. Humanitarian intervention here refers to the armed intervention by one country 
or a group of countries within the territory of another. Controversy arises over the legality of 
doing so in the absence of explicit Security Council authorization, for the purpose of 
protecting people who are in imminent danger of being harmed, whether by their own 
government or some other force. The operative elements here are; (1) that the territorial 
integrity of a state is being violated, and (2) that the international community has not given 
its specific approval for the action. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Davis, From Ideology to 
Pragmatism: China’s Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 44 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 221 (2011) ([H]umanitarian intervention is defined as the use 
of force by a state (or group of states) in another sovereign state’s territory to protect the host 
state’s citizens from gross human rights abuses, mass atrocities, crimes against humanity, or 
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International jurists and commentators appear to be relatively content to let 
this matter remain unresolved despite its central significance for the 
international legal system.2 In fact, whether or not humanitarian intervention 
is to be prohibited, tolerated, or even mandated, is a far more important 
question than others that seem to gain more intellectual attention from 
international legal scholars.3 The answer to this “humanitarian intervention” 
conundrum determines whether extremely vulnerable people in situations of 
violent conflict have a recognized right to be protected against attack—
surely a more pressing question (as perceived by those who suffer) than 
whether a small handful of individual war criminals will face international 
prosecution, for instance.4 And yet, the question of the legality of 
humanitarian intervention is generally treated as a thorny if obscure 
dilemma, about which opinions simply differ. There is little apparent 
urgency with respect to the need to solve this matter once and for all in the 
interests of the most vulnerable and of the international legal system itself. 
Where many commentators seem to get it wrong is in treating 
humanitarian intervention and its legality as just one of many difficult 
questions in international law, whereas it is the question from the point of 
view of those most directly affected by failures in the international rule of 
law. It is well established that the system envisioned by the United Nations 
genocide. Thus defined, humanitarian intervention is in direct tension with the norms of state 
sovereignty and nonintervention that arose out of the settlement at Westphalia in 1648.). 
 2. See Ian Hurd, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an 
Incoherent World, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 293, 293 (2011) (“The debate suggests that 
humanitarian intervention is either legal or illegal depending on one’s understanding of how 
international law is constructed, changed and represented. Since these questions cannot be 
answered definitively, the uncertainty remains fundamental, and the legality of humanitarian 
intervention is essentially indeterminate.”). See also Davis, supra note 1, at 221 (“The legal 
status of humanitarian intervention remains unsettled under international law.”). 
 3. This article will argue that the question of the legality of humanitarian 
intervention in the absence of U.N. authorization is the most fundamental question of 
international law, of far more significance to real people around the world than matters that 
receive far more attention by international lawyers, as humanitarian intervention involves 
effective action on the prevention side. See JAMES PATTISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: WHO SHOULD INTERVENE? 2 (2010) (regarding a trend 
in the direction of recognizing the legality of humanitarian intervention and making the 
argument that despite the lack of legal clarity on the issue, many now believe that 
intervention to prevent mass killing may be justified.) (“Indeed, it is much harder to find 
someone who completely supports non-intervention nowadays. The lack of action in Rwanda 
. . . and the subsequent genocide has had a massive impact on the theory and practice of 
intervention. Even those who are deeply suspicious of armed intervention and deeply 
skeptical about its prospects of success may still admit that it might, in theory, be justified 
when a humanitarian crisis is sufficiently serious.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Margaret M. DeGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection 
at the International Criminal Court, MICH. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012) (pointing out that 
“[t]he International Criminal Court . . . has the mandate to ‘end impunity’ for serious 
international crimes around the world but the budget to prosecute only a few cases per year. 
This high degree of selectivity represents one of the greatest threats to the Court’s 
legitimacy.”) (internal quotations added). 
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(U.N.) Charter—with the Security Council identifying threats to 
international peace and security, and when needed calling forth an 
international military response—never functioned as it should have.5
Careful reading of the U.N. Charter makes plain that this system of 
surveillance and ready response by the international community was to be at 
the heart of a global system that aimed to stamp out conflict before it had a 
chance to spread.6 The profound and ongoing importance of this 
“constitutional” failure at the heart of the international regime has not 
received sufficiently coherent and sustained attention.7 Few seem to state 
clearly that, in the face of this functional defect, either the Charter should be 
revised (to clearly allow for and even demand humanitarian intervention 
 5. See U.N. Charter art. 42 (enabling the Security Council to “take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockage, and other operations by air, sea 
or land forces . . . of the United Nations”). See U.N. Charter art. 43, para. 1(calling on “All 
Members of the United Nations” to make armed forces and other services available to the 
Security Council “for purposes of maintenance of international peace and security”). But see
W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J.
INT’L L. 279, 279-80 (1985) for a formulation of the issue that “special agreements” 
necessary for such action were never carried out (“[T]he security system of the United 
Nations was premised on a consensus between the permanent members of the Security 
Council. Lamentably, that consensus dissolved early in the history of the organization . . . . 
The international political system has largely accommodated itself to the indispensability of 
coercion in a legal system, on the one hand, and the deterioration of the Charter system, on 
the other . . . .”).  
 6. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, International Law in Perplexing Times, 25 MD. J. INT’L L.
11, 15 (2010) (including in his symposium remarks that “the aftermath of World War II saw 
an intensification of many of the doctrinal and institutional trends that began during the inter-
war years. In the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, states agreed to ban the use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of states, with limited exceptions, including 
when a state is responding in self-defense to an armed attack and when the use of force is 
authorized by the U.N. itself. Hence the League of Nations’ failures prompted states to 
modify, rather than reject, the project to build an international collective security system”).  
 7. See, e.g., Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized 
Humanitarian Intervention, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1286-87 (2010) (stating that the three 
principal arguments in favor of humanitarian intervention are somehow made outside 
international “law,” namely: (1) that the Charter’s Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force 
is only violated when the territorial integrity or political independence of the state are 
implicated by the use of force; (2) that when the Security Council fails to realize one of its 
principal purposes, such as protecting human rights, then unauthorized use of force by a U.N. 
Member does not violate the terms of the U.N. Charter; and (3) that customary international 
law provides a right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention). Mohamed advocates 
holding to a firmer line with respect to what he/she sees as the clear legal rule against such 
intervention. However, the real problem is that without the U.N. providing the kind of hard 
and collective military option to protect people suffering mass human rights abuses—as was 
clearly allowed for in the Charter—then it is difficult to understand the “law” as mandating 
that individual states refrain from taking military steps in defense of suffering people. Under 
these circumstances, the basic structure of the “law” has been fundamentally compromised. 
Id.
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under certain circumstances), and/or that the formation of an active global 
“police force” should be revived in the post-Cold War age.8
The U.N. Charter is the most fundamental document of postwar 
international law, amounting almost to a global Constitution.9 To a degree 
that often seems insufficiently appreciated, its main goal is the suppression 
of armed conflict, if necessary, through reliance on targeted multilateral 
force.10 The full operation of the Charter was obviously impaired by the 
ideological gridlock of the Cold War, during which the permanent members 
of the Security Council could not agree on issues relating to the coordinated 
use of force.11 It should be noted that these ideological disagreements have 
persisted to some extent into the post-Cold War era.12 It may be that most 
commentators and policy makers have simply accepted this contradictory 
and unsatisfactory state of affairs in the face of political reality and with the 
resigned awareness that fundamental revision is just not politically feasible. 
The Charter as written is unambiguous, though: the international system 
eschewed unilateral acts of violence by particular states against other states, 
 8. See A NEW CHARTER FOR A WORLDWIDE ORGANISATION? 117 (Maurice Bertrand 
& Daniel Warner eds., 1996) (“That volume, a provision-by-provision revision of the UN 
Charter, calls for the establishment of what has been called a limited world government; but 
since this limited world government implements complete and general disarmament, 
possesses a standing UN police force, compels compulsory jurisdiction before courts and 
establishes a world development authority and other centralized organs, that project is a 
radical revision of the UN.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Blaine Sloan, The United Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1 PACE 
Y.B. INT’L L. 61 (1989) (making the point that the U.N. Charter is a treaty, but also a 
constitution for the international community). 
 10. See Grant L. Willis, Security Council Targeted Sanctions, Due Process and the 
1267 Ombudsperson, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 673, 676-77 (2011) (“In 1945 the United Nations 
was established as an international organization whose raison d’etre was the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The U.N. system was formulated to deal with states, which 
are the principal subjects of international law, and the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) was ascribed the power to take actions that are binding on states in response to 
threats to international peace and security. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
the Security Council may take enforcement measures to maintain international peace and 
security. Such measures range from economic and/or other sanctions not involving the use of 
armed force to international military action.”). See also Mohamed, supra note 7, at 1282 
(“[A]lthough the promotion of human rights constituted a significant focus of the United 
Nations, the aim of the creators of the new organization was, above all, the suppression of 
armed conflict. A right of humanitarian intervention, therefore, did not figure into the UN 
Charter.”). 
 11. See Reisman, supra note 5, at 280. 
 12. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the 
Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 870 (2005) (“The U.N. regime was largely an attempt 
to bring war and the use of force within an international legal framework. But it has proven 
incapable of preventing wars: the twentieth century was one of the bloodiest, and the twenty-
first is not shaping up to be much better. The Cold War undermined whatever hope there 
might have been that the Security Council would be able to play a moderating role during the 
early decades of the U.N. The NATO bombings in Kosovo and the American invasion of 
Iraq without Security Council approval have demonstrated further the limits of international 
law in preventing war in the post-Cold War era.”). 
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except in clear self-defense, while accepting that coordinated use of military 
force might be necessary to achieve the overarching goals of international 
peace and security.13 Viewed systemically, however, it is plain that the 
global regime has failed to adopt a predictable set of humanitarian responses 
to outbreaks of mass violence (perpetrated by state and non-state actors) 
that, of course, continue to occur.14
A central myth of international legal analysis is that we are in the age of 
“international institutional building,” and that international law is gradually 
becoming more “enforceable.”15 As evidence of this new enforceability, the 
emphasis on post-conflict criminal prosecutions takes up an inordinate 
amount of intellectual energy within the discipline of international law.16 On 
the one hand, such an ex-post prosecution focus is disproportionate in 
itself.17 On the other hand, regarding the lack of clarity around the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention, there is little more than an intellectually 
disorganized mission creep approach, in which no one knows exactly 
whether armed intervention on behalf of endangered civilians is to be 
applauded or denounced.18
 13. See, e.g., James A. Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition 
of the Use of Force, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 215, 215-16 (2011) (conceding that “the unilateral 
use of force is a fundamental aspect of the United Nations (U.N.) era system for governing 
the relations between states” and questioning whether this prohibition should be considered 
as having jus cogens status). 
 14. See Hurd, supra note 2, at 297 (“Disagreements about deep points of 
international law, including how law changes in response to practice, how treaties are 
interpreted, and the meaning of compliance and noncompliance in particular cases, overlay a 
remarkable consensus that humanitarian intervention is an important tool for states and 
international organizations whether it is legal or not. The disagreements over how 
international law works, alongside a consensus in favor of the practice regardless of its 
legality, suggests that humanitarian intervention is likely to exacerbate the ambiguities 
inherent in the idea of the rule of law for sovereign states.”) (emphasis in original).  
 15. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Making the State Do Justice: Transnational 
Prosecutions and International Support for Criminal Investigations in Post-Armed Conflict 
Guatemala, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 79, 81 (2008) (“Much of the international institution- building 
over the last two decades in the field of human rights and international humanitarian law has 
been aimed at overcoming the impunity of powerful, untouchable actors. An emerging 
international norm holds that when large-scale humanitarian law violations have been 
committed, action must be taken to deal with the past, including measures to allow victims to 
find out what happened to their loved ones, to sanction those responsible, and to provide 
redress.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Mark S. Ellis, Combating Impunity and Enforcing Accountability as a 
Way to Promote Peace and Stability—The Role of International War Crimes Tribunals, 2 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 111 (2006). 
 17. See, e.g., Gerry J. Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes 
Trials, 60 ALB. L. REV. 801 (1997). 
 18. See Robert P. Chatham, Defense of Nationals Abroad: the Legitimacy of Russia’s 
Invasion of Georgia, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 75, 92 (2011) (describing the legality of 
humanitarian intervention as “tenuous at best”). Compare Robert Marquand, How Libya’s 
Qaddafi Brought Humanitarian Intervention Back in Vogue, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
(March 28, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0328/How-Libya-s-
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A vexing result of this situation is that some of the most egregious 
violations of human rights are left unaddressed—even those that could be 
rectified with relatively little investment of international time and 
attention—while others are responded to with eagerness.19 Recent events in 
Libya fall into the latter category.20 One could argue that what distinguishes 
Libya from, say, Uganda or southern Sudan is the long-standing Western 
desire to drive Muammar Qaddafi from power. However, such opportunistic 
considerations seem an unattractive basis on which to advance international 
law and policy. International law purports to be “law,” in the sense of 
applying principles derived from the realm of rationality, even handedness, 
and fairness. Leaving the basic matter of humanitarian protection 
unresolved is an invitation to ad hoc solutions that inevitably contribute to 
international insecurity and unpredictability. 
A. What the U.N. Charter Actually Said  
Despite some developmental inertia, international law can claim its 
constitutional milestones. The creation of the United Nations in 1945 was 
meant to make serious and unambiguous inroads into the capacity of 
sovereign states to engage in warfare as a means of resolving conflict.21 No 
one reading the U.N. Charter could mistake the fact that the U.N. had, as its 
primary mission, to severely restrict recourse to the unilateral use of force to 
Qaddafi-brought-humanitarian-intervention-back-in-vogue (“[That the international 
community’s decision to intervene in Libya] has returned the idea of humanitarian 
intervention to the world stage. It’s a notion that has lain dormant—and was discredited in 
many corners—after the Iraq war, but has now returned, championed by many of the same 
countries that were the greatest opponents of invading Baghdad.”), with Sarah Joseph, 
Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, CASTAN CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. L. BLOG, (Mar. 18, 2011, 
3:54 PM), http://castancentre.wordpress.com/2011/03/18/humanitarian-intervention-in-libya 
(discussing the pros and cons of international intervention in Libya). 
 19. See, e.g., Jeb Sharp, Why Libya is Different from Darfur, PRI’S THE WORLD
(Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.theworld.org/2011/04/libya-intervention-darfur-sudan. See also
Rebecca Kaplan, Between Sudan and Libya, Critics See U.S. Inconsistency, NAT’L J. (Mar. 
18, 2011), http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/between-sudan-and-libya-critics-see-
u-s-inconsistency-20110314. 
 20. See Simon Chesterman, ‘Leading from Behind’: The Responsibility to Protect, 
the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya (N.Y.U., Pub. L. & Legal 
Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-35, 2011) (describing the role of advocates 
for intervention in Libya within the Obama administration). 
21. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS 
AND ARMED ATTACKS 2 (2002) (“On its face, the UN Charter, ratified by virtually every 
nation, is quite clear-eyed about its intent: to initiate a new global era in which war is 
forbidden as an instrument of state policy, but collective security becomes the norm.”) 
(emphasis in original); ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 29 (1993) (stating most 
important task of U.N. Charter as “maintenance of international peace and security”).
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settle international disputes.22 The Charter set out a system of checks on the 
use of military power by particular states, in favor of a coordinated, 
international approach to the use of force where deemed necessary in order 
to restore peace and security.23 The determination of such a threat was to 
come from the Security Council, acting in its core capacity as keeper of that 
international peace and security.24
The notable exception to this restriction on the use of force was in the 
context of self-defense, at least against an immediate and demonstrable 
threat to the state’s integrity in the form of an armed attack.25 As is well 
known, the integrated system envisaged by the U.N. Charter—meant to 
include a kind of international enforcement brigade at the beck and call of 
the Security Council—was never even remotely implemented.26 The idea of 
an international military force—a kind of “international police”—to respond 
to threats to international peace and security was never realized, and has 
scarcely been treated as a matter high on the international agenda.27 At the 
same time, individual states have in reality continued to engage in armed 
conflict—based on their own determinations of national and international 
need—although legal scholars stick to their formalistic position that 
international law does not “allow” this except when that state has 
experienced armed attack, or when explicitly and unambiguously authorized 
 22. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state . . . .”). See also FRANCK, supra note 21, at 1-5 (characterizing 
Charter’s prohibition on unilateral recourse to force as “absolute”). 
 23. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42, 43 (authorizing use of force upon determination of 
Security Council that there exists a threat to international peace or security, or in response to 
act of aggression); FRANCK, supra note 21, at 2 (introducing international norm of collective 
security). 
 24. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (authorizing Security Council to make recommendations 
or decide measures to be taken to “restore international peace and security”). 
 25. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (authorizing use of individual force by individual U.N. 
members if an armed attack occurs against them); AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 31 
(detailing U.N. Charter exceptions to art. 2, para. 4). 
 26. See U.N. Charter arts. 42, 43 (obligating U.N. members to make available to 
Security Council armed forces and facilities for authorized military actions); AREND & BECK,
supra note 21, at 52-53 (distinguishing between pure collective security and ‘limited’ 
collective security arrangement implemented by United Nations); FRANCK, supra note 21, at 
2 (envisioning an international military police force). In short, the attempt of the United 
Nations to establish a meaningful arrangement for collective security has been seriously 
undermined by: (1) the Security Council veto power wielded by its permanent members and 
(2) the inability of the U.N. to establish formal mechanisms for collective military action, as 
contemplated under Article 43 of the Charter. AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 57-58. 
 27. See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 50-51 (describing attempts to recruit an 
international police force). Article 43 military agreements for the contribution of member 
state forces to Security Council missions broke down with the onset of (and primarily due to) 
the Cold War. Id.
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by the Security Council.28 It is glaringly obvious that there is a basic gap in 
the U.N. system where a ready, willing, and able international military 
entity should exist. This fundamental defect tends irresistibly in the 
direction of a reconceived right of states to engage in military action outside 
the parameters envisaged in the terms of the Charter, in certain defined 
circumstances.29
The two choices for reform seem to be either that states be given explicit 
latitude to go ahead and use force in appropriate circumstances relating to 
humanitarian need, or that the Charter-based vision of a global police force 
should be revived.30 If neither of these options can be exercised due to 
political obstacles, then it should be admitted that the post World War II 
international law experiment has been to some extent a failure, even if one 
can point to positive elements within the system of international relations 
and diplomacy. 
In light of the Security Council’s historical and ongoing gridlock, it has 
been proposed by some commentators that international law should be 
interpreted to allow individual nations or groups of nations to take action to 
prevent mass violations of human rights of the type that shock the global 
conscience and threaten international peace, given the existence of 
particular circumstances.31 However, the notion that the international 
 28. C.f. AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 76-79, 94-102, 114-28 (analyzing use of 
military force by sovereign states under various contexts including anticipatory self-defense, 
protection of nationals and humanitarian intervention). See also SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST 
WAR OR JUST PEACE? 87, 108-11 (2001) (rejecting any possible expansion of Article 2.4 
beyond self-defense and Security Council authorization and agreeing with Franck that 
although the international community may in some circumstances condone derogations from 
the customary uses of force allowed under the U.N. Charter, this is insufficient to provide 
those derogations any legal force).  
 29. See Linda A. Malone, The Responsibility to Protect Haiti, 14 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
(Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.asil.org/insights100310.cfm (questioning traditional rules of 
state consent and Security Council authorization in face of environmental and humanitarian 
disasters, as well as widespread public health dilemmas); Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian 
Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 703, 707 (2006) (identifying 
strain that intrastate conflict, civil war, terrorism and cases of massive internal violence have 
had on U.N. security structure). 
 30. C.f. NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 16 (2000) (recognizing a new norm of Security Council-
authorized intervention). Compare Henry Shue, Limiting Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 11, 21 (Jennifer Welsh ed., 2004) (theorizing 
that basic negative rights such as right not to be killed place a duty upon states to protect), 
with Chesterman, supra note 20, at 2 (framing NATO intervention in Kosovo as a violation 
of international law and a blow to sound international relations policy found in U.N. 
Charter). 
 31. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Humanitarian Responsibilities of 
Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for 
Humanitarian Purposes in International Society, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 29, at 29, 48-51 (disputing not the existence of 
intervention norm, but only its scope); see also ERIC HEINZE, WAGING HUMANITARIAN WAR
134-38 (2004) (describing a consequentialist, morally permissible strand of intervention); see
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community should openly embrace “humanitarian intervention” of this kind 
has also been strongly resisted, at least where the action has not received the 
explicit blessing of the Security Council.32 It is unsurprising that many have 
advocated for a doctrine of humanitarian intervention to act as a legally 
recognized exception to the (formal if ineffective) doctrine that states 
should renounce reliance on unilateral force in international relations,33
considering that state and non-state actors are precluded under international 
law from violating the basic human rights of civilians. Nonetheless, 
opposition to formalizing a doctrine of humanitarian intervention on behalf 
of ordinary people has remained surprisingly strong.34 In light of the fact 
that international custom evolves only slowly, and that an international 
treaty (or Charter revision) seeking to define situations triggering an armed 
international response remains highly unlikely, lack of resolution on this 
also Mehrdad Payandeh, Note, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept 
of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 YALE J.
INT’L L. 469 (2010). 
 32. AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 112-14; Sean Murphy, Protean Jus Ad Bellum,
27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 22, 24 (2009) (noting predominant view among states that 
humanitarian intervention is not a valid legal justification for use of force); see Jean 
D’Aspremont, Mapping the Concepts Behind the Contemporary Liberalization of the Use of 
Force in International Law, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1089, 1089 n.1 (2010) (noting that Art. 2(4) 
prohibition on use of force has been “eroded” by lack of reaction to violations); 
d’Aspremont, supra at 1109-10 (d’Aspremont is far from convinced, though, that there is any 
consensus around particular exceptions to the Charter’s prohibition. He also fails to fully 
address the fact that the collective security system envisaged by the Charter was never truly 
developed. As for the doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” and the more contemporary 
responsibility to protect, he writes: “Although [the doctrine of humanitarian intervention] has 
been expressly invoked by some States and supported by some scholars, it seems uncontested 
that positive international law does not enshrine anything close to an entitlement to use force 
in the case of a humanitarian disaster on the territory of another State. Even the vague 
political concept of the responsibility to protect falls short of recognizing any entitlement to 
use force in the absence of a Security Council authorization.” Id.) (internal footnotes 
omitted). 
 33. See Fernando R. Tesón, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 323 (1996); Samuel Vincent Jones, Darfur, The Authority of Law, and Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 97, 116-19 (2007); Christopher P. DeNicola, 
A Shield for the “Knights of Humanity”: The ICC Should Adopt a Humanitarian Necessity 
Defense To the Crime of Aggression, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 641, 662-69 (2008) (contemplating 
illegality of unilateral humanitarian intervention as a crime of aggression under ICC Rome 
Statute). 
34. See Chesterman, supra note 28, at 235-36 (2001); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN 
& the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 n.9 (1999); Payandeh, supra note 
31, at 470, 482-83 (doubting any claim that responsibility to protect contains normative 
content and noting the recent failures of the international community to act even in the face 
of mass atrocities against civilians, Payandeh writes: “By the end of the twentieth century, 
the world was deeply divided into proponents who regarded humanitarian intervention as 
often the only effective means to address massive human rights violations and critics to 
whom humanitarian intervention was nothing but a rhetorical and euphemistic pretext under 
which the great powers pursued their imperialist self-interests through coercive measures.” 
Id. at 469). 
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vital issue will continue to undermine the international rule of law.35 A 
central argument of this article is that there is no genuine “international rule 
of law” without a clearly defined, militarily effective doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. 
Those most strenuously opposed to the adoption of a humanitarian 
exception have expressed doubt that a pro-intervention doctrine would be 
used impartially and fairly, and there is a fear that strong states would rely 
on the doctrine to interfere in an exploitative manner in the affairs of weaker 
states.36 Humanitarian intervention is also opposed by those who are 
resistant to the proliferation of virtually any genuinely binding international 
norms and collective actions predicated on those norms.37 In theory, the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention as an exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force awaits the development of “international consensus”—
something that is unlikely to occur in the near term.38 The upshot of this 
state of affairs is that the “international community” adheres—if 
ambivalently—to a doctrine which holds that, in the absence of Security 
Council approval, the unilateral (or group) use of force is unlawful except 
for purposes of self defense (either on one’s own behalf or at the specific 
request of another state under attack)—despite the fact that the unilateral 
 35. Neville F. Dastoor, The Responsibility to Refine: The Need for a Security Council 
Committee on the Responsibility to Protect, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 25, 27-29, 32-35 (2009) 
(noting slow pace of R2P implementation due to lack of any activation system and resistance 
from permanent Security Council members).  
 36. See Adam Roberts, The So-Called ‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention, 2000 
Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 32 (noting fear of former colonial states in Africa and Asia 
as to expansion of humanitarian intervention); see also Petr Valek, Note, Is Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention Compatible With the U.N. Charter?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1223, 
1250 (2005) (citing dicta from ICJ’s Corfu Channel case contemplating system of 
intervention dismissed by most powerful states). 
 37. Contrast Chesterman, supra note 20, at 5 (listing various theories of customary 
international law already proliferating with respect to humanitarian intervention and making 
the point that, with the proliferation of newly-formulated models of ‘lawful’ intervention, the 
formal requirements for the use of force embodied in the U.N. Charter have been gradually 
weakened); but see Jutta Brunnee & Stephen Troope, The Responsibility to Protect and the 
Use of Force: Building Legality?, 7 (Mar. 23, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551296 (unpublished manuscript) (A formal plenary debate 
ensued). 
 38. Payandeh, supra note 31, at 484-85 (recognizing difficulty in characterizing 
actions of international actors as stemming from obligation or responsibility to protect and 
predicts that because states are motivated by so many factors, it will be unlikely if not 
impossible for any responsibility to protect to collect a body of state practice and opinio juris 
necessary to cement the principle as jus cogens). See also d’Aspremont, supra note 32, at 
1102; AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 136 (noting states that have condoned or supported 
humanitarian intervention often characterize their actions in other terms, such as self-
defense); Brunnee & Troope, supra note 37 (outlining the international norm building 
process and showing that it is to the detriment of the Responsibility to Protect). 
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use of force in reality remains relatively commonplace.39 Adding to this 
confusing state of affairs, the rise of non-state actors as perpetrators of 
organized violence in the post-Cold War era makes the failure to embrace 
humanitarian intervention as a valid exception to the (theoretical) restraint 
on the use of force seem particularly anachronistic, even cruel.40
Given the range of conflicts in which the world has failed to act 
expeditiously to prevent what seems otherwise preventable slaughter (the 
Balkans, Rwanda, Darfur, civil wars in Sierra Leone and Uganda), it is 
natural that there should be intellectual developments aimed at leading us 
out of this international law impasse, this Westphalian stranglehold. In fact, 
where a jus cogens norm has been articulated and widely accepted, and 
where such a norm is being obviously violated, it is especially odd not to 
allow—even encourage—an armed response. Indeed, it would perhaps 
make more sense to say that an armed or otherwise real and effective 
response is required in such circumstances. 
II. REHABILITATING INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT
In the light of this contradictory state of affairs, the Canadian-inspired 
report of 2001, The Responsibility to Protect, authored by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,41 is a predictable and 
logical attempt to recast the traditional concept of humanitarian intervention 
as a responsibility, a duty, on states to protect the vulnerable.42 This new 
formulation (a duty on the part of states to protect civilians) sounds 
significantly better than an exception to a prohibition on interfering with 
another State’s territory. In articulating a “responsibility to protect,” there is 
no need to manufacture a reason to deviate from a foundational concept of 
 39. Valek, supra note 36, at 1228 (setting forth leading opinion on legality of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention as finding no support in current customary international 
law). 
 40. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 3-5 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS], available at
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (discussing effects of non-state actors on 
U.N. Charter framework); d’Aspremont, supra note 32, at 1119-21 (noting ill-fit of Charter 
article 2(4) to situations involving non-state actors). 
 41. ICISS, supra note 40.  
 42. See generally ICISS, supra note 40, at VI-X (setting forth core principles of 
R2P). See Payandeh, supra note 31, at 470, 482 (deciphering significance of term 
“responsibility to protect”). Payandeh writes that “[t]he concept [of the responsibility to 
protect] moves the debate past the controversial notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ to a 
‘responsibility to protect,’ thereby focusing on the perspective of the victims of human rights 
violations.” Id. at 470. See also Patrick J. Flood, A Next Rwanda? A Next Iraq? Military 
Intervention in the 21st Century, 11 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 383 (2005) (“The 
Commission rightly affirms the existence of a responsibility to protect human life even in the 
face of the important norm of nonintervention, and that appropriate action to carry out this 
responsibility should be recognized as legal.”). 
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the United Nations (that is, the prohibition on the unilateral use of force)—
even one that has been more honored in the breach than otherwise.43 Rather, 
the responsibility to protect sounds like an extension of other positively-
framed human rights principles, not a problematic expansion of the range of 
situations in which states may act militarily in the absence of clear 
authorization of the Security Council.44
It may be asked whether this shift in emphasis from humanitarian 
intervention to the duty to protect is more than a simple repackaging.45
Certainly the reframing has an intellectually calming effect, as it extends the 
already familiar reach of positive state obligations in the realm of human 
rights law; it lengthens the human rights terrain, as it were.46 On the other 
hand, as with other human rights principles and mores, it leaves unresolved 
the important question of when the duty arises, whose duty it is to try and 
stop atrocities from happening, and what the penalties should be (and by 
what entity imposed) for failure to live up to this duty to protect.47 The 
difference may be either semantic or more substantive, but the term 
“humanitarian intervention” does have the virtue of linking the demands of 
 43. See ICISS, supra note 40, at 15-18 (shifting terms of intervention debate away 
from territorial integrity towards protection of human needs). 
 44. It is important to note that the R2P framework calls for the duty to engage and 
take whatever non-military force that may be necessary first. The first two pillars of R2P 
involve the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to react—the latter of which may 
involve a wide range of measures that fall short of military intervention. See ICISS, supra
note 40, at 19-31. 
 45. ICISS, supra note 40, at 12 (“Changing the language . . . does not, of course, 
change the substantive issues which have to be addressed.”). Various scholars throughout the 
recent past have posed this question. See Payandeh, supra note 31, at 481 (discounting 
responsibility to protect as little more than a change in terminology); Natalie Oman, The 
Responsibility to Prevent: A Remit for Intervention, 22 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 355, 361 (2009) 
(characterizing R2P as a reinterpretation of U.N. Charter art. 39 authorizing force in light of 
threats to international peace and security); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: 
Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 102, 111-15 (2007) 
(noting presence of certain parts of R2P framework in various international law documents 
dating back to time of Hugo Grotius).  
 46. See ICISS, supra note 40, at 15 (attempting to bridge the gap between national 
security and individual human rights). See also Oman, supra note 45, at 357 (arguing that the 
responsibility to protect “provides proponents of intervention on humanitarian grounds with 
a theoretical foundation for focusing upon the needs of individuals”). For a good background 
on the liberal theory of duty toward civilians suffering gross human rights violations and 
viewing only those nations which protect the fundamental human rights of their citizens as 
belonging to community of nations, see generally Tesón, supra note 33, at 3-11.  
 47. Jeremy I. Levitt, The Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver Without a Dam, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L. L. 153, 170-72 (2003) (reviewing Int’l Comm’n on Intervention & State 
Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect (2001)) (questioning definitive nature of “just cause” 
requirement and admonishing R2P for its reliance on Security Council authorization); Stahn, 
supra note 45, at 117-18 (pointing out failure of R2P to address consequences for states that 
do not take action to respond, react, prevent and doubting that the authors of R2P 
contemplated the remedy of direct action against non-complying states). 
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humanity with an active, direct, and even militaristic effectiveness.48 By 
explicitly connecting humanitarian intervention with the Charter’s 
proscription on the unilateral use of force—connecting it, that is, as an 
exception—there may be less danger that the concept will languish in the 
realm of human rights do-goodism and be lost sight of.49 The term 
“humanitarian intervention” implies a robust right to act militarily being 
granted to ready and willing member states of the United Nations, allowing 
them to deviate from the general restriction on the use of force to protect a 
threatened group of persons.50 Perhaps the best of both worlds could be 
found in an international duty to engage in humanitarian intervention,51
although this formulation would almost certainly invite states to argue their 
incapacity for doing so. The opposite side of this coin would be the over-
eagerness of certain states to take the lead in such actions. 
International law has supposedly developed a “short list” of particularly 
heinous criminal acts. Based on the combined conceptual traditions of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law, jus cogens
norms constitute a set of thou shalt not behaviors about which there is no 
further international argument possible.52 Torture, rape, genocide, use and 
abuse of children by either state armies or other organized militias—these 
actions are unequivocally proscribed at the international level. No state, or 
indeed non-state actor, may lawfully engage in these behaviors, and no one 
can validly defend such actions. With that in mind, it is extraordinary that 
the international community has not placed greater emphasis on developing 
 48. See ICISS, supra note 40, at 9 (seeking to avoid militarizing the humanitarian 
term); Levitt, supra note 47, at 155 (noting the disdain many humanitarians hold for the 
phrase “humanitarian intervention” due to its invocation as an exception for use of 
militaristic force); Payandeh, supra note 31, at 470-71 (“Conceptually [The Responsibility to 
Protect] tries to cut the Gordian knot of tension between sovereignty and human rights by 
embedding the notion of human rights in the idea of state sovereignty.”). 
 49. See GEORGE R. LUCAS, JR., PERSPECTIVES ON HUMANITARIAN MILITARY 
INTERVENTION 39 (2001) (linking need for a strong U.S. military force to reality of failed 
states around world and need for humanitarian intervention). The “Albright Doctrine,” 
named after former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright and exemplified by U.S.-
led NATO strikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo, envisions the humanitarian uses of force 
as the chief reason for raising, training, equipping and deploying a world-class military. Id. at 
36. 
 50. See infra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text (discussing morally permissible 
behavior and humanitarian intervention as affirmative defenses to proscription on force); but 
see ICISS, supra note 40, at 16- 17 (stating that framing issue as a right to intervene may de-
legitimatize humanitarian purposes). 
 51. Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 355 
(2010) (proposing a framework for assessing whether a bystander state has a duty to 
intervene). 
 52. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Jus Cogens: International Law’s Higher Ethical 
Norms, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (Donald Earl Childress III ed., 
2012) (describing the lack of consensus concerning the scope of the jus cogens definition, 
and asserting the essentially moral roots of jus cogens norms). 
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a doctrine of jus cogens-level crimes of omission, along the lines of
irrefutably unlawful failures to act.
Identifying such failures appears far more significant than prosecuting 
violators of jus cogens norms after the fact, in that failure to protect leads 
directly to suffering that could otherwise be prevented. While in the absence 
of an international military force such as the Charter originally envisaged it 
would be difficult to pin this responsibility on any particular state or states, 
at a minimum acceptance of the doctrine could put humanitarian 
intervention on a clear legal footing. The international community itself 
would then be obligated to come up with a set of options with respect to 
which countries and which military forces are in the best position to take 
action. A new emphasis on prevention could make legal skepticism towards 
justified intervention obsolete.  
For that matter, the legally binding duty could be framed as a duty to 
prevent; a protective notion evident in the full title of the “Genocide 
Convention,” for instance—which is framed as a convention “on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”53 While it may be 
superficially assumed that the duty to prevent applies to national leaders vis 
 53. See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 91, ¶ 165 (Feb. 26) 
[hereinafter Bosnian Muslim Genocide Case] (“In particular, the Contracting Parties have a 
direct obligation to prevent genocide.”). This idea, as explained above, can easily and 
logically be extended beyond the obligation to prevent actors within one’s own territorial 
state from engaging in this behavior. Indeed, in the same ruling, the ICJ states that “[t]he 
substantive obligations arising from Articles I and III are not on their face limited by 
territory. They apply to a State wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in ways 
appropriate to meeting the obligations in question.” Id. ¶ 183. See also id. ¶ 430, wherein the 
Court states that “responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all 
measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have 
contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the notion of ‘due diligence,’ which calls 
for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance.” (emphasis in original). It should be 
noted, though, that some of the absurdity of international law is on display throughout the 
judgment, where the ICJ finds that in most instances of mass slaughter the requisite “dolus 
specialis” for genocide is not present! See, e.g., id. ¶ 376 in which the Court states that it has  
already concluded . . . that—save in the case of Srebrenica—the 
Applicant has not established that any of the widespread and serious 
atrocities, complained of as violating Article II, paragraphs (a) to (e) 
of the Genocide Convention, were accompanied by the necessary 
specific intent (dolus specialis) on the part of the perpetrators. It also 
finds that the Applicant has not established the existence of that 
intent on the part of the Respondent, either on the basis of a 
concerted plan, or on the basis that the events reviewed above reveal 
a consistent pattern of conduct which could only point to the 
existence of such intent.  
See also, ¶ 415 where the Court presents similarly convoluted reasoning to the effect that 
“the acts of those who committed genocide at Srebrenica cannot be attributed to the 
Respondent under the rules of international law of State Responsibility; thus, the 
international responsibility of the Respondent is not engaged on this basis.” 
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á vis activities within their own territories, it seems logical that the duty 
should be extended to potentially all states in their capacity as observers, 
even arm’s length ones. There is no good reason why fears of territorial 
encroachment should make this extension controversial, at least not if the 
international community begins to take as its focus the actual suffering 
international law was meant to alleviate—as opposed to professional legal 
concerns that purport to have “preventative” effects, but in reality do not 
appear to.54
A. International Protection: It Cannot be Pacifist or Piecemeal  
As the international military force envisaged in the U.N. Charter—to be 
at the ready for use by the Security Council—never came into being, there 
is a conspicuous gap where an international “police force” should logically 
be.55 There is no international military to respond to the phenomenon of 
mass killings by a state or by non-state actors, and in situations of political 
collapse this often leaves the most vulnerable populations at the mercy of 
extremely violent forces.56 In at least some of these situations, even a 
modest international force, insulated from the restraining influences of 
national politics, could take action to stop rape, torture, and killing from the 
outset.57 This would be especially effective in situations of low-tech 
warfare, where small militias target villagers and other weak and 
defenseless groups, and where the national military is unable or unwilling to 
adequately protect. Such a force could come quickly and efficiently to the 
assistance of governments or governmental factions struggling to contain 
internal strife leading to ethnic slaughter. This is not to suggest that any use 
of force can be entirely problem free, but compared with the spectacle of 
 54. See id. ¶ 427 (pointing out that “it is not the case that the obligation to prevent 
has no separate legal existence of its own; that it is, as it were, absorbed by the obligation to 
punish . . . . The obligation on each contracting State to prevent genocide is both normative 
and compelling.”). Of course, the ICJ in this case was talking about a situation in which a 
State has some degree of influence over the perpetrators of an imminent genocide—not the 
case of intervention by a third party for the sake of protecting those in need of protection. 
Nevertheless, it is the logic of international law that is in question here; the burgeoning 
norms of international law are worse than meaningless if the international community 
assumes no burden of physical implementation. See also id. ¶ 429 (pointing out that the 
principle of prevention appears in a number of important conventions.). 
 55. See infra notes 58, 60, 65, 67 and accompanying text (tracing the history of U.N. 
Charter and the fate of the proposed international police force attached to the U.N. 
organization). 
 56. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE 381-85 (2002) (estimating the forces necessary to have stopped Rwandan 
genocide).  
 57. See generally id. (estimating forces necessary to contain threat of genocide in 
Rwanda and elsewhere). 
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senseless, long-running regional conflicts, a military-based conclusion is 
certainly to be preferred.58
As mentioned above, there remains resistance to the suggestion that the 
international legal community has begun to embrace an exception to the rule 
against armed interference in the affairs of another state, even where the 
need for such intervention is obvious.59 The United States underwent a 
period of extreme remorse over its intervention in Somalia in an attempt to 
avert humanitarian catastrophe; the political establishment within the United 
States and abroad was highly critical of President Clinton for his decision to 
send in American troops for the “mere” purpose of providing aid to a 
starving population.60 Other uses of force by the United States in what has 
seemed more obvious self-interest have garnered less domestic criticism.61
It is understandable that the international community might still prefer a 
clear-cut rejection of “humanitarian intervention” over adoption of a 
principle that could, in theory, provide justification for a wide range of 
military actions by one nation against another.62 There is no indication that 
we have drawn nearer to creating any truly international police force for 
these purposes. U.N. peacekeepers are sent in to maintain an already 
established peace and not to use force proactively to protect vulnerable 
populations from violence while the relevant conflict is still “hot.”63 Thus, 
 58. TAYLOR B. SEYBOLT, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE CONDITIONS 
FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE 1-22 (2008). 
 59. See infra notes 65, 67 (documenting resistance of international law scholars to 
any duty to protect or right to intervene). 
 60. PETER RONAYNE, NEVER AGAIN? THE UNITED STATES AND THE PREVENTION AND 
PUNISHMENT OF GENOCIDE SINCE THE HOLOCAUST 3, 163-64 (2001) (noting effect of news 
media and public opinion on policymakers following debacle in Somalia). See also Walter 
Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, FOREIGN 
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1996, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51844/walter-
clarke-and-jeffrey-herbst/somalia-and-the-future-of-humanitarian-intervention (describing 
public reaction in the United States to Clinton’s use of force in Somalia for humanitarian 
purposes). 
 61. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, PUBLIC WARY OF 
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LIBYA (2011), available at 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1927/strong-opposition-us-involvement-libya-military-
overcommitted. 
 62. See Sophie Clavier, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 145, 151 (2009) (reviewing
a chapter by Willy Mamah entitled Is Humanitarian Intervention a Pseudonym for 
Aggressive unilateralism? (adopting “the view point that unilateral humanitarian intervention 
is . . . used as a Trojan horse by interventionist countries”)), in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES ON 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR 
CHRISTIAN NWACHUKWU OKEKE 643( Chima Centus Nweze ed., 2009); see also Marjorie 
Cohn, The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, in LESSONS OF KOSOVO: THE 
DANGERS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 121 (Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2003).
 63. U.N. DEP’TS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS & FIELD SUPPORT, UNITED NATIONS 
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 25-26 (2008) available at
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf (describing that today, U.N. 
peacekeeping operations are typically deployed as part of a much broader international effort 
to assist countries emerging from conflict; their primary mandates are to typically strengthen 
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the implementation of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention might well 
come to rely on action taken by military superpowers with uncertain 
consequences and with obvious implications for political objectivity.64
To ensure some consistency, it might be more desirable for international 
responses to be unabashedly driven by moralistic principles than by the 
usual “legal” ones.65 The development of international law according to its 
ordinary methodology is too time-consuming and too open-ended. The duty 
to prevent and protect, at least where feasible, could be placed on the same 
plane as other (non-derogable and/or morally self-evident) jus cogens norms 
whenever an imminent threat to civilians reached a certain level of 
seriousness. In a system without alternative protective mechanisms, there is 
little reason to hesitate when it comes to the need for armed assistance to 
protect the most vulnerable and urgently at risk.66
B. Why the Ready Assumption of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya? 
It is noteworthy that when the Libyan government turned the full force of 
its military on opposition demonstrators in March 2011, the international 
response was swift and urgent.67 There was little evidence of agonized 
discussion of the rightness of humanitarian intervention—strong statements 
were made in the United States and in European capitals about the self-
evident necessity of taking action to protect both civilians and 
a State’s ability to provide security and to promote dialogue and reconciliation among 
civilian populations. To this end, U.N. peacekeepers often play a “catalytic role” in the 
following activities: disarmament, mine removal, security sector reform, human rights 
protection & education, and electoral assistance). Id. at 26. 
 64. See generally Suyash Paliwal, The Primacy of Regional Organizations in 
International Peacekeeping: The African Example, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 185 (2010) (discussing 
the use of regional forces).
 65. See SIOBHAN WILLS, PROTECTING CIVILIANS: THE OBLIGATIONS OF PEACEKEEPERS 
(2009) (arguing that the moral and political imperative to protect civilians ought to be a legal 
duty if the principles of the Geneva Conventions and general spirit of international law are to 
mean anything). See also Tesón, supra note 33, at 361 (arguing in favor of some type of 
moral analysis when considering standards of “international law”). 
 66. It is extraordinary that, even for authors who freely acknowledge the terrible 
failures of the international community to respond to mass violations of human rights, they 
also recognize that the system of making international law places an almost insurmountable 
obstacle in the way of the revised responsibility to protect doctrine. See, e.g., Payandeh, 
supra note 31, at 471-72 (arguing that this doctrine “lacks specific normative content” and 
that the corresponding “conceptual change in the understanding of sovereignty cannot, by 
itself, lead to a change in international law”). 
 67. See Christian Pippan, The 2011 Libyan Uprising, Foreign Military Intervention, 
and International Law, 2 JURIDIKUM: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KRITIK–RECHT–GESELLSCHAFT 159, 
159, 161-64 (2011) (describing the rapid-fire events that led to UN security Council-
authorized action against the Libyan government for the stated purpose of protecting 
civilians as part of a trend towards “value driven interventionism”). 
2012] Yes, No, Maybe 197
demonstration leaders who had quickly come to be treated as a kind of 
government-in-waiting.68
The Security Council resolution allowing for this use of force retained 
the sort of ambiguity characteristic of the international approach to 
humanitarian intervention; the speed and strength of the resulting military 
response was highly unusual.69 As was true of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, 
the Libyan regime had been a thorn in the side of Western governments for 
decades. As so many humanitarian disasters had been ignored by the 
international community, it is not unreasonable to point out that strategic 
interests must have played a key role in pushing Western governments to 
take rapid and effective action against Libya. However, this brings us back 
to a central difficulty posed by the humanitarian intervention dilemma: If a 
coordinated military response to threats to international peace and security 
should be seen as a central aspect of the international rule of law, how can it 
be that these responses are so varying, so ad hoc, and so inconsistent? If 
anything, the more vulnerable the threatened group—especially where many 
children are involved—and where the low tech nature of the warfare (such 
as has been the case in many of the African civil wars) makes success 
almost assured, the more eager and enthusiastic the international response 
should be. Because an international response is often not forthcoming in 
even the most obvious type of situation, it may not be a stretch to conclude 
that international law is in fact too haphazard to be accurately termed “law.” 
Despite the existence of high level international prosecutions and elaborate 
treaty drafting mechanisms, it may be productive to acknowledge this 
 68. See Chesterman, supra note 20 (making the case that the international reaction to 
repression in Libya shows that it is harder in the contemporary world to do nothing in the 
face of such situations). Also note that there is less than full consensus on the meaning of the 
Security Council resolution on Libya and the implications of the international reaction going 
forward; see Russia Warns Over NATO Intervention in Libya, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO 
LIBERTY (June 5, 2011), available at
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_warns_over_nato_intervention_in_libya/24215871.html 
(“Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov has warned that NATO’s Libya campaign is 
‘one step’ away from sending in ground troops to assist antigovernment forces battling 
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.”); see id. (noting that while Russia abstained from the 
Security Council vote, its government stated that it had been supportive of some of the 
international moves to protect civilians, but was opposed to any escalation of that effort to 
include stronger military intervention). 
 69. The international action has also been roundly criticized from a variety of points 
of view. See, e.g., Chris Brown, Liberal Interventionism and the Case of Libya, INT’L AFF. AT 
LSE BLOG (Apr. 7, 2011), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2011/04/liberal-interventionism-and-
the-case-of-libya (explaining that recent action in Libya shows that ‘liberal interventionism’ 
to support the human rights of civilians is not exempt from politics and that “R2P and other 
consensus-oriented interventionist notions come up against this kind of contradiction because 
they are attempts to find non-political solutions to problems that are, in their very essence, 
political. ‘Protecting civilians’ sound like non-political idea we can all subscribe to, but when 
civilians are being attacked (as they certainly were in Benghazi and elsewhere in Libya) they 
are being attacked for a political reason, and, if you protect them, you are, whether you like it 
or not, intervening in local politics.”).  
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central failure of the postwar international legal system and work towards 
the development of a coherent and consistent template for civilian 
protection, a synthetic blend of humanitarian intervention, and the 
responsibility to protect. 
III. THE OLD “IS INTERNATIONAL LAW REALLY LAW?” DEBATE
In light of these systemic failures, it is at times troubling to teach a 
course the law school catalog entitles International Law when so much of 
its subject matter fails to resemble law at all.70 Ideally, international law 
should reflect and encompass a set of aspirations around which the 
international community, acting through the United Nations and other 
bodies, mobilizes to generate clear norms and to ensure enforcement. 
Applying such norms across a wide variety of cultural zones—which 
international law inevitably must—is challenging in and of itself, but not 
insurmountable. It now amounts to a truism to say that the rightful subject 
matter of international law includes both relations between and among 
states as well as between state (and increasingly non-state) actors and 
civilians.71 Given the meteoric rise of human rights norms in the post-World 
War II period, international law should at a minimum provide assurance that 
 70. It is quite usual for a course in public international law to begin with the 
overarching question: Is International Law really law like other kinds of law? I begin my 
class with a selection from the now classic book LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (2d 
ed. 1970), wherein he explores the various criticism routinely made of international law. 
Henkin ultimately defends international law by arguing that international lawyers will insist 
that  
critics of international law ask and answer the wrong questions. 
What matters is not whether the international system has legislative, 
judicial, or executive branches corresponding to those we have 
become accustomed to seek in a domestic society; what matters is 
whether international law is reflected in the policies of nations and in 
relations between nations.  
Id. at 26. See, e.g., ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-73 (2003); Anthony D’Amato, Is
International Law Really “Law”?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (1985) (“Many serious 
students of the law react with a sort of indulgence when they encounter the term 
‘international law,’ as if to say, ‘well, we know it isn’t really law, but we know that 
international lawyers and scholars have a vested professional interest in calling it law.’”) 
(emphasis in original); Elizabeth M. Bruch, Is International Law Really Law? Theorizing 
The Multi-Dimensionality of Law, 44 AKRON L. REV. 333 (2011). 
 71. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE 
L.J. 2599, 2631 (1997) (describing global decision-making as being made by a “complex 
rugby scrum of nation-states, intergovernmental organizations, regional compacts, 
nongovernmental organizations, and informal regimes and networks”); David J. Bederman, 
Law of the Land, Law of the Sea: The Lost Link Between Customary International Law and 
the General Maritime Law, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 299 (2011); ICISS, supra note 40, at 3-4 
(highlighting various non-governmental organizations and other new institutional actors on 
the international stage, including factional terrorist sects). 
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certain types of gross victimization will become far less frequent.72
Proscriptions against genocide, torture, and other forms of inhumane 
treatment are now broadly accepted as part of our international legal 
inheritance.73
As mentioned above, there remain many instances in which the victims 
of organized atrocities (perpetrated either by state actors or insurgent 
militias) are extremely vulnerable, the violence used against them is quite 
low tech and not particularly complicated to prevent or to end, and yet the 
international community stands back as this violence unfolds.74 In such 
 72. See generally, Dinah Shelton, International Human Rights Law: Principled, 
Double, or Absent Standards?, 25 LAW & INEQ. 467 (2007), for a discussion of the main 
purposes behind and weaknesses in international human rights law. 
 73. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
 74. The literature on this problem is voluminous and draws a set of unmistakable 
conclusions, mainly to the effect that much of the extreme mass violence against civilians 
taking place in recent years could have been prevented by a committed international 
community. See generally POWER, supra note 56, at 132-36 (recounting rejection of proposal 
by Senator George McGovern to intervene militarily in Cambodia to halt genocidal Khmer 
Rouge by Carter Administration.); id. at 142 (“Twelve divisions of Vietnamese infantry 
easily disposed of the Khmer Rouge regime, responsible for the death of approximately 1.7 
million Cambodians, in a matter of two weeks during the winter of 1979.”); id. at 283-84 
(contesting figures supplied by U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as to forces necessary to neutralize 
nationalist Serb forces in former Yugoslavia); id. at 367-68 (describing vast undersupply of 
manpower provided to Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire, head of United Nations 
peacekeeping forces in Rwanda, during summer of 1994) (“Dallaire insists that the well-
equipped 1,000 man European force sent into Rwanda to evacuate nationals, together with 
300 U.S. Marines stationed in nearby Burundi, would have sufficed to stop the genocidal 
advances of Hutu fighters, who were armed primarily with machetes and clubs.”); id. at 357 
(“Former Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman believes that, playing on the 
Clinton Administration’s fear of mission creep, U.S. military officials inflated these figures 
in order to avoid military intervention in Bosnia.”); RONAYNE, supra note 60, at 3 (noting 
preference of West to create postgenocide tribunals as opposed to a committed prevention 
policy); id. at 178 (noting presence of American, French and Indian forces in nearby African 
localities) (“More recently, atrocities committed in Sudan, Uganda, the Democratic Peoples’ 
Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic have raised criticism as to the 
effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions around the globe.”); ELIZABETH NEUFFER, THE 
KEY TO MY NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND RWANDA 49, 82 (1st ed. 
2002) (noting emboldening effect of unfulfilled NATO airstrike threats on decisions by Serb 
leaders to bomb Bosnian Muslim areas and enter U.N. safe area at Srebenica); L.R.
MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN RWANDA’S GENOCIDE (2000) 
(describing negligence and complicity of western powers and United Nations in Rwandan 
genocide); W. Michael Reisman, Prevention: Acting Before Victims Become Victims: 
Preventing and Arresting Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 57, 60-68 (2008) 
(relating abject failure of United States and international community to prevent genocide in 
Germany, Cambodia and Uganda). See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KILLINGS IN KIWANJA: THE 
UN’S INABILITY TO PROTECT CIVILIANS, 8-16, 22-25 ( 2008), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc1208web.pdf; CAR/DR Congo: LRA 
Conducts Massive Abduction Campaign, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 11, 2010), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/08/11/cardr-congo-lra-conducts-massive-abduction-
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cases, the term international law seems somewhat of an embarrassment.75 It 
can be painful to cover academic material that shows children in particular 
being mistreated in the most egregious fashion by militarily 
unsophisticated—and thus hardly invincible—groups during armed 
conflicts that often continue for years.76 In such instances, it would seem 
that both the rules and the ideals of the international community—reflecting 
what could be thought of as international constitutional law—should 
mandate an organized and effective response by that international 
community.77 This is generally not the case, however, as international law 
consistently fails to offer anything of immediate value to those most acutely 
in need of protection.78 This is more than a complaint directed at the 
campaign (reporting the abduction of approximately 700 adults and children for war and sex 
throughout Central African Republic and the northern DR Congo by Lord’s Resistance 
Army, and that only 1,000 out of the 19,000 U.N. peacekeeping troops assigned to the region 
were stationed within reach of the affected areas); Scott Baldauf, Mass Rape in Congo 
Reignites Questions on Efficacy of UN Force, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (Aug. 25, 2010) , 
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0825/Mass-rape-in-Congo-
reignites-questions-on-efficacy-of-UN-force (documenting mass rapes in eastern Congo of 
more than 150 women and children with U.N. peacekeepers stationed less than 20 miles 
away). 
 75. See Part II, supra.
 76. See U.N. Secretary General, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Rep. of the 
expert of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 24–27, U.N. Doc A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996) (by Graca 
Machel) [hereinafter Machel Report] (establishing link between rise in civilian warfare, 
displaced populations, and the use of child soldiers utilizing cheap, light weaponry); Timothy 
Webster, Babes With Arms: International Law and Child Soldiers, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 227 (2007) (recognizing that child soldiers are most likely to be engaged in prolonged, 
low-intensity conflicts characterized by fragmentation of armies and police forces and high 
civilian casualty losses). In 2007, author approximated that 300,000 child soldiers were 
actively engaged in combat. The figure of 300,000 children engaged in active combat is cited 
in numerous sources. See, e.g., id. at 231; AFUA TWUM-DANSO, AFRICA’S YOUNG SOLDIERS:
THE CO-OPTION OF CHILDHOOD, 9, (2003); COAL. TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS,
CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008, at 7, 9 (2008) [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS REPORT] 
(reporting that children were actively involved in armed conflict in government forces or 
non-state armed groups in 19 countries or territories between April 2004 and October 2007). 
 77. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 13-15 (1990) (noting transformation of 
idea of constitutional rights into a universal conception); U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55; United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 
24) (citing principles contained in U.N. Charter and those “fundamental” principles 
enumerated in Universal Declaration of Human Rights); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: CUSTOMARY INT’L LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 702 
cmt. a (1987) (listing genocide, murder, torture, and causing disappearance of individuals as 
“those human rights whose status as customary law is generally accepted”); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (listing those crimes outlawed as violating law of 
nations). 
 78. See MELVERN, supra note 74; POWER, supra note 56, at 369 (recounting Security 
Council vote to slash peacekeeping forces of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
amid slaughter in April 1994); Philipp Kastner, The ICC in Darfur—Savior or Spoiler?, 14 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 145, 147 (2007) (claiming the tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
were “too late to influence the conflict whilst the atrocities were being committed”); id. at 
146 (claiming that on the whole, the international community is “slow to react”). 
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systemic defects of international law enforcement, a type of analysis which 
has been presented repeatedly in recent decades.79 Rather, there is a strong 
argument to be made that abstract, academic claims regarding the reality 
and the effectiveness of international law should, as a matter of conscience, 
be scaled back.80 A more honest appraisal of the current capacities of 
international law could lead international policy makers to reconsider and 
redraft the pillars on which contemporary international law stands.81
The gap between international law rhetoric and reality has of course not 
gone unnoticed. A considerable number of writings, intended to 
demonstrate the gross disparity between the promises made by international 
law and its weak delivery of protection for civilians on the ground, feature 
stark, symbolically charged descriptions of particular atrocities.82 Across 
time and space—Cambodia, Iraq, the Balkans, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda, Darfur, Congo and Kyrgyzstan—there is no dearth of examples 
tailor-made for demonstrating the ineffectiveness of international law and 
the fecklessness of the international community when it comes to 
preventing fear, suffering, and slaughter.83 There are many advocates for a 
clear articulation of the view that the familiar failure of the international 
 79. See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 179 (explaining that states have begun to 
re-think “peace before justice” paradigm characterized by weak U.N. enforcement system); 
PATTISON, supra note 3, at 15 (portraying reality gap between international instruments 
aimed at protecting civilians in warfare and atrocities committed on ground); Jones, supra
note 33, at 108 (characterizing U.N. Charter as a woefully ineffective means of protecting 
human rights). 
80. Developments in the Law—International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 
1966 (2001) (stating that international law fails to meet its ambitions often enough to be 
considered illusory). See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 184 (offering support for 
“rejectionist” interpretation of U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 proposed by Professor Thomas 
Franck.); AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 185 (explaining the rejectionist approach argues 
that, due to the large disparity between what states “have been saying and…doing,” Article 
2(4) of the U.N. Charter—supposedly the pillar of our modern international legal order—has 
been rendered a legal fiction).  
 81. See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 188-94 (predicting emergence of a new 
international value hierarchy with new legal obligations and expanded bases for jus ad 
bellum). 
 82. See, e.g., POWER, supra note 56, at XI—XIII (depicting the scene of young 
children killed in bombing of Sarajevo); MELVERN, supra note 74, at 157-62 (describing 
scenes of corpses floating down Rwandan rivers, organized massacres held in churches and 
construction of mass grave sites); id. at 158 (describing that, in Rwanda, the entire 
population of Tutsi men were often exterminated in each village, with mothers and widows 
forced to dig their graves). Melvern tells the story of one survivor: “I will never forget the 
sight of my son pleading with me not to bury him alive . . . he kept trying to come out and 
was beaten back. And we had to keep covering the pit with earth until . . . there was no 
movement left.” Id.; Jones, supra note 33, at 97-98 (describing carnage of Sudan’s Darfuri 
landscape following attack by Janjaweed Arab militia forces).  
 83. See POWER, supra note 56, and accompanying text (noting failure of international 
community to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Congo, Darfur, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda). 
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community to respond in the face of mass atrocities is unacceptable.84 Such 
a theory would, by extension, demand that states take action to protect the 
vulnerable when they are under extreme threat—the so-called duty or 
responsibility to “protect,” discussed above.85 It has been forcefully argued 
that time and again the international community has stepped out of the way 
to allow torturers to get on with their business; time and again 
commentators have bemoaned the lack of action taken by anyone to prevent 
even the most unorganized, low tech, and internationally unimpressive 
tyrants from acting with total impunity against the defenseless.86 The 
geographical range across which this phenomenon has played out is 
striking; the fact that the international political reaction follows a more or 
less identical pattern raises intense concern; yet, the pattern persists.87
Despite a great deal of rhetoric to the contrary, international law remains 
overwhelmingly a system designed to protect the interests of sovereign 
states by ensuring stability of territorial boundaries and deterring outside 
“interference” within those boundaries.88 It continues to promise more than 
 84. See, e.g., PATTISON, supra note 3, at VIII (outlining the core framework of the 
responsibility to protect); Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and 
Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICT 
& SECURITY L. 191 (2008); Peter Stockburger, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: 
Customary International Law, An Emerging Legal Norm, or Just Wishful Thinking?, 5
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 365 (2010); Rebecca J. Hamilton, Recent Developments, 
The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine—But What of Implementation?, 
19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289 (2006); Emma McClean, The Responsibility to Protect: The Role 
of International Human Rights Law, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 123 (2008); Payandeh, 
supra note 31, at 469. 
 85. ICISS, supra note 40, at VII (setting forth criteria necessary prior to military 
intervention in humanitarian crises); Samantha Power, The Void: Why the Movement Needs 
Help, NEW REPUBLIC, May 15, 2006, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-
events/news/commentary/the-void-why-the-movement-needs-help (describing objectives and 
accomplishments of American movement to end genocide in Sudan). 
 86. MELVERN, supra note 74, at 227-33 (capturing lack of political will among 
Western and African leaders); POWER, supra note 56, at XIV-XVII (noting consistency of 
U.S. responses to cases of genocide throughout 20th century).  
 87. POWER, supra note 56, at XIV-XVII; MELVERN, supra note 74, at 5 (explaining 
organized nature of genocide). 
 88. STEVEN L. BURG & PAUL S. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ETHNIC 
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 10 (1999) (commenting on domination of 
realist principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity over international human rights 
enforcement); A Problem from Hell: A Conversation with Samantha Power, Part 1, GOOGLE 
VIDEOS (Mar. 2, 2007), http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2209257471900990711 
(noting inconsistent application of sovereignty as both a sword for and a shield against calls 
for unilateral humanitarian intervention); Payandeh, supra note 31, at 487 (describing tension 
between sovereignty and human rights regime); AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 40, 58, 
114, 136 (justice over peace, rejection of limited collective security). ); Tesón, supra note 33, 
at 371 (“The rise of collective humanitarian intervention and the shrinking of traditional 
concept[s] of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are essential for the preservation of peace 
. . . . Conversely, if we lose the battle for democracy and human rights, we necessarily lose 
the battle for peace and security. . . . [T]he gradual dilution of state sovereignty is . . . a moral 
imperative.”).  
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it can deliver to the world’s people and often operates primarily in the realm 
of assertion.89 At the highest levels of international institution building, this 
image of international law as unresponsive in the face of mass atrocities has 
undergone some repair work in the form of a large number of “post-conflict 
criminal tribunals.”90 However, as these tribunals generally proceed with 
prosecutions after the atrocities have occurred, and as there is generally 
little, if any, prior accompanying intervention in the ongoing slaughter, it is 
possible to see these forums as largely symbolic constructs, providing 
international lawyers with the sense that they are doing something 
meaningful to deter mass violence against civilians.91 More darkly, they can 
be seen as designed to give international lawyers a professional role in 
world affairs.92 This nexus of after-the-fact activity we might call the
pseudo-effective face of contemporary international law. Because they do 
not touch upon the precipitating events directly, these tribunals provide no 
substitute for action that might have been taken to stop the many waves of 
violence directed at civilians.  
 89. See, e.g., Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 81, 115 (1991) (“[I]nternational law is merely a particular type of discourse 
about international social life. It is a method of conversation that states have chosen to 
follow. To some it is a conversation entirely without content.”). See also JACK L. GOLDSMITH 
& ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2005). 
 90. See generally Ellis, supra note 16 (reviewing several major conflict zones during 
the past 25 years); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S FIRST YEARS (2008) [hereinafter COURTING HISTORY],
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62135/section/1 (examining accomplishments and 
shortcomings of ICC since its opening in 2003). 
 91. The performance of the ICTY is but one example. In 2011, out of the 126 
concluded cases, only 64 were convicted, the rest either being acquitted, dead, transferred to 
a regional jurisdiction or had their indictments withdrawn. See Avery Capstone as to most 
prominent complaints with regards to ICTY, including unclear mandate and poor victim-
witness services. See also ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR CRIMES AND THE PROMISE OF 
JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE (2005). See NEUFFER, supra note 74, at 129-31, 256-57, 428, 437, 
443. See generally Hans Peter-Kaul, Construction Site for More Justice: The International 
Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 370 (2005) (describing functions of 
Office of the Prosecutor at ICC, activities conducted in first years of existence); id. at 380 
(The United Nations Security Council took three years to refer the ongoing genocide in 
Sudan to the International Criminal Court); COURTING HISTORY, supra note 90 (In its first 
five years of existence, the International Criminal Court issued 12 public arrest warrants, id.
at 4; only four of the alleged perpetrators have been brought into ICC custody. Id. The ICC’s 
first ever trial, against Thomas Lubanga, was suspended because of the prosecution’s 
inability to disclose to the court potentially exculpatory information. Id. at 5); International
Criminal Court ‘Altered Behaviour’—UN, BBC NEWS.COM (May31, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10196907 (“So far no one has been convicted of alleged war 
crimes.”). 
 92. Interview by Patrick Smith with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC (Sept. 
21, 2009), available at http://www.theafricareport.com/index.php/200909213281793/news-
analysis/interview-luis-moreno-ocampo-icc-prosecutor-3281793.html (discussing progress in 
establishing an “international criminal justice system”). Moreno-Ocampo states that “Armies 
all over the world are adjusting to [the ICC].” Id.
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A certain amoral, professionalized version of justice is contained in the 
vision of international criminal tribunals, insofar as they exist in isolation 
from the more urgent question of how to prevent mass rape, torture, and 
killing from happening before they occur.93 It is certainly problematic for us 
to teach students that international justice exists primarily in the tribunal,
disregarding the general lack of an international response to events giving 
rise to the creation of that tribunal.94
Some have characterized what we call international law as more akin to 
religion or moralistic teaching—insofar as the basic logic of law qua law 
requires an enforcement arm that to some degree corresponds to the letter of 
the law itself.95 This debate over the validity of international law is as old as 
the discipline itself.96 While controversy over whether a particular national 
act is “contrary to international law” or not may at times seem sterile and 
meaningless, states do continue to engage in these arguments and so treat 
the imprimatur of international law as having some ultimate importance.97
 93. Id.
 94. For more philosophical doubts and dissatisfactions arising from efforts to 
prosecute perpetrators of large-scale killings and other war crimes, see Mark J. Osiel, Why 
Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 118 (2000). See Donna 
E. Arzt, Views of the Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal Tribunals in 
the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS, AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 226,
230 (2006) for more practical considerations as to the effectiveness of war crime tribunals; 
see James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities 
Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2009) (critiquing potential of ICC to 
prevent humanitarian atrocities); Richard Ashby Wilson, Judging History: The Historical 
Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 
908, 922 (2005). 
 95. See, e.g., Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 6 (2006) (highlighting and explaining the 
enforcement gap and suggesting a new approach is necessary, while stating “traditional 
approaches to enforcement . . . are inadequate to meet the challenge of effectively realizing 
human rights in the twenty-first century”); Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human 
Rights Committee: An Argument for De-Marginalizing Enforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 211 (1998). 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 32 (listing criticisms of modern 
international legal system); HENKIN, supra note 77, at 1-5 (tracing the history of the role of 
sovereignty throughout international law). 
 97. Again, academic and popular literature on those criteria necessary to support a 
rule of customary international law, and the application of international law to specific acts 
by members of the international community is voluminous. See, e.g., TERRY NARDIN, LAW,
MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1983) (reviewing opposing positions on what is 
international law); Roberts, supra, note 36 (attempting to reconcile “traditional” and 
“modern” approaches to creating customary international law); Victor Kattan, The Legality 
of the West Bank Wall: Israel’s High Court of Justice v. The International Court of Justice,
40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1425 (2007) (discussing the debate over the wall’s legal status 
and comparing contradictory court rulings between the High Court of Israel and the ICJ); 
Anguel Anastassov, Are Nuclear Weapons Illegal? The Role of Public International Law and
the International Court of Justice, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 65 (2010) (outlining the 
debate of whether nuclear weapons are illegal under customary international law). Compare
Leon Sheleff, The Application of Israeli Law to the Golan Heights Is Not Annexation, 20
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On the other hand, the fact that enhanced norms of actual enforcement 
cannot develop without something akin to the clear consent of at least most 
nations would suggest that the international community is likely to go on 
wringing its hands in the face of even the most egregious violations of its 
supposedly non-derogable principles.98 The international law-making 
apparatus functions, if at all, like an unwieldy town meeting, with each bloc 
of participants holding the veto.99 Adoption of cost-free (because abstract) 
norms is attractive; adoption of implementing mechanisms and duties to act 
is much more problematic and nearly impossible to achieve in a still largely 
consensus—and consent—based system.100
Given the amount of time spent by legal scholars and diplomats arguing 
over the status of particular “pieces” of international law (is it yet customary 
international law, is it jus cogens?), it is discouraging to witness those 
instances where disputation over norms evaporates in the face of a violent 
reality.101 United Nations peacekeepers are often associated with such 
lapses—such as in the massacre of Srebrenica and in the Rwandan 
genocide.102 In Rwanda most dramatically, it quickly became clear that the 
role of the U.N. was to get the Europeans and Americans out, while leaving 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 333 (1994), with Asher Maoz, The Application of Israeli Law to the 
Golan Heights Is Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355 (1994). See also Iraq War Illegal, 
Says Annan, BBC NEWS.COM (Sept. 16, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3661134.stm 
(capturing thoughts of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan with respect to U.S.-led 
coalition’s invasion of Iraq). 
 98. See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 136-37 (noting that U.N. Charter 
prohibition on unilateral intervention is authoritative and controlling despite past cases of 
humanitarian intervention); Malone, supra note 29 (questioning whether, due to lack of 
precedent, states should be barred from intervening in order to prevent or mitigate 
environmental and humanitarian disasters). Compare Jones, supra note 33, at 105-06 
(bemoaning the inability to create Security Council precedent for humanitarian intervention 
so long as China and Russia continue to exercise veto power in such instances), with Roberts, 
supra note 36, at 136-37 (stating belief of some international lawyers that NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo will establish a right to unilateral intervention). 
 99. See Roberts, supra note 36, at 28, 38 (citing Security Council veto power as one 
impediment to creation of certain international norms). 
 100. See Philip Alston and Bruno Simma, The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1992) 
(recognizing that, for some writers, the notion of “state practice” has turned into “paper 
practice”: “words, texts, votes and excuses” that contradict the external actions (or inaction) 
of states).  
 101. See generally Roberts, supra note 36 (attempting to reconcile traditional and 
modern forms of customary international law into coherent theory with which to move 
forward). 
 102. POWER, supra note 56, at 361 (describing bitter divide within U.N. Security 
Council over whether to term events taking place in Rwanda during the spring and summer 
of 1994 as “genocide”); id. at 406-30 (describing deliberate efforts by Clinton administration 
to avoid intervening in Bosnia despite reports of mass killings at Srebenica). 
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the incredulous Rwandans to their fate.103 It is apparent that the real sin in 
those cases was one of omission, and that it was the failure of militarily 
capable states to provide effective protection that led directly to the larger 
tragedy.104 As for the U.N., the image of those in the blue helmets stepping 
back while slaughter was being planned and executed was not only 
troublesome, but, in light of the fact that the U.N. represents the 
“international community” and its endless wrangling over international law 
norms, the ultimate irony.105
A. How International Law Gets Made 
In many ways, international law can hardly be called a legal system at 
all, except for the persistence of legal scholars in doing so.106 An especially 
challenging aspect of international law is that its evolving norms—that is to 
say, its very substantive content—is driven by both the consent and practice 
of sovereign states.107 Westphalian notions of sovereignty impede the 
development of international law along cleaner, more coherent lines.108
While no legal system is immune from irrationality, these defects are 
especially characteristic of international law.109 The conceptual dominance 
of sovereignty and its concomitant notion of state consent leave certain 
egregious violations unaddressed. This is true whenever there is a failure by 
 103. Id. at 352-53 (relating commands from head of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations 
Kofi Annan to General Dallaire with regards to maintaining neutrality and evacuating foreign 
nationals). 
 104. At the height of the Rwandan genocide in April-May, Dallaire’s forces were 
reduced from 2,500 to 2,100 and finally to 270 following U.N. Security Council 
authorization. POWER, supra note 56, at 352-53.  
 105. It is a matter of great interest that, as of this writing, the Security Council has 
decided (Russia, China, Brazil, India and Germany abstaining) to give approval to a no fly 
zone in Libya to protect Libyan rebels seeking the end of the Qaddafi regime. Far from 
indicating a sea change in international views of humanitarian intervention, one issue being 
heatedly discussed in what makes this conflict different from so many that have been 
essentially ignored by the international community. One factor that cannot be overlooked, of 
course, is the importance of Libyan oil and general strategic significance. Richard Falk, In 
Libya, Decoding an Uncertain Future, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/201182885646839710.html 
106. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether 
International Law is Law, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451 (2010); Murphy, supra note 32 
(attempting to identify the contemporary norms governing resort to war); ORFORD, supra 
note 70, at 72 (stating that international law appears to lack the familiar institutions of 
domestic law, and questioning whether international law is really law at all). 
 107. See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
41-45 (2006) (listing state and international judicial practice as one factor in identifying 
peremptory norms).  
 108. See Louis Henkin, That ‘S’ Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human 
Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999), for a discussion on the inapplicability of 
Westphalian notions of sovereignty to an increasing number of arenas—including 
international human rights, corporate responsibility and cyberspace. 
 109. See generally debate discussed in note 44, supra.
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states either to arrive at consensus as to the appropriate response or, more 
fundamentally, as to the nature of the unfolding events.110
On the one hand, ordinary “customary international law” is created 
through a process of broad state practice over time, combined with so-called 
opinio juris—the belief by the state that it is adhering to a rule because the 
rule is legally binding upon it. That is to say, the state believes the rule to 
reflect what the law really is (as opposed to merely a good or moral idea).111
This somewhat fanciful formulation reflects the implicit resistance of 
international lawyers to the accusation that international norms rest on a 
merely prescriptive sense of fairness, propriety, or global goodness. Outside 
of treaties and ordinary custom, there is another uber layer of rules, based 
upon the notion that jus cogens or peremptory norms are so basic, so 
fundamental, that it can be assumed no state would or could reject them.112
Such norms are non-derogable; they are inherently and unequivocally 
binding. It is often said that this branch of modern international law is based 
upon natural law, to the extent that as a source of rules, jus cogens norms 
are moral, right, and unquestionably beneficial. One problem, however, is 
that this “peremptory” quality extends only to the norm and not to its means 
of enforcement—which is often all but non-existent. A further problem is 
that this higher status of non-derogable norms means that there is a deep 
reluctance on the part of international and national tribunals to acknowledge 
or identify such norms.113 To the extent that jus cogens is a powerful term, it 
is only reluctantly affirmed.  
 110. See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 128-36 (arguing that norm prohibiting 
humanitarian intervention to remove tyrants is authoritative and controlling based on 
rejection of theory by states); id., at 136 (detailing Professor Tesón’s observations regarding 
this argument: “There must be something deeply wrong with an international legal system 
that protects tyrants like [Idi] Amin”); Scott Straus, Darfur and the Genocide Debate, 84 
FOREIGN AFF. 123, 125, (2005); Joyce Apsel, On Our Watch: The Genocide Convention and 
the Deadly, Ongoing Case of Darfur and Sudan, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 53, 54-55 (2008) (“[A] 
significant amount of time and energy was spent on debates over whether or not events in 
Darfur were ‘genocide’ and if the Genocide Convention applied, on recommendations to the 
Security Council, and on official and public condemnations—none of which stopped the 
momentum of escalating violence.”).  
 111. See Roberts, supra note 36, at 758-61 (introducing concept of opinio juris). 
 112. See id. at 761-63 for a discussion on the difference between legal (prescriptive) 
and moral (normative) imperatives to act and explaining difference between prescriptive, 
descriptive and normative actions. 
 113. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 107, at 545-50 (noting incorporation of jus 
cogens into national decisions in Israel, Britain and United States). Both the Eichmann and 
Pinochet cases are pivotal to the current debate over jus cogens crimes. In the United States, 
a growing body of law centered on delineating the limits of jus cogens and customary 
international law has emerged under the Alien Torts Claims Act, originally passed in 1798. 
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (ruling that illegal detention of 
defendant did not amount to a breach under law of nations); Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent 
Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 
238 (2d Cir 1995) (setting forth basis for an adequate pleading alleging violations of law of 
nations). 
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Several extraordinary facts about the formation of international law come 
together here: international law is still based largely on the consent of 
sovereign states—whether in treaty law or in the creation of customary 
international law, the latter involving a process that is less explicit and more 
mysterious than adoption of treaty obligations.114 A special class of super 
norms, the jus cogens norms, having to do with egregious violations of 
human rights, may be asserted without a full demonstration of state 
consent—or less provocatively, may be treated as so obvious to all that the 
process of demonstrating state consent becomes inherently irrelevant.115 On 
the other hand, even where jus cogens norms are recognized (and it has 
been pointed out that tribunals are reluctant to acknowledge the existence of 
these norms without a very firm foundation for doing so) the means of norm 
enforcement may nonetheless remain largely undeveloped.116 Despite these 
contradictions, international law scholars and international lawyers continue 
to assert that international law is law; it is not morality or secular religion 
but rather law as any other law, albeit with its own specialized 
characteristics.117
I have suggested that the gap between the promise and reality of 
international law is most obvious where an extremely vulnerable set of 
victims could with relative ease be saved by the international community, 
but where the international community conspicuously fails to act.118 This 
puts those insisting that international law is law—and as such guarantees a 
 114. Of the controversial nature of customary international law, British Diplomat 
Anthony Aust states:  
[T]here is no agreement on the criteria for identifying which norms 
of general international law have a peremptory [jus cogens] character 
. . . . Perhaps the only generally accepted example is the prohibition 
on the use of force as laid down in the UN Charter. The prohibitions 
on genocide, slavery and torture may also be said to be jus cogens . . 
. . [b]ut it would be rash to assume that all prohibitions contained in 
human rights treaties are jus cogens, or even part of customary 
international law.  
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 257 (2000).  
 115. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (listing those crimes 
outlawed as violating law of nations). 
 116. See Sloan, supra note 9, at 84-85 (indicating that current international system 
geared not towards accomplishing justice but rather non-intervention); c.f. Alexander, supra
note 94, at 5, 19-22 (assessing the relationship between the ICC and the United States and 
explaining complementarity doctrine). See id. at 5 (stating President Bush famously 
“unsigned” the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court in 2005); id. at 19 
(“ICC jurisdiction operates according to the complementarity doctrine, under which the 
Court will not exercise jurisdiction over a case unless the State(s) with original jurisdiction is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”). 
 117. See HENKIN, supra note 77, at 25-29 (arguing, essentially, that substance of 
international law should take precedence over form). 
 118. See supra notes 5, 7, 9, 10, 13 and accompanying text (suggesting inability of 
international legal system to create an enforceable set of rules governing responses to 
genocide and other atrocities committed by state and non-state actors). 
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certain minimum level of humanitarian protection—in a very uncomfortable 
position, necessitating intellectual gymnastics to preserve the fiction that 
this is indeed recognizably law, as opposed to aspiration. This pressure to 
vindicate the effectiveness and enforcement capability of international law 
in real time accounts, it can be argued, for the intense professional interest 
in structures like the International Criminal Court.119 International criminal 
tribunals in particular create a good deal of rhetorically pleasing 
“accountability,” by “ending impunity” and the like, whereas all of this 
legal activity generally takes place after numerous barbaric events have 
played out on the ground.120
IV. THE ULTRA-VULNERABLE AND A CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
This article has argued that claims of international law effectiveness have 
been consistently undermined by the failure of international law to provide 
basic guarantees of safety for the ultra vulnerable. One example of this 
global cohort of the “ultra-vulnerable” are children caught up in brutal, 
though generally low tech, civil wars. Since the adoption of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in 1989,121 it has 
been often stated that children are now the holders of their own rights;122
 119. See Alexander, supra note 94, at 19-20 (discussing the ability of ICC to enforce 
international criminal laws); Smith, supra note 92 (discussing prospect of prosecuting and 
convicting various alleged war criminals). 
 120. See generally Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal 
Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001) (arguing that ICTY and ICTR 
have contributed to peace-building in post-war societies by introducing international criminal 
accountability). But see STOVER, supra note 91, at 142-45 (summarizing thoughts of ICTY 
witnesses on international criminal tribunal process and sentences received by convicted 
criminals). See also id. at 142 (discussing that, in addition to certain, surprisingly-short 
prison sentences handed down by the ICTY, it is clear that the work of international criminal 
tribunals can in no way substitute for intervention into and prevention of horrific war 
crimes). 
 121. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter UNCRC]. 
 122. Earlier child rights documents focus simply on economic and social needs of the 
child delivered through the parent or family. Compare Declaration of Geneva, League of 
Nations Doc. A.127 (1924); Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 14 
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354, arts. 25, 26 (Nov. 20, 1959); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), arts. 23, 24, 
21, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
arts. 10, 21 U.N.GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966), 
with Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 12, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25, at 167 (Nov. 20, 1989) 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming 
his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all 
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
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they are no longer to be seen as appendages of the family or community.123
While there is no clear consensus on the hierarchy of rights within 
children’s rights as found in the UNCRC, it is apparent that there is 
something distinct and instinctual about the impulse to protect children from 
unnecessary suffering. To the extent that children are unable to analyze or 
influence their own fates to any appreciable degree, it falls to others—the 
non-children among us—to protect them from harm whenever possible. 
This responsibility to protect falls in obvious ways on families, communities 
and states, as well as on the international community. Failure to react 
effectively to the suffering of children may be seen as a particularly 
egregious form of indifference. 
In the late 1990s, Graca Machel described the chilling reality that civil 
conflicts raging in many parts of the post-Cold War world were not only 
dangerous and violent for children; in fact, these conflicts took as their 
specific objective terrorizing children through extreme forms of exploitation 
and brutalization.124 Targeting children as a means of intimidating 
communities had become a principal technique of waging war in the 
1990s.125 The damage was no longer incidental but instead intentionally 
directed at children. Territory could be controlled; villages could be cowed 
through a raw demonstration of power that eschewed any pre-existing 
notion to the effect that, even in warfare, there should be a bare minimum of 
humanistic behavior in the form of child protection.126 In the decade that 
followed publication of her report, a number of conflicts seemed to unfold 
according to the Machel playbook: children were raped, tortured, and killed 
and were also made to engage in this kind of behavior.127 Nothing short of 
the most brutalizing forms of indoctrination would do.128 Anti-government 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the 
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with 
the procedural rules of national law. 
Id. 
 123. See Maria Grahn-Farley, Foreword: Crossing Borders, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 657, 
659 (2002) (“The CRC is a unique human rights treaty, not only in its universality, but also 
in its paradigmatic shift from looking at the child as a passive object based on her needs to 
looking at the child as an active subject and bearer of her own rights.”). 
 124. Machel Report, supra note 76, ¶ 3.  
 125. Id.
 126. Id.
 127. See Baldauf, supra note 75.  
 128. See BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL REPORTING, Uganda’s Silent War (Dec. 20, 
2008), YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2008), at: 1:05/36:19,
http://www.youtube.com/user/TheBIRorg#p/u/20/j8ZxHQLA0ww (interviewing several 
children who were forced to brutally kill and rape other children in Uganda); DeNeen L. 
Brown, A Child’s Hell in the Lord’s Resistance Army, WASH. POST, May 10, 2006, at C1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/09/AR20060
50901907.html.
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militias, well aware of their own weakness in conventional terms, used 
children to augment their power through the sheer terror they could call 
forth in civilian populations by such systematic abuse.129 Destruction of the 
deepest human instinct to protect the very young became a weapon of war.  
While perhaps an obvious point, it should be noted that children and 
their immediate relatives have borne the brunt of this reality themselves. 
The U.N. may use its descriptive outlets to raise awareness of the problem, 
but the terror brought to bear against children has been experienced within 
particular communities.130 Those who make law and policy to address these 
situations do not themselves undergo any of the adverse effects. Much of 
this post-Cold War civil warfare has been extremely unsophisticated in 
military terms. There is little question about the inability of violent militias 
to stand up to the military power of any modern, organized army. 
Nevertheless, a striking characteristic of these conflicts is that they have 
continued in some cases literally for years, leading to tens of thousands of 
deaths.131
One of the most extreme examples of children being allowed to suffer 
needlessly was that of the Ugandan “night walkers,” children who had to 
sleep collectively in order to avoid being kidnapped or killed when in their 
homes. Many had to walk long distances every night in order to find safety 
in numbers at some common location.132 This nightly ritual went on for 
several years during a prolonged period of intense violence perpetrated by 
Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. As far as 
“evidence” is concerned, it is a simple matter to find video depictions of 
these children, marching joylessly out from their homes each night to 
shelter in overcrowded, dirty, and depressing buildings where they could 
 129. CHILD SOLDIERS REPORT, supra note 76. 
 130. See Ilene Cohn, The Protection of Children in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping 
Processes, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 129 (1999) (Despite increased international attention to 
and awareness of children’s rights, children are largely overlooked in the peacemaking and 
peacekeeping process. Rules of engagement for peacekeepers disregard children, and 
reconstruction and reconciliation programs that emerge from negotiations ignore the 
differential impact on and particular needs of children. The effect is to marginalize persistent 
problems like the rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers and, more broadly, to miss 
the opportunity to address widespread systemic problems common to war-torn societies.); 
Brown, supra note 128.  
 131. See, e.g., TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND 
THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY 64-65 (2006) (chronicling the atrocities in Uganda as 
including forcing children to kill their own parents, crushing babies’ and toddlers’ skulls or 
throwing them into fires, mutilating innocent civilians, and abducting and forcing girls and 
young women into sexual slavery). 
 132. See The Oprah Winfrey Show: Humanitarian Crisis, Harpo Productions, (Apr. 
26, 2006), available at http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/Humanitarian-Crisis/2; Jeevan
Vasagar, The Nightwalkers, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 10, 2006, § G2, at 10, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/feb/10/uganda.jeevanvasagar; John Goddard, 
Uganda’s Night Walkers, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 14, 2006, at A03, available at Westlaw, 
2006 WLNR 4226010. 
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attain some basic safety in numbers.133 Because of the brutal nature of the 
militia members’ behavior,134 the communities from which the children 
came could no longer protect them; they had no choice but to let their 
children go out on these forced marches each night. In the face of this 
prolonged and supremely unnecessary suffering (as compared, for instance, 
with the vexed situation of human rights violations in strong, heavily armed, 
totalitarian states like Burma or North Korea), it is hard to accept the fact 
that the international community took no organized steps to stop it—yet that 
is the case.135 News outlets could readily find the children and film them in 
their nightly misery, yet the international community could find no real, 
practical solution, even over the course of many years.  
Joseph Kony did not represent a state, and his military band numbered 
only in the hundreds. As military forces go, his was weak and 
unimpressive.136 It is not difficult to imagine ways in which the international 
community could have taken some direct action against Kony, such that he 
would have been at least deterred from his brutal crusade. Dozens of reports 
and studies were issued, and Kony’s outrages against the people of Northern 
Uganda were exhaustively detailed.137 However, as his actions were allowed 
by the international community to continue indefinitely, tens of thousands 
of refugees entered substandard government-run camps, and where villagers 
did remain in their home places, the children kept walking each night to 
comparative safety.138 Ugandan government-run refugee camps were 
notorious in their own way for violence and a generally dismal quality of 
life.139
 133. See, e.g., Journeyman Pictures, Abduction—Uganda, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2003), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kft07dZLpks.  
 134. See generally ALLEN, supra note 131.  
 135. Payam, Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of 
the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J INT’L L. 403, 404 
(2005) (describing the international community as “aloof” regarding the crisis in Uganda.); 
id. (“Given the absence of any vital national interests, influential states have not been 
inclined either to pressure Sudan to stop harboring the LRA or to help government forces 
confront the insurgents. Instead, the burden was placed on Uganda to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement with a ruthless, cult-like insurgency.”). 
 136. ALLEN, supra note 131, at 40.
 137. See e.g., Uprooted and Forgotten, HUM. RTS, WATCH (Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/03/16/uprooted-and-forgotten; As If We Weren’t 
Human, HUM. RTS, WATCH (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/08/26/if-
we-weren-t-human. 
 138. ALLEN, supra note 131, at 53-54; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced
Persons, ¶1, Statement Submitted by Caritas Internationalis et al., U.N. Doc 
E/CN.4/2006/NGO/174 (Feb. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ECOSOC] (estimating the number of 
displaced persons at 1.7 million). 
 139. ALLEN, supra note 131, at 53-54. See also Abducted and Abused, HUM. RTS,
WATCH (July 14, 2003), http://www.hrw.org/en/node/12306/section/7; Uprooted and 
Forgotten, supra note 137.
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It is interesting that Joseph Kony is being sought by the Ugandan 
government, with the assistance of other governments,140so that he can be 
sent to prosecution to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. 
International lawyers are profoundly interested in the ICC, which has been 
active since 2002. In that time, the Court has spent “half a billion euros”141
and issued warrants for only a small number of criminal defendants.142
International prosecutions of war criminals have been controversial in 
countries where years of civil conflict have left the local populations 
decimated by violence and hunger. In the case of Uganda, there has been 
great fear that Kony’s flight from ICC prosecution could prolong and even 
revive the conflict.143 International law has been bullish on the creation of 
post-conflict tribunals; it has, by ironic contrast, been timid and resistant on 
the question of armed humanitarian intervention.144 In Uganda, as in other 
conflict situations, prosecuting militia leaders has often been debated in the 
context of peace-at-all-costs versus “justice,” as if the mere fact of criminal 
prosecution after many years of neglected conflict aptly represented 
justice.145 This article will not revisit the broader debate over the desirability 
of peace versus justice, one of the grand themes of academic writing on 
“transitional justice.” However, one aspect of justice must surely be to
prevent suffering where possible, and in such conflicts, prevention appears 
to be far more possible than the reaction of the international community has 
indicated. In this sense, we might posit a responsibility to intervene where 
there is a likelihood of success—that is, where there would be no significant 
countervailing threat to international peace and security arising from the 
intervention. 
 140. See generally Caroline Ayugi & Peter Eichstraedt, The ICC Wants Joseph Kony 
Leader of the Lords Resistance Army (May 23, 2008), 
http://miafarrownews.blogspot.com/2008/05/icc-wants-joseph-kony-leader-of-lords.html; Joe 
Bavier, Waiting for the Americans: Dungu, PULTIZER CTR. ON CRISIS REPORTING (Sept. 10, 
2010), http://pulitzercenter.org/blog/untold-stories/waiting-americans-dungu.  
 141. See Press Release, ICC Watch, The ICC: Half a Billion Euros, For What?, (Mar. 
3, 2010), available at http://www.iccwatch.org/pdf/Press%20Release%203Mar10.pdf.  
 142. See All Cases, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2011) (detailing the “situations” in which the ICC is involved). 
 143. Josefine Volqvartz, ICC under Fire over Uganda Probe, CNN (Feb. 23, 2005), 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/02/23/uganda.volqvartz (quoting Jan Egeland, 
U.N. humanitarian emergency coordinator, characterizing/describing? the conflict as “one of 
the world’s most neglected crises”). 
 144. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: WHY ACCOUNTABILITY 
MATTERS FOR PEACE 35- 92 (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0709webwcover_3.pdf.  
 145. Compare Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC, Address at Building a Future 
on Peace and Justice International Conference (June 25, 2007), available at
http://www.peace-justice-conference.info/download/speech%20moreno.pdf, with Lucy Hovil 
& Joanna R. Quinn, Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda 50-
52 (Refugee Law Project, Working Paper No. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.refugeelawproject.org/working_papers/RLP.WP17.pdf.pdf 
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A. International Lawyers, the Nuremberg Illusion and International 
Criminal Tribunals 
Since international law is relatively strong on norm production (even 
taking into account constraints on the development of norms demanded by 
the methods of customary international law, as described above) and 
extremely weak on enforcement and implementation, this leaves an 
unsatisfying state of affairs for international lawyers. Lawyers with a public 
international portfolio resist the idea that international law is merely 
exhortation or moralizing, and seek wherever possible to establish 
equivalence between international law and “real” law.146 Since military 
action carried out to protect the vulnerable from violations of their 
international rights would demand intense political advocacy, and entail at 
least some risks in implementation, international lawyers have turned 
instead to a formalized, ritualized version of norm enforcement—the 
international criminal trial. Recent international criminal tribunals have 
been based loosely on the “Nuremberg” model—the trial of Nazi war 
criminals after the allied victory World War II.147 The authors of the 
Nuremberg judgment took pains to convince an international audience that 
the criminal trials were not merely manifestations of victors’ justice, but 
represented the collective will of the international community, applying real 
law to real criminal defendants.148 The difference between Nuremberg and 
the more recent tribunals, of course, is that in World War II real armies first 
took on the Nazis, and the criminal trials took place only after the war had 
been won through actual intervention of the strongest kind—not after the 
war had been allowed to simply “run its course.”149 Rulings of the 
international tribunals set up in the wake of conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone have all been extensively mined for 
nuggets of international criminal law.150 Such jurisprudential views, 
 146. See Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the Founders, 
Framers, and Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law of 
Nations, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205 (2008). 
 147. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 193, 205 (2d 
ed. 2001) (discussing the ICTY and ICTR as having principle origins from, and similarities 
with, Nuremburg). 
 148. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL 
MEMOIR 42 (1992). 
 149. Simpson, supra note 17, at 805 (“In the absence of a uniform and global 
approach, the trials of war criminals have generally occurred only where defeat and 
criminality coincide.”); see id. at 809 (noting that the ICC was “designed to be operative 
during times of peace when distinctions [of winners and losers] are meaningless.”). 
 150. See id. at 808-09; Akhavan, supra note 120, at 9 (“The empirical evidence 
suggests that the ICTY and the ICTR have significantly contributed to peace building in 
postwar societies, as well as to introducing criminal accountability into the culture of 
international relations.”).  
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however, reflect the situation after brutal conflict has subsided and after 
thousands have suffered and died who might have been protected from that 
fate had international law forthrightly embraced a doctrine like 
humanitarian intervention and/or the responsibility to protect. There may 
well be situations in which nations are fearful of huge investments in blood 
and treasure, and ultimate lack of success, but with respect to many 
conflicts, it would seem that relatively modest involvement by outside 
forces to stop bloodshed, if not to topple governments or engage in nation 
building, might have yielded significant results.151 And yet, such efforts are 
only rarely made.152
The debate over whether international law allows for unilateral or even 
group humanitarian intervention is real and vibrant, if often overly technical 
in nature.153 However, it is treated as an arcane and generally non-urgent 
question to be sorted out over a very long timeline of real-world events and 
academic writing. Interest in international criminal tribunals is far less 
ambiguous, however. International lawyers engage fully with the idea of 
international criminal tribunals, set up under the auspices of the 
international community.154 International crimes are parsed, the relevant 
criminals identified, and the proper procedures pondered. The ICC, for all 
the academic analysis it has engendered, has spent a huge amount of money 
and only brought a handful of defendants to trial as of this writing.155 Yet, 
its chief prosecutor has insisted that the mere fact of its existence will 
“change the world” and act as the ultimate deterrent, even for the type of 
incorrigible war criminal involved in brutal civil wars.156 However 
implausible that claim, this is the belief that drives interest in the 
international criminal tribunals and sustains belief in the relatively inactive 
ICC. 
There is nothing inherently objectionable about the establishment of 
international criminal tribunals. Indeed, the proliferation of these tribunals is 
often cited as a sign that the enforcement aspect of international law is 
 151. GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS, HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 224, 228
(1995).
 152. As mentioned in the first part of this article, the recent Libyan intervention by 
NATO seems to be the exception that proves the rule. While the ostensible justification for 
involvement in Libya is the danger posed to civilians by the Tripoli regime, it must be noted 
that similar dangers in other countries have remained unaddressed for years. Certainly the 
presence of large quantities of oil, and Libya’s consequent geopolitical importance, cannot be 
ignored.  
 153. See Nikolai Krylov, Humanitarian Intervention: Pros and Cons, 17 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 365 (1995).  
 154. See Ellis, supra note 16, at 120 (“The statutes reflect a belief that the creation of 
international war crimes tribunals will ensure respect for and enforcement of international 
justice, and a determination that grave breaches of international humanitarian law will not go 
unpunished.”). 
 155. See Press Release, supra note 141. 
 156. See generally Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 145. 
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becoming more credible.157 U.S. failure to participate in the treaty 
establishing the ICC is taken, by contrast, as an indication of U.S. resistance 
to the encroachment of international law on U.S. military activities.158 What 
is troublesome, however, is that international lawyers appear to endorse this 
over-emphasis on criminal tribunals, by contrast to the at best anemic 
response to real-time rape and slaughter of vulnerable populations, even by 
low tech, poorly armed, and disorganized bands of marauding militias.159
The mobilization of legal elites around the idea of international tribunals 
gives rise to an uncomfortable suspicion that international legal scholars are 
mistaking norm creation and abstract prosecution for effective intervention 
or at least substituting norm analysis for international law reform 
advocacy.160 At their worst, the international criminal tribunals, which are of 
such interest to international lawyers, perversely provide cover for the fact 
that international law has little to offer the most vulnerable populations 
when it comes to actual protection against real threats to life and safety.161
It is nearly ten years since the appearance of Samantha Power’s book, A
Problem from Hell, in which she excoriated the United States for its 
historical indifference to instances of genocide around the world. She was 
not the first to point out that there was little political cost associated with 
turning a blind eye to genocide, nor the first to note American and European 
hypocrisy in these matters.162 The examples of Cambodia, the Balkans, and 
Rwanda could not be clearer, and, as presented by Power, show the degree 
to which political elites in the U.S. and elsewhere were more worried about 
the adverse consequences of direct involvement than what inevitably 
happens to vulnerable populations under extreme threat.163 One would like 
to think that at least the international community broke its own rules when it 
looked the other way and allowed the Rwandan genocide and other 
slaughters to proceed.164 The fact, though, is that even with regard to what 
should be a very clear point of agreement, no solid international law has had 
an opportunity to crystallize. There is no generally recognized responsibility 
to protect civilians not within one’s own borders, even when the act of 
 157. See Ellis, supra note 16, at 119. 
 158. See Osiel, supra note 94. 
 159. For a discussion of the ICC, see COURTING HISTORY, supra note 90. 
 160. Id. It is interesting to note that President Obama recently made the decision to 
send a small number of troops to Africa for the purpose of attempting to capture Joseph 
Kony. This symbolic gesture is to be welcomed, but comes many years too late. Howard 
LaFranchi, LRA Leader Joseph Kony: Why Obama sent US Troops to Uganda to get him,
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-
Policy/2011/1014/LRA-leader-Joseph-Kony-Why-Obama-sent-US-troops-to-Uganda-to-get-
him. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See RONAYNE, supra note 60. 
 163. See POWER, supra note 56, for the recent example of ethnic Uzbeks in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 164. See Wheeler, supra note 31, at 50. 
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protection would be relatively easy and the type of suffering that would be 
prevented is grave and extensive.165
It certainly matters which phrase we use to describe the international 
right and/or duty to take meaningful action when the lives of civilians are at 
serious risk from immediate violence, in situations where the state in which 
these civilians live is unwilling or unable to respond in a protective way. 
The drafters of the report on the Responsibility to Protect might well have 
framed the issue as they did from a desire to remove the entire problem 
from the sterile debate over the U.N. Charter’s proscription on the use of 
force, and bring it instead into mainstream thinking over human rights and 
the widely accepted diminution of state sovereignty in that arena. On the 
other hand, the idea of a broadly embraced exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force has a more robust quality to it and could more squarely and 
explicitly help to remove scruples that arise when the international 
community is faced with the problem of when and how to act in the face of 
mass atrocities. As explained above, perhaps a duty of humanitarian 
intervention would capture both the requirement to take meaningful action 
and the sense that military force (as opposed to mere dialogue or threats) 
would be involved. 
The virtue of the designation Responsibility to Protect is that it 
encompasses situations outside of regular warfare and so has broader 
potential for principled application. As for what the children’s rights 
dimension adds to this discussion, the readiest answer is that where there are 
massive and deliberate violations of children’s rights, there is a heightened 
sense of egregiousness. In instances of extreme vulnerability, it seems 
completely unreasonable to expect that civilians should have to wait for 
conflict to “run its course” before the international community takes action. 
An urgent duty on the international community to come up with strong 
protective structures would seem in such cases beyond dispute. Where such 
indicia of extreme vulnerability are present, any system of “law” should 
certainly be required to offer a clear remedy in the form of unambiguous 
prevention.  
 165. See generally Payandeh, supra note 31. 
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INTRODUCTION
International terrorism has come to be a fact of life. In many regions of 
the world it is a fact of everyday life, while in others it is a topic on the 
agenda. But wherever one chooses to look, the effects of terrorism will be 
there in one form or another. Just this past year we witnessed continuing 
terrorist attacks in Iraq, a suicide bomb on a bus in Jerusalem, but also the 
killing of Osama bin-Laden, whose name needs no introduction. The 
international community, as well as independent states, has employed a 
wide range of measures to suppress terrorism. Legal measures are just a part 
of those, as education, culture, the media and other spheres have no lesser 
role.  
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One instrument in the international community’s toolkit against terrorism 
is international criminal law, which has led in particular to the development 
of several international and regional conventions designed to combat certain 
aspects of terrorism.1 However, the latest and greatest development in the 
field of international criminal law, the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
is still not being used for this purpose. The Rome Statute establishing the 
ICC and its governing document2 (Rome Statute) does not include terrorism 
within its jurisdiction.  
This paper examines that lack of jurisdiction and shows that the principal 
question is not whether terrorism could be included in the Rome Statute but 
what the international community and the ICC itself has to gain by doing so. 
While the existing literature generally discusses the option of including 
terrorism under the ICC, it lacks an A to Z analysis of how it could be done 
and an extensive evaluation of the consequences of such a move. Such an 
analysis is of special importance today because of the changes that occurred 
in international criminal law with respect to terrorism in the previous year—
namely, the Review Conference in the summer of 2010, where the topic of 
terrorism was not mentioned once, a path-breaking decision by the Special 
Tribunal of Lebanon concerning the definition of terrorism,3 and the killing 
of bin-Laden, which illustrated that discussion surrounding the proper 
method to deal with mega-terrorists is not all theoretical. With respect to the 
ICC, it is time to see the reality for what it is a viable option to help 
strengthen international combat against terrorism is not being used due to 
political impediments.  
The paper consists of seven parts. Following this introduction, Part 2 
provides a background to the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute and 
 * CPT Aviv Cohen, Head of Foreign Relations Section, Department of 
International Law, Military Advocate General Corps, Israel Defense Force. The views in this 
article are those of the author alone and do not represent any official policy of the IDF. This 
article was written with the priceless guidance of Prof. David Stewart of Georgetown 
University Law Center. Many thanks go to Prof. David Luban, Prof. Albert Rees and Mr. 
Gilad Noam for their insightful comments. Special thanks to CPT H. John Goodell of the 
U.S. Army JAG Corps for his editing. This article is dedicated to Noam Dekel, whose 
undivided support got me through the long months of writing this piece.  
 1.   Another international law discipline to approach terrorist acts is the laws of war, 
as seen, for example, in the approach of Israel towards Palestinian terrorist organizations, and 
the approach of the United States against Al Qaeda. The issue of applying international 
criminal law along with or instead of the laws of war in the combat against terrorism is a 
complex issue worthy of its own research, which this paper will touch on only to a limited 
extent in the discussion on war crimes. See infra part 5.2.3. It is also interesting to note a 
growing trend to use civil suits, mainly tort claims against terrorists and terrorist 
organizations. For further reading on this topic, see Debra M. Strauss, Reaching out to the 
International Community: Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against 
Terrorism, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307 (2009).
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90. 
 3. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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looks into the attempt at inclusion when the Rome Statute was drafted back 
in 1998. It surveys the arguments for rejecting ICC jurisdiction over 
terrorism and examines whether they are still relevant today. Concluding 
that the only viable argument left concerns the lack of agreeable definition 
of international terrorism, Part 3 delves into the issue of defining terrorism. 
It suggests that there is in fact a definition found in the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism4 that is widely recognized and 
may suffice for the purposes of drafting the international crime of terrorism.  
Part 4 of the paper examines the procedural aspects of including a new 
crime in the Rome Statute, namely how the Statute can be amended. It 
shows that the Statute can be amended at any given time following a 
proposal by a Member State. Part 5 addresses the actual way in which 
terrorism could be included; it examines the possibility of drafting a 
standalone crime of terrorism, an “Article 8ter” to the Statute, based on the 
aforementioned procedure. It also discusses the possibility of interpreting 
the existing crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
aggression) so as to include terrorist acts even without explicitly referring to 
them as such. 
Part 6 of the paper deals with the policy considerations with regard to 
creating ICC jurisdiction over terrorist acts. It presents the advantages and 
disadvantages of such jurisdiction from the points of view of combating 
terrorism, the ICC itself, and Member and non-Member States. Finally, Part 
7 concludes the discussion. The general argument is that, as in many other 
fields of international law, where there is a political will there is a legal 
way. There are currently no legal impediments to including terrorism in the 
Rome Statute; even the definitional issue is not insurmountable. 
To illustrate this point, three case studies of terrorist attacks will 
accompany the analysis. These involve state-led terrorism versus non-state 
terrorist organizations; attacks that are directed against a distinct group of 
people because of national affiliation versus attacks that are planned to 
cause as many casualties as possible with little regard to the nationality of 
the victims. Most interestingly, the response in each of these events was 
different, from a single state operating in covert operations through an 
international sanctions mechanism, to full-scale war. In the later parts of the 
paper, the following question arises: had the ICC been an option for those 
affected states, could these acts have been dealt with under the auspices of 
the ICC?5
 4. See infra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 5. In order for a case to be considered within the jurisdiction of the ICC several 
thresholds need to be met, such as referral of a case to the ICC (according to Articles 12 and 
13 of the Rome Statute) and issues of admissibility (according to Articles 17-19 of the Rome 
Statute). The case studies discussed here may raise questions with regard to these 
requirements, for instance the proper way of referring the case of 9-11 in light of the United 
States not being a member of the Court. These difficulties notwithstanding, it is the purpose 
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The first case study is the massacre of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich 
Olympic Games, where eight Palestinian members of the terrorist 
organization Black September took hostages and later murdered eleven 
Israeli athletes. The terrorists’ demands were to release two hundred and 
twenty-three Palestinians prisoners held in Israel and two held in Germany. 
During the failed rescue operation, five terrorists were killed and three were 
taken into custody of German police but were released after less than two 
months.6 Israel responded with massive air strikes of terrorists’ bases in 
Syria and Lebanon, and a few years later as a consequence, Israeli Mosad 
agents allegedly hunted down and killed at least eight of the terrorists 
involved in the attack. 
The second terrorist attack to be used as an example is the Pan-Am flight 
103 bombing. On the evening of December 21, 1988, Pan-Am flight 103 
was en route from London to New York when it exploded over Lockerbie, 
Scotland. Including all the people on board the flight as well as people on 
the ground, the total number of casualties was 270 from over twenty 
different countries. Investigation of the attack discovered the involvement 
and responsibility of the Libyan government. International sanctions on 
Libya led by the United Nations followed in 1992 and 1994, as well as an 
embargo on arms and certain oil supplies. These sanctions were suspended 
in 1999 after Libya surrendered two suspects to stand trial in Scotland. In 
2003, Libya officially took responsibility for the attack and began paying 
reparations to the families of the victims. 
The third example is the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on 
the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. 
The largest terrorist attack in history, 9/11 took the lives of approximately 
three thousand people when nineteen terrorists belonging to the terrorist 
organization Al-Qaeda took over four commercial flights in the United 
States. The attack was furthered by anti-American sentiments among 
Muslim extremist groups opposing American involvement in the Middle 
East. Less than a month after the attack, the United States led coalition 
forces into Afghanistan where the architect of the attack, Osama Bin-Laden, 
was supposedly hiding. Almost ten years later, Bin-Laden was killed in 
Pakistan during an operation of an elite unit of the U.S. Armed Forces. With 
these three case studies in mind, we now turn to examine the relationship 
between terrorism and the ICC. 
of the current paper to focus on the nature of the acts themselves and the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae alone.
 6. Their release was facilitated by yet another terrorist attack by Black September, 
which kidnapped an airplane of the German airliner Lufthansa, and demanded their release in 
exchange of the safety of the passengers.  
2012] Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court 223
I. TERRORISM AND THE ICC 
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over acts of 
terrorism as a distinct offense. This situation is no accident but rather the 
express intention of the majority of states parties to the Rome Conference, 
which rejected the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute.7 The 
suggested provision defined the crime of terrorism as falling into one of 
three categories:8 First, acts which constitute terrorism under a standalone 
definition that the provision provided;9 Second, an offense under six 
existing international counter terrorism conventions;10 or Third, offenses 
involving use of firearms, weapons, explosives, and dangerous substances 
when used as a means to perpetrate indiscriminate violence involving death 
or serious bodily injury to persons or groups of persons or populations or 
serious damage to property.11
This proposed provision was not approved by the states parties to the 
Rome Conference. At the conclusion of the conference, the only mention of 
 7. See, e.g., statements made by the delegates of Syria, Official Records of the 
Rome Conference, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an Int’l Criminal Court, 3d plen. mtg. at 172, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 [hereinafter 
Official Records of the Rome Conference]; see also Morocco, id. at 173, ¶ 52; Iraq, Id. at 
174, ¶ 55; Belgium, id. at 174, ¶ 65; Greece, id. at 175, ¶ 70; Sweden, id. at 176, ¶ 89; 
Senegal, id. at 176, ¶ 90; United Kingdom, id. at 177, ¶ 117; Brazil, id. at 179, ¶ 142; 
Ethiopia, id. at 179, ¶ 148; Iran, id. at 179, ¶ 150; Netherlands, id. at 181, ¶ 20. Some of the 
state parties did not oppose the inclusion of terrorism in the statute, see the statements made 
by the delegates of Tunisia, id. at 174, ¶ 66; Republic of Korea, id. at 175, ¶ 77; Algeria, id.
at 177, ¶ 110; India, id. at 177, ¶ 120; New Zealand, id. at 178, ¶ 124; Turkey, id. at 179, ¶ 
146; Cuba, id. at 181, ¶ 22. It should also be noted that this is in contrast to the initial idea of 
establishing the ICC, which was originally proposed by Trinidad and Tobago to deal with 
offences of drug trafficking and terrorism. 
 8. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, It., June 15-July 17, 1998, Report of the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, p. 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/2 (Apr. 14, 1998) [hereinafter Report of the Preparatory Committee]. 
 9. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 8, at 21 (defining acts of 
terrorism as those “[u]ndertaking, organizing, sponsoring, ordering, facilitating, financing, 
encouraging or tolerating acts of violence against another State directed at persons or 
property and of such a nature as to create terror, fear or insecurity in the minds of public 
figures, groups of persons, the general public or populations, for whatever considerations and 
purpose of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or such other nature 
that may be invoked to justify them.”). 
 10. The conventions referred to in the provision are: Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation; Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. See Report of 
the Preparatory Committee, supra note 8, at 21.
 11. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 8, at 21. 
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terrorism was in Resolution E in the Annex to the Final Act, which 
recommended revisiting the issue of including terrorism when a Review 
Conference met.12 Reading the records from the Rome Conference reveals 
six reasons underlying the rejection of the suggested terrorism provision.13
The following paragraphs will address each of these arguments and examine 
whether now, almost thirteen years after the Rome Conference, they are still 
valid. 
The first and foremost obstacle to the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome 
Statute was the lack of a clear and universally accepted definition of what 
constitutes terrorism, including dissatisfaction with the proposed definition 
in the text of the draft.14 In contrast, an argument has been put forward that 
the lack of acceptable definition should not stand in the way of employing a 
workable definition and move along with the prosecution of terrorists in the 
ICC.15 One commentator has even suggested defining terrorism in a 
“transitional format” until a universally agreed definition will be achieved.16
The issue of definition was and remains the most serious obstacle in any 
discussion of terrorism, and the current discussion is no exception. 
However, since July of 1998, there have been some developments in the 
road towards finding a universally accepted definition of terrorism. Due to 
the centrality of the issue, it deserves a thorough review, and it will be 
explored at length in the following part of the paper. 
The second reason for states’ reluctance to include terrorism in the Rome 
Statute was the notion that the three core crimes—war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide—represented the crimes of greatest concern 
to the international community, and terrorism does not rise to this level of 
international concern.17 However, examining the way in which the 
 12. Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at vol. 1. 
 13. See also Eric Bales, Torturing the Rome Statute: The Attempt to Bring 
Guantanamo’s Detainees within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 16 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 173, 188 (2009); Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the 
International Criminal Court: Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 18 (2002);
Christian Much, The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Terrorism as an International 
Crime, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 121, 126 (2006); Pouyan Afshar Mazandaran, An 
International Legal Response to an International Problem: Prosecuting International 
Terrorists, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 503, 528 (2006); ROBERTA ARNOLD, THE ICC AS A NEW 
INSTRUMENT FOR REPRESSING TERRORISM 56 (2004). 
 14. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at 172 , 173, 180 for 
statements made by the delegates of Syria, Pakistan, and Oman respectively. See also Bales, 
supra note 13, at 185; Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the 
International Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 
14 (2003).
 15. Michael Lawless, Terrorism: An International Crime, 63 INT’L J. 139, 159
(2007-2008). 
 16. Mark D. Kielsgard, A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism, 36 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 249, 286 (2006). 
 17. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at 72 (statements 
made by the delegate of Slovakia); Much, supra note 13, at 124. 
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international community as a whole and states individually have addressed 
terrorism can lead to the conclusion that nowadays terrorists are as hostis 
humani generic as war criminals or perpetrators of genocide or crimes 
against humanity.18 For instance, comparing the status19 of the Genocide 
Convention20 to that of the Terrorism Financing Convention21 shows that 
while the former has forty-one signatories and 141 parties; the latter has 132 
signatories and 173 parties. In addition, the Security Council has affirmed 
that acts of international terrorism constitute threats to international peace 
and security.22
Even on a more basic level, the notion of an international crime 
originated with piracy. Piracy hampered transnational trade and was in the 
common interest of every country to criminalize. Since piracy occurred on 
the high seas, no one state could assert the responsibility to combat piracy, 
and an international cooperation was necessary. Thus, it developed through 
state practice to be an international crime.23 While terrorist acts occur within 
territorial boundaries, there can be an analogy between piracy and terrorism: 
terrorist acts were initially considered as “mere” treaty crimes, but as they 
became more international in nature and carried more disastrous results, 
they generated a need for an international cooperation to combat them and 
were the subject of growing international condemnation. Thus, this 
development has led some commentators to argue that terrorist acts have 
advanced to be regarded as international crimes.24 Is terrorism less heinous 
than piracy? The most likely answer would probably be no. Does it disturb 
the conscience of the international community just like genocide or crimes 
against humanity? Ten years ago before 9/11 and the global war on terror 
the answer would have been most likely not. Today it is not that simple. For 
example, the attacks of 9/11 in the United States and following attacks in 
various cities in Europe, North Africa, and South Asia probably troubled 
more people than the atrocities and genocide committed in Darfur during 
the same years. 
The third ground for rejecting the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome 
Statute was the desire to avoid overburdening the ICC and the need for a 
 18. Martinez, supra note 13, at 40-41; Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 527. 
 19. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-
1&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants (showing the current status of the Genocide 
Convention). 
 20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
 21. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 
9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270  [hereinafter Financing Convention]. 
 22. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 23. Lawless, supra note 15, at 140. 
 24. Much, supra note 13, at 125. 
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gravity threshold.25 The counter argument to this claim is that the fear from 
a work overload of the court is not unique to terrorism and has already been 
addressed in the Rome Statute itself. The drafters of the Rome Statute knew 
that the ICC should be reserved for a special class of the most atrocious 
acts, and they have put some safety valves in the text to accomplish that. 
These built-in mechanisms will ensure that the ICC will have jurisdiction 
over the most severe terrorist acts just like it has jurisdiction over the most 
severe crimes against humanity or any of the other crimes.26
Article 1 of the Rome Statute set forth clearly that the ICC will exercise 
jurisdiction only for the “most serious crimes of international concern.”27
Article 5, which specifies crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
reiterates this language.28 In addition, the principle of complementarity, 
according to which the ICC will defer to national jurisdictions, was 
designed to prevent an overload of cases in the international court system 
while the national courts have more direct access to evidence and 
manpower.29 Thus, the fears about overburdening the Court with a flood of 
terrorist cases do not seem realistic in light of the safeguards already 
directing the Court’s work.30
The fourth argument against the initial inclusion of terrorism in the 
Rome Statute was that such an inclusion would impede the acceptance of 
the Rome Statute.31 This concern is irrelevant today because the Rome 
Statute did, in fact, come into force and currently has 114 member states. 
However, similar concerns may rise with respect to the acceptance of a new 
crime of terrorism. As will be elaborated ahead,32 any amendment to the 
Rome Statute does not apply automatically to all the states parties but rather 
applies only to those states parties that have ratified it specifically.  
A fifth argument is based on a more practical level; some states 
questioned the need to include terrorism in the Rome Statute because, as a 
 25. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note7, at 176 ¶ 96 for 
statement made by the delegate of Ukraine; id. at 176 ¶ 99 for statement made by the 
delegate of the United States. See also Much, supra note 13, at 129.
 26. ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 195. 
 27. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 1. 
 28. Id. art. 5. 
 29. The other rationale for the principle of complementarity was maintaining state 
sovereignty. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 351 (2003); Mark S. 
Ellis, The International Criminal Court and its Implications for Domestic Law and National 
Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 222 (2002); Michael A. Newton, The 
Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 115, 134 (2010); ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON &
ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 127 (2007). 
 30. Tim Stephens, International Criminal Law and the Response to International 
Terrorism, 27 U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 454, 480 (2004); Martinez, supra note 13, at 52.
 31. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at 178 for statement 
by the delegate of Italy. 
 32. See infra Part 4.
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treaty crime, there was already in place a system of international 
cooperation to deal with it.33 While it may be true that the counter-terrorism 
conventions attempt to create a regime of “extradite or prosecute” between 
their member states and ensure the cooperation between them, this is not a 
good enough reason to deny ICC jurisdiction. For instance, genocide, an 
undisputed core crime, was also under the regime of an international treaty 
already in place in 1948.34 In addition, most of the war crimes under the 
Rome Statute were already dealt with in the Geneva Conventions.35
This argument asserts that terrorism has a solid basis as a treaty crime to 
be dealt with on the international level. This is the exact opposite of the 
argument made earlier, namely, that terrorism is not a well-established 
crime compared to the other core crimes. The fact of the matter is that the 
existing legal instruments to deal with what the international community 
perceives as a criminal conduct are simply irrelevant when determining 
whether a crime should be included in the Rome Statute. The purpose of 
including an international crime in the Rome Statute is to generate ICC 
jurisdiction over it, not to fill a vacuum in international law where there is 
no existing regime to suppress a certain crime. And even if it did, it is not at 
all clear that the current counter-terrorism regime created by these 
conventions is successful enough to justify not creating ICC jurisdiction 
over terrorism as an additional tool.36
As discussed in the following sections, if the definition of the crime of 
terrorism will include a reference to counter-terrorism treaties, then a whole 
array of questions arises regarding the relationship between the Rome 
Statute and these treaties, especially in cases where a country is a party to 
the Rome Statute but not to a specific treaty. This conundrum 
notwithstanding, the mere fact that legal instruments exist to suppress 
certain manifestations of terrorist acts does not preclude in any way the ICC 
from exercising jurisdiction over terrorism as well. 
The sixth and final objection to the inclusion of the terrorism in the 
Rome Statute argued that since terrorism is such a politically-sensitive term, 
 33. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at 174 ¶ 59 for 
statements made by the delegates of Japan; see id. at 176, for statements by the delegate of 
Sweden. 
 34. Genocide Convention, supra note 20. 
 35. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention for the Armed Forces]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention for the Armed Forces at Sea]; 
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War]; Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention for Persons in Time of War]. 
 36. For more elaboration on the deficiencies of the existing counter-terrorism treaties 
see ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 49. 
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if the ICC would deal with cases of terrorism, it will be forced into the 
political realm and thus will hurt its legitimacy and credibility as an 
impartial judicial institution.37 The first part of this argument is true. 
Terrorist acts stir political debates about why a certain act is an act of 
terrorism and not merely a legitimate act of protest. 
Having said that, the fear of politicization is not unique to terrorism. In 
the summer of 2010, the Member States activated the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression, a matter that was also not resolved in the 
Rome Conference. In the modern reality where non-state actors are 
operating from the sovereign territory of certain failed states; where most of 
the armed conflicts are of non-international character; and ‘a low-intensity 
armed conflict short of war’ is the title given to one of the most prolonged 
conflicts in the middle east, there is no doubt that cases involving the crime 
of aggression will touch the very heart and soul of international politics—
the infringement on a state’s sovereignty.38
Moreover, even with other crimes, the ICC is not sheltered from 
concerns of politicization. For example, the official reason why Israel did 
not join the ICC, despite its active role in advocating its importance, is the 
inclusion of transfer of population as a war crime in a language that would 
render Israeli settlements in the occupied territories a war crime.39 This is a 
highly political issue and one of the recurring themes in the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute. More recently, the case of the arrest warrant issued in 
March 2009 against the President of Sudan, Al-Bashir, on account of his 
involvement in acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
committed in Sudan40 also illustrate this point. Is an arrest warrant against 
an acting head of state any less political than possible charges against a 
terrorist? In sum, all international crimes involve political sensitivities to 
some extent, and this argument could have been raised with respect to any 
of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the court.  
 37. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at 278 for statement 
by the delegate of Ghana. Such statements are still made today. See e.g., Luz E. Nagle, 
Terrorism and Universal Jurisdiction: Opening a Pandora’s Box?, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
339, 361 (2011).
 38. See Keith A. Petty, Sixty Years In The Making: The Definition of Aggression for 
the International Criminal Court, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 531, 532 (2008) 
(discussing the political nature of aggression as an impediment to finding a legal definition of 
aggression). See also Marek Meleško, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression in the 
Context of the Rome Statute, 4 ACTA SOCIETATIS MARTENSIS 139, 156-158 (2009-2010) 
(discussing whether the crime of aggression can be prosecuted effectively, among other 
reasons, due to the political considerations the Prosecutor would have to take into account).
 39. Allen Baker, The International Criminal Court, 16 IDF L. REV.  879, 891 (2003). 
 40. Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Presents Case 
Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, for Genocide, Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur (July 14, 2008) ICC-OTP-20080714-PR341-ENG, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/ 
situation%20icc%200205/press%20releases/a?lan=en-GB. 
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The conclusion from the above discussion is that out of the six 
arguments presented in the Rome Conference in 1998 against the inclusion 
of terrorism within the jurisdiction of the ICC, today, five seem not credible. 
With the perspective of almost a decade of work of the court and in light of 
recent developments, such as the adoption of the crime of aggression, the 
stakes have changed. Only one issue may still prove to be a real obstacle. 
That issue is the lack of an acceptable definition of terrorism. Because of 
the centrality of this matter, it will be dealt with at length in the following 
portions of this paper. 
Before turning to the complex and controversial issue of defining 
terrorism, it is worth noting the results of the Rome Conference with respect 
to terrorism, namely that it will “be considered at a later stage”.41 About a 
year ago, in the summer of 2010, that “later stage” finally arrived, and the 
States Parties were convened in the Review Conference held in Kampala, 
Uganda. The agenda for the Review Conference, however, did not include 
terrorism42, and the official records of the conference do not mention the 
words “terrorism” or “terror” even once.43 Despite this failure, a proposal to 
include terrorism in the Rome Statute does not have to wait another seven 
years, a fact that enhances the relevance of this discussion. The crime of 
terrorism suggested here can be endorsed by a state party and amended into 
the Rome Statute as early as the next Assembly of State Parties convene, as 
elaborated ahead.44
II. DEFINING THE CRIME OF TERRORISM
In the past, the word terrorism was referred to as a descriptive term, an 
adjective found along acts that were criminalized, such as bombing, 
hijacking aircrafts, taking hostages, etc. With time, the word began to take a 
legal life of its own. “Terrorism” is now the subject of criminalization and, 
thus, requires a legal definition of what constitutes terrorism.45 The number 
of definitions given to terrorism might directly correspond to the number of 
people asked. This diversity notwithstanding, most of the definitions of 
terrorism address the same core elements.46 These are first, the use or threat 
 41. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at vol. 1. 
 42. International Criminal Court, Provisional Agenda, Doc. RC/1, May 11 2010. 
 43. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Kampala, Uganda, May 31-June 11, 2010, Official Records, Doc. RC/11 [hereinafter Review 
Conference]. 
 44. See discussion on the procedural aspects of amending the Rome Statute, infra,
Part 4. 
 45. James D. Fry, The Swindle of Fragmented Criminalization: Continuing 
Piecemeal Responses to International Terrorism and Al Qaeda, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 377, 
393-94 (2009). 
 46. Bales, supra note 13, at 180; Martinez, supra note 13, at 10; Jackson Nyamuya 
Maotogo, Countering Terrorism: From Wigged Judges to Helmeted Soldiers—Legal 
Perspectives in America’s Counter-Terrorism Responses, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 243 
230 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2
of use of violence; second, the act is indiscriminate in that the immediate 
victims are chosen randomly and are not the ultimate audience of the act;47
third, the violence is intentionally targeted towards civilians as opposed to 
combatant forces; and finally, the purpose of the act is to compel a 
government or an organization to perform or abstain from performing a 
certain action.48 The distinction between domestic and international 
terrorism depends on the existence of a transnational element in the act.49
A support for this argument is found in a recent seminal decision by the 
Appeal Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which 
identified a definition of international terrorism under customary 
international law.50 After examining state practice in suppressing terrorism 
through international cooperation, domestic legislation, and judgments, the 
STL Appeal Chamber concluded that there exists a crime of terrorism under 
customary international law, which is composed of the three 
aforementioned elements.51
The remainder of this part will examine the current state of affairs with 
respect to finding a universally acceptable definition of terrorism. It will 
explore the principal impediments and how they could be dealt with in the 
context of ICC jurisdiction. The main argument presented here is that, as the 
STL Appeal Chamber rightly held, a de facto internationally acceptable 
(2005); Lawless, supra note 15, at 150; ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 4; Reuven Young, 
Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law 
and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 23, 
25 (2006); Vincent-Joel Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court in the Post-September 11th Era: Should Acts of terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against 
Humanity?, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1009, 1034 (2004). 
 47. While the victims are usually affiliated with a larger targeted group, the 
individual identities of most terrorist victims are not a determined factor. This is as opposed 
to the criminal offence of homicide, where the identity of the victims is a vital factor in the 
circumstances of the offence.
 48. How strong the link is between a specific act and the greater purpose could vary. 
For instance, the November 2008 Mumbai attack was not directed against the Indian 
government, but rather was part of a larger campaign against Israel; as opposed to the 
terrorist attack in March 2011 in Itamar (an Israeli settlement where a Palestinian massacred 
a family, including a three month old infant), was directed against the Israeli settlements.  
It is also worth noting that one controversial issue is whether terrorist acts include damage to 
property as the main act, in contrast to damage to property as a side effect of an act designed 
to hurt people. Contrary to the common view in the literature, the Special Court of Sierra 
Leone held that terrorism does encompass damage to property, and noted that “the 
destruction of people’s home or means of livelihood and, in turn, their means of survival, 
will operate to install fear and terror.” See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case no. SCSL-04-16-T, 
Judgment of Trial Chamber II, ¶ 670 (June 20, 2007), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=vjmJCKSU01E%3d&tabid=173. 
 49. This could be, for example, that the perpetrator is not a national of the country 
where the act took place, that the victims were of multiple nationalities, etc. See Interlocutory 
Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I, ¶ 89, Feb. 16, 2011. 
 50. Id. ¶ 83. 
 51. Id. ¶ 85-86.
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definition of terrorism already exists and is found in the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.52 This definition will be adopted 
for the purpose of this study. 
A. Defining Terrorism: Where We Are and Why 
The current state of affairs with respect to defining terrorism has not 
changed a great deal in the last decade. Most individual states have their 
own domestic definitions in national legislation;53 the United Nations 
Security Council has adopted resolutions some of which describe terrorism 
but do not provide a clear definition of it; and a handful of regional 
conventions and international conventions exhibit definitions that exist with 
a certain scenario in mind. Although at first sight these various instruments 
might seem inherently different, the STL Appeal Chamber revealed that 
they are actually very much alike, and leaving out the transnational element, 
domestic definitions are almost identical to those found in international 
instruments.54
In 1996, following an initiative by India,55 a Draft International 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Draft Comprehensive 
Convention) was the new hope to agree on a definition and unite the 
international counter terrorism measures under one single instrument. The 
current version of the Draft Comprehensive Convention is still being 
debated at the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with this matter in the United 
Nations, which is responsible to correspond with the different countries and 
address their concerns with the hopes of concluding an agreeable text to 
pass on to the Sixth (Legal) Committee.  
There are two main obstacles that have been holding back any progress 
on the Draft Comprehensive Convention for almost ten years now.56 These 
 52. Id. ¶ 88. 
 53. A useful source of state legislation in the field of counter terrorism can be found 
in the U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee web-site, which contains reports submitted by 
U.N. member states to the Committee in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1373. 
In these reports, states specify their legal means to combat terrorism and specifically to 
implement the Resolution. Examples of different definitions of terrorism in state legislation 
can be found in Argentina’s Act No. 25,241 on Repentant Offenders (U.N. Doc. 
S/2001/1340); Australia’s Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act of 1978, (using 
the term “engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state”) (U.N. Doc. S/2001/1247); Egypt’s 
Law No. 97, as well as Article 86(a) of the Penal Law (U.N. Doc. S/2001/1237); India’s 
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance Section 3(1) (U.N. Doc. S/2001/1278); and South 
Africa’s Internal Security Act of 1982, Section 54(1) (U.N. Doc. s/2001/1281). 
 54. STL Appeal Chamber decision, supra note 49, ¶ 91.
 55. Letter dated Nov. 1, 1996 from the permanent representative of India to the 
United Nations to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/6 (Nov. 11, 1996). 
 56. Compare the report by the Ad Hoc Committee from 2010 with the Article 
published in 2003. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm., 14th Sess., Apr. 12-16, 2010, U.N. Doc. 
A/65/37; Christopher C. Joyner, International Extradition and Global Terrorism: Bringing 
International Criminals to Justice, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 493, 533 (2003).
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are the matter of state’s use of force against its own civilians and the 
controversy over creating an exception to the definition in the case of 
opposition to foreign occupation.57 With respect to the former, state’s 
terrorism is a complex issue which in itself generated voluminous writing. It 
raises questions regarding the legality of the use of force,58 and a thorough 
examination of it exceeds the scope of the current study. In any event, the 
ICC has jurisdiction only over natural persons, and thus any claims against 
states in the context of terrorism cannot be brought before the ICC. They 
could arguably fall under the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice.59 A natural person following governmental orders or acting in their 
official capacity when carrying out a terrorist attack could be tried before 
the ICC without the need to determine whether the State itself committed 
acts of terrorism. This is similar to prosecuting war crimes, for instance, but 
contrary to the crime of aggression.60
The second area of dispute is more complex, as it touches the politically-
sensitive right of self-determination and the recourse to force used by 
groups who assert such a right and countries that support them. Professor 
Ben Saul, for example, vigorously condemns the criminalization of such 
groups as terrorists, and asserts that “legitimate liberation movements” 
should be accorded the status of lawful combatants.61 However, Saul’s 
argument lacks the clear notion that even if the said groups are treated as, in 
his words, “lawful combatants,” it is still illegal under international law for 
them to target civilians. His argument seems to work against the goal he is 
attempting to advocate since parties to an armed conflict bear more 
responsibilities under international law than parties to violence that does not 
amount to an armed conflict.62 Thus, if accepted, Saul’s argument would 
still enable prosecuting terrorists, in some circumstances, as war criminals.  
Even without treating terrorist groups as “lawful combatants,” and as 
legitimate as claims for self-determination may be, they still do not justify 
the use of violence against civilians. The use of aggressive force was 
 57. Stephens, supra note 30, at 458; Much, supra note 13, at 130; Bruce Broomhall, 
Terrorism at Trial: State Actors in an International Definition of Terrorism from a Human 
Rights Perspective, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 421, 434 (2005); Goldstone & Simpson, 
supra note 14, at 13.
 58. Kielsgard, supra note 16, at 272. 
 59. Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 14, at 19. 
 60. For discussion on the requirement to determine that a state committed an act of 
aggression before charging a person with the crime of aggression, see infra Part 5.2.4. 
 61. Ben Saul, Defending ‘Terrorism’: Justifications and Excuses for Terrorism in 
International Criminal Law, 25 AUST. Y. B. I. L. 177, 186 (2006). 
 62. Violence that amounts to “armed conflict,” whether international or non-
international in nature, is governed by the laws and customs of war, whereas violence that 
does not amount to an “armed conflict” is usually considered within the scope of the 
exceptions to these laws, and as governed by the principle of non-intervention in a state’s 
internal affairs.  
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explicitly prohibited in the UN Charter,63 and since it applies to all existing 
states, the proper policy point of view is that it should apply similarly to 
those groups who perceive themselves as independent states. If the 
international community is serious about its desire to suppress terrorism, 
then there can be no exceptions. Intentional targeting of innocent civilians 
should be deemed illegal in times of peace as it is in times of war regardless 
of the political aspirations of the entity responsible for such acts.64
Debates on the Comprehensive Convention and the role of resistance 
movements in the definition of terrorism will probably not come to an end 
in the near future. Perhaps the events in Egypt in February 2011 will 
demonstrate to extremist groups how a political revolution can be carried 
out in a non-violent manner by showing the strength of the population rather 
than its willingness to kill innocent civilians of the opponent side.65 These 
debates notwithstanding, a crime of terrorism must still be defined in order 
to apply ICC jurisdiction over it. For the purposes of this study the 
definition in the Financing Convention66 was chosen.  
B. The Definition in the Financing Convention 
The Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was 
signed in 1999, and in many respects, it provides the first general definition 
of terrorism since the failed attempt to do so in the League of Nations 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism in 1937.67
Article 2 of the Financing Convention sets forth the prohibition on the 
various forms of financing terrorism. By defining which conduct the finance 
of which is prohibited, the Convention provides a legal definition of 
terrorism. The definition is twofold. Article 2(1)(a) refers to acts previously 
prohibited in prior international counter-terrorism conventions, and Article 
2(1)(b) refers to “any other act” of terrorism or, in the language of the 
provision: 
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in 
a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
 63. UN Charter art. 2, para. 4.
 64. ROBERT J. CURRIE, INTERNATIONAL & TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 299 
(2010). 
 65. Compare the demonstrations and cries for democracy and political within 
Egyptian political system to the demonstrations that took place in front of the Israeli 
consulate in Alexandria, Egypt, where calls were for a third Intifada and another war with 
Israel. See Roee Nahmias, Hundreds Rally Outside Israeli Consulate in Alexandria,
YNETNEWS.COM (Israel)(Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4057217,00.html. 
 66. Financing Convention, supra note 21. 
 67. Young, supra note 46, at 53. 
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context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 
This definition addresses the actus reus of a terrorist act, namely the 
infliction of physical harm.68 The targets are civilians or persons not taking 
direct part in hostilities. It also addresses the special mens rea which 
signifies terrorist acts from “mere” criminal conduct—the purpose is to 
bring about a political change or to intimidate a population. Article 2(1)(b) 
does not, however, deal with the identity of the perpetrator, and thus may 
potentially apply to both state and non-state entities and individuals. This 
definition is acceptable to the majority of states, and it provides a sound 
basis for a crime of terrorism to be introduced to the Rome Statute.  
Furthermore, the general language used in this definition with respect to 
the terrorist act itself, namely not limiting it to certain behavior using 
specific means, makes this definition suitable in the long run as it will be 
able to address issues like cyber-terrorism and future manifestations of 
terrorism.69 It is also worth noting that this definition does not exclude 
“freedom fighters” from its scope. Other than Syria, no contracting party 
made any reservation or declaration regarding resistance to foreign 
occupation and its exclusion from the definition of terrorism.70
The wide acceptance of the Financing Convention and the abstract 
manner in which it describes terrorism have risen it to a level where most 
commentators in the field regard it as the most advanced definition of 
terrorism yet.71 Professor Reuven Young argued “the evident willingness of 
states to rapidly assume binding treaty obligations [with regard to the 
counter-terrorism conventions] illustrates how the momentum and extent of 
state behavior can establish the dual element of [international] custom.”72
When he wrote those lines in 2006, he observed that while the counter-
 68. It is worth noting that in some states in Europe terrorists are criminalized without 
a requirement of actus reus being met. This means that terrorist suspects are criminalized at a 
preliminary stage, before any terrorist attack has occurred. In the Netherlands, for instance, 
terrorists could be criminalized subjectively based on their terrorist purpose alone. For 
further elaboration on European legislation and the criticism against such legislation see 
Elies Van Sliedregt, European Approaches to Fighting Terrorism, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 413, 424-26 (2010) (arguing it does not comply with the presumption of innocence). 
 69. For a review of the applicability of certain counter-terrorism conventions to cases 
of cyber-terrorism and a specific analysis of the Financing Convention in that respect, see 
Aviv Cohen, Cyberterrorism: Are We Legally Ready? 9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 1 (2010). 
 70. See the status of ratifications and reservations on the UNODC website. 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/
Special/1999%20International%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20the
%20Financing%20of%20Terrorism.pdf. 
 71. Bales, supra note 13, at 176; Stephens, supra note 30, at 461; Martinez, supra
note 13, at 6.
 72. Young, supra note 46, at 65. 
2012] Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court 235
terrorism conventions were “norm creating,” they were still far from the 
threshold of creating a customary prohibition.73
This observation is still valid today. While the Financing Convention 
enjoys a large number of state parties to meet the ‘state practice’ 
requirement of customary international law, the second element, ‘opinio 
juris,’ is harder to satisfy. As Professor Naomi Norberg pointed out, the 
definition in the Financing Convention cannot be said to represent 
consensus since the overwhelming majority of state parties joined the 
convention only after the terrorist attack of 9/11 because United Nation 
Security Council Resolution 1373 required them to do so.74 Thus, the 
motives behind the signing of the convention could be attributed to the legal 
obligation on states to comply with Security Council resolutions adopted 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, rather than to a sense of obligation to 
suppress the financing of terrorism as defined in this convention.  
This is a compelling argument, although the magnitude of the events of 
9/11 makes it difficult to determine whether and to what degree they had an 
effect on the great number of states who subsequently joined the 
convention. It is possible to argue that 9/11 was a turning point in how most 
countries in the world treated terrorism, and a thorough survey of state 
behavior before and after 9/11 may support this claim. It is worth noting 
that the STL Appeal Chamber found that opinio juris does exist through 
examining legislation and decisions of domestic courts from countries all 
over the world.75 In any event, whether the definition does or does not rise 
to the normative level of customary international law does not diminish 
from the value of its wide acceptance.  
With respect to the Draft Comprehensive Convention, the greatest 
advantage of the Financing Convention over it is implied in the difference 
between their names. The Financing Convention has already been in force 
for more than a decade; it is a finished product. It is also worth noting that 
the definition of terrorist act in the Draft Comprehensive Convention is built 
upon the definition in the Financing Convention. Thus, as long as the Draft 
Comprehensive Convention remains a “draft” and the support for the 
Financing Convention remains almost universal, the reminder of the 
analysis will use the definition of terrorist acts as referred to in the 
 73. Id.
 74. Naomi Norberg, Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects 
for a Future Together, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 11, 25 (2010). 
 75. This determination was made with respect to what the STL defined as the 
international crime of terrorism under customary international law, which, as was discussed 
earlier, corresponds to the elements in the definition of the Financing Convention. See STL 
Appeal Chamber decision, supra note 49, ¶ 100. The Appeal Chamber continued explaining 
that the practice of states to prevent and punish acts of terrorism is “evidence of a belief of 
States that the punishment of terrorism responds to a social necessity (opinio necessitateis) 
and is hence rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule requiring it (opinio juris).” Id. ¶ 
102. 
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Financing Convention to form the basis of the future definition of the 
international crime of terrorism. 
A word of caution is in order here. In the legal discourse the same word 
can have different meanings in different contexts. Thus, for example, the 
words “crimes against humanity” mean different things in the context of the 
ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC.76 Thus, finding a meaning to the word 
“terrorism” is only the first step. Importing that meaning from an external 
legal context, such as the Financing Convention, requires examination of 
whether that meaning will be acceptable in a different context. In other 
words, while states widely accepted the aforementioned definition for the 
purpose of the Financing Convention, they may have other interests to take 
into account that preclude adopting the same definition for ICC purposes. 
This paper suggests that, in light of the above discussion on the features of 
the definition in the Financing Convention, this definition is not only the 
suitable definition for terrorism per se, but it is also the appropriate 
definition for the crime of terrorism under the scope of ICC jurisdiction.  
III. INCLUDING TERRORISM IN THE ROME STATUTE: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
The Rome Statute includes instructions on how to amend it. These 
instructions are divided into amendments regarding the bodies of the ICC77
and amendments regarding the scope and substance of the Court’s 
jurisdiction.78 Paragraph 1 of Article 121 sets forth that the first 
amendments were to be suggested seven years after the entry into force of 
 76. Compare Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia art. 5, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (defining “crimes 
against humanity” to be any of the following crimes committed in armed conflict and 
directed against any civilian population: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; 
imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; or other 
inhumane acts) with Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, S.C. 
Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (defining “crimes against humanity” to be 
any of the following when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: murder; 
extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on 
political, racial and religious grounds; or other inhumane acts), and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 7 (defining “crimes against humanity” to be 
any of the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: murder; 
extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or 
other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international 
law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparative gravity; persecution against 
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender; enforced disappearance of persons; apartheid; or other inhumane acts of a similar 
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health). 
 77. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 122.
 78. Id. art. 121. 
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the Rome Statute, which was the legal basis for the amendments made in 
the Review Conference last summer.79 Once the seven years period has 
passed, Article 121 does not set any additional time limits for proposing 
amendments. Thus, any State Party may propose an amendment to include 
terrorism as a crime under Article 5 of the Statute at any given time.80
Of course, this kind of a proposal does not pop up out of the blue. Prior 
to submitting an official proposal there will need to be some behind the 
scenes diplomatic efforts to get the support of State Parties for such a move. 
Once an official proposal is made, the Assembly of States Parties, the 
legislative body of the ICC, decides whether to take up the proposal or not.81
The Assembly meets on an annual basis with the next meeting at the time of 
writing, its tenth session, scheduled to take place in December, 2011. In 
addition, Article 121 allows the States Parties to convene a special review 
conference in addition to its annual meetings, so in theory, a suggestion to 
include terrorism in the Rome Statute could be discussed as soon as the 
Assembly next convenes.  
An amendment may be adopted by a consensus or a two-thirds majority 
of States Parties.82 If changes are made in the list of offenses or in their 
definitions, the ICC will exercise jurisdiction only with respect to States 
Parties that have accepted these amendments.83 In cases where the 
amendment was welcomed by an overwhelming majority of seven-eighths 
States Parties, just short of unanimous, approximately 100 out of the current 
114 States Parties, then the opposing state may immediately withdraw from 
the entire Statute.84
The procedure with respect to including terrorism as a crime in the Rome 
Statute is quite simple. It will take two thirds of the States Parties to approve 
such an amendment to the Rome Statute in order for it to be adopted, and it 
can happen as soon as a single State Party puts a suggestion of this sort on 
the table. There are currently no procedural obstacles preventing terrorism 
from being included in the Rome Statute as a matter of principle. However, 
the politics and diplomacy efforts undertaken to get the support for such a 
proposal may prove to overshadow any notions of optimism and enhance 
the conclusion that amending the Rome Statute is as much a political move 
as it is a legal one.  
 79. Review Conference, supra note 43. 
 80. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 190 (2004). 
 81. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(2). 
 82. Id. art. 121(3).
 83. Id. art. 121(5). 
 84. Id. art. 121(6). 
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IV. INCLUDING TERRORISM IN THE ROME STATUTE: SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
ASPECTS
While the procedure for amending the Rome Statute is, at least on its 
face, clear and straightforward, the substance of such an amendment is 
anything but those superlatives. Generally speaking, there are two ways in 
which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over terrorism as an international 
crime.85 The first is through introducing an independent crime of terrorism 
as a fifth crime under Article 5. This is a rocky road, which involves 
defining the crime and whether or not it should include a reference to 
existing international counter-terrorism conventions. The second way to 
include terrorism within ICC jurisdiction is through interpreting the 
language of existing crimes as lending itself to terrorism. While this may 
seem much more appealing in that it does not require changes to the Rome 
Statute, it nonetheless raises serious questions of treaty interpretation, as 
well as questions of policy. Specifically, this concerns the purpose that 
underlies the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute—is it to accomplish 
prosecution of terrorists with less importance attributed to the actual 
charges; or is it to prosecute terrorists because they are terrorists? This latter 
path is more problematic. The following part will explore both these 
avenues. 
A. An Independent Crime 
One alternative to encompass terrorist acts within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC is the direct and explicit way of introducing a new crime into the Rome 
Statute according to the amendment procedure. The new crime could be 
structured similarly to the suggestion made at the Rome Conference by 
introducing a general definition of the offense as well as reference to the 
offenses under existing international counter-terrorism conventions. As 
noted above, this is the approach in the Financing Convention, and thus, the 
new crime would be consistent with the existing counter-terror regime. 
A standalone crime of terrorism sounds more dramatic than it really is, 
assuming it follows the definition in the Financing Convention. Out of the 
114 States Parties to the ICC, 108 are either parties, signatories, or both to 
the Financing Convention, with the six exceptions being Chad, Gambia, 
Saint Lucia, Suriname, Timor Leste, and Zambia. Thus, 94.7% percent of 
ICC State Parties have already acknowledged that terrorist acts are those 
falling within this definition. The only innovation of this crime within the 
Rome Statute will be to introduce ICC jurisdiction over it. Regardless, a 
State Party may refuse to accept the application of the new amendment. For 
states like India, which is currently not a State Party to the ICC but is to the 
Financing Convention and was one of the more adamant participants in the 
 85. Stephens, supra note 30, at 479.
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Rome Conference favoring the inclusion of terrorism within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC, this may provide an incentive to consider joining the ICC. 
The same analysis can be made with respect to any of the international 
counter-terrorism conventions referred to with respect to the crime of 
terrorism. Contrary to concerns raised by at least one commentator,86 there 
is no need for a perfect correlation between the States Parties to the ICC and 
the States Parties to each and every one of these conventions. This is true as 
long as the nature of the reference to other conventions is to create a list of 
illustrative examples of terrorist acts and not to import all the obligations in 
those said conventions.  
A model formulation of the offense according to the above guidelines 
could potentially be: 
Article 8ter: Crime of Terrorism 
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over acts of terrorism. 
2. For the purpose of this Statute, “terrorism” includes, but is not limited 
to: 
a. An offense according to [specified international counter-terrorism 
conventions] 
b. act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, 
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a 
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature 
or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or 
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.  
B. Terrorism as Part of Existing Crimes 
Certain acts of terrorism might fulfill the requirements of the core crimes 
and thus be within the jurisdiction of the ICC, even if not under the title of 
“terrorist acts.”87 This brings about the matter of treaty interpretation. When 
interpreting an international treaty, such as the Rome Statute, the principal 
guidelines are found in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention),88 which are widely considered as 
reflecting customary international law. Article 31 gives preference to the 
treaty’s text, and Article 32 expands the interpreter’s tool kit to include also 
the negotiating history and preparatory work of the treaty (travaux 
préparatories).  
 86. Neil Boister, Treaty Crimes, International Criminal Court?, 12 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 341, 348 (2009). 
 87. Martinez, supra note 13, at 19. 
 88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31 and 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
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Whenever the matter of treaty interpretation arises, there will always 
exist a tension between two basic points of view: whether to use the text in 
its literal meaning as understood at the time the treaty was concluded; or to 
look at the purpose the text was attempting to achieve and, thus, pour new 
meanings into it as circumstances change, and realities pose new challenges 
not envisioned at the time of drafting.  
Treaty interpretation in the field of criminal law is to be carried out with 
even greater caution as the consequences for the accused may be 
irreversible.89 The basic principle of criminal law, international and 
domestic, that of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege prohibits punishing a person for 
conduct that was not considered an offense at the time of its commission. 
Thus, beginning to interpret an existing crime to encompass behavior that it 
was not supposed to include, in our case acts of terrorism, is highly 
problematic. Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute addresses this issue and 
explicitly calls for strict interpretation of the offenses and precludes their 
expansion by way of analogy.90 Interpreting the crimes of the Rome Statute 
must also rely on the guidelines set forth in the Elements of Crimes, a 
document elaborating on each element of the offenses designed to assist the 
Court in the interpretation and application of those provisions.91  
The prudent approach does not come without a cost. If we stick to the 
plain language of the offenses in the Rome Statute we may lose some of the 
normative value of prosecuting terrorists as such. Terrorist acts can take 
many forms. What characterizes an act as terrorism and not as “merely” 
criminal is the intention behind it and the political motives it aims to 
achieve. While common criminal acts carry a private purpose, such as 
vendetta or passion, terrorist acts derive from political or ideological 
purposes.92 Prosecuting terrorists as murders,93 even as a crime against 
humanity, may not take this special intent into consideration and, thus, 
could raise serious doubts as to the benefits of such prosecution in the first 
  
 89. In this context see note by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Stanislav 
Gali , Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion of Trial Chamber I, ¶ 93 (Dec. 5, 2003), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4147fb1c4.html. 
 90. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(2). For a discussion on how Article 22(2) was 
constructed as a reaction to the “liberal” interpretation endorsed by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, see SCHABAS, supra note 80, at 93-95. 
 91. Consistent with Article 9 of the Rome Statute. 
 92. Nagle, supra note 37, at 351-52; STL Appeal Chamber decision, supra note 49, 
¶106. It should be noted that the STL Appeal Chamber acknowledged that this element of 
terrorist acts appears inconsistently and differently among states’ legislation and judicial 
decision, and thus this element does not arise to form part of the customary international law 
definition of terrorism.  
 93. Murder is a criminal offence in virtually every criminal legal system. It can also 
be prosecuted in the ICC as a crime against humanity, as set forth in Article 7(1)(a) of the 
Rome Statute. 
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place94 although it could come into play in later stages such as in the 
sentencing.95
What stems from the above discussion is an exclamation mark and a 
question mark that are inseparable from the following offense-specific 
analysis. The exclamation mark stands for the reminder that the language of 
the relevant provision does not tolerate much linguistic and legal juggling. 
Even if the offense as is may encompass the terrorist act, there is a question 
mark as to whether it is also capable of expressing the special intent 
accompanying it. With these in mind we now turn to examine each of the 
current four crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC: genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Using the three 
case studies presented earlier, the analysis examines to what extent the ICC 
could have provided an alternative recourse to the one that was taken. 
1. Genocide 
Based on the definition in the Genocide Convention,96 Article 6 of the 
Rome Statute defines genocide as one of five possible behaviors when 
committed with a special genocidal intent—“to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” Some terrorist acts 
would fill the requirements of at least some of the enumerated acts, such as 
“killing members of the group”97 or “causing serious bodily… to members 
of the group.”98 For instance, in all three case studies people were killed, but 
were they “members of a group?” The Israeli athletes were undoubtedly 
members of a distinct national group. The victims of Pan Am flight 103 and 
9/11 can be said to belong to a much larger group, that of Westerners, or 
arguably American nationals since both incidents were carried out against 
American dominant targets.  
Even if the terrorist act was committed against members of a distinct 
group, it would have a much harder time meeting the specific intent 
requirement.99 The purpose of terrorist acts is rarely the annihilation of the 
victimized group.100 Instead, and as exhibited in the definition of terrorism 
in the Financing Convention, terrorists use the deaths and injuries they 
cause as leverage to achieve another goal, and those deaths and injuries are 
not an end in itself. There may be exceptions, such as in the case of 
Hezbollah, a terrorist organization that had declared that one of its primary 
goals was to destroy the State of Israel, thus arguably qualifying as intent to 
 94. ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 193; Boister, supra note 86, at 356. 
 95. Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 530. 
 96. Genocide Convention, supra note 20.
 97. Rome Statute, supra note 2, Article 6(a). 
 98. Id. art. 6(b).
 99. Martinez, supra note 13, at 25; ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 300. 
 100. ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 300. 
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destroy part of the religious group of Jews or national group of Israelis.101 
Whether their terrorist acts actually amount to destroying “part” of the 
group is a different question.102 
Returning to the three case studies, the stated purpose of the Munich 
massacre was the release of Palestinian prisoners, not the destruction of the 
Israeli people. In the cases of Pan Am flight 103 and 9/11, on the other 
hand, the purpose of the acts was to hurt American interests as part of a 
larger campaign against the West in general and the U.S. in particular. Thus, 
it is possible to argue that, on its face, the perpetrators of both Pan Am flight 
103 and 9/11 possessed genocidal intent.  
There is, however, an uneasy feeling left by this conclusion. This is 
because comparing the historical examples of genocide with both Pan Am 
flight 103 and 9/11, as devastating as those latter events were, is not a 
straightforward equivalence. Even though Article 6 satisfies itself with 
destroying not the entire group but only part of it, it seems that this part 
should be substantial, whether in percentage of the entire group or because 
of the quality of the victims (i.e. all the political, religious or spiritual 
leadership of the group).103 Neither the victims of Pan Am flight 103 nor the 
victims of 9/11 meet this understanding of the term “part.” 
2. Crimes Against Humanity 
Of all the core crimes currently under the jurisdiction of the ICC, crimes 
against humanity require the least legal juggling in order to lend itself to 
terrorism.104 There are many commentators who believe that terrorism could 
be prosecuted under crimes against humanity as currently formulated in 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute and thereby overcome the definitional 
obstacles.105 The strong support for considering terrorism a crime against 
humanity is due to what the definition in Article 7 does not include—a 
requirement that the acts will be committed within the context of war.106 
  
 101. Id. at 301. 
 102. In this regard the STL Appeal Chamber noted that the victims of fear, terror or 
panic “need not necessarily make up the whole population.” STL Appeal Chamber decision, 
supra note 49, ¶ 112. 
 103. This is the approach adopted by the United States Statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 
(2011). See also Prosecutor v. Krsti , Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment of the Appeals 
Chamber, ¶ 8 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf. 
 104. Stephens, supra note 30, at 479. 
 105. Much, supra note 13, at 127; Boister, supra note 86, at 356; Mazandaran, supra 
note 13, at 527; Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 14, at 15; Proulx, supra note 46, at 1012. 
 106. By this, the ICC has followed the path created by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, which for the first time omitted the war nexus that was found in 
definitions of crimes against humanity until that point. See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. 
O’SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
955-61 (2010); ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 273. 
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Thus, the definition of crimes against humanity may encompass terrorist 
acts that are committed during peace times, as is often the case. 
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute includes several elements in the 
definition of crime against humanity: the commission of any of the acts 
specified in paragraphs (a)-(k); a requirements that the act will be 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; that the attack 
should be directed against civilian population; and the perpetrator must have 
knowledge of the attack. The following paragraphs will discuss each of 
these four elements. 
First, terrorist acts need to fit into one of the eleven acts enumerated in 
Article 7(1). Those eleven acts are divided into ten specific acts and one 
catch-all phrase in paragraph (k). Of the ten specific acts listed in 
paragraphs (a) through (j), the general notion is that different manifestations 
of terrorism could fit into at least four, those being murder,107 torture,108
persecution,109 and imprisonment and deprivation of liberty.110 In all three 
case studies the perpetrators could have been charged with multiple acts of 
murders. 
Paragraph (k) sets forth that crimes against humanity could also be 
“other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” On the 
one hand, terrorist acts, whether they are executed through detonation of 
bombs, taking of hostages, or any other violent manner, are of the same 
nature as those that the Article spells out.111 On the other hand, the history 
and development of crimes against humanity, dating back to the Nuremburg 
Charter, reveals that this crime developed against the background of crimes 
against peace and war crimes. Thus, it can be argued that there is no ground 
to assert that terrorism, a concept well established at that time crimes 
against humanity were recognized, was intended in any way to be included 
under this category.112 The latter approach seems more suitable to the spirit 
of strict interpretation of Article 22(2) as discussed earlier. 
The second element constituting a crime against humanity is that the act 
be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack. This may prove 
to be a difficult standard to meet in the case of terrorist acts.113 While single 
terrorist acts are usually the expression of a larger radical campaign, the 
 107. Martinez, supra note 13, at 28-32; Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 531; ARNOLD,
supra note 13, at 262. 
 108. Martinez, supra note 13, at 28-32; Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 531; ARNOLD,
supra note 13, at 268. 
 109. Martinez, supra note 13, at 28-32; ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 269. 
 110. Martinez, supra note 13, at 28-32; ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 266. 
 111. Martinez, supra note 13, at 28-32; Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 531; ARNOLD,
supra note 13, at 271.
 112. Bales, supra note 13, at 182. 
 113. Martinez, supra note 13, at 33; Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 533; ARNOLD,
supra note 13, at 263.
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question arises as to the nature of the required linkage between a single 
attack and that larger plan. More specifically, how much distance between 
the larger plan and the single act can the provision tolerate? Is the general 
campaign of radical Islam against the West sufficient to render every 
isolated terrorist attack carried out by a Muslim “part of a widespread or 
systematic attack?”114 How much time can elapse between two terrorist acts 
but still make them part of a general greater plan?115 In cases where the 
perpetrators of a terrorist attack are not affiliated with a larger terrorist 
organization, or if no such organization have claimed responsibility for the 
attack, this requirements is even harder to satisfy.116
In the case of the Munich massacre, the responsible terrorist 
organization, the “Black September,” indeed carried out other attacks 
against Israeli targets, but it also operated against Jordanian targets and 
attacked the Saudi embassy in Sudan. Do the different agendas of the Black 
September render the Munich massacre not part of a widespread or 
systematic attack? Or is it possible to argue that one terrorist organization 
can carry out several widespread or systematic attacks? The preferable way 
will be to argue in favor of the second option, that attacks of several 
different spheres of interests do not exclude each of them as constituting a 
widespread or systematic attack in itself.  
The Lockerbie incident of Pan Am flight 103 is more difficult to handle. 
The investigation did reveal Libya’s involvement in the attack, but Libya 
did not admit to its part only until a few years had passed. Furthermore, 
while Libya’s name was mentioned as a state sponsor of terrorists, this 
attack seemed to be an isolated attack, and there is no evidence of a 
widespread or systematic attack on behalf of Libya against American 
targets. This is in contrast to the events of 9/11, which were another incident 
in a long chain of terrorist attacks of Al-Qaeda against American targets.117
The third element of Article 7(1) requires the attack to be directed 
against any civilian population. As further explained in Article 7(2)(a), this 
means that the act must be pursuant to some sort of organizational policy, 
not necessarily attributed to a state. This means that terrorist organizations 
with a clear policy to attack civilians will fall within the scope of the 
Article. Terrorist acts are, by the definition adopted above,118 directed 
 114. It should be reminded that in the context of ICC jurisdiction, due to the threshold 
barriers, not every isolated terrorist attack would end up in the ICC, but if such an attack 
would, then the question of the larger campaign would arise.  
115. Compare to the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on “pattern of racketeering 
activity” which may, in some circumstances, consist even of two or more acts that were 
committed within the period of ten years. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990); H.J., 
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 
785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 116. Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 533. 
 117. Proulx, supra note 46, at 1039, 1068-69. 
 118. See supra § 3.2. 
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towards civilian population.119 Whether or not they are committed in 
furtherance of an organizational policy is a different question, one that 
involves similar problems as the second condition aforementioned, and it 
will be left to be tested on a case-by-case basis. 
In the three examples of this discussion, it is clear that all of them were 
attacks directed against a civilian population. The organizational policy 
requirement is easier to meet in the cases of Black September and Al-
Qaeda; both are terrorist organizations whose stated purposes and repertoire 
of acts clearly illustrate that they target civilians. Whether the Libyan 
government had a policy of committing terrorist acts will be harder to 
prove, and it is also related to the difficulty stemming from the second 
condition discussed above, that the Pan Am flight 103 was an isolated 
event.120 A single incident does not point to the existence of a general 
policy, and more indications of terrorist attacks furthered by Libya will be 
needed to make the case.  
With respect to the fourth element of Article 7, the requirement of 
knowledge that the terrorist act is part of a larger attack means that the 
accused has a sense of the overall context in which he or she is operating.121
This should not pose insurmountable problems if the connection to a 
terrorist organization has already been proven. As distinct from the case of a 
state or government policy, terrorist organizations usually declare publicly 
and take pride in their violent agenda, thus rendering any lack of knowledge 
to a minimum. Both Black September and Al-Qaeda follow this pattern, 
have claimed responsibility for past attacks, and use anti-western sentiments 
in their recruiting mechanisms. Indeed, when the sole purpose of the 
organization is to carry out terrorist attacks, it will be difficult to argue that 
a person did not know his actions are part of the widespread or systematic 
attack. 
The conclusion from the above analysis is that while terrorist acts seem 
to intuitively correlate to the notion of crime against humanity, the actual 
application of the requirements in Article 7 of the Rome Statute to acts of 
terrorism is not a perfect fit. Even the most blunt and clear terrorist attacks, 
such as the Munich massacre, the Pan Am flight 103 bombing, and 9/11, 
will encounter difficulties if prosecuted under Article 7. Much depends 
upon the circumstances of the specific attack and the strength of the 
connection between it and a larger plan by a terrorist organization and other 
terrorist acts that organization has executed.  
 119. Martinez, supra note 13, at 33. 
 120. Isolated, though it could arguably be connected to the Berlin discotheque 
bombing of April 5, 1986, in which a bomb was placed in discotheque frequented by 
members of the United States Armed Forces. Libya was blamed for this incident, and the 
U.S. retaliated with bombing cities in Libya. No individual was ever charged or prosecuted 
as being responsible for this event.  
 121. Proulx, supra note 46, at 1062. 
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Before moving on to examine the next core crime, it should be noted that 
there is a possibility of adding terrorism as a separate act to the list in 
Article 7(1). This will enable the creation of a crime that will include a 
requirement of the special motivation of terrorist acts, thus addressing the 
symbolic matter of prosecuting terrorists. However, it will not solve any of 
the aforementioned difficulties as this offense will still be subject to the 
general requirements of the Article. 
3. War Crimes 
War crimes are unlawful acts committed during an armed conflict.122
They are defined in Article 8 of the Rome Statute, which distinguishes 
between war crimes committed during the course of an international armed 
conflict123 and those committed during an armed conflict not of an 
international character.124 Hence, for terrorist acts to be regarded as war 
crimes, the first requirement is that an armed conflict exists, and then the 
question arises as to the classification of that armed conflict as international 
or non-international. This distinction is of great importance as it determines 
which set of rules will apply and, consequently, whether a certain behavior 
will be considered as a war crime.  
The Rome Statute itself does not provide a definition of what constitutes 
an armed conflict of either type. Thus, the Court has to resort to “the 
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict.”125 This refers to the Geneva Conventions126 and their Additional 
Protocols.127 Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions characterizes an 
international armed conflict as occurring between states.128 This is a 
relatively easy and objective test to be determined,129 although more 
 122. Luban et al., supra note 106, at 1037. 
 123. Rome Statute, supra note 2, Article 8(2)(a)-(b).
 124. Id., art. 8(2)(c)-(f). 
 125. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 205 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF.
 126. Geneva Convention for the Armed Forces, supra note 35; Geneva Convention 
for the Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 35; Geneva Convention for Persons in Time of War, 
supra note 35; Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War, supra note 35. 
 127. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 128. Geneva Convention for the Armed Forces, supra note 35, art. 2; Geneva 
Convention for the Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 35, art. 2; Geneva Convention for 
Persons in Time of War, supra note 35, art. 2; Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War,
supra note 35, art. 2.
 129. CURRIE, supra note 64, at 136. 
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controversial examples could arise, such as in the case of the unilateral 
declaration of independence of Kosovo. 
The law of armed conflict addresses non-international armed conflicts in 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as well as in Additional 
Protocol I. Common Article 3 sets forth a minimum standard that should 
apply to non-international armed conflicts. It confines its scope of 
application to any armed conflict involving only one state (or, arguably, no 
state entity) and a limited geographical scope. This wide definition of non-
international armed conflict was narrowed in Additional Protocol II.130
Article 2 of Additional Protocol II excludes from the application of the 
protocol “situation(s) of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.”131
There is no minimum threshold with respect to the length or intensity of the 
conflict. The only condition that is required is that the non-state actor will 
exhibit some form of structure and hierarchy.  
As a matter of practice, it is quite difficult to identify modern armed 
conflicts as belonging to one type or the other. One of the more recent and 
particularly atrocious of armed conflicts, the Balkan war in the early 1990s, 
offers a fitting example of this difficulty. As the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia’s Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case observed— 
In 1993, when the Statute was drafted, the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia could have been characterized as both internal and 
international, or alternatively, as an internal conflict alongside an 
international one, or as an internal conflict that had become 
internationalized because of external support, or as an international 
conflict that had subsequently been replaced by one or more internal 
conflicts, or some combination thereof.132
This complex issue is worthy of its own extensive examination. The 
following analysis will examine the possibility of terrorist acts be 
considered as war crimes in both scenarios, assuming that the existence of 
an armed conflict has been proved.  
The second tier of the examination is to see if terrorist acts can constitute 
any of the listed war crimes.133 Following the definition in the Financing 
 130. Additional Protocol II, supra note 121, art. 1. 
 131. Id. art. 2. 
 132. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal of Jurisdiction, ¶ 72 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Oct. 2, 1995), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=search&amp; 
docid=47fdfb520&amp;skip=0&amp;query=IT-94-1-I.
 133. It is worth noting that in contrast to the Rome Statute, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention as well as both Additional Protocols do include a specific prohibition against 
terrorism within their scope. See Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (“No protected 
person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective 
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”). Article 
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Convention, which highlights that terrorist acts are committed against 
civilian population or against persons not taking direct part in hostilities, the 
answer is affirmative. Each category of crimes includes, as a war crime, the 
intentional targeting and killing or injuring any of these protected persons,134 
in accordance with one of the fundamental principles of the laws of armed 
conflict—the principle of distinction, or noncombatant immunity.135 This is 
also supported by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Gali  case, which held 
that prohibition against terror is a specific prohibition within the general 
prohibition of attack on civilians.136 
The conclusion of this analysis is that terrorist acts, as defined above, 
may be prosecuted as war crimes, conditioned upon the existence of an 
armed conflict, whether an international or non-international. Some authors 
claim that most terrorist acts are committed in times of peace.137 The STL 
Appeal Chamber also stated that the extent of the customary rule of an 
international crime of terrorism extends only to terrorist acts committed in 
times of peace.138 For instance, there was no non-international armed 
conflict between Israel and Black September139 and no international armed 
conflict between Libya and the United States.  
On the other hand, the vast majority of terrorist bombings in the last 
decade occurred in Iraq during the war. Additionally, the case of 9/11 
illustrates another challenge because Al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin-Laden, 
already declared war on the United States in his infamous fatwa from 1996, 
and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 seems to be another example of 
this non-international armed conflict emerging before 9/11. 
Even if 9/11 and other terrorist acts are perceived as part of an armed 
conflict, the prohibition on targeting protected persons in times of hostilities 
  
51(2) of AP1 and Article 13(2) of AP2 use identical language and state that “[t]he civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited.” The Appeal Chamber of the ICTY recognized that these 
provisions reflect customary international law. See Prosecutor v. Gali , Case No. IT-98-29-
A, Appeal Chamber: Judgment, ¶86-88 (Nov. 30, 2006). 
 134. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(a)(iii), 8(2)(b)(i), 
8(2)(c)(i), 8(2)(e)(i). 
 135. Luban et al., supra note 106, at 1040. 
 136. This was said with respect to Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I. See Gali  
Trial Chamber I, supra note 89, ¶ 98 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 
2003), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4147fb1c4.html. 
 137. ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 194. 
 138. STL Appeal Chamber decision, supra note 49, ¶ 107. 
 139. However, it is worth noting that in 2006 the Israeli Supreme Court classified the 
conflict between Israel and Hamas as an international armed conflict, even though Hamas 
was not acting on behalf of an independent sovereign state. Thus, one could make a parallel 
argument with regard to Black September, although the circumstances of the two 
organizations are quite different, as Black September targeted sites outside the context of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Hamas is not. See HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture 
in Israel v. Gov. of Israel, ¶ 21, (Dec. 13, 2006). 
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is a very well established regime in international humanitarian law, and it is 
hard to think of a case that will not be covered under this protection until 
terrorist acts will also be included within it. Thus, the added value of 
declaring that terrorist acts can be prosecuted as war crimes will not result 
in prosecuting cases that until now were left unaddressed.  
4. The Crime of Aggression 
The Review Conference held in the summer of 2010 adopted a definition 
of the crime of aggression,140 which will be in force with respect to the 
States Parties that have ratified it in accordance with the amendment 
procedure described above.141 The new Article 8bis defines the crime of 
aggression as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person 
in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”142
This definition consists of several key elements of crucial importance to 
the consideration of terrorist acts as crimes of aggression.143 First, the act of 
aggression is defined as an act of a state.144 Thus, a first step is to determine 
that a state committed an act of aggression, and only then would certain 
individuals be liable for the crime of aggression.145 This observation stands 
at the heart of many controversies as to what body will determine the 
existence of an act of aggression on the part of a state, one choice being the 
Security Council the other is the ICC itself; and what will be the nature of 
the relationship between this external political decision, or lack thereof, on 
the actions of the Prosecutor.146
The reference to acts of states excludes individual members of non-state 
terrorist organizations from the scope of jurisdiction and, thus, effectively 
leaves out the majority of terrorist acts.147 In this respect it is worth 
mentioning that the Security Council has regarded a non-state actor as an 
aggressor at least in one case in the late 1970s.148 In addition, few 
 140. Review Conference, supra note 43, at 18. 
 141. See Part 4, supra.
 142. Review Conference, supra note 43, at 18.
 143. For a historical survey of the development of the legal definition of criminal 
aggression and its main elements, see Petty, supra note 38; Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling 
the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 551 
(2007).
 144. Review Conference, supra note 43, at 21. 
 145. Judith Lichtenberg, The Crime of Aggression and the International Criminal 
Court, 13 TILBURG FOREIGN L. REV. 160, 165 (2006). 
 146. For further elaboration on this point, see id.
 147. Martinez, supra note 13, at 50. 
 148. S.C. Res. 405, U.N. Doc. S/RES/405 (Apr. 14, 1977) (involving aggression 
against Benin). 
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commentators regarded acts of aggression as acts that can be carried out by 
states or “similar entities.”149 However, these sources cannot by themselves 
indicate any change or a nascent perception of the ability of non-state actors 
to carry out acts of aggression and, thus, the ability of their members to be 
liable for the crime of aggression. 
Out of the three case studies examined in this paper, the Munich 
massacre and 9/11 cannot be considered as acts of aggression because they 
were not perpetrated by a state. Within the relatively narrow spectrum of 
terrorist acts committed by agents of a state against another state, it can be 
argued that acts such as the Lockerbie case meet the definition of 
aggression. By exploding a bomb over British soil, Libya arguably 
committed an act of aggression against the United Kingdom, and by 
exploding an American courier it can similarly be argued that it committed 
an act of aggression against the United States. Thus, both the United 
Kingdom and the United States could have viewed Libya’s leaders’ 
furtherance of the Pan Am flight 103 bombing as a crime of aggression.  
C. Including the Crime of Terrorism in the Rome Statute: A      
Summation 
The above analysis demonstrates the problems involved with trying to fit 
terrorist acts into existing molds of the current core crimes. Each one of the 
four crimes described was designed to deal with certain circumstances, and 
terrorist acts do not always manifest themselves in such a manner. The 
crime of genocide poses a difficult challenge with respect to the special 
intention it requires, as terrorists usually seek to change the status quo rather 
than to annihilate a protected group. Crimes against humanity are arguably 
the most suitable format to prosecute terrorist acts although they also 
require a wider context of a wide spread or systematic attack and, thus, raise 
the threshold for the more common isolated terrorist acts. While these may 
meet the gravity threshold in and of themselves, the lack of a broader 
campaign prevents them from being tried as crimes against humanity. War 
crimes are conditioned upon the existence of an armed conflict and, thus, 
will not encompass terrorist acts committed in times of peace; the newly 
introduced crime of aggression excludes terrorist acts committed by non-
state actors, thus casting serious doubts as to its relevancy to most acts of 
terrorism. Taken together, it appears that prosecution of terrorist acts will be 
more likely to succeed under a separate individual crime of terrorism with 
due regard to the challenges this avenue poses.  
 149. Ferencz, supra note 143, at 562.
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V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The previous section presented the various options to incorporate 
terrorism into the Rome Statute, either explicitly or through interpretation of 
existing crimes. Like most things in the realm of international relations and 
international law, where there is a will there is a way. If states will fully 
commit to using the ICC as means to suppress terrorist acts, they will adopt 
any of the abovementioned legal platforms to do so. The problem then 
comes to generating the will. This part will explore the pros and cons of 
including terrorism under the auspices of the ICC. Prosecuting terrorists in 
the ICC offers prominent advantages, and encompasses various issues, from 
the rights of the accused to the normative message it represents. However, 
there are practical downsides that should not be underestimated. 
A. Advantages of ICC Jurisdiction over Terrorism  
The ICC’s advantages in terms of legal procedure are fairly clear.150
Compared to some national legal systems, some of which are ineffective or 
are perceived as ineffective, the ICC provides a more capable forum.151 The 
ICC provides the highest standards of due process and secures the rights of 
the accused to an extent that terrorist suspects will probably not enjoy 
elsewhere.152 The ICC also allows a great deal of victims’ participation in 
the proceedings, a concept that is foreign at least in common law systems 
and may generate wide public support for prosecuting terrorists in the ICC 
as opposed to national forums.153
From the point of view of States Parties, the ICC offers a neutral and 
impartial forum and will enable them to discard any judicial and political 
impasses that they would have encountered had they pursued the 
prosecution in national courts.154 From the other side of the coin, the ICC 
provides a solution to a situation where a terrorist attack affects several 
States Parties which hold competing claims of jurisdiction.155
While important and viable, this argument is also slightly naïve as 
illustrated by Vincent-Joel Proulx, who argued that if the ICC had been in 
 150. For more thorough review of the procedural aspects of the ICC, see M. CHERIF 
BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 522-23 (2003). 
 151. Neil Boister, supra note 86, at 341. 
 152. Bales, supra note 13, at 189; Kathleen Maloney-Dunn, Humanizing Terrorism 
Through International Criminal Law: Equal Justice for Victims, Fair Treatment of Suspects, 
and Fundamental Human Rights at the ICC, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 69, 74 (2010); 
Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 540; Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 14, at 23. 
 153. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 152, at 74. The issue of victims’ participation is 
discussed at length in SCHABAS, supra note 80, at 171-75. 
 154. Bales, supra note 13, at 189; Stephens, supra note 30, at 480-481; Much, supra
note 13, at 135; Boister, supra note 86, at 355.
 155. Matthew Lippman, The New Terrorism and International Law, 10 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 297, 354 (2003). 
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place during the Lockerbie incidents, Gaddafi would have surrendered the 
Libyan nationals to the ICC.156 While states may be suspicious of other 
states’ judicial systems trying their own nationals, the notion that Gaddafi 
and other leaders of his sort would have trusted the ICC is, at best, 
farfetched. We are now experiencing the living proof of this point as the 
recent events in Libya and the international intervention against Gaddafi 
included a statement by the Prosecutor that he will start an investigation of 
the situation in Libya beginning February 15, 2011.157 The prospects of 
Gaddafi surrendering to the ICC are not promising. It is more plausible that 
the ICC will come into play between several like-minded countries with a 
common interest in ICC prosecution than by third world leaders on their 
own initiative surrendering their nationals to the ICC. 
Examining ICC jurisdiction over terrorism from a counter-terrorism 
standpoint also reveals several benefits. The scope of the ICC jurisdiction 
will cover members of terrorist groups that hold powerful positions within a 
country’s formal institutions, whether political parties or others.158 This is 
particularly important since in these cases the prospects of national 
prosecutions are virtually null.159
Another important feature that makes the ICC attractive as a counter-
terrorism measure is found in Article 25 of the Rome Statute. According to 
this Article, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction not only over the main 
perpetrator of the offense but also over a wide variety of his accomplices. 
What makes this provision especially important in the terrorism context is 
the fact that many terrorist acts are committed through some sort of suicide 
attacks.160 In these cases the perpetrator himself obviously cannot stand trial, 
but the people who aided and abetted him, incited him, or otherwise 
facilitated the act could.  
Furthermore, ICC jurisdiction over terrorism might strengthen domestic 
enforcement of counter-terrorism measures.161 Evidently, in the relatively 
short period since its establishment, the ICC had the effect of facilitating 
and strengthening domestic initiatives to outlaw the crimes that were under 
its jurisdiction.162 This is arguably due to the aforementioned 
complementarity principle. If states were reluctant to find themselves in The 
Hague with respect to the other core crimes, so as to render their domestic 
 156. Proulx, supra note 46, at 1015-17. 
 157. Press Release, ICC Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Libya (Mar. 2, 2011), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/
statement%20020311.
 158. This assumes that that the country would be a State Party to the ICC, which at the 
current state of events, rules out many key players in the international arena, unless the 
Security Council would refer a case to the ICC.
 159. Bales, supra note 13, at 189; Proulx, supra note 46, at 1018. 
 160. Martinez, supra note 13, at 17. 
 161. Stephens, supra note 30, at 479. 
 162. Id.
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enforcement efforts more effective, the same process could be anticipated 
with respect to terrorism. Not only that, the ICC will set the standard 
regarding prosecution of terrorists and will thus generate cohesiveness and 
legal predictability.163
In this regard, Professor Nagle argued that the lack of cooperation among 
states to extradite terrorist suspects is an obstacle to seeing terrorism as an 
international crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC.164 The point made 
here is exactly the opposite. While states may act suspiciously in a bilateral 
basis, on a multilateral basis, like the ICC, the safeguards against abusing 
rights are higher, and the expectations for cooperation are higher as well. 
Thus, while a state “can get away” with stalling or refusing extradition of 
terrorist suspects to another state, it can be argued that it will not have the 
same leeway to do it before the ICC. In order to avoid being portrayed as 
“unwilling” or “unable,” it is expected that ICC jurisdiction over terrorism 
will increase bilateral cooperation, rather than reflect any lack thereof.  
Finally, on a more normative level, ICC jurisdiction will send a clear 
signal that the international community condemns terrorism in the utmost 
way. ICC jurisdiction will enhance the universal condemnation of terrorist 
acts and will strengthen the rejection of terrorism as a means to bring 
political change.165 As Goldstone and Simpson correctly noted, “the 
important link between peace and prosecution by an impartial court should 
not be underestimated.”166 From a general human rights perspective, ICC 
jurisdiction over acts of terrorism would arguably present an alternative to 
combating terrorism through the use of forceful measures.167
According to this argument, prosecuting Al-Qaeda members in the ICC 
could have been an alternative to United States engagement in Afghanistan 
following 9/11. It would have likewise allowed the Israeli government 
another course of action before resorting to a covert, global manhunt for the 
members of Black September. On the other hand, since the ICC does not 
have its own police force and is dependent on cooperation from Member 
States in surrendering suspects, it could equally be argued that an ICC arrest 
warrant would have still required United States involvement in Afghanistan 
and Israeli covert actions to apprehend the perpetrators, even if only to 
eventually transfer them to The Hague.  
B. Disadvantages of ICC Jurisdiction over Terrorism 
The abovementioned values of prosecuting terrorists in the ICC carry a 
lot of weight. However, they are being overshadowed by practical 
 163. Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 14, at 22. 
 164. Nagle, supra note 37, at 375.
 165. Much, supra note 13, at 135. 
 166. Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 14, at 26. 
 167. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 152, at 74.
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disadvantages. As will be elaborated ahead, the downsides of including 
terrorism within ICC jurisdiction are mostly practical ones and derive their 
strength from the realpolitik of the work of the ICC and cooperation among 
states when it comes to terrorism. 
First and foremost among those is, as mentioned before, the fact that the 
ICC does not have its own police force and is dependent on the good will 
and cooperation of States Parties in every step of the way,168 from sharing 
intelligence, through the collection of evidence, to the apprehension of the 
suspect.169 At the end of the day, if the ICC will not be able to get terrorists 
to stand trial, then why go through all the trouble of a politically sensitive 
problem of generating jurisdiction over terrorism? Instead, it might prove 
more useful to put more effort into strengthening domestic legal systems in 
their fight against terrorism with a tailor made strategy for each country.170
Another practical problem is that the United States is currently not a 
member of the ICC.171 With the United States running its own worldwide 
campaign against terrorists, introducing ICC jurisdiction over terrorist acts 
might create two competing routes. Thus, third states might face a dilemma 
with which of the two to cooperate. Suppose a state party to the Rome 
Statute has apprehended a terrorist suspect that an arrest warrant was issued 
against but is also wanted by the United States; to whom should that state 
surrender the suspect? Which obligation comes first—an obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC or an obligation to respond to an extradition request 
by the United States?172
From the ICC’s own perspective, including terrorism under its 
jurisdiction might not be self-serving. The ICC is a relatively young 
institution that is still developing and proving its credibility and legitimacy. 
It is struggling with claims against it being a court for “African States”173
and with the embarrassing reality of its limited powers, as shown by the 
non-enforced arrest warrant against Al-Bashir. In this context, bringing an 
 168. A cooperation that State Parties take upon themselves when they sign the Rome 
Statute, in accordance with the provisions of Part 9 of the Rome Statute. 
 169. Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 542; Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 14, at 24; 
Martinez, supra note 13, at 55; Much, supra note 13, at 129; Nagle, supra note 37, at 376. 
 170. An interesting example of an international cooperation between law enforcement 
authorities in the field of counter terrorism is found in the European Union, which enacted 
the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) which offers expedient extradition procedures in case 
of terrorist suspects and applies the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions. See
Van Sliedregt, supra note 68, at 415. 
 171. Bales, supra note 13, at 174; Martinez, supra note 13, at 59; Mazandaran, supra
note 13, at 537. For a more in depth survey of the relationship between the United States and 
the ICC, see Fiona McKey, US Unilateralism and International Crimes: The International 
Criminal Court and Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 455 (2004).
 172. It should be noted that Article 90 of the Rome Statute sets forth the rules 
governing such a procedure, although it leaves quite a large margin of appreciation to the 
state to consider whether to surrender the suspect to the ICC or to extradite him to a non-
member state. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 90(6).  
 173. Luban et al., supra note 106, at 1040. 
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internationally sensitive and controversial matter such as terrorism into the 
Court’s jurisdiction might not contribute to strengthening the Court’s 
reputation and status.  
Additionally, prosecuting terrorists in the ICC, as mentioned previously, 
is likely to generate more national prosecutions of terrorists. This may seem 
as a shortcoming rather than an advantage because, as Professor Naomi 
Norberg argues, “unlike genocide or crimes against humanity, for example, 
terrorism is the subject of ongoing police operations and measures that at 
times violate the very human rights the ICC at least indirectly protects.”174
She claims that in the name of following ICC’s directions, national law 
enforcement authorities will enjoy a greater shield to violate human rights 
of suspects and detainees.175 This is indeed a concern, but it is not as 
threatening as Norberg asserts. Mistreating suspects and detainees could be 
regarded as a state “unwillingness” or “inability” to exercise a just criminal 
trial and thus generate ICC jurisdiction. Within the ICC itself, as mentioned 
earlier, the rights of the suspects are vigorously maintained, and arguments 
as to compromising those rights could cost the prosecution its case.  
Finally, from a deterrence point of view, some optimistic views see the 
international criminal adjudication as the most effective deterrent for future 
terrorism.176 This view is questionable at best.177 Terrorist organizations do 
not hold any respect for the rule of law or they would not choose to work 
outside the law and target innocent civilians in the first place. They motivate 
their people by talking in terms of ideology, religion, martyrs, and the 
like.178 If a person is willing to wear explosives on his body and bomb 
himself it is doubtful that his thoughts wander to The Hague before he 
pushes the button. A criminal trial will probably not deter the perpetrators or 
the men who send them, and addressing terrorist acts only ex post facto
makes it seem less attractive than alternative avenues of international law, 
such as the laws of armed conflict, which have a more substantial deterrence 
effect.179
CONCLUSIONS
Since the end of World War II major institutional developments have 
happened in international criminal law, the most prominent of those being 
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. This 
 174. Norberg, supra note 74, at 27.
 175. Similar criticism was made by Prof. Van Sliedregt with respect to European 
legislation. See Van Sliedregt, supra note 68, at 426 (arguing that parts of the counter 
terrorism legislation at the European Union and within its Member States “strengthen the 
Executive’s power and weaken judicial control”). 
 176. Lawless, supra note 15, at 159. 
 177. Maogoto, supra note 46, at 254. 
 178. Norberg, supra note 74, at 47. 
 179. Maogoto, supra note 46, at 254. 
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institution has been operating for almost a decade, and it embodies the 
aspiration of its member states to end impunity for the perpetrators of the 
most heinous of crimes. Though still in its infancy, the ICC is gaining 
legitimacy and credibility and induces enforcement of international criminal 
law within national boundaries. 
Parallel to this development, the last decades have also witnessed a sharp 
escalation in international terrorist acts, both in numbers and the magnitude 
of the harm they generate. Terrorist groups, whether operating 
independently or under the auspices of a state, target civilian populations 
with the hopes that their acts will influence a decision making process. 
Whether they explode a bomb on a bus in Jerusalem, on trains in Madrid, in 
the streets of New Delhi or fly commercial airplanes into the World Trade 
Center in New York, terrorists groups have been largely successful in 
getting away with it. Furthermore, states that experienced terrorist attacks 
on their soil adopt measures in order to better face the new threat, measures 
that carry great costs. 
The question that arises is why these two parallel developments do not 
collide? More precisely, why is the ICC not being used in the international 
effort to suppress terrorism? This paper suggested that including terrorist 
acts as an international crime in the Rome Statute is more a question of 
policy considerations and realpolitik constraints than it is a question of law. 
To support this claim, it has been illustrated how the core legal questions 
arising from the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute can be answered. 
First and foremost, Part 2 looked at the historical reasons for rejecting 
the inclusion of terrorism within the ICC jurisdiction as presented at the 
Rome Conference. It concluded that out of the six primary concerns that 
prevented the adoption of terrorism as an international crime, only the 
definitional issue may still be valid today. However, as seen, even the 
definition of terrorist acts, the one issue that has been constantly regarded as 
insolvable, is illuminated in a different light as the STL Appeal Chambers 
decision acknowledged the existence of a definition of terrorism under 
customary international law. While legal scholars were busy hiding behind 
idioms like “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” states’ 
legislation and practice created a common sense definition of what terrorism 
is.
This customary definition correlates to the most widely accepted 
international definition of terrorism, which is found in Article 2 of the 
Financing Convention, as elaborated in Part 3. The prospects of adopting a 
Comprehensive Convention by the UN do not seem to be coming true in the 
near future, leaving the Financing Convention the most comprehensive and 
recognized reference for defining terrorism. This definition is both practical 
and appropriate. Its language allows its application to contemporary threats, 
such as terrorism by non-state actors (in addition to state terrorism) and 
cyber-terrorism. It was recognized by a vast majority of states and was 
included in Security Council Resolution 1373, calling for its immediate 
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integration to national legislation. Thus, even the most controversial issue of 
defining terrorism proves to be not insurmountable. 
As to the ICC itself, the procedure to amend the Rome Statute is 
straightforward and can be utilized at any given time. As demonstrated in 
Part 4, in order to trigger this procedure and ensure it is a successful one, 
diplomatic lobbying for promoting the idea of a crime of terrorism will be 
needed behind the scenes, getting the support of States Parties prior to 
making the official proposal for amendment. This is tied to the conclusion 
in Part 5, which surveyed the four crimes currently within the jurisdiction of 
the ICC and concluded that while they may lend themselves to terrorist acts 
in some cases, it is subject to legal interpretation, and persuasive arguments 
can be made either way. Prosecutions of major terrorists ought not to be 
based upon such vagueness, and a crime of terrorism needs to be articulated 
by itself and to stand alone as an independent crime.  
Amending the Rome Statute so as to include an independent crime of 
terrorism requires, as previously noted, a great deal of political and 
diplomatic efforts to make such an amendment possible. These political and 
diplomatic efforts will be influenced by a set of pros and cons, such as the 
ones discussed in Part 6. The advantages of the ICC are mainly of 
normative value, such as maintaining due process rights for the accused as 
well as for the victims; allowing a neutral and impartial forum in cases of 
conflicting jurisdiction claims between several states; and reinforcing the 
international community’s denunciation of terrorist acts. The shortcomings 
of the ICC are more practical in nature. Most notably of those shortcomings 
are the absence of U.S. membership in the institution, the lack of 
independent enforcement capabilities of the ICC, and its dependence on the 
cooperation of State Parties, notwithstanding the fact that they committed 
themselves to cooperate when they joined the institution.  
International criminal law can be a powerful instrument. It generated the 
conviction of perpetrators of the most devastating atrocities such as World 
War II and the Holocaust, the Rwandan Genocide, the Srebrenica Genocide, 
and more. This powerful instrument should also be employed to combat 
terrorism. It is easy to put on a serious face and blame the lawyers and the 
legal complexities, but the fact of the matter is that the law is not an 
impediment in treating terrorist acts as the grave international crimes they 
are. The reason the two parallel routes of the establishment of the ICC and 
the advancement of international terrorism have not yet collided is politics, 
not law. As a matter of law, the road is open for including terrorism as a 
crime in the Rome Statute and by this to add another tier to the international 
fight against terrorism. 
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Across cultural, physical, and political boundaries is the human desire to 
imprint the fabric of society by producing another being in one’s likeness. 
This desire transcends merely the want to reproduce, but also encompasses 
that innate need for companionship and love. Most of us can create a family 
through sexual intercourse with virtually no restrictions upon us. Some 
choose to pursue other means, such as fostering or adoption. But there are 
those who have no choice. Faced with infertility or another disability, they 
cannot reproduce through sexual intercourse and perhaps not even with the 
use of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”). The only way these 
women and their partners can pursue their right and desire to reproduce is 
through the use of a surrogate. In states where surrogacy is prohibited, these 
individuals are denied a basic human right.  
This paper argues that Article 23 of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is a powerful tool for citizens to demand 
that their states provide effective and appropriate assistance through 
surrogacy. Effective and appropriate assistance requires enforcing the 
surrogacy contract in a court of law and allowing compensated surrogacy. 
These two conditions would maximize individual liberty, while minimizing 
incidences of black markets and medical tourism. The CRPD is an effective 
instrument because it seeks to incite change by recognizing the ways in 
which society disables individuals. As a widely adopted international 
doctrine, the Convention also encourages international cooperation and 
collaboration. This is particularly advantageous when addressing the 
conflicts that have arisen as a result of surrogacy tourism.  
In her recent article Reproductive Rights as a Human Right: A Matter of 
Access or Provision, Sara Davies argues that one reason for the lack of 
progress in women’s reproductive health, as a human right, is the failure to 
clearly articulate the responsibilities of key actors in ensuring that women 
have access to services required to realize their reproductive rights.2 She 
suggests that what is needed is a framework that can translate decades of 
rights language into action and identify the provisions of law required to 
address women’s health. This paper seeks to establish the role and 
responsibility of the state in ensuring that the right to reproduce is a 
meaningful right for all. Drawing upon the theoretical constructs developed 
in disability law, this article articulates a rights-based claim to access 
surrogacy. The United States is used as an analytical framework, including 
the evolution of reproductive rights in the U.S. and the theory of disparate 
thoughtful support, guidance, and comments in preparation of this article. This article also 
benefited from comments by Mark Levin, Brien Hallet, and Frances Miller. Please send 
comments to lindsey.coffey@gmail.com. 
  1.     Matthew D. Martin III, The Dysfunctional Progeny of Eugenics: Autonomy Gone 
Awol, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371, 418 (2007). 
 2. Sara E. Davies, Reproductive Health as a Human Right: A Matter of Access or 
Provision?, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 387, 387-97 (2010). 
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impact, because these concepts inform our understanding of why 
prohibiting surrogacy is discriminatory towards persons with disabilities.  
Part I provides a brief history of the reproductive rights of persons with 
disabilities. Part II introduces the CRPD. The article argues that Article 23 
of the CRPD augments the right to reproduce and should be interpreted as 
creating a positive duty on behalf of the state to enact effective and 
appropriate legislation that permits and regulates surrogacy. It then 
demonstrates that this interpretation of Article 23 is consistent with current 
laws and policies pertaining to persons with disabilities. This section 
concludes by arguing that, in the least, governments should refrain from 
prohibiting surrogacy because this violates the CRPD by unreasonably 
interfering with the right to reproduce. Part III provides an international 
comparative analysis and concludes that two conditions are necessary in 
order for the state to ensure effective and appropriate access to surrogacy—
enforceable surrogacy contracts and compensation of surrogates.  
Surrogacy legislation is a ripe issue for three reasons. First, the inability 
to procreate through traditional means affects a significant portion of the 
population. Of the 650 million people worldwide who have a disability,3
certain physical disabilities hinder a woman’s ability to engage in sexual 
intercourse or gestate a child.4 More precisely, nine out of every one 
hundred women worldwide between the ages of twenty and forty-four 
cannot conceive a child.5 Ten to fifteen percent of the U.S. population 
suffers from infertility,6 which constitutes a disability under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA).7 Although approximately eighty-five percent 
of infertility cases can be resolved through drug therapies or surgery,8 for 
the remaining cases, surrogacy is the only available option for procreation.  
Secondly, regardless of whether one agrees that surrogacy should be 
available as a matter of right, the reality remains that the current regimes of 
 3. International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Aug. 14-25, 
2006, Some Facts about Persons with Disabilities, 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/facts.shtml. 
 4. Among other disabilities, see text accompanying note 51.  
 5. ART Fact Sheet, EUROPEAN SOC’Y OF HUMAN REPROD. AND EMBRYOLOGY (June 
2010), http://www.eshre.eu/ESHRE/English/Guidelines-Legal/ART-fact-sheet/page.aspx 
/1061. 
6. Infertility Fact Sheet, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV,
http://www.womenshealth.gov/faq/infertility.cfm (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); The Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010 (“India’s Draft ART Bill”), Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare et al., http://www.icmr.nic.in/guide/ART%20REGULATION 
%20Draft%20Bill1.pdf [hereinafter Draft ART Bill].  
 7. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12102(1)-(2) (1994 & 
Supp. V 2000). See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (holding reproduction 
is included within “major life activity” contemplated by the ADA).  
8. Fertility Treatment, FERTILITY-TREATMENT.ORG, http://www.fertility-
treatment.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); Draft ART Bill, supra note 6, pmbl. 
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highly restrictive and/or ambiguous surrogacy laws9 have created dangerous 
and irresponsible conditions—namely, reproductive black markets and 
surrogacy tourism.  
Thirdly, the pressure for governments to address the issue of legalized 
surrogacy will likely intensify when India enacts its draft Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010 (“Draft ART Bill”).10
Currently, thousands of foreign couples are evading the legal and financial 
constraints of their home countries by traveling to India where surrogacy is 
legal and unregulated. However, a provision of India’s draft ART bill would 
require couples to produce a certificate from their home country verifying 
that surrogacy is legal in their home country and that the baby will be 
granted citizenship and entry into the home country.11 This provision will 
change the domestic and international landscape of the surrogacy industry.  
I.  THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
“Those who cannot remember the past are destined to repeat it”—George 
Santayana  
Persons with disabilities have historically been denied full enjoyment of 
their reproductive rights. The most devastating example of this is the 
eugenics movement of the first half of the twentieth century.12 Eugenics, a 
Greek word meaning “well born,” is an applied pseudo-science aimed to rid 
 9. The U.S. has no federal law governing surrogacy, which has resulted in a 
hodgepodge of state laws. State laws range from most restrictive (penalizing surrogacy 
arrangements with fines or imprisonment) to least restrictive (holding surrogacy 
arrangements legally enforceable and allowing compensation of the surrogate). Most states 
fall somewhere in the middle or have no clear legislation, rending courts ill-equipped to 
handle surrogacy litigation. See State Laws & Legislation, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/laws-and-legislation/state/c/parenting/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). Most 
of Europe either prohibits all surrogacy arrangements or allows only altruistic surrogacy. See
Regulation (or Lack Thereof) of Assisted Reproduction Technologies in U.S. and Abroad,
THE CENTER FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN DIGNITY, http://cbhd.org/content/regulation-or-lack-
thereof-assisted-reproductive-technologies-us-and-abroad (last visited Jan. 25, 2012); Whose 
Child is it Anyway?, CANADIAN FERTILITY AND ANDROLOGY SOCIETY,
http://www.cfas.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=790&Itemid=523 (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2012).  
 10. The law ministry has scanned the bill and it is expected to be introduced to 
Parliament in 2011 or 2012. Savita Verma, Bill to Help People Stay Single and Have Kids,
INDIA TODAY(June 13, 2010), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/bill-to-help-people-stay-
single-and-have-kids/1/101327.html; Govt Likely to Implement Surrogacy Bill Soon,
DEVELOPMENT CHANNEL (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.developmentchannel.org/government/ 
parliament/1789-govt-likely-to-implement-surrogacy-bill-soon. 
 11. Draft ART Bill, supra note 6, at §34(19). 
 12. Martin, supra note 1, at 376. “Our society has a history of using sterilization 
procedures to prevent procreation by mentally retarded individuals.” In re Romero, 790 P.2d 
819, 821 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). During the eugenics movement, thirty U.S. states enacted 
statutes authorizing compulsory sterilizations. Id.
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society of mentally deficient and socially unfit individuals.13 Eugenics 
theory propagates the hereditary nature of “defects” and in turn the 
betterment of society rests in prohibiting such degenerates from reproducing 
their kind.14 “Defects” included epilepsy, lunacy, mental illness, mental 
retardation, reproductive challenges, and physical handicaps.15
In the United States, Charles Davenport founded the Eugenics 
Committee in 1903, a subdivision of the American Breeders Association. 
The Committee was charged to investigate heredity in the human race and 
the concepts of superior and inferior blood.16 As the first superintendent of 
the Committee, Harry Hamilton Laughlin proposed the Model Eugenic 
Sterilization Law in 1922, which became the foundation for many state 
sterilization laws.17 During the eugenics movement, thirty U.S. states 
enacted statutes authorizing compulsory sterilizations.18
The eugenics movement was not limited to the United States; Europe 
and Asia also employed eugenic-based policies, including sterilizations, 
under the guise of improving the human race.19 Nazi administrators on trial 
in Nuremberg after World War II cited the United States as the inspiration 
for its eugenics movement and Hitler’s racial purification laws.20
Forced sterilizations reached the height of popularity and legitimacy21 in 
the United States in 1927 when the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s 
 13. Martin, supra note 1, at 372-73.  
14. See id. at 375 (describing a sentiment expressed by Theodore Roosevelt). 
 15. For example, the Wisconsin sterilization law enacted in 1913 bore the title 
“Sterilization of Defectives” and was “related to the prevention of criminality, insanity, 
feeble-mindedness, and epilepsy.” In re. Guardianship of Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 889 
(Wis. 1981). “Idiots” and “lunatics” were forbidden from marrying in the District of 
Columbia. Jonathan Matloff, Idiocy, Lunacy, and Matrimony: Exploring Constitutional 
Challenges to State Restrictions on Marriages of Persons with Disabilities, 17 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 497, 498 (2009). Interestingly, this law remained on the books 
from 1901 until 2008 when a committee hearing in D.C. discovered the archaic language and 
overturned the law. Id. Connecticut prohibited the marriage of epileptics. HELEN I. CLARKE,
SOCIAL LEGISLATION 99 (1957).Virginia’s 1924 sterilization law authorized coercive 
sterilizations of feebleminded inmates, upheld in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).  
 16. Martin, supra note 1, at 376. 
 17. Id. at 377. 
 18. In re Romero, supra note 12. 
 19. See Martin, supra note 1, at 371; Nordic Eugenics: Here of all places,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 1997, available at http://www.economist.com/node/155244; Takashi 
Tsuchiya, Eugenic Sterilizations in Japan and Recent Demands for Apology: A Report, 3 
NEWSL. NETWORK ON ETHICS & INTELL. DISABILITY (Osaka City Univ., Osaka, Japan), Fall 
1997, at 1-4, http://www.lit.osaka-cu.ac.jp/user/tsuchiya/gyoseki/paper/JPN_Eugenics.html. 
 20. California, the state responsible for one third of the 60,000 sterilizations that took 
place in the U.S., published a favorable report on the results of sterilizations in the state that 
was later cited by the Nazi government as evidence that the sterilizations programs were 
feasible and humane. See Edwin Black, Eugenics and the Nazis—The California Connection,
S. F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2003, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-11-
09/opinion/17517477_1_eugenics-ethnic-cleansing-master-race. 
 21. “[B]ecause of questions in respect to the constitutionality of compulsory 
sterilization statutes, many state legislatures withheld their approval until the landmark case 
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compulsory sterilization statute in Buck v. Bell as part of a general plan 
applicable to all feeble-minded.22 Justice Holmes wrote, “it would be 
strange if [society] could not call upon those who already sap the strength of 
the state for these lesser sacrifices … in order to prevent our being swamped 
with incompetence … It is better for all the world, if … society can prevent 
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”23
The atrocities of WWII challenged the ethical basis of eugenic policies 
and soon coercive sterilizations fell out of favor in the U.S. and most of 
Europe.24 U.S. courts established the right to procreate or not procreate as 
fundamental rights, “expand[ing] the cluster of rights protecting the 
physical integrity of the human body in other decisions relating to marriage, 
sexual relations, and childbearing.”25
Procreative rights26 have traditionally been interpreted negatively27-
obligating others not to interfere with one’s right to procreate or avoid 
of Buck v. Bell.” In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, supra note 15, at 889. “Within ten years 
of Buck v. Bell, 20 states passed eugenic sterilization statutes.” Id.
 22. The majority found Carrie Buck “the probable potential parent of socially 
inadequate offspring” and that she may be “sterilized without detriment to her general health 
and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization.” Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).  
 23. Id. Carrie Buck was sterilized on October 19, 1927. Eugenics: Carrie Buck, 
Virginia’s Test Case, UNIV. OF VA. HEALTH SYS., CLAUDE MOORE HEALTH SCIENCES 
LIBRARY, http://www.hsl.virginia.edu/historical/eugenics/3-buckvbell.cfm (last visited Dec, 
6, 2011). She married twice. Her daughter Vivian did not show any conclusive signs of 
feeble-mindedness before her death at age eight. Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s 
Daughter: A Popular, Quasi-Scientific Idea Can Be a Powerful Tool for Injustice, NAT’L
HIST. July 1, 2002, at 12. In fact, it is reported that she performed well in school. Id.
 24. “Most competent geneticists now reject social Darwinism and doubt the premise 
implicit in Mr. Justice Holmes’ incantation that ‘…three generations of imbeciles is 
enough.’” North Carolina Ass’n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 
454 ( M.D.N.C. 1976). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, discussing its own state’s sterilization 
law, concluded “[s]uffice it to say, the initial enthusiasm for laws requiring eugenic 
sterilization has waned, and many of them have been repealed.” In re Guardianship of
Eberhardy, supra note 15, at 889.  
 25. In re Welfare of Hillstrom, 363 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 26. The right to procreate is a fundamental, constitutionally-protected right. See Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Procreative rights are “aspects of the right to privacy 
which exist within the penumbra of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 
Conservatorship of Mildred, 707 P.2d 760, 772 (Cal. 1985) (citing Roe v. Wade, supra, at 
154; Eisenstadt, supra, at 453; Griswold, supra, at 485). The right to procreate, the right not 
to procreate, and the right of privacy flow “either directly from the fourteenth amendment or 
by it incorporation of the Bill of Rights, or from the ninth amendment, or through the 
penumbra surrounding all of the Bill of Rights.” In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).  
 27. A negative right is the right to be free from interference with one’s exercise of 
that right. “The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy [[including the right to 
procreate]] is protected from government intrusion.” Griswold, supra note 26, at 483. In 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court held “[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is 
the right of the individual…to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into 
matters fundamentally effecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 
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procreation. Initially, U.S. courts considered challenges to state action that 
interfered with the right to avoid procreation. These cases involved the right 
to access abortion services and contraception.28 Later, in 1942, the Supreme 
Court revisited the Buck v. Bell issue in Skinner v. Oklahoma, and rendered 
coercive sterilizations for penal purposes unconstitutional.29 Although the 
court never explicitly overturned Buck v. Bell, Skinner was the first time the 
court defended the positive, intentional act of procreation. Justice Douglas 
proclaimed the right to procreate, “one of the basic civil rights of man,” 
which is subject to the judiciary’s strict scrutiny.30
II. THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
When the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD 
or Convention) entered into force on May 3, 2008, it was the first treaty to 
specifically address the needs of persons with disabilities.31 The treaty was 
groundbreaking for its embodiment of the social model of disability and 
articulation of human rights within the context of disabilities.  
Frédéric Mégret outlines the significant contributions of the CRPD to 
human rights law in his articles The Disability Convention: Towards a More 
Holistic Concept of Rights and The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities or Disabilities Rights? He rightly points out 
that one of the key moments in the CRPD is when it asserts concern that 
despite the existing human rights instruments, persons with disabilities 
continue to face barriers in their participation as equal members of society 
and violations of their human rights.32 This travesty can be attributed to the 
“laissez-faire” approach expressed by previous treaties.33 In contrast, 
persons with disabilities typically require more complex social, political, 
economic, and institutional arrangements in order to enjoy their rights on an 
Supra note 26, at 454 (emphasis added). In Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, the Supreme 
Court again explained that regulations imposing a burden on the decision whether or not to 
beget or bear a child may only be justified by a compelling state interest and must be 
narrowly drawn. 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).  
 28. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 26 (protecting one’s right not to procreate); 
Carey, supra note 27; Eisenstadt, supra note 26. The right of a woman to choose not to bear 
children is a constitutionally protected right, as is the right to implement that choice by use of 
contraception and, subject to reasonable restrictions, to terminate a pregnancy. 
Conservatorship of Mildred, 707 P.2d 760, 772 (Cal. 1985)(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).  
 29. The court unanimously concluded that if the state sterilizes the individual, he is 
“forever deprived of a basic liberty.” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  
 30. Id.
 31. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/611 (Dec. 13, 2006) (entered into force on May 3, 2008). 
 32. Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Concept of 
Rights, 12 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 261, 263 (2008).  
 33. Id.
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equal basis.34 Mégret explains that a specific instrument is needed because 
there is a dimension of experience inherent to persons with disabilities 
which almost requires the creation of new rights.35 While confirming 
existing rights, the CRPD amplifies upon, evolves from, and even departs 
from traditional expressions of human rights in creative ways required by 
the issue of disability.36 Mégret concludes that the CRPD’s most significant 
contribution is its reinvention of human rights law grounded in a plural, 
relational concept of the human in society.37
The treaty indeed marked a major shift in the way societies view persons 
with disabilities. Rather than an inherent attribute of the individual, the 
Convention views disability as the result of an “interaction between an 
inaccessible environment and the person with the disability.”38 The former 
theory is referred to as the medical model of disability. This model 
emphasizes the surgical and medical ways one might “normalize” a person 
with a disability. In contrast, the social model of disability identifies the 
environments, or systemic and attitudinal barriers assumptively inherent in 
society, that exclude persons with disabilities.39 In other words, it is society
that disables the individual.40 The Convention challenges States Parties to 
reevaluate the relational experience of persons with disabilities in order to 
construct accessible environments. Accordingly, States Parties are obligated 
to enact antidiscrimination laws, as well as eliminate those laws and 
practices that discriminate against persons with disability.41
Additionally, the Convention recognizes that women with disabilities are 
subject to double discrimination, which places them at higher risk for 
maltreatment, exploitation, and exclusion from social life.42
Acknowledgement of this reality is particularly important because 
surrogacy is a gendered issue—surrogacy is necessary when the woman is 
 34. Id.
 35. See Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities or Disability Rights?, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 494, 496 (2008). 
 36. Id. at 498. 
 37. See Mégret, supra note 32, at 264, 274. 
 38. W.H.O. & WORLD BANK, WORLD REPORT ON DISABILITY 4 (2011), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789240685215_eng.pdf [hereinafter WORLD 
REPORT ON DISABILITY]; Backgrounder: Disability Treaty Closes a Gap in Protecting 
Human Rights, U.N. ENABLE (May 2008), http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=476.
 39. WORLD REPORT ON DISABILITY, supra note 38. 
 40. Id.
 41. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Why a Convention?,
UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/questions.shtml (last visited Dec. 27, 
2011). 
 42. Women and Girls with Disabilities, U.N. ENABLE,
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1514 (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); Luz Angela 
Melo, Human Rights Technical Adviser, U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA), Panel Discussion: 
Cross-sectionalities of Gender, Disability, and Development: Towards Equality for Women 
and Girls with Disabilities, 54th Sess. of the Comm’n on the Status of Women, (Mar. 4, 
2010). 
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disabled, and only a woman can act as a surrogate. Because surrogacy 
occupies this fragile space where the needs of two disadvantaged groups—
women and persons with disabilities—overlap, governments must tread 
carefully to safeguard their human rights and prevent injustices. The CRPD 
calls on States Parties to challenge and modify stereotypes that burden 
progress when adopting legislation. For example, Melissa Fraser’s note 
Gender Inequality in In Vitro Fertilization: Controlling Women’s 
Reproductive Autonomy suggests that the regulation and process of 
infertility treatments subjugate women’s interests and reproductive 
autonomy, which reflects the larger societal attitude that women are the 
“second sex.”43 Proponents of surrogacy also criticize governments that ban 
surrogacy for adopting patriarchal legislation that assumes women cannot 
make informed decisions about their bodies.44
A.  “Respect for and the Family” (Article 23) 
Article 23 sets forth the standards governments shall meet to guarantee 
reproductive rights. Section 1 of Article 23 calls on States Parties to “take 
effective and appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
persons with disabilities in all matters relating to marriage, family, 
parenthood and relationships.” 45 Three rights must be protected and 
guaranteed on an “equal basis” with non-disabled persons in order to 
eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities. Those three rights 
include the right to: (i) found a family, (ii) decide freely on the number and 
spacing of their children, and (iii) retain one’s fertility on an equal basis 
with others.46 More specifically, States Parties shall ensure that “the means 
necessary to enable [persons with disabilities] to exercise these rights are 
provided.”47 The italicized words (“effective and appropriate measures,” 
“equal basis,” and “means necessary”) function to create a state 
responsibility to eliminate discrimination.48 Mégret attributes the CRPD’s 
 43. See Melissa E. Fraser, Gender Inequality in In Vitro Fertilization: Controlling 
Women’s Reproductive Autonomy, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 183, 190-91 (1998). See also Jessica 
H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion of Female Autonomy in 
Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717, 722 (2003). 
 44. Munyon, supra note 43, at 726-28; Jennifer Rimm, Comment, Booming Baby 
Business: Regulating Commercial Surrogacy in India, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1429, 1447
(2009). 
 45. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 31, art. 23 
(emphasis added).  
 46. Id.
 47. Id. art. 23(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
 48. “All of these obviously appear as duties of the state rather than human rights per 
se.” Mégret, supra note 35, at 506. 
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arguable “extension” of human rights, or “human rights ‘plus,’” to its focus 
on the societal dimension of the rights experience.49
B.  A Legalized Surrogacy Industry: States Parties Have a 
Responsibility to Provide “Effective and Appropriate” Surrogacy 
Legislation  
Article 23 creates a positive duty on behalf of States Parties to allow 
access to surrogacy when it obligates States Parties to provide “effective 
and appropriate measures” and “means necessary” to persons with 
disabilities to retrain their fertility and found a family. Surrogacy is included 
within “means necessary” because of its indispensible role in founding a 
family. In other words, the obligation of States Parties to protect and 
promote the right to reproduce arguably goes beyond merely not prohibiting 
surrogacy; States Parties should establish a framework for legalized and 
regulated surrogacy.  
Access to surrogacy is indispensible to protecting procreative liberty 
because certain disabilities render it impossible for a woman to become 
impregnated through sexual intercourse and carry a baby to full term. 
Among these disabilities is infertility—encompassed by Section 12102 of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).50 Within this group are women 
who (i) are medically advised against carrying a baby, (ii) are unable to 
engage in sexual intercourse or carry a baby due to a physical characteristic, 
(iii) undergo a hysterectomy, (iv) suffer from certain cancers or diseases, (v) 
have recurrent miscarriages, and (vi) are born without a uterus.51 These are 
human conditions, not life choices. Moreover, this reality renders the 
medical model of disability inapplicable to this class of persons. It is only 
through changing the social and legal environment that reproduction 
becomes accessible.  
Providing access to surrogacy operates as an antidiscrimination measure. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act provides a model for understanding 
how antidiscrimination measures operate within the context of disabilities 
rights. The ADA mandates certain alterations—for example, a ramp to enter 
 49. See id. at 507. 
 50. Americans with Disability Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2009)). The goal of the ADA is to not 
only remove barriers but to provide equal opportunity and full participation for people with 
disabilities. Id. § 12101(a)-(b).  
 51. See also Fiona MacCallum et al., Surrogacy: The Experience of Commissioning 
Couples, 18 HUM. REPROD. 1334 (2003). Drug therapies and surgery are typically ineffective 
means of treating these conditions. Moreover, Fertility and Sterility recently published new 
findings concluding that “cycle-based fertility treatments may offer a point of diminishing 
returns for infertile couples.” James F. Smith et al., Fertility Treatments and Outcomes 
Among Couples Seeking Fertility Care: Data from a Prospective Fertility Cohort in the 
United States, 95 FERTILITY & STERILITY 79, 79 (2011). After about two to three cycles the 
chances of success may diminish. Id.
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a building—so that persons with disabilities can access the same facilities as 
persons without disabilities. These alterations are termed 
“accommodations,” yet it is doubtful that anyone would argue that the 
ability to enter a building is a “special” accommodation or privilege. Rather, 
these measures are meant to break down socially created barriers so that 
persons with disabilities can fully participate in society. This example is 
illustrative of the way in which society disables and enables individuals.  
In his article Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations 
as Antidiscrimination, Michael Stein, an internationally recognized 
disabilities rights expert, explains that “ADA-mandated accommodations 
are consistent with other antidiscrimination measures” in that each 
accommodation remedies a class of persons’ “exclusion from [an] 
opportunity by questioning the inherency of established … norms.”52 He 
argues that “disability-related accommodations must operate as 
antidiscrimination provisions … in order to alter social attitudes towards the 
disabled.”53 Most importantly, society must recognize that these measures 
are not just “accommodations,” they are a right.54 Similarly, surrogacy is a 
method for eliminating socially created barriers to reproduction for persons 
with disabilities.55 Barrier-free access to surrogacy should be available as a 
matter of right, not privilege or special accommodation.  
Article 23 should be read in conjunction with the Standard Rules on the 
Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (the “Rules”),56
although the Rules are non-binding. In particular, Rule 9 strengthens the 
position that States Parties have a positive duty to undertake the necessary 
measures to eliminate discrimination in and barriers to family life and 
parenthood and enhance personal integrity. As enumerated in Rule 9, 
persons with disabilities must not be denied the opportunity to experience 
parenthood.57 States Parties should promote the right to personal integrity 
and ensure that laws do not discriminate against persons with disabilities in 
 52. Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA 
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. U. PA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2004).  
 53. Id.
 54. Id.
 55. Congruent with other U.S. states’ measures to eliminate social barriers to the 
enjoyment of society, family life, and personal integrity for persons with disabilities. See, 
e.g., Conservatorship of Mildred, 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985) (discussing the intent of the 
Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (LDDSA)). California’s Supreme Court 
explained “it is the intent of LDDSA that services for such clients continue to provide ‘an 
unbroken chain of experience, maximum personal growth and liberty’ under ‘conditions of 
everyday life which are as close as possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream 
society.” Id. at 771. LDDSA propagates that people with developmental disabilities and their 
families have a right to get the services and supports they need to live like people without 
disabilities. The Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act, FRANK D. LANTERMAN 
REGIONAL CENTER, http://www.lanterman.org/index.php/lanterman_act (last visited Dec. 27, 
2011). 
 56. G.A. Res. 48/96, Annex, U.N. Dec. A/RES/48/96 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
 57. Id. at 15. 
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the context of parenthood.58 This idea of personal integrity stems from the 
concept of self-determination in medical decision-making and the 
recognition that a patient’s medical decisions advance her intrinsic worth as 
an independent moral agent.59 Procreation is arguably the greatest 
advancement of one’s intrinsic worth.  
C.  Re-Expressing Existing Rights  
The Convention challenges countries to express existing rights in a 
manner that addresses the needs of persons with disabilities—it does not 
create new rights per se. Likewise, many existing laws and policies 
strengthen a citizen’s right to demand that her state provide effective and 
appropriate access to surrogacy.60 Canada, a nation discussed in Part III, is 
also bound by the Canadian Human Rights Act, which is based on the 
principal that “all individuals should have an equal opportunity to make for 
themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have, consistent with 
their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered 
in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on … 
disability.”61
Several European nations ban all forms of surrogacy, which is 
inconsistent with the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020. The Strategy 
calls on EU nations to (i) respect and protect human dignity, (ii) recognize 
and respect that persons with disabilities benefit from measures designed to 
ensure their independence, social integration, and participation in life of the 
community, (ii) combat discrimination based on disability when defining 
and implementing its policies and activities and adopt appropriate 
legislation, (iv) tackle obstacles to a barrier-free Europe, including 
attitudinal barriers, and (v) aim to empower people with disabilities so that 
they can enjoy their full rights.62 Further, the Strategy declares that the EU 
will support improving the availability and choice of assistive 
technologies.63
Moreover, establishing a legal framework that allows regulated 
surrogacy arrangements is congruent with current government policies that 
aid access to fertility treatment and establish rights resulting from the use of 
 58. Id.
 59. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, 
Indelible Harms, E23BERKELEY J. GEN. L. & JUST. 18, 59 (2008). 
 60. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 50, 55. 
 61. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. 33 (1976-77) (as amended by 2008, ch. 
H-6). 
 62.  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, 
The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European 
Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, COM 
(2010) 636 final (Nov. 15, 2010). 
 63. Id.
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ART. First, some U.S. states have established a regulatory framework that 
recognizes parenthood based on intent to parent through artificial 
insemination, rather than genetic ties or parturition. California, Nevada, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin, for example, revised their family laws to 
affirmatively establish the paternity rights and obligations of husbands 
whose wives undergo IVF using donated sperm.64 The husband is “treated 
in law as if he were the natural father.”65 These laws facilitate family 
building through nontraditional methods by creating a presumption of 
paternity. States can similarly facilitate the creation of a family through 
surrogacy by regulating the legal rights of intending parents, surrogates, and 
surrogate children.  
Connecticut’s Uniform Probate Code III fully embodies the idea of 
“intent to parent” and recognizes parenthood for the purposes of intestacy 
and class gifts (the Uniform Parentage Act has not been modified 
accordingly) in each of the following situations:66 (i) a person who intended 
and consented to be a parent of a child created through ART, regardless of 
marriage status; (ii) a birth mother not acting as a surrogate, regardless of 
genetic ties; (iii) a person who consented to the ART of the birth mother in 
(ii) above; (iv) an intending parent whose baby is gestated and birthed by a 
surrogate, and (v) a person whose name appears on the birth certificate. A 
parent-child relationship does not exist between a child and a third-party 
gamete donor or surrogate.67
Second, several U.S. states and the U.K. have expanded access to 
fertility treatments and ART through insurance law. Fifteen U.S. states have 
passed laws requiring that insurance companies provide coverage for some 
level of infertility treatment- either that infertility treatment be provided as a 
basic health plan benefit (“mandate to cover”) or that insurance companies 
at least offer infertility coverage to purchasers (“mandate to offer”).68 The 
 64. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); OR. REV.
STAT. §109.243 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 891.40 (1979). 
 65. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a). Likewise, the donor of semen is treated by law as if 
he were not the natural father. Id.
 66. Elizabeth A. Bryant, Kimberly R. Willoughby & Constance Beck Wood, 
Changes to Colorado’s Uniform Probate Code, 39 COLO. LAW. 41, 43 (2010). 
 67. Id.
68. Insurance Coverage in Your State, RESOLVE: THE NAT’L INFERTILITY ASSOC., 
http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/insurance_coverage/state-coverage.html (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Insurance Coverage in Your State].The level of infertility 
coverage within each of these fifteen states is highly variable. For example, some of the 
restrictions are: imposing a lifetime cap (Connecticut, Maryland, Rhode Island), limiting 
coverage to married couples (Arkansas, Hawaii, Rhode Island), requiring that the patient’s 
egg be fertilized with only the spouse’s sperm (Arkansas, Hawaii, Texas, Maryland), 
specifically excluding IFV (California, New York), and requiring two years of infertility 
before insurance coverage is mandated (Arkansas, Maryland, Rhode Island). Id. See also
Daar, supra note 59, at 272. Note, however, that federal law—the Employee Retirement 
Income and Security Act (ERISA)—exempts self-insured health plans, those maintained by 
the majority of employers, from state insurance regulation. Health Insurance 101,
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twelve states that have laws requiring insurance companies to cover 
infertility treatment are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island and 
West Virginia.69 California, Louisiana, and Texas mandate that insurance 
companies offer infertility coverage to policyholders.70 New Jersey should 
be commended for its progressive approach to ensuring reproductive rights.  
In the U.K., although it remains very unlikely that fertility treatment is 
covered by private health insurance, the government has expanded access to 
reproductive care by providing financial assistance through the Nation 
Health Service (NHS).71 Availability of IVF treatment on the NHS is 
subject to the guidelines issued by the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE).72 NICE advocates funding IVF when the 
couple’s chance of success is more than 10%.73 Specifically, the Institute 
recommends that a couple should be offered up to three free cycles of IFV 
or intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) if:74
1. The woman is between 23 and 39 years of age at the time of 
treatment, and 
2. One, or both, of the patients have been diagnosed with a fertilty 
problem, or 
3. The patient has been infertile for at least three years. 
Patients in the U.K. can also subsidize the cost of infertility treatment by 
participating in an egg-sharing agreement. Under an egg-sharing scheme, a 
patient can donate eggs collected from a cycle of IVF to another woman in 
RESOLVE: THE NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N, http://www.resolve.org/family-building-
options/insurance_coverage/health-insurance-101.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
Therefore, ERISA severely limits access to infertility coverage, even within the 
abovementioned states.  
 69. Aaron C. McKee, The American Dream—2.5 Kids and a White Picket Fence: 
The Need for Federal Legislation to Protect The Insurance Rights of Infertile Couples, 41 
WASHBURN L.J. 191, 204 (2001). 
 70. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 68.  
 71. Infertility—Treatment, NHS CHOICES, http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Infertility/ 
Pages/Treatment.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Infertility—Treatment].
 72. Id.
 73. Quick Facts About Fertility, HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/infertility-facts.html (last updated Mar. 23, 2011). 
74. Infertility—Treatment, supra note 71. Nonetheless these are only guidelines and 
hence some jurisdictions only cover one cycle. See, e.g., Sophie Goodchild & Jonathan 
Prynn, Leading Doctor Wants the NHS to Fund More IVF Treatments, LONDON EVENING 
STANDARD, May 10, 2011, available at http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-
23948124-leading-doctor-wants-the-nhs-to-fund-more-ivf-treatments.do. Therefore, 
provisions of NHS-funded treatment vary across the UK. See id.; Can I Get IVF Treatment 
on the NHS?, NHS CHOICES, http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/889.aspx?CategoryID=54& 
SubCategoryID=127 (reviewed Apr. 8lastreviewed Apr. 8, 2011); HUMAN FERTILISATION &
EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., INFERTILITY: THE HFEA GUIDE 10 (2007-08), available at
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Guide2.pdf.  
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return for a reduced price of IVF treatment.75 These schemes not only 
benefit the patients monetarily, but also supplement the shortage of egg 
donations. Egg-sharing schemes demonstrate how a state can creatively 
subsidize reproductive care in order to expand access.  
D.  The Bare Minimum: Governments should Refrain from Prohibiting  
Surrogacy 
As a “necessary measure” to ensuring the right to reproduce, 
governments should, in the least, refrain from prohibiting surrogacy.76 A 
prohibition renders procreation an empty right for infertile individuals and 
those persons with another disability that makes child bearing unattainable. 
Adopting such a policy is reminiscent of the eugenics movement. One 
cannot argue that sterilization is unethical, but then deny an individual the 
right to use the reproductive talents she has retained or the measures that 
would assist procreation. As Judith Daar articulates in her article Accessing 
Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, “while the 
eugenicists of a century ago coerced the “feeble minded” into surrendering 
their reproductive capacity through forced sterilizations, today’s practices 
act to deprive the disempowered of their capacity to reproduce by 
withholding the means necessary to produce a child.”77
The U.S. theory of disparate impact, which was developed in the context 
of employment litigation, provides a useful analogy for understanding how 
prohibiting surrogacy results in discrimination against persons with 
disabilities. When employment discrimination is alleged to be intentional, 
the court’s analysis proceeds under a theory of “disparate treatment”; when 
a neutral policy appears to produce discriminatory effects upon a class of 
individuals, courts examine the case under the “disparate impact” analysis. 
For example, in the landmark disparate impact case Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., the court focused on the “consequences of employment practices, not 
simply the motivation.”78 As Michael Stein explains, “[b]ecause disability-
based exclusion arises from subtle forms of exclusion and stigma that fall 
within the province of disparate impact theory, our focus is on that 
doctrine.”79 Examples of seemingly neutral policies that result in disparate 
impact are: (1) denial of job-protected leave under the Family and Medical 
 75. See, e.g., Egg Sharing Scheme, SALISBURY, NHS FOUNDATION TRUST,
http://www.fertility.salisbury.nhs.uk/Treatments/Pages/EggSharingScheme.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2011); Egg Share Programme, UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS COVENTRY &
WARWICKSHIRE, NHS, http://www.uhcw.nhs.uk/ivf/treatments/esp (last visited Dec. 28, 
2011).  
 76. For persons with disabilities. 
 77. Daar, supra note 59, at 73. 
 78. Griggs v. Duke, 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
 79. Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, 
and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 869 (2006). 
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Leave Act, which disproportionately effects women because they are the 
sex that must gestate the child; or in the alternative, denial of paternity leave 
based on the stereotype that the male is the financial provider while the 
woman is the homemaker; (2) standardized test requirements that 
historically deny African American males entry to certain positions and 
programs; and (3) height and weight requirements that limit the female sex 
from entering into certain professions or services.80 Here, the seemingly 
neutral policy of prohibiting surrogacy for all persons in fact 
disproportionately affects persons with disabilities because only those 
persons are excluded from the opportunity to reproduce as a result of the 
prohibition.  
Furthermore, allowing legalized, regulated surrogacy is consistent with 
the principles set forth by several U.S. high courts. The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Griswold v. Connecticut, which struck down a state’s 
prohibition of contraceptives, is on point here:  
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within a zone of 
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it 
concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of the contraceptives rather 
than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by 
means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such 
a law cannot stand under the principle, so often applied by this Court, that 
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally 
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep 
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.81
Here, a prohibition on surrogacy is an unnecessarily broad regulation that 
wholly denies certain individuals the opportunity to procreate. Such a policy 
infringes upon one’s basic civil and human rights, and therefore violates the 
CRPD.82
As early as 1987, in the famous Baby M case, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court declared a progressive and exemplary interpretation of the right to 
procreate as: “the right to have natural children, whether through sexual 
intercourse or artificial insemination,” which includes the artificial 
insemination of another woman for the purposes of surrogacy.83 This 
interpretation of procreative liberty is consistent with and in furtherance of 
the principles set forth in the CRPD and should serve as a model for other 
jurisdictions.  
 80. Id. at 915. 
 81. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (emphasis added).
 82. Although the Court has not assumed to define “liberty” with any great precision, 
that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Conservatorship of Mildred, 
707 P.2d 760, 773 (Cal. 1985) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954)). 
“Liberty under the law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to 
pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper government objective.” Id.
 83. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (N.J. 1988). 
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III. THE COMPONENTS OF “EFFECTIVE AND APPROPRIATE” SURROGACY 
LEGISLATION
A. The Adverse Effects of Unenforceable Contracts and 
Uncompensated Surrogacy 
1. Unavailability of Surrogates- A Review of Canada and the 
U.K.
Several countries, and some U.S. states, have adopted a restrictive 
system in which surrogacy is not illegal, but is subject to debilitating 
constraints.84 These constraints include holding surrogacy contracts 
unenforceable in a court of law and prohibiting compensation of 
surrogates.85 The supply of surrogates in these jurisdictions is so 
dangerously low that the practice is virtually inaccessible.86 The vague laws 
or absence of laws regulating surrogacy in other jurisdictions force 
participants to take on greater risks and accept uncertainties, which also 
deters participation. For example, in such states, the rights of the intending 
parent(s), surrogate, and child are uncertain. The surrogate may decide to 
keep the baby and the intending parents are powerless. In response to 
inaccessibility, black markets have emerged and couples are resorting to 
surrogacy tourism.  
Canada and the U.K. demonstrate these phenomena. Both countries 
allow altruistic surrogacy, but prohibit compensation of the surrogate.87 A 
surrogate may only be reimbursed for reasonable medical expenses (after 
the production of itemized receipts) and loss of earnings in connection with 
the surrogacy in according with regulations.88 In fact, couples in the U.K. 
risk losing their parental rights to the child if a court finds that they have 
paid the surrogate beyond “expenses reasonably incurred.”89 Additionally, 
the U.K. and province of Quebec hold the surrogacy contract 
 84. For example, the UK, Canada, and Australia. See discussion infra Part III. See 
also Surrogacy Laws: State by State, supra note 9. 
 85. See Jason Burke, India’s Surrogate Mothers Face New Rules to Restrict ‘Pot of 
Gold,’ GUARDIAN (London), July 30, 2010, at 19, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/30/india-surrogate-mothers-law.  
 86. The limited compensation of UK surrogates has contributed to an acute shortage 
of surrogates in the UK, driving many couples to travel abroad. Ailsa Taylor, Experts Attack 
‘Fertility Tourism’ Industry, BIONEWS (Sept. 21, 
2009),http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_48893.asp.  
 87. Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, c. 49, § 1A (U.K.), inserted by Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (c. 37, § 36(1)) (U.K.); 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 6(1) (Can.). 
 88. Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, supra note 87, c. 49; Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, § 12§.  
 89. Denis Campbell, Couples Who Pay Surrogate Mothers Could Lose Right to 
Raise the Child, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 5, 2010, at 9, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/apr/05/surrogacy-parents-ivf. 
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unenforceable.90 Both Canada and the U.K. have acknowledged that 
limiting payment to surrogates (as well as egg and sperm donors91) has 
significantly reduced the number of willing participants.92 Canada reports 
the emergence of a black market in which couples resort to online 
advertisements and do-it-at-home insemination kits.93 A black market is 
medically dangerous and intensifies the risks involved. This is comparable 
to the situation before Roe v. Wade was decided, when abortion was 
outlawed in many states in the U.S.94
2. Surrogacy Tourism—A Look at India  
The inaccessibility of surrogacy in countries with restrictive reproductive 
policies has resulted in the rapidly growing and controversial practice of 
surrogacy tourism.95 This refers to the act of foreign couples, generally from 
the U.S., the U.K., and Europe, traveling to another country to hire a woman 
to gestate their child. Typically, the surrogate woman is not genetically 
related to the child; she is inseminated with an embryo formed using the 
gametes of the intending parents or a third-party donor. 
 90. Surrogacy Arrangements Act c. 49, § 1A; Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 
64, art. 541. 
 91. Law Against Paying Egg Donors Drives Couples to U.S., CBC NEWS, Apr. 30, 
2007, http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/story/2007/04/30/fertility-tourism.html; Women 
Shopping for Super Sperm, CANWEST NEWS SERV., Dec. 10, 2005 [hereinafter Women 
Shopping for Super Sperm], available at
http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/story.html?id=52e43aa6-b15c-423f-a845-
13a845143e70&k=9062. 
 92. See Jayden Roberts, Desperate for a Baby, Canadians Resort to World’s Baby 
Farms, TOP NEWS (Dec. 11, 2010), available at http://topnews.us/content/230276-desperate-
baby-canadians-resort-world-s-baby-farms; Paid Surrogacy Driven Underground in 
Canada: CBC News Report, CBC NEWS (May 2, 2007), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/story/2007/05/01/surrogates-pay.html; Taylor, supra note 86.  
 93. See generally Sharon Kirkey, Canadian Law Driving Infertile Couples into Black 
Market: Critics, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 13, 2010, 
http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/archives/story.html?id=1995fb4a-b64f-40dd-
b2b4-2e89b504a6ff. 
 94. “Couples are getting ripped off when their fear of penalties forces them to engage 
in surrogacy arrangements without a contract. And, surrogates are a little bit less desirable to 
the couple because they are those women who are acting out of desperation.” Paid Surrogacy 
Driven Underground, supra note 92. 
 95. Dr. Seang Lin Tan, an infertility expert at Montreal’s McGill University, 
explains that “about 50 patients a year who can find their own donors—friends or relatives. 
But the majority can’t find donors and for those who can’t find donors we send them 
abroad.” Sharon Kirkey, Desperate Canadians Resort to Foreign Surrogates,
OTTAWACITIZEN.COM (Dec. 12, 2010), http://www2.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/ 
story.html?id=f19591e1-a773-4bf2-a6b6-597c92a6ce69. The same is true for finding a 
surrogate. See Kirkey, supra note 92. One interviewee quoted in The Guardian explained, “It 
is very difficult to find surrogates in the UK. There are lots of delays and surrogates are very 
rare…So, we ended up with 10 attempts, all in India.” Burke, supra note 85.  
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India, the surrogacy capital of the world,96 illustrates how the benefits 
and disadvantages of cross-border surrogacy arrangements yield a labyrinth 
of ethical and legal dilemmas. Indian legalized surrogacy in 2002.97 With 
the exception of nonbinding guidelines set forth by the India Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare (the Guidelines),98 the practice remains 
unregulated. Clinics are, therefore, accustomed to adopting their own 
policies with little to no government oversight. For childless couples, the 
lack of red tape enables them to navigate the Indian surrogacy market with 
ease and efficiency. However, it also leaves the industry vulnerable to 
unethical practices.99
Further, the lower cost of reproductive services in India is attractive to 
foreign couples. India offers surrogacy for about $22,000-30,000, versus 
$55,000-65,000 in the U.S.100 Nonetheless, the well-developed medical 
infrastructure and highly trained doctors assure couples that they are 
receiving quality care.101 Additionally, Indian women are considered more 
trustworthy than American women because they are less likely to smoke, 
 96. Burke, supra note 85. 
 97. Id.
 98. INDIAN COUNCIL OF MED. RES., NAT’L ACAD. OF MED. SCI., NATIONAL 
GUIDELINES FOR ACCREDITATION, SUPERVISION & REGULATION OF ART CLINICS IN INDIA,
(Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2005) [hereinafter NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR 
ACCREDITATION], available at http://www.icmr.nic.in/art/art_clinics.htm. 
 99. Stories circulate of eggs and embryos stolen, fertility drugs sold illegally, missing 
medical records, surrogates deciding to keep the baby, as well as improper post-natal care. 
Usha Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International Surrogacy 
Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 34-35 (2009). 
 100. LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, GOV’T OF INDIA, REP. NO. 228, NEED FOR LEGISLATION 
TO REGULATE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY CLINICS AS WELL AS RIGHTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS OF PARTIES TO A SURROGACY 11 (2009), available at
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report228.pdf [hereinafter NEED FOR 
LEGISLATION]. Donor egg surrogacy in the U.S. can cost upwards of $80,000—$120,000. For 
examples of costs advertised by clinics and agencies, see Anticipated Program Expenses for 
Gestational Surrogacy, CIRCLE SURROGACY, http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/index.php/ 
costs (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); Surrogacy Program—Financial Information on Surrogacy 
Costs, GROWING GENERATIONS, http://www.growinggenerations.com/surrogacy-program/ 
intended-parents/financial-information (last visited Dec. 28, 2011); Surrogacy—How Does it 
Work?, ADOPTION.COM, http://adopting.adoption.com/child/surrogacy.html (last visited Dec. 
28, 2011). It should also be noted that despite the cost savings, the fee surrogates earn for one 
birth is substantial—approximately equal to ten to fifteen years worth of work. Burke, supra
note 85.  
 101. Roberts, supra note 92; Amana Fontanella-Khan, India, the Rent-a-Womb 
Capital, SLATE, Aug. 23, 2010,  
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2010/08/india_the_rentawomb_capital_of_t
he_world.html; Margot Cohen, A Search for a Surrogate Leads to India, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 
2009, at W8, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704252004574459003279407832.html.  
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drink alcohol, or engage in drug use due to cultural and religious norms. 102
Some fertility clinics are even located in dry cities of India.103
Finally, in contrast to other surrogacy markets,104 clinics in India 
typically recognize the intending parents as the baby’s legal parents by 
placing their names on the birth certificate.105 Although there is no law on 
point, the Guidelines state that the birth certificate shall bear the names of 
the genetic parents of the baby.106 The Guidelines correspondingly state that 
the surrogate mother cannot also act as the egg donor and relinquishes all 
parental rights to the child.107 Therefore, in theory, the surrogate mother’s 
name should never appear on the birth certificate. Nonetheless, because 
these Guidelines are non-binding, each clinic adopts its own policy.108 The 
situation is more complicated when the baby is conceived using an egg 
donor. Clinics will either denote only the genetic father’s name on the birth 
certificate or both of the intending parents’ names.109 However, in 2009, the 
High Court of Gujarat set precedent when it granted a surrogate baby, born 
of a foreign father’s sperm and an Indian woman’s egg donation, Indian 
citizenship.110 The Draft ART bill, if enacted, would address these 
inconsistencies by granting the intending parents legal parenthood in all 
surrogacy arrangements and naming the intending parents on the birth 
certificate.  
The conflict of laws currently permeating virtually all cross-border 
surrogacy arrangements further complicates the issue of surrogacy tourism 
because the parenthood and citizenship of babies born through international 
surrogacy remains questionable. The predicaments of Baby M and the Balaz 
twins illustrate the urgent need for legislation.111 Both surrogacy 
 102. Amelia Gentleman, Foreign Couples Turn to India for Surrogate Mothers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/asia/04iht-
mother.1.10690283.html; Cohen, supra note 101; Scott Carney, Inside India’s Rent-A-Womb 
Business, MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2010), available at
http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/02/surrogacy-tourism-india-nayna-patel. 
 103. Carney, supra note 102. 
 104. For example, the U.K. and Australia.  
 105. Draft ART Bill, supra note 8, at § 34.10. 
 106. NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR ACCREDITATION, supra note 98, at ch. 3, § 3.5.4. 
 107. See id.
 108. Hillary Brenhouse, India’s Rent-a-Womb Industry Faces New Restrictions,
TIME (June 5, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1993665,00.html. See 
also examples referenced in note 109, infra.
 109. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, NEW LIFE INDIA,
http://www.newlifeindia.com/FAQ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011); MED. TOURISM CORP.,
http://www.medicaltourismco.com/assisted-reproduction-fertility/surrogacy/surrogate-baby-
birth-certificate-FAQ-089.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 110. See Pronoti Datta, Surrogacy Goes into Labour, TIMES OF INDIA, May 15, 2010, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-15/india/28282187_1_manji-yamada-
gay-couples-law-commission-report (discussing the Balaz twins case, further explained in 
the preceding paragraphs).  
 111. See, e.g., id.
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arrangements resulted in the birth of babies who were deemed stateless 
orphans until their statuses were established.  
Baby Manji was the first stateless orphan born through a cross-border 
surrogacy arrangement in India. Her story sensationalized the risks inherent 
in an unregulated surrogacy market and ignited the campaign for new 
legislation.112 In the Baby Manji case, a Japanese couple, Ikufumi and Yuki 
Yamada, traveled to India to hire a surrogate.113 The arrangement was 
complicated by the intending parents’ divorce, which occurred one month 
before the baby’s birth.114 The intending mother then decided she did not 
want the baby.115 The intending father (Yamada) did want the baby and flew 
to India himself to take Manji home.116 Although the couple had used an 
Indian egg donor, Yamada was biologically related to the baby.117
Nonetheless, the Japanese embassy in India refused to grant Manji a 
Japanese passport or visa because the Japanese Civil Code recognizes as the 
mother only the woman who gives birth to the baby.118 In this case, the 
woman who had given birth to Manji was Indian, not Japanese. Yamada 
then turned to adoption. Alas, an ancient guardians and ward law in India 
disallows a single man from adopting a baby girl.119 The Indian government 
also refused to issue an Indian passport to Manji. A passport requires a birth 
certificate, which, under India law, must bear the name of both the baby’s 
mother and father.120 Because the registrars were uncertain as to who was 
Baby Manji’s mother, the Municipal Council of Anand refused to issue a 
birth certificate, which prevented the processing of a passport.121 After 
months of pleas and filings, the Rajasthan regional passport office issued 
Manji an identity certificate,122 and the Japanese Embassy issued a 
temporary visa on humanitarian grounds.123 Nonetheless, the identity 
certificate issued by the Indian government did not mention nationality, the 
 112. KARI POINTS, COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AND FERTILITY TOURISM IN INDIA: THE 
CASE OF BABY MANJI 2 n.1 (KENAN INST. FOR ETHICS AT DUKE UNIV. 2009), available at
http://www.duke.edu/web/kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf. 
 113. Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr., (2008) 13 SCC 518, Writ 
Petition No. 369 of 2008; POINTS, supra note 112, at 2. 
 114. POINTS, supra note 112. 
 115. Id. at 2. 
 116. Id. at 5. 
 117. Id.
 118. Id. at 5. 
 119. Id.
 120. POINTS, supra note 112, at 5. 
 121. Id.
 122. Japan Gate-Pass for Baby Manji, TELEGRAPH (Calcutta), Oct. 17, 2008 
(explaining that Identity certificates are granted to people who are stateless or cannot get a 
passport from their home country), available at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081018/jsp/
nation/story_9984517.jsp.  
 123. POINTS, supra note 112, at 7. 
280 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2
mother’s name, or the mother’s religion, thus leaving many uncertainties in 
cross-border surrogacy arrangements in India.124
In the case of the Balaz twins, two German nationals hired an Indian 
surrogate who was inseminated with an embryo formed by the sperm of the 
intending father and an anonymous Indian egg donor.125 When the intending 
parents tried to bring the twins home to Germany, India would not issue 
passports to the babies.126 The Indian government grants a passport only if a 
child’s biological parents are Indian and there is no law establishing the 
Indian surrogate or the Indian egg donor as the babies’ legal mother.127
Germany would not grant the babies citizenship and entry into the country 
because surrogacy is illegal in that country.128 The couple also tried 
adoption. However, the Central Adoption Resource Agency (CARA) in 
India initially refused on the grounds that it does not grant adopted status to 
surrogate children.129 Finally, the high court decided, in a case of first 
impression, 130 that without guidance from the legislature, and in absence of 
any law positively establishing the intending mother as the babies’ mother, 
the court was forced to conclude that the woman who gestated and gave 
birth to the babies was their legal mother.131 Hence, the babies were born in 
India to an Indian mother, and therefore were entitled to Indian citizenship 
and passports.132 After almost two years, this decision facilitated the twins’ 
eventual travel home to Germany.133
Due to the absence of any reporting system, it is difficult to gather 
accurate statistics about India’s surrogacy industry. Nonetheless, based on 
fertility clinics’ reports, surrogacy tourism to India has exploded over the 
last few years. For example, the Wall Street Journal reports that 
PlanetHospital, a medical tourism company based out of California, sent 33 
individuals/couples abroad in 2007.134 Then, within the first eight months of 
 124. Id.
 125. Jan Balaz v. Anand Municipality, No. 3020, ¶ 2, Special Civil Application 
(Gujarat H.C., Nov. 11, 2009). 
 126. Id. ¶ 4-8; Brenhouse, supra note 108.  
 127. Balaz, No. 3020, ¶ 4, 6-8, 16. 
 128. Id. ¶ 7; Dhananjay Mahapatra, German Surrogate Twins to Go Home, TIMES OF 
INDIA, May 27, 2010, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-27/india/28279835 
_1_stateless-citizens-balaz-surrogate-mother. 
 129. German Twins’ Father Makes Desperate Plea, TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 27, 2010, 
http://www.timesnow.tv/German-twins-father-makes-desperate-
plea/articleshow/4339533.cms. 
 130. Balaz, No. 3020, ¶ 9. 
 131. Id. ¶ 16. 
 132. Id. ¶ 22. 
 133. Brenhouse, supra note 108. Once the babies were granted Indian citizenship and 
then Indian passports, the Indian government provided them with exit permits so that they 
may travel home to Germany. Mahapatra, supra note 128. German authorities finally agreed 
to provide the necessary travel documents after the Balazs went through inter-country 
adoption. Id.
 134. Cohen, supra note 101.  
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2009, the company sent 600 individuals/couples abroad—all but seven 
traveled to India.135 The surrogacy industry in India is worth approximately 
$5.4 million per year136 but projections for 2012 estimate that profits will 
reach $2.3 billion.137
Surrogacy tourism has resulted in additional opposition to the practice of 
surrogacy. Particularly in India, where surrogates are often from 
impoverished rural communities, there are concerns about exploitation and 
the unequal bargaining power of surrogate women.138 The fear is that 
women engage in surrogacy out of desperation, rather than for altruistic or 
well-informed reasons.139 Additionally, from the perspective of the home 
state, creating a system that encourages surrogacy tourism is irresponsible 
because it ignores the needs of its citizens. Persons with disabilities and the 
surrogates’ host states are left to bear the burden of fertility treatment. 
Legislatures have been criticized for allowing surrogacy tourism to be a 
method by which they can avoid legislating issues involving ART.140 As 
previously mentioned, this avoidance may soon be thwarted if India’s draft 
ART bill, requiring that couples produce a certificate validating that 
surrogacy is legal in their country,141 becomes law. Couples will likely put 
more pressure on their state legislatures to pass new or updated surrogacy 
laws.
Several countries have begun addressing surrogacy tourism through new 
or updated laws. India’s draft ART bill is likely to be introduced to 
Parliament by 2012.142 In addition to the previously mentioned provisions,143
 135. Id.
 136. NEED FOR LEGISLATION, supra note 100. 
 137. Brenhouse, supra note 108. 
 138. Smerdon, supra note 99, at 51-56; Rimm, supra note 44, at 1444-45, 1448 
(explaining that because the controlling party has the power to control the flow of 
information, legal scholars worry that the intending parents may try to mislead or unduly 
influence the surrogate); Carney, supra note 102; Fontanella-Khan, supra note 101. 
 139. Cohen relays stories of women who acted as surrogates out of desperation, 
including debt and an alcoholic husband. Cohen, supra note 101. One woman conveyed that 
acting as a surrogate was a better option than selling her kidney. Id. See also Carney, supra
note 102. Carney reports that one twenty-six year old surrogate told him “she opted for a 
Delhi clinic that recruits educated surrogates and doesn’t cloister them after she learned that 
some clinics hire ‘basically the very, very poor, strictly doing it for the money.” Id. Even in 
the U.S., Munyon discusses how the court in the Baby M case invalidated surrogacy 
arrangements on policy concerns of the surrogate being coerced by the prospect of making 
money. Munyon, supra note 43, at 730 (citing In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241 (N.J. 
1988)). 
 140. See G. Pennings et al., ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 15: Cross-border 
Reproductive Care, 23HUM. REPROD. 2182, 2183 (2008). As will be discussed briefly infra,
after a glimpse at the waterfall of complex issues that could potentially result from allowing 
surrogacy one can understand why a state would be inclined to simply ban surrogacy.  
 141. Draft ART Bill, supra note 8, at § 34.19 
 142. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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India’s law seeks to minimize the potential for exploitation. Some 
exemplary safeguards include: creating a national registry,144 requiring a 
separation between the roles and responsibilities of ART clinics and the 
ART banks,145 limiting who can act as a surrogate (women between 21 and 
35, with at least one previous child of her own),146 restricting a surrogate to 
five live births (including her own children),147 and requiring that intending 
parents provide the surrogate with health insurance during the term of the 
arrangement.148
Taking a different approach, Queensland, Australia recently enacted a 
new altruistic surrogacy law that punishes couples who travel overseas to 
take part in a commercial surrogacy with a $110,000 fine or two years 
imprisonment.149 However, experts are urging State Parliament to reconsider 
the new surrogacy laws that they say will lead to infertile couples lying to 
authorities, friends, and family about their children’s births.150 Canada has 
seen this happen with couples who travel to the U.S. for ART procedures 
and then simply lie to authorities.151
In recognition of the adverse affects of Canada’s restrictive surrogacy 
law, the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) has advocated for allowing 
broader rules regarding surrogate compensation.152 The CBA specifically 
remarked that prohibiting compensation of surrogates is likely to have a 
negative impact on the availability of ART and encourages informal 
arrangements without the benefit of legal advice.153
 143. For example, holding the surrogacy contract enforceable, requiring a certificate 
from the intending parents’ home country, and requiring the surrogate relinquish all rights to 
the child and the intending parents are bound to accept the child.  
 144. Draft ART Bill, supra note 8, at § 3. 
 145. Compare id. § 13.3-13.5 and id. §§ 20-25 with id. § 26 (demonstrating that ATR 
clinics are to perform only medical services, such as the artificial insemination, and ART 
banks are responsible for recruiting surrogates. The purpose of this separation is to ensure 
that doctors are solely concerned with medicine, and not profits.).  
 146. Id. § 34.5-34.6. 
 147. Id.
 148. Id. § 34.2. 
 149. Surrogacy Act 2010 (Queensl.), ch 4 pt 1, 54-56 (Austl.), available at 
www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/2010/10AC002.pdf.
 150. New Surrogacy Law Will “Make Mums Lie,” DAILY TELEGRAPH (Austl.), Jan. 
22, 2011, http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/new-surrogacy-law-will-make-mums-lie/story-
fn6bmg6l-1225992594035. “University of Technology Sydney law professor Jenni Millbank 
said that couples who were desperate to have a child would still seek commercial surrogates 
overseas and simply lie about it when they return home.” Id.
 151. Datta, supra note 110.  
 152. CANADIAN BAR ASS’N, REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENDITURES UNDER THE ASSISTED 
HUMAN REPRODUCTION ACT 1, 4-7 (Sept. 2007), available at
http://www.cba.org/CBA/sections_health/pdf/reimbursement.pdf. 
 153. Id. at 1. 
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Similar to Canada, the U.K. launched a three-month public consultation 
concluding in April 2011 on compensation of sperm and egg donors.154
Fertility experts warned that due to the drastic lack of gamete donors, 
women were resorting to importing sperm, medical tourism, and do-it-
yourself insemination kits bought on the internet.155 The current policy in 
the U.K. permits reimbursement for loss earnings and expenses, but not for 
inconvenience.156 The Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority is 
considering increasing the allowable reimbursement of donors to include 
inconvenience, and the consolation survey also asked the public if the 
Authority should change the law to allow compensation.157 The Authority is 
scheduled to present the findings and its decision on compensation and 
benefits in kind on October 19, 2011. 158 These unfavorable results, and the 
potential solution of compensation, are also relevant to the practice of 
surrogacy.  
B. The Benefits of “Effective and Appropriate” Surrogacy 
Legislation 
An effective and appropriate legal framework requires (1) enforcing 
surrogacy contracts in a court of law and (2) not prohibiting compensation 
of surrogates. This framework is optimal because it maximizes individual 
procreative liberty while minimizing the prevalence of black markets and 
cross-border surrogacy. A legalized and regulated surrogacy industry also 
provides protections for all parties, sets standards of practice, guarantees 
oversight of the industry, and provides a forum for redress of abuses. 
1. Enforcing the Surrogacy Contract 
Several benefits flow from enforcing the surrogacy contract. First, the 
rights and responsibilities of each party are known and clearly defined, 
which reduces risks. Arrangements absent enforceable contracts threaten the 
family unit with possible disintegration, causing greater emotional and 
 154. Donating Sperm and Eggs: Have Your Say, HUMAN FERTILIZATION &
EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., http://www.hfea.gov.uk/5605.html (last updated Jan. 20, 2011). 
 155. Kate Kelland, Britain Wants Ideas to Boost Egg, Sperm Donation, REUTERS, Jan. 
17, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/17/us-fertility-britain-
idUSTRE70G00R20110117. 
 156. HFEA Launches Public Consultation on Sperm and Egg Donation, HUMAN 
FERTILIZATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., Jan. 17, 2011, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/6285.html. 
 157. Donation Review Web Questionnaire, HUMAN FERTILIZATION & EMBRYOLOGY 
AUTH., at 2, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/2011-02-08-Donation_review-website-
questionnaire.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2011). Lisa Jardine, chair of the HEFA, explains that 
the HEFA wants to make sure it has the best policies in place so that there are no 
unnecessary barriers in the way of those wishing to donate while still protecting those who 
are born as a result of the donation. Kelland, supra note 155. 
 158. Donating Sperm and Eggs: Have Your Say, supra note 154. 
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psychological stress.159 When the surrogacy contract is enforceable, the 
names of the intended parents are put on the birth certificate, the intended 
parents inherit all rights and responsibilities of parenthood, and the 
surrogate retains no rights as a legal mother.160
Second, an enforceable contract provides important protections for the 
surrogate. She is afforded avenues for redress if she is subjected to abusive 
or exploitative behavior. The same is true if the pregnancy encounters 
complications or the intending parents reject acceptance of the baby, which 
may occur when the baby is born with a disability.161 Also, the parties can 
contract to provide additional benefits, such as health insurance coverage 
and pre and post-natal care.  
Third, with guidance from the legislature, courts are better equipped to 
interpret surrogacy contracts. The “court is not an appropriate forum for 
making policy in such a sensitive area.”162 There are inherent limitations to 
any case, which make the extrapolation of judicially-made policy too 
risky.163 Moreover, the advantage of unambiguous laws and consistent 
outcomes is that individuals are on notice of their rights and responsibilities 
and the consequences of their actions. They can, therefore, conform their 
behavior to the expectation of the law in order to produce the outcome they 
desire.  
Finally, holding the surrogacy contract legally binding remedies some of 
the concerns regarding the rights of the child. Under Article 7 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), “immediately after birth” a 
child shall have the right to acquire a nationality and to be known and cared 
for by her parents.164 The CRC also protects the child’s right to be free from 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with her privacy, family, or her right not 
to be separated from her parents.165 This is particularly relevant in cross-
border surrogacy arrangements where conflicts of laws (or absence of laws) 
between the host and home country complicate issues of parenthood and 
citizenship. For example, in the case of Baby Manji, the surrogate baby 
arguably had three mothers—the intended mother who had contracted for 
 159. This is particularly true when the intending mother is not biologically related to 
the baby. In the famous case of Baby M, the surrogate mother, who was also biologically 
related to the child, decided to keep the baby. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236-37 (N.J. 
1988). The New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the surrogacy contract and recognized the 
surrogate as the baby’s legal mother. Id. at 1264.  
 160. If the surrogate changes her mind and decides she wants to keep the baby, a court 
will interfere and order the surrogate to release the baby to the intending parents. See, e.g.,
Draft ART Bill, supra note 8, at § 34.4 (surrogate to relinquish rights); see also id. § 34.11 
(intending parents must accept the surrogate baby). 
161. Id. § 34.11.  
 162. In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 895 (Wis. 1981). 
 163. Id.
 164. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 7, Annex, U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).  
 165. Id. arts. 8, 9. 
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the surrogacy, the egg donor, and the gestational surrogate—yet legally she 
had none. 166 Enforcing the terms of the contract makes certain that upon 
birth the baby will have the same citizenship as her identifiable parents with 
whom she will reside.167
2. Compensating the Surrogate 
Allowing compensation ensures that there are willing surrogates so that 
access to surrogacy is a meaningful right. Women report choosing to 
become a surrogate for many reasons, including the fee, empathy for 
childless couples, enjoyment of pregnancy, and a sense of enhanced self-
esteem.168 While the emotional and psychological reasons may be very 
strong, jurisdictions that allow compensation have a higher number of 
surrogates than states that do not allow compensation.169
The most widely cited reason for prohibiting commercial surrogacy is 
that the exchange of money creates a baby market that transforms women’s 
bodies and children into commodities.170 However, this is a simplistic and 
assumptive view of surrogacy. First, opponents fail to recognize that a baby 
market already exists—money currently exchanges hands between 
intending parents, hospitals, doctors, fertility clinics, and pharmaceutical 
companies.171 The same is true of adoption and organ procurement.172
Although these practices are widely cited as favorable support for the 
prohibition of commercial surrogacy, they are also examples of systems in 
 166. POINTS, supra note 112 (discussed in Part III A(2)). 
 167. See, e.g., Draft ART Bill, supra note 8, § 35.  
 168. Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An 
Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 30-31 (2005). 
 169. Compare note 92 with reports from jurisdictions such as the U.S., India, and 
Israel. Further, a review of jurisdictions that allow compensated gamete donation is also 
convincing. No nation has a pool of donors anywhere near the size of that in the United 
States, where compensation is not prohibited. Peggy Orenstein, Your Gamete, Myself, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2007 (Magazine), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/magazine/15egg-
t.html?pagewanted=all. See also Robyn Nazar, The Value of an Egg Donation, AM.
FERTILITY ASS’N, (June 30, 2011),http://www.theafa.org/article/the-value-of-an-egg-
donation/. 
 170. For example, The Vancouver Sun reports that Margaret Somerville, founding 
director of Montreal’s McGill Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law, says, “what bothers me 
so much is that we are totally commercializing, depersonalizing and de-humanizing the most 
intimate of human relationships, that of parents and children.” Kirkey, Desperate Canadians 
Resort to Foreign Surrogates, supra note 95.  
 171. Carole Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M,
30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 67. See also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in 
the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 211 (2009); Michele Goodwin, The 
Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 65 
(2006). 
 172. See Goodwin, supra note 171(explaining how the U.S. adoption processes, once 
based on the altruistic child welfare model, have morphed to reflect the desires of would-be 
parents and have exposed children to the free-market dynamics).  
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which only the supplier is unpaid, while the middlemen (doctors, lawyer, 
hospitals, etc.) profit. (That being said, the next section proceeds to 
distinguish between organ donation and surrogacy as further support of why 
surrogacy should be compensated.) It remains relevant, nonetheless, that 
opponents often feel it is wrong to mix money and procreation when in 
reality this is happening all of the time. 
Second, the discourse of those who oppose commercial surrogacy on the 
ground that it commodifies women’s bodies is the exact discourse that 
represses women and perpetuates the stereotype of women as baby-
makers.173 The fee paid to a surrogate woman is in recognition of and 
compensation for her services and sacrifices. It is in exchange for the 
surrogate refraining from certain activities (smoking, drinking, sexual 
contact), engaging in certain activities (going to doctor appointments), 
enduring discomfort (morning sickness, hormonal changes, the birth), and 
undergoing IVF and hormone treatment—it is not a value paid for the life of 
a baby. Not compensating the surrogate woman devalues and under-
appreciates her commitment. To assert that a woman should voluntarily 
undergo these sacrifices out of “the goodness of her heart” reinforces the 
stereotype that women’s role in society is that of child-bearer.174
Lastly, the argument that commercial surrogacy commodifies women’s 
bodies and procreation misconstrues the nature of the relationship between 
the surrogate and the intending parents. Opponents tend to paint a picture of 
a wealthy white family choosing to engage a poorer surrogate for voluntary 
reasons, such as convenience and vanity.175 This portrayal is false. Intending 
couples turn to surrogacy as a last resort after years of emotional and 
financial sacrifice.176 They sell their homes, forgo vacations, and commit 
 173. Courts and legal scholars who reject commercial surrogacy as contrary to public 
policy often express a concern that it will reinforce a perception of women as “baby-makers” 
and promote the view of children as marketable goods. Rimm, supra note 44, at 1444. The 
flaw in this argument is similar to the contradiction inherent in society’s acceptance of the 
fact that men can and do donate sperm for financial gain, yet society feels that women should
express some altruistic reason for donating their reproductive material. See Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Foreword, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. i, x (2009). 
 174. One might argue that it is an anomaly to pay a risk premium for other jobs but 
then not pay a surrogate for her demanding (twenty four hours a day, seven days a week) 
services. 
 175. Rimm, supra note 44, at 1446 (discussing the concern that a Brave New World 
scenario will emerge as a result of surrogacy). Munyon discusses how one reason the court 
invalidated the surrogacy contract in the Baby M case was out of fear for the potential class 
distinctions, stating “surrogacy will be used for the benefit of the rich at the expense of the 
poor.” Munyon, supra note 43, at 730 (citing In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 
1988)). 
 176. A U.K. study found that couples had considered surrogacy only after a long 
period of infertility or when it was the only option available. MacCallum, supra note 51. See 
also Carney, supra note 92 (citing one couple who turned to India as a “final stage of an 
expensive and emotional quest for genetic parenthood—their last option after a series of 
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years to trying to get pregnant, only to find their last hope in the help of 
another woman. Women with infertility have been shown to suffer from 
severe depression, comparable to cancer patients, and almost half of all 
infertile women report infertility to be the most devastating experience of 
their lives. 177
To subdue the worry that the commoditization of women’s bodies and 
baby making is a necessary consequence of a regulated commercial 
surrogacy industry, consider the recounts reported by Elly Teman. In 
Birthing A Mother: The Surrogate Body and Pregnant Self, Elly Teman 
narrates the experiences of twenty-six surrogates and thirty-five intending 
mothers in Israel, where compensated surrogacy is legal and regulated.178
Israeli surrogates, unlike their U.S. counterparts, are not stigmatized by 
negative connotations that flow from seeking and receiving compensation 
for reproductive services.179 Hence, they are more upfront from the 
beginning about their financial motivations.180 But, as one surrogate puts it, 
“surrogacy begins with the money but it doesn’t end with the money.”181
Teman concludes that although the surrogacy arrangement began as a 
commercial exchange, surrogates came to shift their understanding of it as a 
gift exchange.182 Another surrogate recounted, “From a certain point 
onwards, even if I had won the lottery I would have continued, because the 
money stopped having the same meaning that it did in the beginning.”183
These narratives demonstrate that a profitable surrogacy industry exists 
where the relationships between the surrogates, intending parents, and 
children are much deeper than a mere commercial transaction.  
failed fertility treatments”); Burke, supra note 85 (reporting that one couple turned to India 
after a “13 year struggle”). 
 177. INFERTILITY COUNSELING—A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK FOR CLINICIANS 
(Sharon N. Covington & Linda Hammer Burns eds., 2d ed. 2006). See id. at 98 (comparing 
the level of stress experienced by infertile patients to that of cancer patients) and 54 
(infertility and its treatment is traumatic for women); Ellen W. Freeman et al., Psychological 
Evaluation and Support in a Program of In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer,
43FERTILITY & STERILITY 48, 50 (1985).  
 178. ELLY TEMAN, BIRTHING A MOTHER: THE SURROGATE BODY AND THE PREGNANT 
SELF 19 (2010). 
 179. Teman and Krawiec both comment on the guilt American women feel for 
seeking compensation because society projects an expectation that women should act out of 
altruistic, not financial, motivations. TEMAN, supra note 178, at 207-08; Krawiec, supra note 
173, at x.  
 180. TEMAN, supra note 178, at 208. 
 181. Id. at 207. 
 182. Id.
 183. Id.
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a. Surrogacy v. Organ Donation  
Opponents often reference the prohibition of the sale of organs and baby 
selling as support for the prohibition of commercial surrogacy.184 However, 
surrogacy is distinguishable from both practices in ways that fail to justify a 
full ban on compensation. The first difference is one of buying versus 
renting. Organ donation is permanent, whereas surrogacy services are 
temporary. In surrogacy, both the use of the body and the promise to refrain 
from/engage in certain activities are temporary. Second, there is the 
renewability aspect. Gamete donation and gestational services are activities 
that can be done more than once. In contrast, when you donate an organ, 
you do not grow another one in its place. 
Third, unlike organ procurement, surrogacy is a service rather than a sale 
of goods. Especially in the case of gestational surrogacy, which is most 
common, the surrogate is not contributing any part of her genetic material or 
giving away any part of her body. Rather, she is choosing to use her body in 
a particular way.185 Moreover, she is using her body in a natural way, and 
many surrogates have already experienced pregnancy and childbirth with 
their own children. 
Fourth, organ donation arguably carries even heavier emotional and 
psychological consequences than surrogacy, particularly in situations where 
the donor is deceased. Some of the additional stresses that are relevant to 
the organ donation of a deceased individual include: religious beliefs about 
the treatment of the body after death and the afterlife, family members’ 
emotions, societal ideas of respect for the deceased, and concern about 
establishing the donor’s intent. This is not to underestimate the emotions 
involved in a surrogacy arrangement. However, it is worth noting that 
several studies disprove critics’ concern that surrogacy arrangements result 
in negative psychological affects.186
 184. Rimm, supra note 44, at 1436. Rimm also concludes that these public policy 
arguments are not convincing enough to compel a full ban on commercial surrogacy in India. 
Id. at 1449-50. 
 185. One could argue that this is similar to professional athletes and models.  
 186. It has been found that surrogate mothers do not generally experience major 
problems in their relationship with commissioning couples in handing over the baby or from 
the reactions of those around them. Vasanti Jadva et al., Surrogacy: The Experiences of 
Surrogate Mothers, 18 HUM. REPROD. 2196 (2003). The emotional problems experienced by 
some appeared to lessen over time. Id.; See also Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 168, at 
31(noting that surrogate mothers generally report being quite satisfied with their experience 
as surrogates). A study comparing families created through surrogacy and families created 
through natural reproduction found that families created through surrogacy indicted greater 
psychological well-being and adaptation to parenthood. See Susan Golomboket et al., 
Families Created Through Surrogacy Arrangements: Parent-Child Relationships in the 1st
Year of Life, 40 DEV. PSYCHOL. 400 (2004). In addition, the absence of a genetic and/or 
gestational link between parents and their child does not appear to have a negative impact on 
the parent-child relationships or the psychological well-being of mothers, fathers, or child at 
age 3. S. Golombok et al., Non-Genetic and Non-Gestational Parenthood: Consequences for 
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b. Surrogacy v. “Baby-Selling”  
One might argue that, ultimately, the product of the surrogacy 
arrangement results in the sale of a good—the baby—which amounts to 
baby selling, a practice that is socially and legally forbidden.187 However, 
surrogacy is distinguishable from baby selling because the assumptions 
upon which baby selling prohibitions rest are not relevant in surrogacy 
arrangements. The goal of baby selling prohibitions is to prevent a baby 
black market by eliminating financial incentives when making childbearing 
decisions about a child already conceived.188 In other words, the legislature 
did not want a mother to sell her baby because of financial pressures, when 
she might otherwise choose to abort or keep the baby. Here, the purpose of 
the surrogacy arrangement is to create a baby that will join the intending 
parents’ family. More importantly, assuming a genetic relationship exists 
between at least one of the intending parents and the baby, one can argue 
that the intending parents cannot buy what is already theirs. Rather, if the 
intended parents created the embryo, they are giving the embryo to the 
surrogate only to care for it while it develops. The surrogate is providing a 
service akin to the service provided by wet nurses of the past.189
Parent-Child Relationships and the Psychological Well-being of Mothers, Fathers and 
Children at Age 3, 21 HUM. REPROD. 1918 (2006). Research presented at an annual 
conference of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology revealed that 
intending parents have better parenting skills and show more warmth towards their children 
than those in non-surrogacy families. Research Shows Surrogacy Fears Unfounded,
BIONEWS (Progress Educational Trust, London, U.K.), July 1, 2002, available at
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_11396.asp. Additional research presented years later at the 
same conference found that surrogate children are psychologically well and revealed no 
difference in self-esteem. Surrogate Children Are Psychologically Well: Study, AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, July 5, 2008, available at
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hsVjzHODQfj9pEV3qZew2VbQNrsg. In addition, it 
is argued that the harm to maternal bonds arising from surrogacy is merely symbolic. 
Munyon, supra note 43, at 734. Additionally, in her study of twenty-six surrogates and thirty 
-ive intending mothers in Israel, Elly Teman reports that Israel has succeed in creating a 
regulatory framework that, rather than threatening the family, reaffirms it. TEMAN, supra
note 178, at 289. The institutions work toward the singular goal of creating only one mother. 
Id.
 187. In Gloria Banks’s article discussing a commercial organ transplant system, she 
explains that states must first decide whether the use of human sperm and eggs procured by 
donation or sale constitutes a transfer of a “human life” akin to “baby selling” prohibited by 
existing law and policy. Gloria Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society’s 
Most Vulnerable Participant in a Commercialized Organ Transplant System, 21 AM. J. L. &
MED. 45, 50-51 (1995).  
 188. See Abby Brandel, Legislating Surrogacy: A Partial Answer to Feminist 
Criticism, 54 MD. L. REV. 488, 502 (1995). 
 189. Where the birth mother and genetic mother are the same, courts and legislatures 
have a harder time distinguishing the surrogacy arrangement from “baby-brokering.” Rimm, 
supra note 44, at 1439. But where the genetic mother is the intending mother or egg donor, 
courts have been more willing to view the surrogacy arrangement as a contract for 
“services.” Id.
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Governments could choose to go beyond facilitating surrogacy 
arrangements and provide financial support. For example, nations that offer 
universal health care could cover the costs of the ART procedures in 
connection with the surrogacy arrangement and offer subsidies for payment 
of the surrogate. This paper does not delve into this possibility beyond 
acknowledging that it is an important issue for legislatures to consider. 
Regardless of whether insurance plans cover of the cost of compensating the 
surrogate, a state should refrain from prohibiting the intending couple from 
compensating the surrogate.  
C.  Proportionality—The Weighing Game  
Generally, citizens are protected from arbitrary interference with the 
exercise of their human rights.190 When the government does interfere, the 
question becomes whether it is doing so rationally and in the public 
interest.191 Here, although a full ban on surrogacy is an unnecessarily broad 
state regulation, certain restrictions on surrogacy may be justified on public 
policy grounds or to protect the rights of others. For example, limiting 
surrogacy to cases of medical necessity192 would address several of the 
concerns voiced by opponents of surrogacy. First, this provision would 
minimize the potential for individuals to pursue surrogacy for superficial 
reasons, such as convenience, vanity, and career goals.193 Second, it would 
likely equalize the bargaining power of the intending couple and the 
surrogate because both parties would be indispensible to the arrangement.  
Another limitation that legislatures may consider is requiring that at least 
one of the intending parents is genetically related to the baby (or at least in 
cases where that is possible). This provision, in conjunction with the 
medical necessity limitation, addresses the very contentious concern that 
sex and gamete selection operate as modern day eugenics practices. 
Together these restrictions would prevent intending couples from exploiting 
surrogacy as an opportunity to design the “perfect” baby.194 Also, requiring 
that one of the intending parents be genetically related to the child is 
directly in furtherance of the right to procreate. Otherwise, opponents have a 
stronger case to advocate that intending parents should alternatively adopt 
or foster a child.  
 190. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), art. 17, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(Dec. 16, 1966). 
 191. Alison Barnes & Michael McChrystal, The Various Human Rights in Healthcare,
HUM. RTS., Fall 1998, at 12, 13. 
 192. Medical necessity may exclude menopausal women. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR 
HEALTH & CLINICAL EXCELLENCE, FERTILITY: ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (UPDATE) §
4.1.2(a) (2010), available at www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/live/12157/48617/48617.pdf.
 193. TEMAN, supra note 178, at 2; Rimm, supra note 44. 
 194. Women Shopping for Super Sperm, supra note 91. 
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CONCLUSION
Elly Teman makes two striking comments in the introduction to Birthing 
a Mother. First, by threatening the understanding of families as biological 
facts, surrogacy reveals instead that families are social constructs.195 And 
second, surrogacy constructs families through a marketplace, making them a 
matter of choice rather than fate.196 “Social constructs” and “choice” are the 
operative words here. Disability is a function of socially created attitudinal, 
physical, and legal barriers. By questioning the assumptions founding these 
boundaries, society can eliminate discrimination against persons with 
disabilities, including in the realm of reproductive choice.  
The first ever World Report on Disability is dedicated to the “moral duty 
to remove barriers to participation for people with disability and to invest 
sufficient funding and expertise to unlock their vast potential.”197 Under 
Article 23, individuals can demand that their states take effective and 
appropriate measures, as well as provide the means necessary, to ensure that 
they retain their fertility and found a family. Surrogacy enables certain 
individuals to retain their fertility and reproduce. Accordingly, governments 
should fulfill their Article 23 obligations by instituting a legal framework 
that defines the relationships between the surrogate, intending parent, and 
child, enforces the surrogacy contract, and allows compensation of the 
surrogate. These conditions would maximize individual procreative liberty, 
while simultaneously minimizing incidences of black markets, surrogacy 
tourism, and the potential for unethical conduct.  
 195. TEMAN, supra note 178, at 7. 
 196. Id.
 197. WORLD REPORT ON DISABILITY, supra note 38, at ix. 
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INTRODUCTION
This paper argues that Operation Allied Force—the United States led, 
NATO military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 
the Kosovo War aimed at ensuring full compliance with UN Security 
Council Resolution 1199—violated both United States and international 
law. Part I of this paper provides a brief history of Kosovo in order to place 
the conflict in the proper context. It continues with a blow-by-blow account 
 † J.D. with International Law Certificate, The Florida State University College of 
Law; M.B.A., International Business and Management, The University of Toledo; B.S., 
Eastern Michigan University. The idea for this paper arose when reading a question posed in 
the notes of CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW CASES 
AND MATERIALS 255 n.17 (2006). 
 ‡ J.D. with International Law Certificate, The Florida State University College of 
Law; B.A., History, George Mason University. 
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of the events and decisions leading up to the initiation of Operation Allied 
Force and ends with a detailed description of the operation, which was the 
second major combat operation in NATO’s history, following the 
September 1995 Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Part II explores how the war powers are allocated between the Executive 
and Legislative branches of the United States federal government under the 
Constitution. In addition, the President and Congress’s authority over the 
United States Armed Forces under the War Powers Resolution is explained.  
Part III argues not only that President Clinton lacked the constitutional 
authority to commit United States Armed Forces to NATO’s Operation 
Allied Force, but also that continuing the operation until June 10, 1999 
violated the War Powers Resolution.  
Part IV explores whether Operation Allied Force was illegal under 
international law. Through an examination of key events, originating with 
Operation Allied Force and leading up to Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral 
declaration of independence and the July 22, 2010 International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) Advisory Opinion, the authors analyze whether Operation 
Allied Force violated the U.N. Charter’s prohibition against the use of force 
and conclude that the Operation cannot be legally justified under the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.  
I.  THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO
A.  A Brief History of Kosovo 
The Kosovo conflict is complicated. One must know its deep historical 
background in order to properly understand it. Kosovo lies in southern 
Serbia. Albanian and Slavic peoples have coexisted in Kosovo since the 
eighth century.1 With the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbia by 
Stephen Nemanya in 1168 A.D., Serb national identity started to grow.2 By 
that time, Kosovo had become the administrative and cultural center of the 
medieval Serbian State.3 Kosovo remained part of the Serbian Empire until 
it became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1389 after the famous Battle of 
Kosovo Polje in which the Serbs and their allies were defeated by the 
Ottoman Turks.4 To this day, Serbs consider the Battle the primary reason 
 1. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 100 (2005). 
 2. MOHAMMAD TAGHI KAROUBI, JUST OR UNJUST WAR? INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
UNILATERAL USE OF ARMED FORCE BY STATES AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH CENTURY 171 
(2004). 
 3. Id.
 4. Id. at 172. 
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for the collapse of the medieval Serbian State,5 and they hold the 
battleground sacred as a critical piece of their national pride.6
After they were defeated by the Ottoman Turks, Serbs abandoned the 
region while Albanians started to move back into Kosovo in large numbers.7
During the 17th and 18th centuries, the population of Kosovo gradually 
became dominated by ethnic Albanians.8
In the second half of the 19th century, Serbs began seeking to regain their 
lost lands.9 In response to this, the Ottoman Turks encouraged more 
Albanians to settle in Kosovo.10 After the Ottoman Turks were defeated in 
the Russo-Ottoman War in 1878, Serbs regained control of Pristina—the 
modern day capitol of Kosovo.11 When the Serbs won the first Balkan War 
in 1912, the entire region of Kosovo came under Serbian authority, and 
Serbs started to migrate back.12
Following World War I, Serbs implemented a policy that attempted to 
shift the demographics of Kosovo.13 Serbs encouraged settlers from other 
regions to move to Kosovo while forcing the Albanians to leave by illegally 
taking their land.14 Furthermore, the Yugoslav government gave Serbs and 
Montenegrins preferential treatment.15 Despite the unfavorable conditions in 
Kosovo, the population remained 63% Albanian.16
During World War II, Italy controlled most of Kosovo.17 In an attempt to 
recruit Albanian soldiers, the Yugoslav Partisan, Josip Broz Tito, promised 
Kosovo Albanians the right to unite with Albania after the war.18 In 1945, 
Tito’s promise was revealed as a lie.19 Albanians rose up in protest against 
Tito’s deception.20 In order to quiet the uprising, Tito declared Kosovo an 
autonomous province of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of 
 5. Id.; Gerald G. Howard, Comment, Combat in Kosovo: Ignoring the War Powers 
Resolution, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 261, 264 (2001). 
 6. Howard, supra note 5, at 264; see also MIRANDA VICKERS, BETWEEN SERB AND
ALBANIAN: A HISTORY OF KOSOVO 12-16 (1998).  
 7. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 172. 
 8. Id.
 9. Id.
 10. Id.
 11. Id.
 12. Id. at 175. 
 13. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 175. 
 14. Id. at 176. 
 15. Id.
16. Id.; see also G. Richard Jansen, Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo: An Abbreviated 
History, COLO. ST. UNIV., http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html (last updated 
July 22, 2008). 
 17. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 176. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.
 20. Id.
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Yugoslavia.21 In reality, however, the policy-making capabilities of the 
province remained very limited.22 Ethnic Albanians suffered acts of 
violence, terror, and harassment at the hands of the Yugoslav Secret 
Police.23 As the Yugoslav government implemented a policy to change the 
cultural demographics of Kosovo,24 many Albanians left the region; that 
trend continued until 1967.25  
In 1974, Yugoslavia adopted a new constitution.26 The most important 
point in the Yugoslav Constitution was the equal constitutional element.27 
According to the Constitution, Kosovo was an equal constitutional element 
of the Yugoslav Federation as one of eight federal units.28 Although not a 
republic, Kosovo’s authority within the Federation was now equal to that of 
Serbia.29  
Following the change in Kosovo’s status there was a high Albanian birth 
rate within the province while Serbs migrated out due to lack of economic 
opportunities.30 As a result, the Serbs became a clear minority within 
Kosovo.31 Today, the majority of Kosovars are ethnic Albanians.32  
During the 1970s and 1980s, Kosovo enjoyed a high degree of autonomy 
within Yugoslavia.33 In 1989, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic altered 
the status of Kosovo by removing its autonomy and bringing it under the 
direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital.34 The Kosovar Albanians 
strenuously opposed Milosevic’s decision to eliminate the autonomy of 
Kosovo.35 In 1990, amid a growing movement among Kosovars for 
complete autonomy, the Milosevic regime began a routine of strict control 
over the region.36 
  
 21. Id. The autonomy of Kosovo has been accepted since 1946 even though the 1946 
Yugoslav constitution in did not grant territorial autonomy to Kosovo. Id. See CONSTITUTION 
OF THE FEDERAL PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 1946. Kosovo was defined as an 
autonomous region under federal, not Serbian, jurisdiction. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 176 
n.162. 
 22. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 176. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 176-77. 
 25. Id. at 177. 
 26. Id.; see also USTAV SOCIJALISTI KE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE 
[CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA] 1974. 
 27. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 177. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. NATO & Kosovo: Historical Overview, NATO, 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last updated July 15, 1999) [hereinafter NATO & 
Kosovo]. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Howard, supra note 5, at 264-65; VICKERS supra note 6, at 244-54. 
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At first, the ethnic Albanian majority resisted non-violently.37 “By the 
mid-1990’s ethnic Albanian resistance came in the form of violent 
retaliatory attacks conducted by several underground groups against ethnic 
Serbs living in Kosovo.”38 In 1998, open conflict erupted39 as “ethnic 
Albanian guerillas calling themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
began attacks on Serbian police and Yugoslav army troops.”40 The conflict 
resulted in the deaths of over 1500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400,000
people from their homes.41
B.  Key Events and Decisions Leading Up to the Initiation of Operation 
Allied Force 
“The international community became gravely concerned about the 
escalating conflict, its humanitarian consequences, and the risk of it 
spreading to other countries.”42 The United States, in partnership with 
NATO member countries and other allies, sought a diplomatic resolution to 
the conflict and began to pressure Milosevic to cease repression and restore 
autonomy to Kosovo.43
On May 28, 1998, the North Atlantic Council . . . set out NATO’s two 
major objectives with respect to the crisis in Kosovo[: (1)] to help to 
achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the response 
of the international community; [and (2)] to promote stability and security 
in neighboring countries with particular emphasis on Albania and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.44
In June, NATO began to consider a large number of military options.45
On June 9, 1998, President Clinton issued an Executive Order that 
declared a “national emergency” to deal with the threat of regional 
destabilization posed by the conflict in Kosovo.46 President Clinton ordered 
economic sanctions against Republic of Yugoslavia leaders after finding 
that “the actions and policies of the government of the Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Serbia with 
respect to Kosovo . . . constitute[d] an unusual and extraordinary threat to 
 37. STEVEN WOEHREL & JULIE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31053, KOSOVO AND 
U.S. POLICY 2 (2006). 
 38. Howard, supra note 5, at 265; VICKERS supra note 6, at 290-91. 
 39. NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 40. WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37. 
 41. Ved P. Nanda, NATO’s Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International Law, 10 
U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2000); see also NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 42. See NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 43. WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37, at 3. 
 44. See NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 45. Id.
 46. Exec. Order No. 13,088, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,109 (June 9, 1998). 
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the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”47 The 
Executive Order blocked the governments of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the 
Republic of Montenegro property and property interests that were either 
within the United States or in the “possession or control of United States 
persons.”48
On September 23, 1998, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
UN Security Council Resolution 1199.49 The Resolution expressed deep 
concern about the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces and the 
Yugoslav army and called for a cease-fire.50
“On October 13, 1998 . . . the NATO Council authorised Activation 
Orders for air-strikes.”51 “This move was designed to support diplomatic 
efforts to make the Milosevic regime withdraw forces from Kosovo, 
cooperate in bringing an end to the violence, and facilitate the return of 
refugees to their homes.”52 “At the last moment . . . President Milosevic 
agreed to comply and the air-strikes were called off.”53
In January 1999, the situation in Kosovo flared up again when forty-five 
ethnic Albanian civilians were massacred.54 Diplomatic efforts intensified. 
The Contact Group—comprised of the United States, Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy and Russia—agreed on a draft peace plan for Kosovo.55 In 
February 1999, the Contact Group invited an ethnic Albanian delegation 
and representatives of the Serbian government to participate in peace 
negotiations in Rambouillet, France.56 As an incentive for the Serbian 
government to comply, the North Atlantic Council had already agreed to 
authorize NATO air-strikes against targets in Serbia if it rejected the peace 
plan.57
“As the rhetoric of possible United States use of force against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia began to reach a crescendo, Congressman Tom 
Campbell and thirty-eight other members of Congress sent a letter to 
President Clinton.”58 The letter opened by reminding President Clinton “that 
the Constitution requires [him] to obtain authority from Congress before 
 47. Id.
 48. Id.
 49. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199, at 1 (Sept. 23, 1998), 
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm.
 50. Id.
 51. NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 52. Id.
 53. Id.
 54. Id.; Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D.C.C. 1999).  
 55. WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37, at 3. 
 56. Id. at 3-4. 
 57. Id. at 4. 
 58. Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers 
Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149 (2001). 
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taking military action against Yugoslavia.”59 The letter emphasized that the 
military action in Kosovo “falls within the exclusive powers and 
responsibilities of Congress under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution—
the war powers clause.”60
It went on to say:  
No provision of the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty 
can override the requirement of United States domestic law as set forth in 
the Constitution. In fact, Congress conditioned U.S. participation in both 
the U.N. and NATO on the requirement that Congress retain its 
constitutional prerogatives. The Constitution compels you to obtain 
authority from Congress before taking military action against 
Yugoslavia.61
The letter closed sternly by flatly stating, “past violations of 
constitutional duty form no justification for additional violations. Nor does 
consulting with a few Members of Congress satisfy the constitutional 
obligation to obtain the approval of Congress.”62
On March 18, 1999, the ethnic Albanian delegation signed the peace 
plan; the Serbian representatives rejected it.63 “Although the numbers of 
Kosovo-Albanians killed, raped or expelled up to this point were low, the 
credibility of NATO’s threats was at issue.”64 Immediately after rejecting 
the peace plan, “Serbian military and police forces stepped up the intensity 
of their operations against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.”65
On March 23, 1999, NATO issued an order to commence air-strikes 
under the name Operation Allied Force.66 On March 24, 1999, the United 
States Armed Forces in coalition with NATO allies began air-strikes on 
Serbian forces in Kosovo and government targets in Serbia and 
Montenegro.67
C.  Operation Allied Force 
Operation Allied Force was the largest military operation in Europe since 
World War II.68 Over the 78-day air campaign, thirteen NATO countries 
 59. Id. at 1150 (quoting Letter from Representative Tom Campbell and other 
Members of Congress to President Clinton (Feb. 19, 1999)). 
 60. Id.
 61. Id.
62. Id.
 63. WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37, at 3. 
 64. BYERS, supra note 1, at 101. 
 65. NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 66. Id.
 67. BYERS, supra note 1, at 101; WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37, at 3. 
 68. Nanda, supra note 41, at 9.  
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deployed over 1,000 aircraft and flew 38,400 sorties.69 Of those, 10,484 
were strike sorties that released 26,614 air munitions over the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.70 A 15,000 feet minimum altitude was adopted in 
order for attacking aircraft to avoid enemy air defenses.71 NATO usually 
conducted the air campaign from a safe altitude of 20,000 feet.72
The purpose of Operation Allied Force “was to disrupt and degrade 
Serbian forces”73 and to prevent a humanitarian crisis.74 This was to be 
accomplished by using precision bombing—”smart bombs”—in order to 
prevent hurting innocent civilians.75 However, civilian casualties occurred 
because of human error and other forces beyond NATO’s control.76 For 
example, “because of bad weather, a NATO pilot [who was] engaged in 
mounting a remotely directed attack on a bridge struck a passing train, 
killing many passengers.”77 Also, NATO accidentally hit the Chinese 
Embassy with precision-guided bombs;78 they had mistaken the embassy for 
a legitimate military target.79 As the Operation progressed and the air-strikes 
intensified, the means of attack were broadened to include cluster bombs 
and depleted uranium ordnance, both of which caused civilian casualties.80
The number of civilian casualties caused by Operation Allied Force is 
open to debate. One estimate approximates five hundred civilian deaths—
which, if true, would represent the largest number of deaths inflicted on 
another state in a military operation overseen by President Clinton.81 By 
 69. INDEP. COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 92 (2000). 
 70. Id. 
 71. JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND USE OF FORCE BY STATES 
120 (2004). 
 72. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 73. Id. at 9. 
 74. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 188. 
 75. Nanda, supra note 41, at 9; Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the 
Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 847, 851 (1999). 
 76. Nanda, supra note 41, at 9. 
77. Id.
 78. Chinese Anger at Embassy Bombing (BBC News broadcast May 9, 1999), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/9/newsid_2519000/251927 
1.stm. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Falk, supra note 75, at 851-52. 
 81. Elizabeth Becker, Rights Group Says NATO Killed 500 Civilians in Kosovo 
War, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000 at A10. See also RYAN C. HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON
WARS: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND WAR POWERS 117 (2002). “Human Rights Watch 
concludes that as few as 489 and as many as 528 Yugoslav civilians were killed in the ninety 
separate incidents in Operation Allied Force.” Refugees were among the victims. Almost two 
thirds (303 to 352) of the total registered civilian deaths occurred in twelve incidents where 
ten or more civilian deaths were confirmed. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO 
(2000), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm.  
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Serbian estimates, two thousand civilians were killed.82 In comparison to the 
number of civilian casualties, NATO forces incurred none.83
Operation Allied Force ended on June 10, 1999, seventy-nine days after 
it began.84 “NATO and Yugoslav military officers concluded a Military 
Technical Agreement governing the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from 
Kosovo.”85 By the time the operation had ended, it had 912 aircraft and 35 
ships at its disposal—almost triple the forces it started with.86 And NATO 
forces had destroyed “Serbian planes, helicopters, anti-aircraft guns, 
missiles, and infrastructure including bridges, [and] communication 
towers.”87
II.  AUTHORITY TO MAKE WAR
A. The Constitutional War Powers of the Executive and Legislative 
Branches 
The United States Constitution divides authority over military forces and 
their employment between the Legislative and Executive branches of the 
federal government. However, it does not clearly vest the power to initiate 
hostilities in either branch.88
Arguably, the Constitution provides Congress with many more duties 
and responsibilities pertaining to war than it does the President.89 Under 
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress is allocated 
the power to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States,”90 “declare War,”91 “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”92
“make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,”93 “raise and support 
Armies”94 and a navy,95 make rules regulating the armed forces,96 “provide 
 82. Kevin Cullen, Amid the Rubble and Death, Few Find Elation in Milosevic’s 
“Victory,” BOS. GLOBE, June 11, 1999, at A22; see also HENDRICKSON, supra note 81, at 
117. 
 83. GARDAM, supra note 71, at 117. 
 84. WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37, at 3-4. 
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Adam Roberts, NATO’s “Humanitarian War” Over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 
109 (1999). 
 87. Nanda, supra note 41, at 9. 
 88. John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1673, 1676 (2000). 
 89. Andrew D. LeMar, Note, War Powers: What Are They Good For? 
Congressional Disapproval of the President’s Military Actions and the Merits of a 
Congressional Suit Against the President, 78 IND. L.J. 1045, 1046 (2003). 
 90. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 91. Id. at cl. 11. 
 92. Id.
 93. Id.
 94. Id. at cl. 12. 
 95. Id. at cl. 13. 
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for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions,”97 provide for “organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the Militia,”98 and govern the parts of the militia that “may be 
employed in the Service of the United States.”99 Additionally, Congress has 
the authority to make laws necessary to exercise its powers.100
In order for there to be a constitutionally valid declaration of war, a 
measure calling for such declaration must be passed by both Houses of 
Congress and then presented to the President for signature.101 Separate and 
substantially different actions by the Senate and House, short of enactment, 
cannot have legal effect.102
The President’s war powers are stated much more concisely. Under 
Article II of the Constitution, “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”103 The 
President may also have military powers as a result of other provisions of 
Article II, such as the “vesting clause” or the Take Care Clause.104
 96. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14. 
 97. Id. at cl. 15. 
 98. Id. at cl. 16.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 18. 
 101. Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late 1990s by Partial Congressional 
Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 4 (1999); Michael Hahn, The Conflict in Kosovo: A 
Constitutional War?, 89 GEO. L.J. 2351, 2367 (2001). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”); id. § 7 (“Every Bill which shall 
have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be 
presented to the President of the United States.”); id. § 8 (“The Congress shall have the 
power To . . . declare War. . . . “). Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding the 
legislative veto unconstitutional). 
 102. Tiefer, supra note 101, at 2; Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. Even though the language of 
Chadha only deals with attempts by the Senate and House to take part in statutorily 
delegated powers—rather than shared constitutional powers—it is informed by the Formalist 
approach and teaches that almost all legislation must go through the full enactment process 
of bicameralism and presentment. Tiefer, supra note 101, at 16; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 
n.16, 954-55. The Formalist approach holds that Congress must follow the normal legislative 
process when affirmatively approving a military action. Hahn, supra note 101, at 2367. The 
alternative approach is the Functionalist approach. Under the Functionalist approach, both 
Houses of Congress must affirmatively demonstrate approval for the commencement of war 
prior to the President’s orders to launch the first attack. Id. at 2370. Congress’s approval for 
military action may be inferred from its treatment of resolutions, bills, and appropriations—
even those that do not pass through bicameralism and presentment. Id. at 2367. Applying the 
Functionalist approach to the Kosovo conflict produces the conclusion that the conflict in 
Kosovo was unconstitutional because not only did both Houses of Congress not approve the 
military action in Kosovo before it began but both Houses never agreed on approval after the 
conflict ended. See Hahn, supra note 101. 
 103. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.  
 104. CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW CASES 
AND MATERIALS 220 (2d ed. 2006). 
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The President has no power to initiate or declare war105 either against a 
foreign nation or a domestic State.106 As Commander in Chief, the President 
has the legal authority to direct military forces and deploy them in any 
appropriate manner after a declaration of war is made by Congress.107 In 
essence, “the President carries into effect all laws passed by Congress to 
conduct war once it is declared, to regulate the armed forces, and to define 
and punish all offenses against the rights that exist between nations.”108
Yet “the President does have the power to recognize the existence of a 
state of war109 forced upon the United States, and to determine whether war 
has been initiated by invasion of a foreign entity into the United States.”110
In those particular cases, “the President is permitted to resist by force and 
respond to the challenge without waiting for special legislative 
authorization.”111
B.  Executive and Legislative War Powers Under the War Powers 
Resolution 
After years of unsuccessful military operations in Vietnam, and President 
Nixon’s continued disregard of congressional pleas to obey the war powers 
structure set forth in the Constitution, Congress passed the War Powers 
Resolution112 over President Nixon’s veto in 1973.113
Congress specifically relied on its powers enumerated under Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution when it enacted the War Powers Resolution.114
By enacting the War Powers Resolution, Congress attempted to restore the 
constitutional balance of war powers so as to “fulfill the intent of the 
 105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Congress has the power “To declare War, grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.” 
Id.
 106. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
 107. Kelly L. Cowan, Comment, Rethinking the War Powers Resolution: A 
Strengthened Check on Unfettered Presidential Decision Making Abroad, 45 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 99, 102 (2004). See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614-15 (1850). 
 108. Id. at 101; see Fleming, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 614-15.  
 109. Id.; Matthews v. McStea, 91 U.S. 7, 12-13 (1875). 
 110. Cowan, supra note 107 at 102; The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 698-99. 
 111. Cowan, supra note 107, at 102 (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 698-99); The 
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668. 
 112. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000)). It is important to note that since 1973 every President has 
taken the view that the War Powers Resolution “is an unconstitutional infringement by 
Congress on the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.” RICHARD F. GRIMMETT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 81050, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE 2
(2004). “The courts have not directly addressed this question.” Id.
 113. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT VETOING H.J. RES. 542, A JOINT RESOLUTION 
CONCERNING THE WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT, H. DOC. NO. 93, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
 114. War Powers Resolution § 1541(b). 
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framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the 
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the 
introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”115
The War Powers Resolution is laid out in nine sections.116 On its face the 
War Powers Resolution “envisions congressional approval and close 
monitoring of military involvement in all but time sensitive situations.”117
Its “core purpose is to prevent the President from ordering the initiation of 
combat operations absent the express consent of Congress.”118
Under § 1541(c) of the War Powers Resolution, Congress expressly 
limited the President’s Executive power as Commander in Chief of the 
United States Armed Forces. The sections states:  
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to 
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) 
specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by 
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed 
forces.119
In subsequent sections the statute prescribes specific duties and 
procedures to be followed by the President and Congress in exercising their 
constitutional powers to commit American forces into hostilities. 
Section 1542 requires the President “in every possible instance [to] 
consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances.”120 This consultation requirement is 
obligatory.121 The President is “obliged by law to consult [with Congress] 
before the introduction of forces into hostilities and to continue 
consultations so long as the troops are engaged.”122 After the Resolution was 
passed, the House committee explained that the word “hostilities” includes 
combat and any dispute where there is a “clear and present danger of armed 
conflict.”123
 115. Id. § 1541(a). 
 116. Id. §§ 1541-1548. 
 117. Howard, supra note 5, at 275. 
 118. Corn, supra note 58, at 1173. 
 119. War Powers Resolution § 1541(c) (entitled “Presidential executive power as 
Commander-in-Chief; limitation”). 
 120. Id. § 1542. The White House has attempted to construe the “hostilities” 
requirement very narrowly to avoid congressional control. Martin Wald, Note, The Future of 
the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1407, 1417 (1984).  
 121. The section uses the phrase “shall consult.” War Powers Resolution § 1542. 
 122. 119 CONG. REC. 33,550 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits). 
 123. Wald, supra note 120, at 1418; H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 1, 5 (1973), reprinted in 
1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346. 
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Under § 1543, when there is no congressional declaration of war, the 
President is required to submit a report124 “within forty-eight hours to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President Pro Tempore 
of the Senate” after introducing United States Armed Forces equipped for 
combat “into the territory, airspace, or waters of . . . foreign nation[s].”125
“[S]o long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such 
hostilities . . .,” the President must make periodic reports to Congress on the 
status of the hostilities.126 The periodic reports must be made at least once 
every six months.127
Pursuant to § 1544, once the President’s report is submitted to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President Pro Tempore 
of the Senate, the President must end any use of the United States Armed 
Forces within sixty calendar days unless “Congress [has] (1) declared war 
or has enacted specific authorization for such use of United States Armed 
Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically 
unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.”128 The 
President may extend the sixty-day deadline by an additional thirty days if 
he “determines and certifies to . . . Congress in writing that unavoidable 
military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces 
requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing 
about a prompt removal of such forces.”129
The next three sections of the War Powers Resolution detail procedures 
for consideration of resolutions and bills to declare war,130 provide 
authorization for a deployment,131 and allow for the recall of troops.132
Section 1547, the penultimate section of the War Powers Resolution,
addresses the inference to be drawn from previously signed laws and 
treaties.133 The section provides:  
 124. The reporting requirements are specifically detailed in § 1543 of the War Powers 
Resolution.  
 125. War Powers Resolution § 1543(a). 
 126. Id. § 1543(c). 
 127. Id.
 128. Id. § 1544(b). The section essentially functions as a burden-shifting device. As 
Judge Joyce Hens Green has observed:  
[T]he automatic cutoff after 60 days was intended to place the burden on the President to 
seek positive approval from the Congress, rather than to require the Congress positively to 
disapprove the action, which had proven so politically difficult during the Vietnam war. To 
give force to congressional power to declare war, Presidential warmaking would not be 
justified by congressional silence, but only by a congressional initiative . . . .  
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 
1983).  
129. Id. § 1544(b). 
130. Id. § 1545. 
 131. War Powers Resolution § 1546a. 
132. Id. §§ 1545-46. 
133. Id. § 1547(a) (emphasis added). 
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Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into 
situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances shall not be inferred-- 
(1) from any provision of law . . . including any provision contained in any 
appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the 
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such 
situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory 
authorization within the meaning of this chapter; or  
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is 
implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of 
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and 
stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization 
within the meaning of this chapter. 
In other words, the authority to introduce United States Armed Forces 
into hostilities shall not be inferred from any provision of law or from any 
treaty,134 whether or not those laws or treaties were in effect prior to the 
passage of the War Powers Resolution.135 For congressional approval to be 
established for the introduction of United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities, Congress must explicitly state in law “that [the provision] is 
 134. Id. § 1547(a)(1-2).  
 135. Id. Section 1547 may negate any authority the President might potentially 
assume under the North Atlantic Treaty. See Howard, supra note 5, at 277. The 
constitutionality of § 1547(a)(1-2) has been questioned. Howard, supra note 5, at 277 n.93. 
Some argue that the provision is constitutional because ratification of treaties only requires 
Senate action—”advice and consent”—while the exercise of war powers is a function of 
Congress, implying participation by both the House and the Senate. G. Sidney Buchanan, A
Proposed Model for Determining the Validity of the Use of Force Against Foreign 
Adversaries Under the United States Constitution, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 379, 419-21 (1992). 
Alternatively, others argue that “[i]f by treaty the President and the Senate have an 
independent constitutional power to initiate military action without the approval of both 
houses of Congress, then the [provision is] unconstitutional [because] Congress by statute 
[cannot] destroy a power granted independently by the constitution to the President and the 
Senate.” Id.
Section 1547(a)(1)-2) is probably constitutional. In the hierarchy of United States domestic 
law, the constitution is the highest legal authority. U.S. CONST. art. VI (Supremacy Clause). 
Yet the Constitution does not specify the relationship between treaties and statutes. As a 
general rule, if there is a conflict between a treaty and a statute, the last one in time controls. 
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). Additionally, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held “that the constitutional delegation of the war-declaring power to the 
Congress . . . [imposes on it] a duty of mutual participation in the prosecution of war.” 
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971). “By definition, Congress cannot 
‘mutually participate’ in a use of force decision unless both of its houses are involved in that 
decision.” Buchanan, supra, at 420. Therefore, it appears constitutional to mandate that the 
President cannot rely on a previously signed treaty as authorization to commence military 
action and use force against another nation-state.  
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intended to constitute specific statutory authorization” under the War 
Powers Resolution.136
The last section describes the severability of the Resolution.137 If one 
provision of the statute is held invalid, such invalidity will not affect the 
other remaining provisions.138
III. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE WAS Unconstitutional AND VIOLATED THE 
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
A.  President Clinton Lacked the Constitutional Authority to Commit 
United States Armed Forces to Operation Allied Force 
On March 24, 1999, in a nationally televised address to the nation,
President Clinton argued that air-strikes by United States Armed Forces 
acting in coalition with NATO forces were necessary to protect innocent 
Albanians, to prevent the conflict from spreading to the rest of Europe, and 
to act with our European allies in maintaining peace.139 That same day, 
Operation Allied Force began bombing targets in Kosovo and Serbia 
proper.140
Over the next two months, President Clinton defended his unilateral 
decision to send United States Armed Forces to Kosovo to carry out air-
strikes. Two days after Operation Allied Force began, President Clinton sent 
identical letters to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and to Strom Thurmond, President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate.141 The letter opened:  
At approximately 1:30 p.m. eastern standard time, on March 24, 1999, 
U.S. military forces, at my direction and in coalition with our NATO 
allies, began a series of air strikes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) in response to the FRY government’s continued campaign of 
violence and repression against the ethnic Albanian population in 
Kosovo.142
The letter goes on to detail the circumstances that led to the decision to 
begin air strikes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the 
atrocities committed by the Milosevic government and the Milosevic 
 136. War Powers Resolution § 1547(a)(1)-(2). 
 137. Id. § 1548. 
 138. Id.
 139. Address to Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 1 PUB. PAPERS 451, 451 (Mar. 24, 1999). 
 140. Id.
 141. Clinton v. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D.C.C. 1999). 
 142. Id. at 37-38 (quoting Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 19). 
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government’s history of noncompliance with resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council and NATO.143 The letter concludes:  
“We cannot predict with certainty how long these operations will need to 
continue . . . . Milosevic must stop his offensive, stop the repression and 
agree to a peace accord based on the framework from Rambouillet. . . . I
have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to 
conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief 
Executive. In doing so, I have taken into account the views and support 
expressed by the Congress . . . . I am providing this Report as part of my 
efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War 
Powers Resolution. I appreciate the support of the Congress in this 
action.”144
President Clinton was relying upon the independent authority of the 
President as the Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces 
under Article II of the United States Constitution as the legal basis for his 
unilateral decision to send American forces into hostilities in Kosovo. 
President Clinton made it clear from the beginning that he did not need 
congressional authorization.145 However, President Clinton was mistaken.  
It is necessary to classify the eleven-week, United States-led military 
campaign in Kosovo as either a war or something less in order to assess the 
constitutionality of President Clinton’s initiation of military action.146 “If a 
conflict is a . . . perfect war, then the Constitution requires that Congress 
authorize it through a formal declaration of war.”147 If a conflict is an 
imperfect war, then either a formal declaration of war or some other type of 
congressional authorization is required before the United States enters the 
conflict.148 “If a military conflict does not exist, but a dangerous situation 
does, then the President’s Commander in Chief power instills him with full 
authority to position United States troops.”149
The Constitution does not define war. Consequently, it is difficult to 
classify conflicts for constitutional purposes. Fortunately, the United States 
Supreme Court has provided some definitional clarity. In Bas v. Tingy the 
Court described perfect and imperfect war. 150 With regard to perfect war, 
the Court said: 
 143. Id. at 38 (citing Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 38). 
 144. Id. (citing Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 19) (emphasis added). 
 145. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets 
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 1 PUB. PAPERS 459 (Mar. 
26, 1999) [hereinafter Clinton’s Letter of Mar. 1999]. 
 146. Hahn, supra note 101, at 2359.  
 147. Id.; see also. See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 40 (1800) (opinion of Washington, J.); 
J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 33 (1991). 
 148. Id.; see also Bas, 4 U.S. at 40-41. 
 149. Id. at 2359-60; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  
 150. Bas, 4 U.S. at 40. 
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If it be declared in form, it is called solemn, and is of the perfect kind; 
because one whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the 
members of the nation declaring war, are authorized to commit hostilities 
against all the members of the other, in every place, and under every 
circumstance. In such a war all the members act under a general authority, 
and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.151
With respect to imperfect war, the Court said: 
[H]ostilities may subsist between two nations more confined in its nature 
and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and things; and this is more 
properly termed imperfect war; because not solemn, and because those 
who are authorized to commit hostilities, act under special authority, and 
can go no further than to the extent of their commission. Still, however, it 
is public war, because it is an external contention by force, between some 
of the members of two nations, authorized by the legitimate powers. It is a 
war between the two nations, though all members are not authorized to 
commit hostilities such as in solemn war, where the government restrains 
the general power.152
The Kosovo conflict was an imperfect war for reasons beyond the 
absence of a formal declaration of war.153 The Kosovo conflict was an 
imperfect war because not all members of the United States Armed Forces 
were “authorized to conduct hostilities”—United States ground forces were 
not engaged in the conflict.154
Furthermore, “[t]he ‘nature and extent’ of the Kosovo operation indicates 
that it was an imperfect war.”155 The operation attempted to achieve 
specific, limited political objectives.156 During the air campaign, United 
States and NATO leaders repeatedly declared that the goals of Operation 
Allied Force were to (1) cease all combat activities and killings; (2) ensure 
the withdrawal of Serb Military, police and paramilitary forces from 
Kosovo; (3) allow the deployment of an international military force; (4) 
allow the return of all refugees and the access of international humanitarian 
aid; and (5) “create a framework for establishing a political solution to 
Kosovo’s status based on the grounds set forth at Rambouillet.”157
Additionally, “the risks associated with the [Kosovo] conflict indicate 
that the United States fought an imperfect war.”158 “First, there was no risk 
that United States sovereignty might be lost or even that its power would 
 151. Id.
 152. Id.
 153. Hahn, supra note 101, at 2361. 
 154. Id. at 2362.  
 155. Id.
 156. Id.
 157. Id. See Roberts, supra note 86, at 2362 (citing Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
Address at the Chicago Economic Club (Apr. 22, 1999)). 
 158. Hahn, supra note 101, at 2363. 
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substantially decline from a loss in the war.159 Second, the risk to American 
forces was different from that in a perfect war.”160 NATO fought from the 
air because it was not willing to risk lives during Operation Allied Force.161
As a result, there was a much smaller chance of United States troops 
sustaining casualties.162 Finally, “NATO strategists lacked a clear 
conception of when victory was achieved—a state of affairs common to 
imperfect wars.”163
Since the conflict in Kosovo constituted an “imperfect war,” President 
Clinton could not act unilaterally—solely relying on the Commander in 
Chief power enumerated in the Constitution. Before introducing American 
troops into the Kosovo conflict, President Clinton needed congressional 
consent through either a formal declaration of war or statutory 
authorization.164 President Clinton also had to comply with the War Powers 
Resolution after introducing troops into hostilities. 
B. President Clinton Violated the War Powers Resolution 
President Clinton had to fulfill three requirements in order to comply 
with the War Powers Resolution. First, he had to consult with Congress 
before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities.165 Second, 
he had to present a written report on the situation within forty-eight hours to 
the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate166 and 
then provide periodic reports not less than every six months.167 Third, he 
had to remove the United States Armed Forces from the hostilities within 
sixty calendar days after submitting the initial report unless Congress had 
declared war or had enacted specific authorization for the use of United 
States Armed Forces.168 President Clinton failed to meet the last 
requirement.169
 159. Id.
 160. Id.
 161. Roberts, supra note 86, at 110. 
 162. Hahn, supra note 101, at 2363. 
 163. Id.
164. Id. at 2362. 
 165. War Powers Resolution § 1542. 
 166. Id. § 1543(a). 
 167. Id. § 1543(c). 
 168. Id. § 1544(b). 
 169. Howard, supra note 5, at 283-84.  
It is important to mention that no court has ever upheld a challenge to the War Powers 
Resolution. All challenges have been dismissed under limiting doctrines such as standing, 
ripeness, equitable discretion, and the political question doctrine. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d 
34 (D.C.C. 1999); see also Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ange v. 
Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990) (dismissing challenge to Gulf War on political 
question, equitable discretion, and ripeness grounds); Lowery v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 
(D.D.C. 1987) (dismissing challenge to reflagging operations in the Persian Gulf on 
equitable discretion and political question grounds); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. 
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President Clinton met the first requirement. There was ongoing 
consultation between President Clinton’s administration and Congress 
concerning the situation in Kosovo that was highlighted by significant 
testimony before congressional committees by the President’s cabinet 
members.170
President Clinton also met the second requirement. He submitted a report 
“consistent with the war Powers Resolution” within forty-eight hours to the 
Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.171
Furthermore, he provided periodic reports to Congress. On April 7, 1999, 
President Clinton sent letters to Speaker Hastert and Senator Thurmond 
reporting on the situation in Kosovo as part of his “efforts to keep the 
Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution.”172
“The letter states that ‘[w]e will continue to intensify our actions to achieve 
the objectives I set forth in my report to the Congress of March 26 and to 
support the international relief efforts being conducted in the region.’”173
“The letter reemphasizes that it is ‘not possible to predict how long [the] 
operations will continue.’”174 On May 25, 1999, President Clinton again 
reported to Congress.175 He informed members of Congress that he deployed 
more aircraft and combat ground troops to the region to support deep strike 
operations.176
Yet President Clinton failed to meet the third requirement. Unless 
Congress had declared war or enacted specific legislation approving the use 
of United States Armed Forces, President Clinton had to terminate any use 
Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983) (dismissing challenge to covert assistance to Nicaragua contras on 
political question grounds); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982) (dismissing 
challenge to military aid to El Salvador on political question grounds).  
Consequently, those who seek remedies for Presidential violations of the War Powers 
Resolution will likely be left empty-handed. Apparently, those who feel the President has 
violated the War Powers Resolution, or the Constitution for that matter, are relegated to 
protest demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns to their Congressional representatives. 
 170. Howard, supra note 5, at 284; see also id. at 284 n.141 (“Situation in Kosovo: 
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int’l Relations, 106th Cong. 4 (1999) . . . (statement of 
Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State, updating the committee on the impact of NATO 
operations on Yugoslavian President Milosevic); Supplemental Appropriations for Kosovo 
Operations, Refugee Relief, and Other Requirements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Defense of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 1999 WL 16946755 (1999) . . . (statement 
of William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, updating the committee on military operations 
and their effect in Kosovo”)).
 171. Clinton’s Letter of Mar. 1999, supra note 145. 
 172. Campbell , 52 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (quoting Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 38). 
 173. Id.
 174. Id.
 175. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 898 (May 
25, 1999).  
 176. Id.
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of the armed forces within sixty calendar days from submitting his initial 
report.177
Congress never declared war. After President Clinton issued an 
executive order designating the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a 
“combat zone,”178 the House of Representatives voted on four measures. By 
a vote of 427 to 2, the House rejected a joint resolution declaring a state of 
war between the United States and the government of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia.179
The House then rejected, by a tie vote, the concurrent resolution that had 
been passed by the Senate on March 23, 1999, authorizing the President to 
conduct military air operations and missile strikes against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.180
In an odd twist of events, the House also rejected a concurrent resolution 
that would have directed the President, “pursuant to section [1544(c)] of the 
War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from their 
positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.”181
Despite this inconsistent decision, one thing is clear: Congress did not 
declare war. Consequently, President Clinton needed congressional 
approval to introduce United States Armed Forces, as part of Operation 
Allied Force, into hostilities in Kosovo.  
Under the War Powers Resolution, “only express legislative support for 
combat operations may be regarded as constitutionally sufficient.”182 On 
May 20, 1999, Congress passed Pub. L. No. 106-31, an Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act that, inter alia, provided supplemental 
emergency appropriations in the amount of $11.8 billion for the conflict in 
Yugoslavia.183 The Appropriations Act required the President to transmit to 
Congress “a report, in both classified and unclassified form, on current 
United States participation in Operation Allied Force,” defined as 
“operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) during 
 177. See War Powers Resolution § 1544(b). 
 178. Exec. Order No. 13,119, 64 Fed. Reg. 18,797 (Apr. 13, 1999). 
 179. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34,38 (D.C.C. 1999) (citing H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th 
Cong. (1999)). 
 180. Id. (citing S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999)). 
 181. Id. (citing H.R. Con. Res. 82, 106th Cong. (1999)). “The House passed a bill that 
prohibit[ed] the use of Department of Defense funds for deployment of United States ground 
forces to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without specific congressional authorization.” 
Id. (quoting H.R. 1569, 106th Cong. (1999)). 
 182. Corn, supra note 58, at 1174.  
 183. John C. Yoo, UN War, US War Powers, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 357 (2000) 
(referring to the $11.8 billion funding request); see also, Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57 (1999); Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 38. 
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the period beginning on March 24, 1999, and ending on such date as NATO 
may designate, to resolve the conflict with respect to Kosovo.”184
Although Pub. L. No. 106-31 specifically appropriated over $5 billion to 
fund continuing hostilities in Kosovo, it did not make specific reference to 
the War Powers Resolution.185 Therefore, Congress never authorized the use 
of United States Armed Forces in Kosovo as part of Operation Allied Force 
under the War Powers Resolution.  
Since Congress neither declared war nor issued specific statutory 
authorization for the use of United States Armed Forces in Kosovo, 
President Clinton was required to remove the armed forces from hostilities 
within sixty days. He did not. Therefore, one can easily prove, through 
simple addition, that President Clinton violated the War Powers Resolution.  
President Clinton issued an Executive Order designating the Kosovo 
region a United States combat zone and March 24, 1999 as “the date of 
commencement of combat activities in such zone.”186 Bombing attacks 
against Serbian targets both in Kosovo and Serbia proper did not end until 
June 10, 1999—seventy-nine days after the war first began and nineteen 
days after the War Powers Resolution’s sixty-day clock had ended.187
In sum, President Clinton lacked the constitutional authority to 
unilaterally commit United States Armed Forces to Operation Allied Force 
and the Kosovo conflict. Even though Congress provided funding for the 
Kosovo conflict and the House of Representatives expressed its support for 
the American troops involved, those actions were not sufficient legislative 
authorization for military hostilities.188 Accordingly, President Clinton 
violated not only the War Powers Resolution because he failed to stop an air 
war that lasted nineteen days after the Resolution’s sixty-day clock had 
ended,189 but also the Constitution because he introduced United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities without congressional approval.  
IV.  OPERATION ALLIED FORCE CANNOT BE LEGALLY JUSTIFIED UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
There is little doubt that the intervention in Kosovo had, at its base, a 
concern for human rights. But, “there is no clear law permitting 
humanitarian intervention in cases short of genocide.”190 Humanitarian 
184. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (citing Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, Pub.L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57, 76-77 (1999)). 
 185. Id.
 186. Exec. Order No. 13,119, 64 Fed. Reg. 18797 (Apr. 13, 1999). 
 187. Address to the Nation on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 913, 913 (June 10, 1999). 
 188. Yoo, supra note 88, at 1681-82. 
 189. Id. at 1674, 1687. 
 190. KATHARINA PICHLER COLEMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND PEACE 
ENFORCEMENT: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 200 (2007) (noting that Article 
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intervention is not an exception to the United Nations Charter’s prohibitions 
on the use of force.191 Under the Charter, cross-border military force may be 
used in self-defense192 or with the authorization of the Security Council of 
the United Nations.193 NATO military actions during Operation Allied Force 
do not meet either condition.194
The military actions in Kosovo do not fit within the traditional norm of 
self-defense.195 As a result, the intervention in Kosovo would be lawful only 
if authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations.196 However, 
NATO bypassed the UN Security Council and acted unilaterally.197
Therefore, since NATO’s military action in Kosovo was neither in self-
defense nor authorized by the UN Security Council, NATO’s use of force in 
Kosovo violated the UN Charter. If NATO’s use of force violated the UN 
Charter’s prohibition against the use of force, then it was illegal under 
customary international law.198
There exists dissention among jurists as to the justification of 
humanitarian intervention under customary international law. Kathrina 
8 of the 1951 International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide arguably enjoins international military action against genocide). 
 191. Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comments, NATO’s Kosovo Intervention: 
Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 834, 836 (1999). 
 192. U.N. Charter art. 51; see Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist 
Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 488 (2006).  
 193. U.N. Charter art. 42; see Posner, supra note 192, at 488. 
 194. Charney, supra note 191, at 834-35.  
 195. Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millennium, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 11, 51 
(2000). Kahn also posits that “[t]he military action in Kosovo was not an enforcement 
action . . . [nor was it] a police action under Chapter Seven of the [UN] Charter.” Id. It is 
clear that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was not a response to an armed attack on any 
NATO member country and therefore cannot be justified as an act of collective self-defense. 
See COLEMAN, supra note 190, at 197. 
 196. See Posner, supra note 192, at 492. 
 197. Nanda, supra note 41, at 1. In the months before the NATO bombing in Kosovo, 
China and Russia appeared ready to veto any call for UN intervention, as well as any 
mandate that conferred upon NATO such a right. Falk, supra note 75, at 850. 
 198. Serbia challenged the legality under international law of the use of force by 
various NATO countries during the Kosovo conflict. Unfortunately, the ICJ never resolved 
the issue because the court unanimously decided that it had no jurisdiction to hear the cases. 
Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.), 2004 I.C.J. 279 (Dec. 15), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org.  
However, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded “that the NATO 
military intervention was illegal but legitimate.” INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE 
KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 1, 4 (2000),
available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256
989005CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf [hereinafter Kosovo Report]. The Commission applied 
three threshold principles and eight contextual principles to NATO’s military intervention in 
order to evaluate its humanitarian legitimacy. Id. at 193-94. The Commission reasoned that 
NATO’s military action “was illegal because it did not receive prior approval from the 
United Nations Security Council . . . [but] justified because all diplomatic avenues had been 
exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of 
Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.” Id. at 4. 
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Pichler-Coleman citing Mary-Ellen O’Connell notes, “[T]here is no real 
evidence of a practice followed out of legal obligation to support a right of 
humanitarian intervention under customary international law.”199 However, 
Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne finds that jurists have noted through state practice, 
mainly in Eastern Europe, that a particular State’s violation of the norms of 
international law in regard to war and humanity against its own subjects or a 
particular subgroup of subjects could not be ignored, for it not only was to 
the detriment of those subjects but against all civilized States.200 Fonteyne 
contended that jurists feared inaction would be seen as justification of those 
violations and concluded that humanitarian intervention is legally 
permissible under customary international law.201
In recognition of this division among jurists, the following five criteria 
will be employed to evaluate the legitimacy under customary international 
law of the unilateral humanitarian intervention taken in Kosovo by NATO 
forces during Operation Allied Force: (1) necessity, (2) proportionality, (3) 
purpose, (4) nature of the actors, and (5) maximization of the best 
outcomes.202 If a majority of the criteria are met, then arguably NATO’s 
bombing of Kosovo was legally justified under the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention.203
 199. COLEMAN, supra note 190, at 200 (citing Mary Ellen O’Connell, The UN, NATO, 
and International Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57, 70 (2000)). 
 200. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 203, 214-32 (1974). Fonteyne supported his argument by looking as far back as the 
Crusades and including State practice via Russian intervention in Greece in 1827, “invoking, 
for the first time in history, humanitarian concern as justification for intervention,” id. at
207-08; France intervention in Syria in 1860 following massacre of thousands of Christians 
by local Moslem population, id. at 208-09; Serbian and Russian intervention in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria in support of oppressed Christian populations in those areas, id. at 
211-12; Bulgarian, Greece and Serbian intervention against Turkish control programs in 
Macedonia, id. at 213.  
 201. Id. at 269 (“As long as the world community appears to be unable or unwilling to 
promptly respond in a collective manner to those dramatic situations where the very nature 
and existence of man are threatened, individual initiatives by concerned States will have to 
be relied upon if a viable world order is to be maintained.”). 
 202. These criteria were developed by Ved P. Nanda over two separate, yet related, 
articles. Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Haiti—
Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, 20 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 305 (1992) [hereinafter Nanda Part I]; Ved P. Nanda et al., Tragedies in 
Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia—Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian 
Intervention Under International Law, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 827 (1998) [hereinafter 
Nanda Part II]. See also Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 258-67 (employing a three prong 
analysis of the substantive, procedural and preferential criteria of humanitarian intervention 
under customary international law). 
 203. Part IV of this paper does not explore whether NATO’s military action was 
morally justified. Rather, it explores the legality under international law of NATO’s use of 
force during Operation Allied Force. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
concluded that Operation Allied Force was morally justified because it was a humanitarian 
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The necessity criterion assesses “whether there was genocide or gross, 
persistent, and systematic violations of basic human rights.”204 If there was, 
then arguably the intervention was necessary. The necessity criterion can be 
detailed as including two, and depending upon the jurist possibly three, 
elements: the fundamental character of the human rights violations, the 
exceptionally large scale of those violations, and possibly the potential 
immediacy of those violations.205
It is indisputable that the Albanian Kosovars had suffered deprivation of 
human rights and widespread repression under the Milosevic regime.206
Thus, the fundamental character of the human rights involved is satisfied 
under the first element of the necessity criterion. The human rights 
discussed include, but are not limited to, the right to life and the prevention 
of torture.207
However, there exists debate upon the scale and thus the immediate 
threat of human rights violations. “The extent of the human rights violations 
in Kosovo prior to the withdrawal of the [Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe’s (OSCE)] observer force was not massive and 
widespread.”208 “In fact, the Security Council had authorized the 
deployment of the verification mission, which had effectively prevented the 
commission of widespread atrocities.”209 The Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s behavior toward the Albanian Kosovars “changed only after 
NATO forced the withdrawal of the OSCE observers.”210
This is clear from the indictment of Milosevic by the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.211 The specific 
charges against Milosevic document only one incident involving a 
significant number of deaths caused by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
forces in the months prior to the start of the NATO bombing campaign.212
That incident, in which forty-five civilians were killed, took place at Racak 
on January 15, 1999, more than two months before Operation Allied 
Force.213 All the remaining counts concern incidents that occurred after the 
intervention that had at its base human rights concerns. See generally, Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, supra note 198. 
 204. Nanda Part II, supra note 202, at 827.  
 205. Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 258-60. 
 206. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. See generally LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE,
YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION (1997). 
 207. Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 258-59. 
 208. Charney, supra note 191, at 839.  
 209. Id. at 839-40 (emphasis added). 
 210. Id. at 840. 
 211. Id.; see Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia May 22, 1999) [hereinafter Milosevic Indictment]. 
 212. Charney, supra note 191, at 840; Milosevic Indictment, supra note 211, at pp 7-
10 ¶¶ 28, 36-37, 39, and at pp 21-28 ¶¶ 97-98. 
 213. Charney, supra note 191, at 840; Milosevic Indictment, supra note 211, at 26 ¶ 
96a. 
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bombing commenced; therefore, those incidents cannot be used to justify 
Operation Allied Force.214
There were also reports of incidents involving the displacement of 
Albanian Kosovars within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.215 German 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer claimed the refugee crisis was produced 
by a Serbian ethnic cleansing plan codenamed “Operation Horseshoe.”216
“NATO’s leaders . . . . used the existence of the plan to illustrate 
Milosevic’s character, and to prove that the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo was 
not triggered by the NATO bombing, thereby justifying the NATO 
campaign.”217
However, a retired German brigadier-general questioned the legitimacy 
of Operation Horseshoe and alleged that the German Defense Ministry 
turned a vague report from Bulgarian intelligence into a “plan.”218 The 
brigadier-general contended that German politicians misquoted the 
Bulgarian report, which noted the Serbian military goal was focused on 
destroying the Kosovo Liberation Army rather than the expulsion of the 
entire Kosovo Albanian population.219 German reporter Franz Josef Hutsch 
“got the impression in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 that ‘a lot of things were 
staged’ or ‘orchestrated’ and that the Kosovo Liberation Army had very 
good ‘PR advisers.’”220 There rests, then, an issue as to whether NATO 
conducted its due diligence prior to the commencement of Operation Allied 
Force.221
A postwar statistical analysis of the patterns of displacement, conducted 
by Patrick Ball of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, found a direct correlation between Serbian security force 
operations and refugee outflows, with NATO operations having little effect 
on the displacements.222
 214. Charney, supra note 191, at 840 (emphasis added); Milosevic Indictment, supra
note 211, at pp 21-28 ¶¶ 97-98. 
 215. Charney, supra note 191, at 840; Milosevic Indictment, supra note 211, at 10 ¶ 
39. 
 216. SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FOURTH REPORT, KOSOVO: THE 
MILITARY CAMPAIGN, 1999-2000, H.C. 28-II, ¶ 93 (U.K.) (citing 345 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th 
ser.) (2000) 686W (U.K.)). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. (citing THE TIMES, Apr. 2000). 
 220. Testimony About the War That was “Staged” in Kosovo, SENSE NEWS AGENCY
(Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.sense-agency.com/icty/testimony-about-the-war-that-was-
staged-in-kosovo.29.html?cat_id=1&news_id=8781.
 221. Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 260 (“[A] good faith determination by the 
prospective intervenor that human rights violations are in fact imminently threatening.”). It is 
illogical to have to wait until an actual violation occurs; therefore, reasonableness must be 
applied.  
 222. ABA Cent. & E. Eur. Law Initiative & Am. Ass’n for Advancement of Sci., 
Political Killings in Kosova/Kosovo, MAR.-JUNE 1999, at 11 (2000), available at 
http://shr.aaas.org/kosovo/pk/politicalkillings.pdf. 
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By comparing the estimated numbers of people who left each municipality 
over time to the times when NATO airstrikes occurred, the AAAS study 
concludes that only a small fraction of Kosovar Albanians fled 
Kosova/Kosovo as a direct result of NATO bombing raids. It also 
concludes that the mass exodus of refugees from Kosova/Kosovo occurred 
in patterns so regular that they must have been coordinated. In the context 
of descriptive accounts given by refugees, the most likely explanation for 
the migration is the implementation of a centrally-organized campaign to 
clear at least certain regions of ethnic Albanians.223
NATO relied upon the impression that Operation Horseshoe would go 
into effect in Kosovo in an attempt to bolster the scale and immediacy of the 
human rights violations. Yet there existed questionable evidence of 
Operation Horseshoe and its goals and a lack of large scale violations prior 
to NATO operations. Because there were not widespread incidents of gross, 
persistent, and systematic violations of basic human rights in Kosovo before 
NATO’s bombing campaign began,224 Operation Allied Force may not be 
justified as necessary.225
In correlation with the necessity criterion there exists what Fonteyne 
describes as the “procedural”226 criteria or what can be domestically termed 
as exhaustion of all administrative remedies. These procedural elements 
include the exhaustion of all peaceful means of settlement227 and the 
absence of any reasonable prospect of timely action by international 
organizations.228
Even though the Albanian Kosovars’ suffering could not have been 
addressed effectively by the UN Security Council because of the probable 
veto of any resolution by Russia or China, the NATO intervention was still 
unnecessary.229 One must still ask hard questions such as, were all 
diplomatic efforts and non-forcible remedies exhausted before Operation 
Allied Force began?  
Certainly not all diplomatic efforts were exhausted. In fact, there were 
questionable efforts made to negotiate with the Federal Republic of 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. In fact, on the 10-year anniversary of NATO’s bombing, Serbia’s Prime 
Minister Mirko Cvetkovic said NATO air strikes on Kosovo “resulted in ethnic cleansing 
and gross violations of human rights . . . .” NATO Strikes Over Kosovo Continue to Divide, 
10 Years On, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,4121076,00.html (emphasis added). 
 225. If the authors apply Fonteyne’s immediacy element to the equation, NATO’s 
intervention may have been considered necessary if NATO did in fact reasonably believe 
Operation Horseshoe was in effect. This appears to be an element not required in Nanda’s 
categorical approach to humanitarian intervention. 
 226. Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 264-66. 
 227. Id. at 264. 
 228. Id. at 264-65. 
 229. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
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Yugoslavia.230 “The Rambouillet accords were tilted against the Serbs, who 
were provided no opportunity to negotiate revisions to the draft 
agreement.”231 Similarly, in meetings that NATO and U.S. officials held 
with Milosevic, they pitched take-it-or-leave-it propositions.232 Moreover, 
using non-forcible remedies, such as an oil embargo or other economic 
sanctions, was considered only after the bombing campaign began.233
Clearly, there was more that could have been done before resorting to the 
use of force. Therefore, under a procedural analysis, Operation Allied Force 
was unnecessary.  
The proportionality criterion examines “the duration and propriety of the 
force applied.”234 The elements of proportionality include no unnecessary 
force,235 no unnecessary affectation of the authority structures of the States 
intervened,236 and no unnecessary duration.237
Operation Allied Force was the largest allied military operation in 
Europe since World War II and lasted seventy-nine days.238 During the 
Operation, allied pilots flew over 14,006 strike missions239 from a safe 
altitude of 20,000 feet.240 The means of attack included “B-52s, cluster 
bombs, and depleted uranium ordnance”—a weapon of questionable 
lawfulness.241 NATO intended to continue the air campaign on an 
“intensifying scale” until Milosevic “‘submitted’ without conditions.”242
 230. Charney, supra note 191, at 840. 
 231. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 232. Id.
 233. Charney, supra note 191, at 840. 
 234. Nanda Part II, supra note 202, at 827. 
 235. Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 262. (“[E]mploy only the amount of troops 
reasonably necessary to accomplish the objective, so as to reduce to a minimum infringement 
upon the territorial integrity and political independence of the State intervened.”) (citing 
Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 349-
50 (1967)). 
 236. Id. at 262-63. Seek “to limit the lawfulness of extensive alteration by the 
intervenor of the internal authority structures of that State.” Id. (citing John Norton Moore, 
The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 9 VA. J. INT’L L. 205, 264 (1969), 
“If the protection of human rights requires the overthrow of authority structures, it would 
seem best to require U.N. authorization as a prerequisite for action. To allow unilateral action 
in such cases would be to permit all manner of self-serving claims for the overthrow of 
authority structures.” T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light 
of Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 47 (citing John Norton Moore, 
The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 9 VA. J. INT’L L. 205, 264 (1969)). 
 237. Id. at 263-64. The removal of troops upon completion of objective. 
 238. Nanda, supra note 41, at 9; Roberts, supra note 86, at 109.  
 239. Roberts, supra note 86, at 109.  
 240. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 241. Falk, supra note 75, at 851. 
 242. Id. at 855. 
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The bombing caused severe damage to Serbia’s infrastructure and 
destroyed many cities and towns.243 The bombing targeted key components 
of the civilian infrastructure and resulted in heavy damage to the water 
supply and electricity systems.244 Furthermore, the bombing “caused severe 
pollution through the destruction of chemical factories and oil refineries.”245
The bombing caused the deaths of hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians246
and induced a flow of refugees that approached one million.247 Finally, 
NATO miscalculated that Milosevic would capitulate after a few days of 
bombing.248 This miscalculation caused NATO to intensify its efforts, which 
ultimately led to a disproportionate use of force by NATO.249
“The magnitude and effects of [the] bombing are difficult to reconcile 
with the humanitarian claims made by NATO.”250 This difficulty is 
compounded by NATO’s reliance on tactics of warfare that minimized the 
risk of harm to its forces, while shifting that risk to the civilians of 
Kosovo.251 The absence of casualties among NATO forces and the killing of 
innocent Kosovars seriously damages NATO’s humanitarian rationale for 
Operation Allied Force.252 Although the duration of the bombing may have 
been relatively short, the impropriety of NATO’s force in terms of 
magnitude and effect supports the view that NATO’s force was 
disproportional.  
The purpose criterion explores “whether the intervention was motivated 
by humanitarian considerations, self interest, or mixed motivations.”253 The 
 243. Id. at 851; Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. In the years that followed Operation 
Allied Force there grew rising concern from some in the international community of not only 
the Operation itself, but also the derivative effects of the overall campaign; see Press 
Release, Office of the Prosecutor for the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo., 
Prosecutor’s Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign, U.N. Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-e (June 13, 
2000), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7846; see also Marjorie Cohn, No “Victor’s 
Justice” in Yugoslavia: NATO Must be Held Accountable for Its War Crimes, Jurist (Mar. 
27, 2000), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew4.HTM (discussing how U.N. High 
Commissioner Mary Robinson had warned NATO it might be held accountable for war 
crimes after two buses in Kosovo were bombed killing more than fifty citizens); see also
Roberts, supra note 86, at 123 (citing Commissioner Robinson, “In the NATO bombing of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, large numbers of civilians have incontestably been 
killed.”); see also INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA(June 2000), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1257, 
1282 (2000) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN].  
 244. Falk, supra note 75, at 851.  
 245. Id.
 246. Id.; Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 247. Falk, supra note 75, at 851-52. 
 248. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 249. Id.
 250. Falk, supra note 75, at 855-56. 
 251. Id. at 856. 
 252. Id.
 253. Nanda Part II, supra note 202, at 827. 
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NATO initiative was not a war in the conventional sense. Rather, it was 
based on a claim of humanitarian intervention. NATO’s Secretary-General 
stated the objectives of the air-strikes were “[t]o prevent more human 
suffering, more repression, more violence against the civilian population of 
Kosovo . . . . “254 Similarly, President Clinton justified the NATO action in 
the following words:  
Today we and our 18 NATO allies agreed to do what we said we would 
do, what we must do, to restore the peace. Our mission is clear: to 
demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose so that the Serbian 
leaders understand the imperative of reversing course; to deter an even 
bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo; and, if necessary, 
to seriously damage Serbian military’s capacity to harm the people of 
Kosovo. In short, if President Milosevic will not make peace, we will limit 
his ability to make war.255
Notwithstanding these statements, there is evidence that other 
considerations were involved. Six days before Operation Allied Force, 
Walter Slocombe, United States Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
stated that “[t]he conflict in Kosovo threatens our calculated, cold-blooded 
national interests . . . .”256 Essentially, the conflict in Kosovo implicated 
national security concerns of the United States.257 In addition, Operation 
Allied Force was not tailored to protect ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, but 
rather had the broader objective of undermining the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s government in order to force its acceptance of the Rambouillet 
peace agreement.258 Despite the possible mixed-motives of the United 
States, it is fair to say that Operation Allied Force was a humanitarian 
intervention by NATO acting under the leadership of the United States. At 
bottom, Operation Allied Force’s purpose was grounded in humanitarian 
concerns.259
 254. Nanda, supra note 41, at 8 (citing Javier Solana, Statement by NATO Secretary-
General on Air Strikes, Mar. 23, 1999,  
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/solanatranscript.html). 
 255. Id. (citing CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; In the President’s Words: ‘We Act to 
Prevent a Wider War, ‘N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A15, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/25/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-in-the-president-s-words-
we-act-to-prevent-a-wider-war.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm). 
 256. Howard, supra note 5, at 266 n.23 (citing Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense 
Authorization Act-United States Policy in the Balkans: Hearings on Authorization and 
Oversight Before the House Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. 722 (1999)). 
 257. Howard, supra note 5, at 266.  
 258. See Charney, supra note 191, at 840. 
 259. See, Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 261 (“[It is] ‘naive’ . . . to require that ‘where 
the decision to intervene falls to a single state, it should be safeguarded by a requirement that 
the state be totally disinterested.’ The presence, among the . . . intervenor, of some 
considerations of national interest should not be taken to necessarily ‘invalidate the resort to 
[force] if the overriding motive is the protection of human rights.’”) (citing Richard B. 
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The nature of the actors’ criterion appraises whether the humanitarian 
intervention was “collective or unilateral.”260 It is clear that NATO’s 
humanitarian intervention was unilateral. NATO acted unilaterally because 
it lacked a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. Furthermore, 
although NATO is a collective, regional organization, the countries 
comprising NATO are a small part of the total number of United Nations 
members. Since only NATO members planned and implemented Operation 
Allied Force, they acted unilaterally from the United Nations as a whole.  
Lastly, the maximization of best outcomes criterion assesses “whether 
the intervention maximized the best outcome.”261 Operation Allied Force 
failed to optimize the best outcome.262 Operation Allied Force’s purpose 
was to protect Kosovar Albanians from the excessive use of force by 
Serbs.263 However, the operation resulted in Milosevic intensifying his 
efforts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo.264 As a result, almost a million ethnic 
Albanians either were displaced within Kosovo or fled to neighboring 
countries.265
A year after Operation Allied Force ended, Kosovo was still beset with 
ethnic hatred, violence, crime, and revenge killings.266 The UN Secretary-
General’s June 6, 2000 report on the United Nations Interim Mission in 
Kosovo is revealing.267 The report notes that “Some aspects of Kosovo 
society have not changed. Kosovo Serbs and other minority communities 
continue to be murdered, attacked and threatened. [United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo] staff members have also been murdered 
by extremists motivated by ethnic hatred.”268
Furthermore, the report states:   
Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 350 (1967 )). 
See Id. citing Lillich, supra note 235, at 350 “naïve to require that where the decision to 
intervene falls to a single state, it should be safeguarded by a requirement that the state be 
totally disinterested. The presence among the intervenor of some considerations of national 
interest should not be taken to necessarily invalidate the resort to force if the overriding 
motive is the protection of human rights.” 
 260. Nanda Part II, supra note 202, at 827; see also Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 266-
67 (stating that “collective operations should be preferred over individual measures. While it 
is true that ‘intervention does not gain in legality . . . by being collective rather than 
individual,’ there is nevertheless a presumption that collective action is more likely to ensure 
the relative purity of the intentions required from the intervenors.”) (citation omitted). 
 261. Nanda Part II, supra note 202, at 827-28.  
 262. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 263. Id.
 264. Id. at 18-19. 
 265. Id. at 19. 
 266. Id.
 267. Id. at 15. 
 268. Nanda, supra note 41, at 15. See also U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, ¶ 22, 
U.N. Doc. S/2000/538 (June 6, 2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/sgrep00.htm [hereinafter Report of Security-
General]. 
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As a result of the continued violence and harassment, the freedom of 
movement of minority communities remains restricted. This in turn affects 
their ability to fully exercise a range of basic rights, such as health care, 
education, social welfare, access to public utilities and other public 
services. [Furthermore, [d]iscrimination in the employment sector, 
particularly against ethnic minorities . . . is increasingly apparent.269
In addition, there is strong evidence that the only real winners in Kosovo 
were the members of the Albanian mafia engaged in organized crime.270
As time progressed, numerous talks amongst the parties between 2003 
and 2007 yielded few results as protests and rallies often interrupted into 
violence.271 The freedom of movement of minority communities still 
remained restricted.272 Ethnic violence still plagued Kosovo as the ethnic 
Albanian majority continued to push for independence from Serbia.273 The 
end result of the violence and breakdown of negotiations was the unilateral 
declaration of independence issued by Kosovo’s elected parliament in 
February 2008. 
The parliamentary declaration quickly aroused international reaction on 
both ends of the spectrum as nations sought to recognize or declare invalid 
the Kosovo independence.274 On October 8, 2008, the UN General 
Assembly adopted resolution 63/3 (A/63/L.2) in which it requested the ICJ 
to render an Advisory Opinion on the following question: “Is the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
 269. Report of Security-General, supra note 268, at ¶¶ 41, 51. 
 270. See generally Frank Cilluffo & George Salmoiraghi, And the Winner Is . . . the 
Albanian Mafia, 22 WASH. Q. 21 (1999); see also Nanda, supra note 41, at 19. 
 271. From Racak to the ICJ Ruling: Kosovo Timeline Since 1999,
BALKANINSIGHT.COM (last visited Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/info/29604/); Key Dates in Kosovo’s Drive for 
Independence, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23292262/ 
(2008). Instances of violence include March 2004 riots across Kosovo, after three ethnic 
Albanian children drown in the Ibar River, alleged involvement of Serbs leads to nineteen 
deaths, and the February 2007 nationalist movement, Vetevendosje, protests lead to two 
deaths. 
 272. Grenade Explodes in Serb Classroom in Kosovo, REUTERS, Nov. 21, 2006, 
available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/11/21/us-kosovo-school-grenade-
idUKL2179137820061121. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Kosovo MPs Proclaim Independence, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249034.stm (reporting that demonstrators, numbering 
around 1000, threw stones and broke the windows of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade along 
with attacking a nearby McDonald’s restaurant. Russia, in particular, questioned the validity 
of the declaration under both international law and UN Security Council resolution 1244,
(1999). Journalists believe the Russian stance was based upon its own issues with the 
Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
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Government of Kosovo in accordance with International Law.”275 In other 
words, the ICJ was asked to render an opinion on whether the declaration of 
independence violated general international law and/or Security Council 
resolution 1244(1999).  
When discussing any violation of general principles of international law, 
the ICJ divested the issue of a unilateral declaration of independence from 
that of territorial integrity.276 The Advisory Opinion goes on to note, 
“several participants have invoked resolutions of the Security Council 
condemning particular declarations of independence.”277 The ICJ found no 
applicable prohibition in general international law against Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence.278
The Court then looked to any violation of the lex specialis created by 
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).279 The resolution sought to provide 
an interim administration for Kosovo, which would provide a transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions.280 Since the authors of 
the declaration were elected officials acting in their capacity as 
 275. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 4-5 (July 22) [hereinafter 
Accordance]. 
 276. Id. at 30-31. The Court notes Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United 
Nations which holds: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Id. The ICJ 
determined that Article 2 paragraph 4 concerns the relations between States, the Court found 
a unilateral declaration by a particular population of a State to be outside the principal of 
territorial integrity. The 2010 ICJ Advisory Opinion seems to brush past Operation Allied 
Force. In the forty-four page opinion there is not a single mention of the operation itself. The 
conclusion by the ICJ that this issue did not involve territorial integrity can be considered a 
correct determination if Operation Allied Force is ignored.  
 277. Id. at 30. Those resolutions include declarations by Southern Rhodesia, Northern 
Cyprus and the Republika Srpska. The ICJ found, however, that in all of those instances the 
Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the 
time that those declarations of independence were made; “the illegality attached to the 
declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these 
declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with 
the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international 
law… in the context of Kosovo, the Security Council has never taken this position.” Id. at 
30-31. 
 278. Id. at 32. 
 279. Accordance, supra note 275, at 32-33. In adopting resolution 1244 (1999), after 
the completion of Operation Allied Force, the Security Council was determined to resolve 
the grave humanitarian situation in the region and to put to an end the armed conflict in 
Kosovo. 
 280. Id. at 22. The Court found that the resolution contained three main aspects, (1) 
establishing an international civil and security presence in Kosovo with full civil and 
political authority, (2) the implementation of an interim international territorial 
administration for humanitarian purposes and (3) establishing an interim regime, not a 
permanent institutional framework. 
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representatives of the people of Kosovo and not members of the 
international interim regime, the Court found no violation.281
Operation Allied Force precipitated the current situation in Kosovo. 
Arguably, the only success one can speak of is the end of Serb violations 
against Albanian Kosovars initiated after the bombing began and the de 
facto partition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.282 Thus, it is fair to 
say that Operation Allied Force set into motion a series of events that 
resulted in the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo as opposed 
to joint proceedings between Kosovo and Serbia.  
The nature of Operation Allied Force, its legality issues, the resulting 
turmoil in the region and overall dismissal of any NATO violations only 
served to widen the divide between the parties as the years moved forward 
and thus ran counter to the maximization of the best outcome, which in the 
opinion of the authors would have been joint proceedings between the 
parties. 
In summation, because Operation Allied Force was unnecessary, 
disproportional, and failed to maximize the best outcome, it cannot be 
legally justified under customary international law as a humanitarian 
intervention. 
CONCLUSION
Operation Allied Force was “the most aggressive and sustained use of 
military force during the Clinton presidency.”283 However, President Clinton 
lacked the constitutional authority to authorize United States Armed Forces 
to participate in Operation Allied Force. Furthermore, President Clinton 
violated the War Powers Resolution by allowing United States Armed 
Forces to participate in Operation Allied Force beyond sixty days without 
express statutory authorization from Congress.284 Finally, NATO sought to 
justify Operation Allied Force as a humanitarian intervention. However, 
Operation Allied Force cannot be legally justified as a humanitarian 
intervention. Operation Allied Force was unnecessary. It failed to meet its 
purpose and to maximize the best outcome and the force used during the 
Operation was disproportionate. Thus, Operation Allied Force cannot be 
justified as a humanitarian intervention under general principles of 
customary international law—which means there is even less of an 
argument that President Clinton had the power to commit United States 
Armed Forces without congressional approval.285
 281. Id. at 22, 28. The ICJ determined that the declaration of independence would 
have been invalid if it had come out of the interim regime.
 282. This can also been seen as a failure to satisfy Fonteyne’s criteria and Moore’s 
contention that the invention not interfere with the authority structures of the State. 
 283. HENDRICKSON, supra note 81, at 117. 
 284. Corn, supra note 58, at 1154.  
 285. Kahn, supra note 195, at 52. 
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“… and look at your laws: criminal law, civil law, property law, 
commercial law, international law, the law of the sea, law and order, legal 
codes, legal books…”  
–From ‘Excess’ by Sebhat Gebre-Egziabher, in SEED and     
            Other Short Stories, Retold by Wendy Kindred, p. 4
INTRODUCTION
In a moment of dismissive hubris, the Ethiopian tax system may be 
described as a loose agglomeration of proclamations, regulations, directives, 
rules, etc., which despite their loose ends and rough edges, seem to fulfill 
the singular purpose for which they are designed, namely raising revenues 
for the Ethiopian government. In the face of these loosely connected laws, 
one is tempted to conclude like Jacques Vanderlinden did more than forty 
years ago about the Ethiopian legal system as a whole: that is, it does not as 
yet exist.1 The Ethiopian tax system has not been blessed with the excellent 
organization of many of the modern laws of Ethiopia—which (thanks to the 
codification project the country undertook in the 1950s and 1960s) were 
organized into well-written codes. A system (understood as an orderly 
arrangement of rules and institutions) is not the first impression that one 
gets out of coming face to face with the dizzying array of taxes scattered 
almost haphazardly in so many disparate pieces of legislation.  
Luckily, we don’t have to subscribe to impossibly high standards (which 
appear to inform the opinions of Professor Vanderlinden) to qualify a given 
system as a legal system. If, in the words of John Henry Merryman, a legal 
system is understood merely as “an operating set of legal institutions, 
procedures and rules,” it is possible to qualify the rules of any sovereign 
state as a legal system, regardless of the degree of legal organization 
involved and the level of legal development in a given country.2 In a sense, 
it is possible to speak in terms not only of a legal system as a whole, but 
also parts of that legal system, such as a criminal justice system, a revenue 
system, or as this article proposes, a tax system. To the extent it is possible 
to detect a hierarchy of institutions, laws, and procedures (however 
imperfectly these are understood), it is possible to write about a tax system 
 1. Jacques Vanderlinden, Civil Law and Common Law Influences on the 
Developing Law of Ethiopia, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 250, 256-57 (1966) (denying that the 
Ethiopian legal system had yet existed after Ethiopia commissioned some of the most 
distinguished jurists at the time to codify its laws—the Penal Code in 1957, the Civil, 
Commercial, and Maritime Codes in 1960, the Criminal Procedure Code in 1961 and the 
Civil Procedure Code in 1965). 
 2. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 1-4 (2d ed. 1985); 
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL EDUC. SERIES, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA,
AND EAST ASIA 3 (1994). 
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like that of Ethiopia without losing sight of the fact that some tax systems 
are better organized and more coherent than others. The Ethiopian tax 
system has an operating set of legal institutions (such as the parliament, tax 
authorities, and tax appeal tribunals and courts), procedures (for assessment, 
collection and complaints handling), and rules (the constitution, 
proclamations, regulations, directives, etc.).  
The modern “Ethiopian tax system” (let’s put it, provisionally, in 
quotation marks) is a product of more than half a century of 
experimentation in legislation and tax reform. It had neither the grand 
lawgiver to guide and direct it from behind nor a clear set of overarching 
policies to inform its directions.3 Since its humble beginnings in the 1940s, 
the modern Ethiopian tax system has developed and evolved by fits and 
starts as the needs for revenue arise, as governments change and as the 
economy and international situations shift. Over the course of this period 
the Ethiopian tax system went through some major revisions and numerous 
piecemeal amendments.4
This article will attempt to show that there is a system behind the 
apparently haphazard and disparate pieces of tax legislation of Ethiopia. No 
one has ever looked at the Ethiopian tax system as a whole (not as legal 
scholars would have liked it anyway) and it is therefore no surprise if the 
Ethiopian tax system strikes one as random, disorganized, and incoherent in 
places. We are more accustomed to talking (if ever) about income taxes 
(even then, of specific income taxes), the value added tax, or customs duties 
than of the Ethiopian tax system as a whole.  
Since the jurisprudence of Ethiopian taxation is yet to develop fully, this 
article will draw upon the comparative experience of some tax systems 
elsewhere to illuminate the “gaps” in, and suggest future directions for, the 
Ethiopian tax system. Some of the terminologies used in this article are 
adopted from other tax systems for heuristic purposes. Due to the paucity of 
information on regional tax practice, the article will not deal with taxation at 
the regional level, except where federal laws impact the operation of 
regional tax systems.5
This article is divided into two parts. Part I of the article will address the 
constitutional and administrative issues surrounding the Ethiopian tax 
system. The second part will deal with the organization and sources of tax 
 3. Eshetu Chole, Towards a History of the Fiscal Policy of the Pre-Revolutionary 
Ethiopian State: 1941-1974, in ESHETU CHOLE, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA,
ORGANIZATION FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 
(OSSREA) 63 (Eshetu Chole ed., 2004) (“[I]t [the Ethiopian tax system] evolved in an ad 
hoc basis, in response to specific needs and pressures, i.e., in a planning vacuum.”).  
 4. The major tax reforms in Ethiopia occurred in the 1940s, in the aftermath of the 
Ethiopian revolution of 1974, after the fall of the Derg in 1991 and most recently in the 2002 
tax reforms.  
 5. This is not a significant omission, as the Federal Government has had an 
overwhelming influence over the regional tax system, to the extent the latter is said to exist.  
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laws, including tax dispute settlement schemes in Ethiopia. The article will 
end with a conclusion and some recommendations. Through the legal and 
institutional arrangements that have made the Ethiopian tax system into 
what it is (in spite of the gaps and loose ends), the article aims to draw 
attention to the patterns that underlie the Ethiopian tax system.  
I. PART I
A. The Federal Arrangement in Ethiopia and Taxing Powers 
The fundamental authority to tax is derived from the Constitution of 
1995, which, following the federal structure, shares tax powers between the 
Federal Government and the Regional States. 6 The Ethiopian Constitution 
goes to greater lengths than other areas of power in allocating taxation 
powers between the Federal Government and the Regional States.7 The 
Constitution classifies taxation powers as “taxes exclusive to the Federal 
Government,”8 “taxes exclusive to the Regional States,”9 “taxes concurrent 
to both the Federal Government and the Regional States,”10 and “taxes 
undesignated.”11
With the exception of customs duties, which are the exclusive preserve 
of the Federal Government, most other taxes are sliced into pieces by the 
Ethiopian Constitution and shared between the Federal Government and the 
Regional States on the basis of certain set formulas. Income taxes on 
employment income are, for example, shared on the basis of the identity of 
employers so that if an employer is a Federal Government or an 
international organization, the Federal Government exercises the power to 
impose tax on the employees, and if an employer is a state government or a 
private enterprise, state governments get to levy tax on the employees.12 The 
Constitution follows similar patterns of tax-power sharing on most other 
taxes.13
 6. See The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia of 1995.
Articles 95-99, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 1.  
 7. On the implications of the specificity of the Ethiopian Constitution, see Taddese 
Lencho, Income Tax Assignment Under the Ethiopian Constitution: Issues to Worry About, 4 
Mizan L. Rev. 31 (2010). 
 8. The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia of 1995.
Articles 95-99, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 1 (the Constitution headlines these powers 
simply as “federal power of taxation” and “state power of taxation”; the word “exclusive” is 
added here to highlight what these powers actually mean).  
 9. Id. art. 97.  
 10. Id. art. 98.  
 11. Id. art. 99. There is an implicit fifth category: a tax designated by the 
Constitution but requiring re-designation via an amendment of the Constitution.  
 12. Id. arts. 96(2), 97(1).  
 13. Profit taxes are assigned on the basis of the legal status of the business enterprise 
subject to profit taxes; similarly, sales taxes appear to be assigned on the basis of the legal 
status of the business enterprise collecting sales taxes; taxes on federally owned and 
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The Ethiopian federal arrangement follows the dual structure in which all 
the three branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial) co-
exist in respect of the Federal and Regional powers. This, in taxation, means 
in principle that both the Federal Government and the Regional States enjoy 
full legislative, executive, and judicial powers with respect to taxation 
powers reserved to them. In practice, however, the Federal Government has 
had the most dominant presence in the legislation of taxation, respecting not 
just “federal exclusive taxes” but also “concurrent taxes” and at times even 
“regional exclusive taxes.”14 Although Regional States have the prerogative 
to issue their own tax laws with respect to tax sources reserved to them by 
the Constitution, many of the Regional States for a while used federal tax 
laws to levy and collect regional taxes.15 The Regional States did not 
immediately exercise their legislative powers of issuing their own tax 
legislations. Some of the Regional Governments have begun issuing their 
tax legislations recently. However, the exercise of the legislative power over 
taxation still remains a formal matter because the Regional Governments 
have yet to fully exercise their taxation powers. Many of the Regional States 
that have issued their own tax laws have used federal tax laws as models 
with the result that there is virtually no difference in substance between 
federal tax laws and regional tax laws.16
One of the striking features of the Ethiopian Constitution on matters of 
taxation is the unusual specificity and detail of provisions that assign 
taxation powers between the Federal Government and the Regional States. 
Since the Ethiopian Constitution is unusually concrete and specific in the 
area of tax powers, its language in this respect leaves very little room for 
argument about which layer of government has what tax powers. 
Nonetheless, some issues remain contentious. One is the exercise of 
concurrent powers. The Constitution gives out very little as to how the 
concurrent tax powers are to be exercised in practice.17 Following the 
regional-state-owned enterprises are assigned to the federal and regional states respectively.
See Lencho, supra note 7, at 38-40.  
 14. Id.
 15. See id. at 43-45. 
 16. This form of tax legislation has created some curious developments in the 
Ethiopian Federation, casting doubts over the capacity and the will of the Regional States to 
chart their own autonomous course. The only area of tax law where the Regional States have 
not copied from federal tax laws is the agricultural income tax laws, presumably because 
there is no federal agricultural income tax law—agricultural income taxes are the exclusive 
preserve of the Regional States under the Ethiopian Constitution. See The Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia of 1995, Articles 95-99, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, 
No. 1; see also Deso Chemeda, Agricultural Income Taxation in Oromia (2008) (unpublished 
Senior Thesis, Addis Ababa University) (on file with Faculty of Law Library Archives, 
Addis Ababa University) (even today, many of the Regions invoke federal tax laws like the 
Federal Turnover Tax law of 2002 to collect turnover taxes).  
 17. SOLOMON NIGUSSIE, FISCAL FEDERALISM IN THE ETHIOPIAN ETHNIC-BASED 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 136-37 (2006). 
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practice of other federal systems, several options may be open to both layers 
of the Ethiopian federation.18 The Regional States may impose their own 
taxes in addition to the Federal Government taxes. The Regional States may 
choose to impose additional tax rates on an otherwise federal tax law. Or the 
Regional States may choose to agree with the Federal Government to share 
the proceeds of federally collected taxes. In Ethiopia, it is the third option 
that prevails, presumably because there is a hint to that effect in Article 
62(7) of the Constitution.19 The Federal Government levies and collects 
concurrent taxes. The revenues from concurrent taxes are shared on the 
basis of a revenue-sharing scheme approved in 2004 by the House of the 
Federation (HoF).20
The other contentious area is the meaning of “undesignated taxes.” In the 
assignment of expenditure powers, the Ethiopian Constitution follows what 
might be described as the principle of residuality, which is stipulated in 
Article 52 of the Constitution. All expenditure powers which are not 
expressly stated as federal powers or concurrent powers of the Federal 
Government and the Regional States are assumed to be reserved as the 
powers of the Regional States. This is not the case for taxation powers. 
Taxes not designated as “federal exclusive,” “state exclusive” or 
“concurrent to both” should be referred to the joint session of the House of 
the Federation and the House of Peoples’ Representatives, which shall 
18. See 4 ANWAR SHAH, THE PRACTICE OF FISCAL FEDERALISM: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 21 (2007).  
 19. Article 62, sub-article 7, of the Ethiopian Constitution empowers The Federal 
House of Federation (HOF) to determine the division of revenues derived from joint Federal 
and State sources, which must be the case because the Federal Government collects 
joint/concurrent tax sources; See The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia of 1995, Articles 95-99, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 1. In this regard, it is also 
instructive to review the practice prior to the ratification of the Constitution. During the 
transition period (1991-1995), the division of revenues was regulated by a proclamation 
issued in 1992; that proclamation has a clear provision regarding the levying and collection 
of “joint” or “concurrent” revenues. It provides that ‘joint’ taxes shall be collected by the 
central (federal) government and the proceeds distributed among Regional States on the basis 
of derivative principles. There is reason to believe that this practice continued unabated after 
the Constitution has replaced the proclamation in 1995. See Proclamation to Define the 
Sharing of Revenues between the Central Government and the National/Regional Self-
Governments. Article 8(4), Proclamation No. 33/1992, Negarit Gazeta, Year 52, No. 7 (Eth.); 
see also Lencho, supra note 7, at 42.  
 20. The revenue sharing scheme instructs the Federal Government to share with the 
Regional States 50% of the proceeds of profit and dividend taxes, 30% of the indirect taxes 
and 40% of the mineral taxes; the Federal Government also controversially took over the 
administration of VAT (part of which would have fallen under the jurisdiction of the 
Regional States) and decided to return the proceeds to the Regional States based on the 
sources from which VAT is being collected (i.e., derivative principle). See NIGUSSIE, supra 
note 17, at 140, 210. 
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determine by a two-thirds majority vote on the exercise of powers of 
taxation.21
What really constitutes “undesignated” in the world of taxes has been a 
subject of some debate in practice. The Ethiopian Constitution refers to 
many types of taxes by name. The Ethiopian Constitution may have also 
mentioned some taxes in substance but not in name. A case in point is the 
value added tax (VAT). VAT is not mentioned in name but in substance (if 
we take it to be in the family of sales taxes in general), it is mentioned in 
several provisions of the Constitution.22 If we take “undesignated” to mean 
literally “unmentioned,” VAT qualifies as an undesignated tax and therefore 
falls under Article 99 of the Constitution. When VAT was first proposed as 
a new source of tax at the beginning of this century, some members of the 
Joint Houses questioned whether VAT was indeed an Article 99 matter or 
whether its introduction as a federal tax required the amendment of the 
Constitution.23 Apparently, not many put much stock in the merit of those 
debates, and when the matter came to the vote, the Joint Houses 
unanimously gave the power to impose VAT to the Federal Government 
(apparently taking VAT as an undesignated tax).24 But in an apparent U-
turn, the Federal Government later agreed to return to the Regional States 
the proceeds of VAT collected from sources reserved to the Regional 
States.25 If VAT were a federal tax, as the Joint Houses at first seemed to 
think, there would be no need to share the revenues with the Regional 
States. The Federal Government could have treated VAT as any of the 
federal exclusive taxes and used the proceeds either for its direct budgetary 
needs and/or distributed the proceeds in the form of federal grants. The 
Federal Government probably realized upon assuming the power to levy 
and collect VAT that VAT was not an undesignated tax after all but a 
designated tax (as a sales tax) requiring the exercise of power over VAT at 
 21. The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia of 1995,
Articles 95-99, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 1.  
 22. Id. arts. 96(1), 96(3), 97(4), 97(7), 98(1). The literature on VAT invariably 
classifies VAT as a sales tax. See, e.g., ALAN SCHENK & OLIVER OLDMAN, VALUE ADDED 
TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH, WITH MATERIALS AND CASES 24 (2001); JOHN F. DUE &
ANN F. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 404
(2002). At the time of the ratification of the Constitution in 1994, VAT was unknown in 
Ethiopia and it could not have been mentioned by the drafters by name. At that time, 
Ethiopia had a general sales tax law that applied upon manufacturers or producers and 
importers of goods and services only, and it is therefore of little surprise that the Constitution 
mentions this type of sales tax and not the VAT.  
 23. See Berhanu Assefa, Undesignated Powers of Taxation in the Distribution of 
Fiscal Powers between the Central and State Governments under the FDRE Constitution 59-
60 (2006) (unpublished Senior Thesis, Addis Ababa University) (on file with Faculty of Law 
Library Archives, Addis Ababa University).  
 24. Id. at 60 (VAT was issued as a federal tax law in 2002); See Value Added Tax 
Proclamation. Proclamation No. 285, Negarit Gazeta, Year 8, No. 33 (Eth.) [hereinafter VAT 
Proclamation]. 
 25. See NIGUSSIE, supra note 17, at 140.
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multiple jurisdictions: federal, regional state, and concurrent. In any case, 
the decisions reached over the years with respect to the introduction of VAT 
illustrate the practical problems arising from characterizing “undesignated-
ness” under the Ethiopian Constitution.  
The subject of “undesignated taxes” is not always contentious, however. 
There are many clear cases in which the Constitution failed to designate the 
power over certain taxes, and the Joint Houses appropriately intervened to 
designate these taxes in the exercise of their power under Article 99 of the 
Constitution. Excise taxes on private enterprises, income taxes on royalties 
from the exercise of copyrights and patents, and income taxes on interest 
from bank deposits are not designated in the revenue provisions of the 
Constitution. The Joint Houses met and designated excise taxes on private 
enterprises as “concurrent taxes,” income taxes on interest accruing from 
bank deposits as “federal taxes,” income taxes on royalties derived by 
individuals as “regional taxes,” and income taxes on royalties derived by 
enterprises as “concurrent taxes.”26 Since none of these taxes could be said 
to be designated either in name or substance, there would be little debate 
over the decisions the Joint Houses took.  
B. Constitutional Limits on Tax Powers 
Apart from the limitations federalism imposes upon the powers of 
taxation, a number of provisions in the Federal Constitution impose 
additional limitations upon the taxation powers of the Federal Government 
and Regional States. Constitutional issues pertaining to taxes are perhaps as 
numerous as the constitutional issues themselves. Taxes may affect the right 
to property, equality, privacy, freedom of expression, speech, religion, etc.27
Should we want to write about how taxes may encroach upon constitutional 
rights and freedoms, there wouldn’t be enough space to write them. Instead, 
we will focus upon constitutional issues that are of direct relevance to the 
exercise of taxation powers.  
In writing about the limits on taxation powers, we cannot (unfortunately) 
go beyond the bare language of the Ethiopian Constitution—for there are no 
cases as yet to illuminate for us what the Constitution might mean in this 
regard. Our principal reference in this regard is Article 100 of the Ethiopian 
Constitution. Although it carries an unfortunate title “directives on 
taxation”—which downplays and understates the force of the provision—
 26. Minutes of the 1st Joint Session of the House of Federation and the House of 
Peoples Representatives (Meskerem 26, 1996 E.C. in Amharic), quoted in Assefa, supra note 
23, at 62-63. 
 27. See Tracy A. Kaye & Stephen W. Mazza, United States—National Report: 
Constitutional Limitations on the Legislative Power to Tax in the United States, 15 MICH. ST.
J. INT’L L. 481, 489-90 (2007); David Gliksberg, Israel-National Report, 15 MICH. ST. J.
INT’L L. 371, 373-88 (2007); see also Stephen W. Mazza & Tracy A. Kaye, Restricting the 
Legislative Power to Tax in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 641 (Supp. 2006). 
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there is little doubt that Article 100 of the Constitution is intended as a limit 
on taxation powers of the Federal Government and Regional states.28 Since 
the objective of this article is not simply to restate the principles and 
limitations laid down in the Constitution but also to highlight gaps (if any) 
in it, we shall have recourse below to some other limitations that are not 
clearly recognized under the Ethiopian Constitution.  
1. The Principle of Tax Legality
The first limitation found in some constitutions is the principle of tax 
legality. The modern principle of tax legality is a derivation from the great 
historical battles fought between legislative and executive bodies over the 
power of taxation. Taxation is historically the crucible of the struggle for 
supremacy of powers between the legislative and executive bodies.29 From 
the Magna Carta to the English Revolution of 1688, to the American 
Independence, taxation was the battle cry of those who sought to keep the 
power of taxation in the hands of the legislative (representative) bodies of 
the government—hence the colorful slogan “no taxation without 
representation.”30
At the minimum, the principle of tax legality means that taxation must 
have a legal basis, and this is recognized as a constitutional precept in most 
legal systems.31 This requirement is written into the constitutions of many 
countries, and even in those countries where it has not obtained explicit 
constitutional recognition; it has been derived from other constitutional 
principles like “equality in taxation” (Switzerland) or constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing personal freedom (Germany).32
Beyond the threshold consensus that taxation must have a legal basis, 
there is no agreement as to what else the principle of tax legality requires in 
a given tax system.33 One area where the principle of tax legality has some 
 28. The Amharic version of the Constitution has the final authority in the event of 
conflict between the English and Amharic versions of the Constitution. The Amharic version 
of the Constitution uses the word “merihowoch,” which roughly translates as “principles.” In 
this regard, the Amharic version is closer to the spirit of the Constitution. See The 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia of 1995, Articles 95-99, Negarit 
Gazeta, Year 1, No. 1. 
 29. As William B. Barker writes, “[O]ne of the most important movements in the 
development of the modern state ‘has been the struggle to remove the power to tax from 
monarchs and to place that power exclusively in the hands of legislators.’” William B. 
Barker, The Three Faces of Equality: Constitutional Requirements in Taxation, 57 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006).  
 30. See Barker, supra note 29; see also Frans Vanistendael, Legal Framework for 
Taxation, in 1 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 1, 16, 18 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996). 
 31. Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 16.  
 32. Id. at 16-17. 
33. Id.; “Tax legality” may be understood as prohibiting tax authorities from entering 
into agreements with individual taxpayers, or to limit administrative discretion in granting 
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relevance is over the extent to which legislatures can delegate tax law 
making authority to the other branches of government.34 The principle of tax 
legality can be understood not only as principle that ensures the supremacy 
of the legislature over tax matters but also as a precept that constrains the 
powers of the legislature (in this case its power to delegate taxation powers 
to the other branches of government). In this regard, the principle of tax 
legality can be understood to mean “no delegation of taxation powers 
whatsoever” and at the other extreme it can also mean delegation of taxation 
powers is permissible for the legislature so long as a constitution allows 
delegation of legislature powers generally.35 The position that appears to 
have won acceptance in many systems is the intermediate position that 
makes delegation of certain taxation powers permissible so long as the 
legislature has specified the so-called “essential” or “basic” elements of the 
tax in the enabling act or principal tax statute.36 Some Constitutions are very 
particular about what elements of tax should be specified in a tax act 
approved by parliaments. The Constitution of Greece, for example, requires 
that parliamentary tax acts should set out in the tax law a definition of the 
basic elements of taxation, such as the subjects of the tax, the property 
subject to tax, the tax rate, and exemptions.37 On the question of delegation, 
the constitution of Greece prohibits delegation of the “basic” or “essential” 
elements of tax to the executive branches.38 The Constitution of Greece goes 
so far as to specifically proscribe the retroactive application of tax statutes.39
tax privileges, or to enjoin courts and tax tribunals to construe tax laws strictly. See VICTOR 
THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW 71 (2003). 
 34. Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 17. 
 35. Id.
 36. Id.
 37. Theodore Fortsakis, Greece-National Report, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 327, 328 
(2007). In the United States, courts have reached similar conclusions over the power of the 
U.S. Congress to delegate taxation powers to the executive branches. U.S. courts have held 
that the power of taxation is not subject to delegation “to either the other departments of the 
government, or to any individual, private corporation, officer, board or commission.” The 
legislature cannot leave too much discretion with the executive as to enable the latter to 
select the property to be taxed, or determine “the basis for the measurement of the tax” or 
define “the purpose for which the tax” is levied. The powers of taxation that are delegable 
are those that are “merely advisory or ministerial in their nature, such as computing the levy, 
fixing the rate or enforcing the payment.” Powers that are advisory or ministerial in their 
character have been interpreted to include “the power to value property, the power to extend, 
assess and collect the taxes and the power to perform any of the innumerable details of 
computation, appraisement and adjustment.” See 84 C.J.S. Taxation §8 (1954). 
 38. Fortsakis, supra note 37, at 329.  
 39. A partial quote from Article 78 of Greece Constitution may be instructive here: 
1. No Tax shall be levied without a statute enacted by Parliament, 
specifying the subject of taxation and the income, the type of 
property, the expenses and the transactions or categories thereof to 
which the tax pertains; 
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The current Constitution of Ethiopia does not explicitly require that 
taxation must have a firm basis in law passed by the Parliament, but this can 
be derived from a provision of the Constitution that grants the Federal 
Parliament the power to impose taxes and duties on sources reserved to the 
Federal Government.40 In addition, the Federal Government has issued a 
public financial administration law, which appears to recognize the 
principle of tax legality as requiring that any tax must have a firm basis in 
law.41 Although this law does not have constitutional status, it shows at least 
that the principle of tax legality in its minimum requirement is recognized in 
Ethiopia.  
Beyond this, the recognition of the principle of tax legality in matters of 
delegation of taxation powers, retroactive application of taxation powers, 
and other matters is unclear. The current Constitution of Ethiopia contains 
no provision that might even remotely constrain the Ethiopian parliament 
from delegating the essential elements of taxation powers to the executive 
branches. The question is whether, in the face of the silence of the 
Constitution, the Ethiopian parliament can delegate wholesale taxation 
powers to the executive branches, and if, in particular, the Ethiopian 
parliament can give full powers to the Council of Ministers or the Ministry 
of Finance or for that matter the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority 
(ERCA) to define by regulations or directives the tax base, the tax rates and 
the taxpayers? A recent amendment to the income tax law of Ethiopia came 
close to doing just that. After broadly defining “windfall profits,” the 
income tax amendment law delegated to the Ministry of Finance broad 
powers to define “windfall profits” and to determine the tax rates through 
2.  A tax or any other financial charge may not be imposed by a 
retroactive statute effective prior to the fiscal year preceding the 
imposition of the tax; 
3. Exceptionally, in the case of imposition or increase of an import 
or export duty or a consumer tax, collection thereof shall be 
permitted as of the date on which the Bill shall be tabled in 
Parliament, on condition that the statute shall be published within the 
time-limit specified in article 42 paragraph 1, and in any case not 
later than ten days from the end of the Parliamentary session; 
4. The object of taxation, the tax rate, the tax abatements and 
exemptions and the granting of pensions may not be subject to 
legislative delegation; Theodore Fortsakis, supra note 37, at 328-29. 
Non-retroactivity is treated by some writers as a separate limitation on taxation powers. See
THURONYI, supra note 33, at 76-81. 
 40. The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia of 1995, Article 
55(1), Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 1. 
 41. See The Federal Government of Ethiopia Financial Administration Proclamation.
Article 10(1), Proclamation No. 648, Negarit Gazeta, Year 15, No. 56 (stating that “no public 
money shall be collected except when authorized by law”).  
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directives.42 This law clearly devolves broad discretionary powers of 
taxation upon an executive branch of government. 
However this type of delegation is viewed in the future (if at all such an 
issue is taken to the House of the Federation—the body with the power to 
handle issues of constitutional interpretation in Ethiopia), the constitutional 
constraints upon the delegatory powers of the Ethiopian parliament appear 
to be weak at best. We may infer this from the practice of tax power 
delegation—which, although not conclusive, does suggest that delegation of 
taxing powers is not frowned upon as in some other systems.  
The Ethiopian parliament makes extensive use of delegation—if the tax 
laws are anything to go by. One of the powers that the Parliament routinely 
delegates to the executive branches is the power to exempt taxpayers—
sometimes with a proviso and at other times without any strings attached. 
Tax exemption powers are liberally delegated to the executive branches. We 
can cite many examples of liberal delegation of exemption powers in the 
Income Tax law of Ethiopia, which has a provision that, for example, 
empowers the Council Ministers to exempt income for “economic, 
administrative or social reasons.”43 We can also cite examples from the 
Ethiopian Value Added Tax law, which authorizes the Ministry of Finance 
to exempt supplies from VAT without having to seek the approval of the 
Parliament.44
It is not just exemption powers that are liberally delegated to the 
executive branches. The Ethiopian Parliament makes extensive use of 
delegations that tend to create new or increase obligations of taxpayers. 
These types of delegations are not couched in as clear a language as the 
powers of exemption, but the consequence is all the same—these 
delegations empower the executive to define the obligations of taxpayers (in 
effect create new obligations). An example of this form of delegation is 
found in the VAT Proclamation of 2002. The Proclamation empowers the 
 42. See Proclamation No. 693, Negarit Gazeta, Year 17, No. 3 (Eth.) [hereinafter 
Income Tax Proclamation No. 693]. The relevant provision of the amendment Proclamation 
empowers the Minister (of Finance) to prescribe (by directives) the amount of income to be 
considered as windfall profit, the businesses that are subject to tax on windfall profits, the 
date on which the tax will become effective, and the manner in which the tax is to be 
assessed and the factors to be taken into account for assessment. See id. art. 2(2), 2(3).  
 43. Income Tax Proclamation of Ethiopia of 2002, Article 13(e), Proclamation No. 
286, Negarit Gazeta, Year 8, No. 34 [hereinafter Income Tax Proclamation No. 286]. The 
Council of Ministers has used this power to exempt some types of employment income from 
tax. Id.; See Council of Ministers Income Tax Regulations of 2002, Article 78, Proclamation 
No. 78, Negarit Gazeta, Year 8, No. 37 (Eth.).  
 44. VAT Proclamation, supra note 24, art. 8(4). The Ministry has used this power to 
exempt certain transactions from VAT. Consider, for example, the exemptions for supplies 
of medical supplies, bread and milk and fertilizers. Tax Synopsis, MINISTRY OF FIN. & ECON.
DEV., http://www.mofed.gov.et/English/Information/Pages/TaxSynopsis.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2011).  
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Ministry of Finance to increase or reduce VAT registration threshold,45
which may not, at first sight, appear to increase the tax obligations of 
taxpayers, but whenever the Ministry moves to redefine the administrative 
reach of the VAT (by reducing the threshold), the consequence is bringing 
within the VAT network more and more registrants—in effect increasing 
their tax obligations or at least their tax burdens in the process.46
The most recent example of a liberal delegation (perhaps too liberal for 
comfort) is to be found in a recent amendment to the Income Tax 
Proclamation of 2002.47 The amendment has introduced a “new” source of 
taxable income into the income tax regime of Ethiopia—windfall profits. 
After broadly defining “windfall profits” as “any profit obtained by any 
person as a result of a change occurred (sic) in local or international 
economic or political situations without its efforts,”48 the amendment 
Proclamation confers extensive powers upon the Ministry of Finance to 
determine from time to time the sources of income which are to be subject 
to the windfall profits tax and the tax rates.49 The Ministry has issued a 
directive shortly after the issuance of the Proclamation targeting “windfall 
profits” derived by banks from devaluation of Ethiopian currency—the 
Birr.50 An interesting feature of the directive is that it purports to apply the 
tax upon “windfall profits” derived by banks before the Proclamation and 
the Directive were issued (both the Proclamation and the Directive were 
issued in November 2010, but the taxes were to be applicable upon profits 
allegedly obtained by banks from foreign exchange holding back in 
September 2010, when the Ethiopian Government devalued Birr by almost 
20%).51 The directive is not only an evidence of broad exercise of executive 
powers but also of retroactivity.  
To sum up, the liberal use of delegation of taxing powers to the 
executive does seem to indicate that the principle of tax legality is not 
 45. See VAT Proclamation, supra note 24, art. 16(2).  
 46. See Value Added Tax Proclamation, Article 64, Proclamation No. 285, Negarit 
Gazeta, Year 8, No. 33 (Eth.); See also Income Tax Proclamation. Article 117, Proclamation 
No. 286, Negarit Gazeta, Year 8, No. 34 (Eth.) (citing another example of a delegation which 
empowers the executive branch to increase tax obligations for the “proper implementation” 
of the respective proclamations). The Council of Ministers has used these provisions to issue 
a regulation for the obligatory use of cash register machines; the Council has also used this 
power to delegate its delegated power to the Ministry of Revenues and the latter has issued 
directives defining the obligations of various parties in the use of the sales register machines. 
See Council of Ministers Regulation to Provide for the Obligatory Use of Sales Register 
Machines of 2003. Regulation No. 139, Year 13, No. 4 (Eth.); Ministry of Revenues of 2007, 
Directive No. 46 (Eth.) (Directive to Provide for the Use of Sales Register Machines, 
unpublished). 
 47. See Income Tax Proclamation No. 693, supra note 42. 
 48. Id. art. 2(1).  
 49. Id. art. 2(2). 
 50. See Directive No. 29/2003, A Directive to Impose Tax on Windfall Profits of 
Banks, MINISTRY OF FIN. & ECON. DEV. (Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished).  
 51. Id. art. 5. 
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recognized in Ethiopia. However, simply because tax delegations are 
liberally employed does not mean that the practice is right. Unfortunately, 
there are no formal channels for challenging delegations of taxing powers, 
and even if there are, there has never been this tradition of challenging 
discretionary administrative actions in courts or other tribunals,52 and as a 
result, the practice of delegation has never been subjected to scrutiny by 
courts or other tribunals.
2. The Principles of Fidelity to Sources of Taxes and Procedural 
Fairness 
Unlike the principle of tax legality, the principles of fidelity to sources of 
taxes and procedural fairness are recognized in the Ethiopian Constitution—
in Article 100(1). Article 100 (1) is perhaps the most inscrutable of all the 
limitations we find in the Ethiopian Constitution. It is so inscrutable that 
even finding a proper title for it has been a challenge. It states that both 
Federal and State Governments “shall ensure that any tax is related to the 
source of revenue taxed and that it is determined following proper 
considerations.” We notice from the language of Article 100 (1) that it is a 
composite of two related limitations: one on the relationship between the tax 
and the source of revenue taxed and the other is a variant of due process 
required in the levying of taxes.  
The first requirement in Article 100(1) is that the taxes the Federal 
Government or the Regional States impose be related to the “source of 
revenue” taxed. The phrase “source of revenue” may be construed as the 
sources of revenue assigned to the two layers of the Ethiopian federation. 
We have already seen how the Ethiopian Constitution assigns taxes between 
the Federal Government and the Regional States (see above). Some 
“sources of revenue” are designated as “federal exclusive” (Article 96), 
some as “state exclusive” (Article 97), some as “concurrent” (Article 98), 
and there are some that are yet to be designated by the Joint Houses (Article 
99). We may say Article 96 taxes are sources of revenue for the Federal 
Government, Article 97 taxes are sources of revenue for the Regional 
States, and Article 98 taxes are sources of revenue for both layers. Article 
100 (1) appears to be saying that the two layers ensure the taxes they 
impose in practice be faithful to the sources designated as theirs in Articles 
96, 97 and 98 of the Constitution.  
This begs some inconvenient questions: can either of the two layers of 
the Ethiopian federation levy and collect taxes, which are related to, but not 
 52. Taxpayers may, of course, challenge the constitutionality of delegations 
whenever the Tax Administration or the executive in general are suspected of violating some 
provisions of the Constitution. So far, no such challenges have been known to have been 
mounted by taxpayers. The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia of 
1995, Articles 95-99, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 1; See also Ibrahim Idris, Constitutional 
Adjudication Under the 1994 FDRE Constitution, 1 ETH. L. REV. 67-75 (2002). 
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expressed in, Articles 96-98 of the Constitution? Can the Federal 
Government, for example, impose payroll taxes on “Federal Government 
employees” and justify that as a federal tax because the payroll taxes are 
imposed on employees of the Federal Government? Can the Regional States 
impose “education taxes” or “health taxes” on farmers and cooperative 
societies as in the old times when these taxes were tied to agricultural land 
and income? Are these related enough to Articles 96 and 97 of the Ethiopian 
Constitution? If they are deemed related, how do we distinguish “related” 
taxes from “undesignated” taxes? 
The lines between “related” taxes and “undesignated” taxes are not well-
defined in the Ethiopian Constitution. Nonetheless, both the Federal 
Government and Regional States have in practice continued to levy and 
collect taxes that are not expressly stated in the Constitution as theirs. The 
Regional States, for example, have authorized the levying and collection of 
municipal/property taxes although these taxes are not expressly mentioned 
in the Constitution as regional government taxes.53 The Federal Government 
has, on its part, introduced a sur-tax on imports—which is probably the 
most perfect example of a tax related to the sources of revenue assigned to 
the Federal Government.54 The Constitution does not make direct reference 
to sur-tax on imports, but since the Federal Government has exclusive 
jurisdiction over taxes on imports and exports, the Federal Government may 
have been justified in introducing sur-tax on imports without having to go to 
the Joint Houses for designation.55
So far these practices have gone uncontested because both levels of 
governments tend to tolerate one another in the levying and collection of 
certain taxes. The Federal Government has not challenged the levying and 
collection of municipal taxes, nor have the Regional States really challenged 
the Federal Government over the levying and collection of some taxes 
which are not designated by the Constitution.  
The absence of contest from either side does not show that the tension 
between “related” taxes and “undesignated” taxes is a chimera. The tensions 
may come to the surface when opposing political forces control Federal 
Government and regional government bodies.56 There is nothing in the 
 53. See Addis Abba City Government Revised Charter, Article 52(6), Proclamation 
No. 361/2003), Negarit Gazeta, Year 9, No. 86 (Eth.). 
 54. See Import Sur-Tax Council of Ministers Regulations of 2007, Proclamation No. 
133, Negarit Gazeta, Year 13, No. 23 (Eth.).  
 55. The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia of 1995,
Articles 95-99, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 1 (the introduction of sur-tax on imports is 
consistent with the power of the Federal Government to “levy and collect customs duties, 
taxes and other charges on imports and exports”; although sur-taxes are not mentioned, they 
are related to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government over international trade 
taxes).  
 56. At the moment, the ruling party (the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front—EPRDF) controls all the reins of power in both the Federal Government 
and Regional States either through its constituent parties or through its affiliates.  
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Constitution that prevents either the Federal Government or the Regional 
States from triggering the “undesignated” button in Article 99—which is 
simply referring controversial taxes to the arbitration of the Joint Houses.  
In any event, Article 100 (1) should be construed so strictly as to permit 
both layers of governments to levy only taxes that are so related to the taxes 
expressly stated in the Constitution that there might not be a need to refer 
the matter to the verdict of the Joint Houses. Article 99 of the Ethiopian 
Constitution has already stated that taxes which are undesignated by 
Articles 96-98 are to be determined by the Joint Houses. There is a reason 
why the Ethiopian Constitution has departed from its approach in the area of 
expenditure assignment, which is based on the principle of residuality. The 
Constitution is very particular about the assignment of taxes in Articles 96-
98. The Constitution is also very particular about the fate of “undesignated” 
taxes in Article 99. It appears that neither the Federal Government nor the 
Regional States are willing to cede powers over “undesignated” taxes. In 
cases of doubt, all undesignated taxes, including those that are “related” to 
the sources of revenue assigned in Articles 96-98, should be referred for 
arbitration of the Joint Houses and be designated properly. Otherwise, the 
potential for abuse of “related tax” powers is innumerable.57 The 
Constitution that has gone to great lengths to specify the taxation powers of 
both layers of government cannot be read as to condone the liberal use of 
“related” tax powers.  
As for the second limitation in Article 100(1), we shall have recourse to 
constitutional limitations elsewhere in search of clues as to what the 
limitation might mean. One limitation we find in some constitutions is the 
“principle of equality,’” which may be taken to have two meanings: 
procedural and substantive.58 In its procedural context, the principle of 
equality may require the law (in this case, tax law) to “be applied 
completely and impartially, regardless of the status of the person 
involved.”59 Substantively, the principle has been understood in some 
countries to require equal treatment of “persons in equal circumstances.”60
The obvious prohibition in this regard is the differential taxation of persons 
on grounds of ethnicity, religion, gender or political affiliation.61 In France, 
for example, the principle of equality has been construed to prohibit the 
 57. Unless one of the two layers complains about the levying of ‘related taxes’ or 
unless taxpayers challenge the levying of ‘related taxes,’ there is a possibility that the Federal 
Government or the Regional States may establish their right to impose these taxes, as it were, 
by tradition—despite what Article 99 of the Constitution states. 
 58. See Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 19; see also THURONYI, supra note 33, at 82-
92.  
 59. Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 19. In some countries, equality is understood in 
its procedural aspect only, requiring merely that governments apply the law as written 
although the law itself may discriminate among different categories of taxpayers. See David 
Elkins, Horizontal Equity as Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 63 (2006). 
 60. See Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 19.  
 61. Id.
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denial of procedural rights to some citizens but not to others,62 while in 
Germany, the Constitutional Court interpreted it as calling for equal taxation 
of similarly situated persons and held that de facto unequal taxation of 
interest income was unconstitutional.63
Another principle of tax limitation, which might throw some light on the 
meaning of Article 100(1) of the Ethiopian Constitution, is the principle of 
fair play or public trust in tax administration.64 The principle addresses the 
rights of taxpayers during tax administration. The principle has been held to 
require tax administration to notify a taxpayer of any action it may take 
relating to the taxpayer and to afford a taxpayer all the rights of process.65
The principle has also been held in some countries to mean that taxpayers 
“can rely on the statements of tax administration” provided that taxpayers 
have given the tax administration “a full and fair representation of the 
facts.”66 Still another limitation might be of some relevance—the principle 
of proportionality, which has been used by western European courts to 
require proportional relationship between the goals to be attained and the 
means used by the legislator.67 This principle is said to have prohibited 
excessive taxes, which may incidentally be proscribed by constitutional 
guarantees of private property and the freedom of commerce and industry.68
In the end, we cast about so many constitutional limitations in other tax 
systems in the hopes of approximating the meaning of Article 100(1) of the 
Ethiopian Constitution. We can only speculate as to the meaning of the two 
limitations in Article 100(1) until a dispute arises and somehow those 
charged with the interpretation of the Constitution (the HoF in Ethiopia) 
explain for us what it means. The best clue to the meaning of these 
limitations is to be found in actual cases, of which there are none at the 
moment.  
3. Intergovernmental Immunity 
It is quite common for federal structures and constitutions to impose the 
limitation of “intergovernmental immunity.” We shall take the development 
of intergovernmental immunity in the United States to highlight the issues 
surrounding the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. In the U.S., the 
limitation of intergovernmental immunity grew out of a series of cases in 
which the Supreme Court defined and redefined the limits of 
 62. See id. at 20. 
 63. Id.
 64. See id. at 21-22. 
 65. Id. at 21. 
 66. See Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 21. 
 67. Id. at 22- 23. 
 68. Id. at 23. 
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intergovernmental immunity.69 At first the doctrine of intergovernmental 
immunity was used by the U.S. Supreme Court to prohibit the Federal 
Government from imposing taxes on income derived from state bonds, 
extending the immunity even to those who made contracts with the states.70
The limitation worked both ways. In other words, it served as a limitation 
on states to impose taxes on those who made contracts with the Federal 
Government. This limitation was gradually relaxed in later cases. The extent 
of intergovernmental immunity has been relaxed in later cases. Under the 
modern doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, the states can impose 
taxes on private persons who do business with the Federal Government and 
the Federal Government can do the same, even though the financial burden 
of the tax falls indirectly upon the states or the Federal Government. As 
long as the tax does not discriminate against those who do business with 
either the Federal Government or the states, the tax will stand constitutional 
scrutiny.71 What does not withstand constitutional scrutiny is a tax that 
imposes a direct burden upon either the Federal Government or the states.72
The Ethiopian Constitution is fairly explicit about intergovernmental 
immunity. In Article 100(3), it states that neither the Federal Government 
nor the Regional States can impose taxes on each other’s property, unless 
the property is a profit-making enterprise. However, it can be argued that 
the modality of revenue assignment in the Ethiopian Constitution already 
precludes the possibility of most cases of intergovernmental taxation in 
Ethiopia. As we saw above, the Constitution divides tax powers between the 
Federal Government and the Regional States on the basis of set formulas 
that assign taxes based on their association with either of the levels of the 
Ethiopian Federation. Although the Ethiopian Constitution excepts profit-
making federal or state government enterprises from “intergovernmental 
immunity,” it is unlikely these enterprises will become the subject of 
taxation, as the Federal Government has been assigned the power to levy 
and collect most taxes on enterprises it owns as Regional States are assigned 
the power to levy and collect taxes on the profit-making enterprises they 
own. Currently, the value added tax (which is a federal tax) is levied upon 
private contractors that have supply or service contracts with Regional 
States, which means that Regional States pay the VAT to the Federal 
Government. It is not clear if Regional States may challenge this and similar 
other taxes on grounds of “intergovernmental immunity.” So far, none of 
the Regional States have raised challenges.  
 69. FEDERAL TAX COURSE 118 (Chicago, CCH Ed. Staff ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
FEDERAL TAX COURSE]; See also Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 290 (1977). 
 70. See Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), quoted in
FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69, at 119. 
 71. FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69, at 118-19. 
 72. Id. at 119. 
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4. Principle of Non-Discrimination 
Another limitation closely associated with federal structures is the 
prohibition of discrimination in taxation. Unlike “intergovernmental 
immunity,” the principle of non-discrimination (or against discrimination) is 
mostly invoked against the constituent states of a federation. When states in 
a federal system are entrusted with the power of taxation, a distinct threat of 
discrimination arises particularly against out of state residents, businesses or 
goods. In the U.S., the principle of “non-discrimination” is developed 
through judicial review to curtail the power of states from discriminating 
against out of state residents, businesses, or goods.73 Taxpayers challenged 
and succeeded in getting state taxes struck down on the ground that these 
taxes are discriminatory. In Toomer v. Witsell,74 the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down one licensing fee on non-resident shrimp boat owners imposed 
at a rate a hundred times greater than residents. In Lunding v. New York Tax 
Appeals Tribunal,75 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New York law 
that prevented non-residents from deducting alimony payments. In Davis v. 
Michigan Department of Treasury,76 the state of Michigan granted blanket 
exemption from state taxation of all retirement benefits paid by Michigan or 
its political subdivisions while keeping in place taxation of retirement 
benefits paid by all other employers, including the Federal Government. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the exemption by the state of Michigan 
was discriminatory and failed constitutional scrutiny.77
The U.S. Supreme Court has also used the so-called “dormant commerce 
clause” doctrine to limit the powers of states in this regard.78 The doctrine 
has been held to prohibit state discrimination of interstate commerce as well 
as undue burdens on commerce.79 In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax 
Commission,80 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state that 
provides a direct commercial advantage to local business is imposing a tax 
that discriminates against interstate commerce.  
The principle of non-discrimination, which in the U.S. is developed 
through judicial review, is explicitly recognized in the Australian 
 73. See Dam, supra note 69, at 282-87. 
 74. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), cited in Kaye & Mazza, supra note 27, 
at 511. 
 75. Lunding v. New York Tax App. Trib., 522 U.S. 287 (1998), cited in Kaye & 
Mazza, supra note 27, at 511.  
 76. 89-2, USTC ¶ 9456, cited in FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69, at 119 n.33. 
 77. See FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69, at 119. 
 78. Kaye & Mazza, supra note 27, at 511-12. See also Dam, supra note 69, at 282-
83. 
 79. Kaye & Mazza, supra note 27, at 512. 
 80. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) quoted in
Kaye & Mazza, supra note 27, at 513.  
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Constitution.81 The Australian court has used the Constitution to strike down 
exemptions that were available to in-state residents on discriminatory 
bases.82 The Ethiopian Constitution does not contain a non-discrimination 
clause specifically for taxes. There is a general equality clause in Article 25 
of the Constitution, and there is a provision that gives to the Federal 
Government the power to regulate interstate commerce.83 It is not clear if 
these provisions in the Ethiopian Constitution may be used to constrain the 
power of the states from discriminating against out of state residents, 
businesses, or goods. Once again, there are as yet no cases in which any of 
the regional state taxes have been struck down on grounds of discriminatory 
treatment of out-of-state citizens or businesses. 
5. Adverse Impact and Benefit Principles 
At the outset, it must be stated that these two limitations are not related 
except for the fact that the Ethiopian Constitution (for some curious 
reasons) treats the two in one sub-article. Article 100(2) of the Ethiopian 
Constitution states two limitations on tax powers, but, given the ambiguity 
of the limitations involved, it is difficult to say that these are indeed 
limitations. The first limitation is the “adverse impact” limitation. The 
Constitution enjoins the Federal Government and the Regional States from 
exercising their tax powers in ways that would adversely impact the tax 
powers of the other. The opportunities for adverse impact are too numerous 
to count here. Let’s take some examples if only to raise questions.  
The Federal Government has issued investment incentive laws that have 
an impact on the capacity of the Regional States to raise revenues from 
sources assigned to them by the Constitution.84 The ostensible rationale of 
these investment laws is the attraction of investment—both foreign and 
domestic.85 The principal instrument for attraction of investments in this 
country has been the use of tax incentives in various forms. For example, 
investments in agro-processing and manufacturing industries at the moment 
enjoy a five-year tax holiday which may be extended under certain 
 81. Miranda Stewart & Kristen Walker, Australian National Report, 15 MICH. ST. J.
INT’L L. 193, 238 (2007) (discussing section 117 of the Australian Constitution). 
 82. Id. (quoting Commission of Taxes v. Parks, (1933) St R Qd 306). 
 83. The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia of 1995,
Articles 95-99, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 1. 
 84. See Investment of Ethiopia of 2002, Proclamation No. 280, Negarit Gazeta, Year 
8, No. 27; Investment Amendment of Ethiopia of 2003, Proclamation No. 373, Negarit 
Gazeta, Year 10, No. 8; Council of Ministers Regulations on Investment Incentives and 
Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors of 2003, Proclamation No. 84, Negarit 
Gazeta, Year 9, No. 34 (Eth.). 
 85. See Investment of Ethiopia of 2002, Proclamation No. 280, supra note 84, pmbl. 
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circumstances.86 Should the Regional States be constrained by the federal 
investment laws and restrain themselves from taxation of investors who 
enjoy a tax holiday under the federal investment laws? If we look at the 
issue from the vantage point of the Federal Government, we may argue that 
the Regional States are constrained by the federal investment policy from 
levying taxes on investors who are exempted from tax by the Federal 
Government. But we may also look at the issue from the vantage point of 
the Regional States. The investment laws (no matter how well-intentioned 
they may be) have an adverse impact on the capacity of the Regional States 
to raise revenues from sources assigned to them by the Constitution. 
Shouldn’t the Federal Government exercise equal restraint when it comes to 
the legitimate revenue interests of the Regional States? There are many 
contentious issues like these that require resolution through practical cases –
of which we can adduce none at this point.  
The second prong of Article 100(2) appears to make “benefits received” 
by members of the public as a basis for levying of taxes by both the Federal 
Government and the Regional States. The “benefit principle” is a well-
known and established principle in the literature of taxation, although the 
constitutional recognition of it is of doubtful value. It is a principle that is 
more often invoked for sentimental and rhetorical reasons in tax literature 
than for explaining the practice of taxation.87 It may have limited application 
in the area of fees and a few other taxes but that is just about it. It is 
extremely difficult for taxpayers to challenge a tax on the ground that they 
receive no benefits, and it is equally difficult for the government to establish 
correspondence between what it collects from taxes and the public services 
it provides to taxpayers. The apparent incorporation of the “benefits 
principle” in the Ethiopian Constitution is one of the reasons why we should 
cast doubts about the binding force of constitutional limitations upon the 
powers of taxation in Ethiopia.  
C. The Federal Tax Administration 
For a long period of time, tax administration in Ethiopia was an 
appendage of ministries that did not have administrative specialization over 
the assessment and collection of taxes—the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
before the Italian occupation (1936) and the Ministry of Finance after the 
 86. Council of Ministers Regulations on Investment Incentives and Investment Areas 
Reserved for Domestic Investors of 2003, Article 4, Proclamation No. 84, Negarit Gazeta, 
Year 9, No. 34 (Eth.). 
 87. See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees and Assessments, Dues and the “Get What You 
Pay for” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA L. REV. 373 (2004); Joseph M. Dodge, 
Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership and Ability-to-Pay 
Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399 (2005); See also Due & Friedlaender, supra note 22.  
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Italian occupation (1941).88 Administrative units or departments within 
these Ministries were charged with tax administration. The preferred mode 
of organization was the organization of administrative units around the 
types of taxes rather than the functions of tax administration.89
One mode of organization that prevailed for a long time was an 
organization of tax administration units or departments for assessment and 
collection of taxes on international trade (customs duties, sales and excise 
taxes on imports and exports) and another one for domestic (internal) taxes 
or revenues (income taxes, sales and excise taxes, stamp duties on domestic 
transactions). The administrative units for assessment and collection of 
international trade taxes were organized under the “customs departments” or 
“customs authorities” while those for the administration of domestic taxes 
were organized under “inland revenue departments” or “inland revenue 
authorities.” There were also times when specific taxes had their own tax 
administration units or departments within the Ministries (e.g., income tax 
departments, excise tax departments). The separation of tax administration 
for domestic and international transactions had the effect of parallel tax 
administrations for those taxes that were levied on both domestic and 
international transactions. For example, customs departments or 
administrations assessed and collected sales taxes on imports and Inland 
Revenue Departments assessed and collected sales taxes on domestic 
transactions.90
With the establishment of the Federal Government Revenue Board in 
1995, Ethiopian Tax Administration was for the first time organized as a 
separate and autonomous government body. 91 The Board was established to 
 88. Tax administration was the domain of the Ministry of Commerce and Customs 
(established in 1907) before the Italian occupation. See Bahru Zewde, Economic Origins of 
the Absolutist State in Ethiopia, in SOCIETY, STATE AND HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS 113
(Addis Ababa University Press 2008). See also Mahteme Sillassie Wolde Meskel, Zikra 
Nagar, 2d Issue (in Amharic), 1962 E.C., pp. 171-174; Abebe Hunachew, About the 
Ethiopian Customs Authority, 3 GEBI LELIMAT, at 37 (2007); The Ministers (Definition of 
Powers) Amendment No. 2 of 1966, Article 29, Order No. 46 (Eth.) (repealed). One of the 
powers of the Ministry of Finance was the power to “ensure that tax laws are properly 
enforced and that all revenues due from taxes, customs and excise duties, fees and monopoly 
dues and other sources are properly assessed, collected and accounted for.” Ministers 
(Definition of Powers) of 1943, Article 29(d), Order (Eth.) (repealed); See also Proclamation 
No. 145 of 1955 (Eth.) (repealed); Income Tax Proclamation No. 173 of 1961, Article 20 
(Eth.) (repealed). 
 89. See Melkamu Belachew, Powers and Functions of the Federal Inland Revenue 
Authority (FIRA) and the Position of the Tax Appeal Commission (2003) (unpublished 
senior thesis, Addis Ababa University) (on file with the Faculty of Law Library Archives).  
 90. See Income Tax Proclamation of Ethiopia of 1961, Article 20, Proclamation No. 
173, Negarit Gazeta, Year 20, No. 13 (Eth.) (repealed) [hereinafter Income Tax Proclamation 
No. 173]; Alcohol Excise Tax of 1965, Articles 31-35, Proclamation No. 217 (Eth.) 
(repealed); Proclamation to Consolidate and Amend the Law Relating to the Customs of 
1955, Article 5, Proclamation No. 145 (Eth.) (repealed). 
 91. The Federal Government Revenues Board was established as an autonomous 
organ of the Federal Government with accountability to the Council of Ministers at the time. 
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oversee and coordinate the operations of three federal revenue agencies at 
the time: the Inland Revenue Authority, the Ethiopian Customs Authority, 
and the National Lottery Administration.92 A reorganization of Ethiopian 
tax administration in 2001 elevated tax administration to a ministerial level, 
creating the Ministry of Revenues (MoR). Like its predecessor, the Federal 
Government Revenue Board, the Ministry of Revenues was established to 
coordinate and supervise the three revenue agencies of the Federal 
Government, namely, the Federal Inland Revenue Authority (FIRA), the 
Ethiopian Customs Authority (ECuA), and the National Lottery.93
The most recent reorganization and restructuring of tax administration—
which occurred in 2008—merged the three revenue agencies of the Federal 
Government into one authority—the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs 
Authority (ERCA).94 This reorganization of Federal Tax Administration has 
relegated the task of tax administration from ministerial level to an authority 
but in substance, the reorganization has in fact strengthened the powers of 
the Tax Authority.95 Recent tax administration reforms have introduced a 
number of changes to Ethiopian tax administration, only some of which are 
mentioned here under for their instructive value.  
For the first time, the tax authority (ERCA) has assumed the powers to 
investigate and prosecute tax and customs offenses directly without having 
to rely upon the goodwill of the regular police and prosecution offices as 
was previously the case. Under the reforms of 2008, most of the 
investigation and the prosecution work are to be handled within the tax 
authority.96 The elevation of the tax authority to that of “prosecutor and 
investigator” of tax and customs crimes relegates the regular police and 
prosecution offices to mere supporting acts like the apprehension of 
suspects, production of witnesses, seizure and control of contraband, and the 
See Federal Government Revenues Board Establishment of 2005, Article 2(1)-(2), 
Proclamation No. 5, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 5 (Eth.), available at
http://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/proc-no-5-1995-federal-government-revenues-
board-establishment.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 92. Federal Government Revenues Board Establishment Proclamation, supra note
91, art. 4(2). 
 93. See Reorganization of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia of 2001, Proclamation No. 256, Negarit Gazeta, Year 8, No. 2 (repealed and 
replaced by Proclamation No. 471/2005). 
 94. See Council of Ministers National Lottery Administration Re-establishment of 
2009, Regulation No. 160, Negarit Gazeta, Year 15, No. 21 (Eth.) (the National Lottery 
retained some autonomy even after the merger under the supervision of the ERCA). 
 95. ERCA is organized as an authority with direct accountability to the Prime 
Minister. It is headed by a Director General and Deputy Director Generals appointed by the 
Prime Minister. Under them, the Authority has prosecutors and administrative employees. 
Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority (ERCA) Establishment of 2008, Article 9, 
Proclamation No. 587, Negarit Gazeta, Year 14, No. 44.  
 96. Id. art. 16. 
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accompanying of customs transit goods and vehicles.97 The technical 
matters of tax and customs crime investigation and prosecution are now the 
exclusive preserve of tax administration.  
The other significant reform of recent times is the decision to create 
special personnel administration rules and procedures for employees of 
ERCA. Shortly after the major reorganization of Ethiopian tax 
administration, special personnel administration regulations were issued in 
2008 governing employees of ERCA, who until then had been governed by 
the Federal Civil Service Laws. The “Special Personnel Administration 
Regulations” of 2008 is a sui generis legislation governing most issues 
pertaining to the employment relationships of the personnel of ERCA. The 
Regulations have special rules for the personnel of ERCA governing 
classification, salary, allowances, recruitment, promotion, internal transfer, 
re-deployment, training, performance evaluation, incentives, and benefits.98
The Regulations have special rules even for working hours (the maximum 
weekly working hours is 43, not 48), annual leave, and special leaves.99
Some of the special rules and procedures of the “Special Personnel” 
Regulations are bound to become controversial for they depart from and at 
times conflict with the general rules of civil service regulations in Federal 
Civil Service laws. In the section on “Duties, Ethics and Disciplinary 
Measures,” for example, the Regulations introduce several novel 
requirements and procedures, which are not contemplated in the Federal 
Civil Service Laws.100 The Regulations are one of the first to require 
prospective and existing employees of ERCA to submit property held in 
their names or in the name of their spouses or minor children for 
registration, no doubt to combat corruption.101 The Regulations contain a 
long list of offenses which entail rigorous penalties, once again intended to 
combat corruption.102 The new rules might have been well-intentioned 
(driven, probably, by the desire to stamp out corruption), but they are bound 
to raise concerns largely because of the possible conflicts between the 
special Regulations and the existing Federal Civil Service Laws.
The new Regulations confer sweeping powers upon the Director (of 
ERCA) to dismiss any employee upon mere suspicion of corruption.103 The 
decision of the Director is final in this regard, taking away the rights 
 97. Id. See also Customs Proclamation of 2009, Articles 18(2), 86, Proclamation No. 
622, Negarit Gazeta, Year 15, No. 27 (Eth.). 
 98. Administration of Employees of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority 
Council of Ministers Regulation of 2008, Articles 4-10, 15-18, Proclamation No. 155, 
Negarit Gazeta, Year 14, No. 49 (Eth.). 
 99. Id. arts. 20-23.  
 100. Id. part 7.  
 101. Id. art. 26. 
 102. These include accepting or seeking any kind of benefit from customers, 
divulging confidential information, and obstructing the proper course of service delivery. Id.
art. 31. 
 103. Id. art. 37(2). 
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employees of the Authority used to have under the Federal Civil Service 
laws of Ethiopia.104 A former employee of the Authority who was dismissed 
under the new Regulations challenged this power of the Director before the 
Federal Civil Service Agency Administrative Tribunal.105 The 
Administrative Tribunal believed that this case raised an issue of 
constitutional interpretation and referred the case to the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry. The Council did not see anything unusual about the 
denial of judicial review to employees of ERCA and ruled that the matter 
did not raise constitutional interpretation.106 This decision of the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry strengthens the now powerful arm of ERCA in tax 
administration. The establishment laws, the personnel regulations as well as 
decisions reached over their legality signal the ever increasing powers of 
ERCA in all aspects of tax administration. It is quite evident that ERCA has 
assumed hitherto unheard of powers of prosecution and investigation of tax 
and customs offenses as well as regulation of its employees, perhaps 
untroubled by the country’s civil service laws in the latter case.  
Recent tax administration reforms have clearly concentrated the powers 
over tax administration in ERCA, but ERCA is by no means the sole player 
in tax administration. Other government bodies are involved in tax 
administration, albeit in a limited capacity. The Ministry of Finance may 
have ceased as a tax administration body since 1995, but it is still involved 
in some capacity in tax administration.107 The Ministry of Finance is a major 
player in the field of issuing tax exemptions and directives on the 
implementation of the principal tax laws. The Ministry receives applications 
for exemptions and grants tax exemptions on case-by-case basis. The 
Ministry is also involved in the formulation of the fiscal policy of the 
Federal Government, whose instruments happen to be taxes and duties, 
among others.108 Other governmental bodies, like the Federal Investment 
Agency, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ministry of Tourism and 
Culture, and the National Bank of Ethiopia, are also involved in tax 
administration in more limited capacity.109 The Ethiopian Investment Board 
 104. See Federal Civil Servants Proclamation of 2007, Article 74, Proclamation No. 
515, Negarit Gazeta, Year 13, No. 15 (Eth.). 
 105. Ato Ibrahim Mohammed v. Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority, Federal 
Administrative Tribunal, Appeal File No. 00852/2001, Yekatit 26, 2002 E.C. (in Amharic) 
(unpublished). 
 106. In the Matter of Federal Civil Service Agency Administrative Tribunal, Council 
of Constitutional Inquiry, File No. 101/12/2001, Yekatit 1, 2002 E.C. (in Amharic) 
(unpublished). 
 107. Income Tax Proclamation No. 286, supra note 43, art. 13(d)(iii); VAT 
Proclamation, supra note 24, art. 8(4).  
 108. See Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE 
Proclamation of 2005, Article 19(10), Proclamation No. 471, Negarit Gazeta, Year 12, No. 1 
(Eth.). 
 109. Council of Ministers Regulation on Investment Incentives and Investment Areas 
Reserved for Domestic Investors of 2003, Articles 4(4), 4(7), 9, 10(2), Proclamation No. 84, 
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(now Agency) is active in the area of tax incentives, where it has issued 
directives to define and determine the extent of tax incentives provided by 
the Investment laws of the country.110
The diffusion of tax administration in the hands of multiple government 
bodies may have been unavoidable but it has side effects. Sometimes 
conflicts of jurisdiction may arise between the different government bodies. 
Jurisdictional conflicts may, for example, arise between the regular 
prosecution offices or the Federal Anti-Corruption Commission on the one 
hand, and the prosecutors of ERCA on the other, over the characterization 
of certain offenses, which depending on who is looking at them, may be 
characterized either as corruption offenses or customs/tax offenses. The 
chances for conflicts of jurisdiction or lack of coordination have been 
considerably reduced as a result of recent reforms to merge the authorities 
that are directly involved in tax administration, but there are still many 
government bodies involved (at least indirectly) in tax administration, 
raising concerns of mis-coordination and conflicts of jurisdiction. 
II. PART II 
A. The Organization of Tax Laws in Ethiopia 
A logical organization of laws, particularly of tax laws, is critical for the 
proper comprehension of the tax system.111 Different legal systems organize 
their tax laws differently, ranging from those countries that organize their 
tax laws in codes to those that issue tax laws in scattered pieces of 
legislation. The organization of tax laws in different legal systems is one 
minor paradox in and of itself. The status of a country as a civil law country 
has not had any impact on codification of tax laws. A number of countries, 
such as Cameroon, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, France, Gabon, Kazakhstan, 
and the United States, have organized their tax laws in a code.112 While 
France has a tax code, many other civil law countries remain without tax 
Negarit Gazeta, Year 9, No. 34 (Eth.); Ministry of Mines and Energy, Directive to Determine 
the type and quantity of vehicles to be imported free of duty for mining projects, Sene 2001 
E.C.(in Amharic, unpublished); Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Directive to Determine 
conditions for Duty Free Importation of vehicles by tour operators and tour guides, Ginbot
2000 (in Amharic) (unpublished). 
 110. See Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic 
Investors of 2003, Article 4, Council of Ministers Regulations No. 84, Negarit Gazeta, Year 
9, No. 34 (Eth.), available at http://www.ecaa.gov.et/upload/laws/Investment%20Incentives 
%20and%20Investment%20Areas%20.pdf. 
 111. Victor Thuronyi, Drafting Tax Legislation, in 1 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING
79, supra note 30.  
 112. Id. at 80 n.29.  
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codes.113 The United States has a tax code although it is a common law 
country.114
Organization of tax laws in a code has many advantages. Judged purely 
in terms of accessibility and intelligibility, the organization of rules in a 
formal code with logically coherent arrangement of rules is without doubt 
the most preferred form of rule organization. By organizing all general areas 
of definitions and administrative provisions in a single section, codes help 
eliminate duplication of definitions and administrative provisions in 
individual pieces of legislation.115 Codes overcome the possible treatment of 
general definitions and administrative provisions in separate pieces of tax 
legislations and help avoid differing and at times conflicting 
interpretations.116
Codification of tax laws also helps to rationalize the organization of the 
whole tax system because in a code system one is forced to think of the 
whole, of the forest rather than just the trees. And more importantly, 
codification facilitates compliance by taxpayers because taxpayers know 
they have all the tax laws before them when they consult them.117 Finally, 
where laws are organized in a code, subsequent amendments can be 
automatically consolidated into it by adding sections or articles to it or 
repealing or replacing the language of the Code.118 This process of 
amendment—called “textual amendment”—is obviously desirable for it 
spares many a taxpayer from the uncertainty of what the law is.119
Organizing tax laws in a tax code is not always desirable, even if 
possible. Only rules of general application with the power to endure the test 
of time can be organized in codes, while ephemeral rules should be 
contained in specific tax laws that are more amenable to frequent revisions 
and amendments.120 Some countries that do not have tax codes have opted 
 113. Id. at 81. 
 114. As the U.S. experience attests, having a tax code is no guarantee to simplicity of 
taxation. See Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. 
Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 261-310 (2002); see also SANFORD M. GUERIN & PHILIP F.
POSTLEWAITE, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 885 (6th ed. 2002);
THURONYI, supra note 33, at 17-19. 
 115. Thuronyi, supra note 111, at 80.  
 116. Id.
 117. Id. at 81.  
 118. Id.
 119. Id. at 81-82. The organization of tax laws in a code would have received 
endorsement from Adam Smith who, in his famous treatise “the Wealth of Nations,” 
developed four maxims of a good tax system, one of which happens to be “certainty” of tax 
obligations. Adam Smith thought his maxim of certainty so important as to place it above all 
of the other maxims: “The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a 
matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I 
believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree 
of uncertainty.” ADAM SMITH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 778 (1937).  
 120. Thuronyi, supra note 111, at 81. 
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for the next best thing, i.e., consolidation, which by careful organization of 
the separate tax laws with cross-references, achieves virtually the same 
result as the tax codes.121 Another option, followed in some countries, is to 
consolidate and issue tax rules of general application (e.g., administrative 
provisions) in a “revenue” or “fiscal” law and flank these by an array of 
individual tax legislations.122
In the organization of its formal laws, Ethiopia is squarely in the camp of 
civil law countries. Since 1950s and 1960s, Ethiopia has organized most of 
its civil, commercial, and criminal laws and procedures in codes. However, 
many laws, most notably in the tax area, have remained outside the code 
system of organization. The country has not attempted to organize the tax 
laws since modern tax laws were introduced in the 1940s. The closest 
Ethiopia has come to organizing tax laws into a systematic body of laws is 
through the Consolidated Laws project, which was unfortunately terminated 
in 1975.123 Since then, partial attempts were made to organize some tax 
laws. Several pieces of tax legislations in the area of excise taxation were 
brought together in 1990124 and similar attempts were made for income 
taxes in the 2002 income tax reforms. Sadly, these attempts were soon 
forgotten and the situation went back since then to the old system of issuing 
piecemeal legislations whenever a need arises for revision of this or that tax 
law. 125
 121. Id.
 122. See, e.g., id. (citing Germany as an example of a country that has a general 
revenue or fiscal laws). 
 123. The Consolidated Laws of Ethiopia arranged legislations other than those in the 
codes of Ethiopia by subjects, one of which was taxes. All taxes in force at the time were 
consolidated by subject and any amendments to specific provisions were inserted after each 
provision (under consolidation note), and what is more, the Consolidated Laws even included 
some court decisions of the Ethiopian high courts and the Supreme Court (note of decision) 
so readers of the laws would immediately know any amendments made to specific provision 
and decisions reached on specific subject of tax law. But the Consolidated Laws of Ethiopia 
was not an official publication of the Government at the time. It was initiated by the Faculty 
of Law of Addis Ababa University in collaboration with the Office of the Prime Minister at 
the time. Although Consolidated Laws was not official, its utility in making tax legislations 
accessible was undeniable. The Consolidated Laws of Ethiopia was in part an attempt to 
systematically organize laws outside the codes of Ethiopia but the project was discontinued 
after 1975 and has since never been revived; the 1975 Supplement of the Consolidated Laws 
of Ethiopia appeared with a strange apology for consolidating laws of the feudal regime. It 
was evident that this project would not be viewed kindly by the new socialist regime. See
FACULTY OF LAW, HAILE SELLASSIE I UNIV., CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF ETHIOPIA (Beyenne 
Abdi ed., Commercial Printing Press, Supp. I 1975). 
 124. See Sales Tax Council of State Special Decree of 1990, Proclamation No. 16, 
Negarit Gazeta, Year 49, No. 11 (Eth.). 
 125. In 2008 alone, several tax law amendments were issued separately. See Income 
Tax Proclamation of Ethiopia of 2008, Proclamation No. 608, Negarit Gazeta, Year 15, No. 
5; Value Added Tax of 2008, Proclamation No. 609, Negarit Gazeta, Year 15, No. 6 (Eth.); 
Turnover Tax of 2008. Proclamation No. 611, Negarit Gazeta, Year 15, No. 8 (Eth.); Excise 
Tax of 2008, Proclamation No. 610, Negarit Gazeta, Year 15, No. 7 (Eth.), available at
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The tax laws of Ethiopia are presently found scattered not just in 
different tax laws but in other laws of Ethiopia. Many other laws of Ethiopia 
contain tax rules and provisions. In some forms of legislations, tax matters 
feature significantly while in others tax matters may appear in one or two 
articles in a body of legislation dealing with many other matters, taxation 
being one insignificant side note. Tax rules are found in significant numbers 
in investment laws, for obvious reasons. Tax incentives are some of the 
major instruments of attracting investment (domestic or foreign) and it is no 
surprise that the rules about tax incentives occupy a central position in these 
laws.126 In many other laws of Ethiopia, however, tax rules may appear in 
one or two articles, if at all.127
To date, the Ethiopian tax legislation field is chaotic, disorganized, 
uncoordinated and worse, making it difficult for an average taxpayer to 
make sense of her obligations under the various tax laws in force. Because 
tax laws are uncoordinated, most tax legislations repeat certain provisions as 
if they were not already provided for in other tax legislations.  One area 
where so much ink could surely have been saved is in the definition 
sections, where certain terms appear repetitively as if they were not already 
defined in another tax law. One can, for example, take the definition of 
“body” for tax purposes—which is found in many tax proclamations of 
Ethiopia. There is reason to believe that the definition of “body” should be 
uniform for all tax laws, but because of the absence of a tradition of having 
certain general tax laws, we find ourselves reading the same definition 
repeated in so many tax laws of Ethiopia.128 The same can be said for the 
definition of terms like “person,” “related person,” and “authority” in 
different tax laws of Ethiopia.  
Similarly, administrative provisions (which are of general application) 
are repeated in individual legislations without reference to other legislations 
–something that could have been avoided had Ethiopia had something like 
“general tax administration” law or “general fiscal” law, as in some 
http://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/procno-610-2008-excise-tax-amendment.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2011); Stamp Duty of 2008, Proclamation No. 612, Negarit Gazeta, Year 15, 
No. 9 (Eth.); Council of Ministers Income Tax of 2009, Regulation No. 164 (Eth.).
 126. See, e.g., Council of Ministers Regulations on Investment Incentives and 
Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors of 2003, Articles 4-11, Proclamation No. 
84, Negarit Gazeta, Year 9, No. 34 (Eth.). 
 127. See, e.g., The Labor Proclamation of 2003, Article 112, Proclamation No. 377, 
Negarit Gazeta, Year 10, No. 12 (Eth.); Public Servants Pension of 2003, Article 51, 
Proclamation No. 345, Negarit Gazeta, Year 9, No. 65(Eth.); Proclamation to Provide for the 
Issuance of Government Bonds of 1968, Article 6, Proclamation No. 172, Negarit Gazeta, 
Year 20, No. 11 (Eth.); Proclamation to Provide the Issuance of Government Bonds of 1969,
Article 7, Proclamation No. 262, Negarit Gazeta, Year 28, No. 12 (Eth.).  
 128. Compare the definition of ‘body’ in the Income Tax in Proclamation No. 286, 
supra note 43, art. 2(2) with the almost identical definitions in the Value Added Tax in 
Proclamation No. 285, supra note 24, art. 2(5) and in the Excise Tax of 2008 Proclamation 
No. 307, Article 2(3), Proclamation No. 307, Federal Negarit Gazeta, Year 9, No. 21 (Eth.).  
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countries. The result of these repetitions has at times been the provision of 
incompatible or contradictory administrative procedures in different tax 
legislations of Ethiopia. We may cite a few examples to illustrate the 
problems. In the Income Tax and VAT proclamations, taxpayers dissatisfied 
with assessment of tax must first appeal to the Tax Appeal Commission 
before going to courts, but in the Stamp Duty Proclamation of 1998, 
taxpayers could appeal directly to the High Court from the assessment made 
by the Tax Authority. This procedural discrepancy was later discovered and 
corrected by an amendment.129 Such a discrepancy was probably created 
inadvertently, but these kinds of errors are inevitable when similar matters 
are to be dealt with in individual legislations. Similarly, there is some 
discrepancy in the administrative schemes of complaints handling in 
disputes involving stamp duties and other types of taxes. In many other tax 
disputes, an administrative tribunal called the “Review Committee” has 
been established since 2002, but the tribunal is not available for disputes 
involving stamp duties. Such a discrepancy can only be explained by the 
existence of separate legislations pertaining to the same matter, namely 
dispute settlement. 
Ethiopia has an admirable track record in organizing some of its modern 
laws into codes, which have stood the test of time, but it has not followed 
this with respect to tax laws. What has prevented Ethiopia from collecting 
its general tax provisions in a single body of rules? It has in part to do with 
the approach to reform taken with respect to taxes, which is different from 
the approach taken in many other aspects of Ethiopian law. The approach to 
tax reform has been one of gradualism or incrementalism, which piles one 
amendment over another until the original tax legislation is eventually 
obliterated as a result of numerous subsequent amendments to the original 
legislations. This approach to tax reform has for so long prevented 
Ethiopian tax reformers from looking at tax laws in their totality. Not even 
the comprehensive tax reforms of 2002 could overcome this problem of 
obsessing with individual sections of separate tax legislations rather than the 
impact of the amendment or revisions of a part upon the consistency of the 
whole.  
B. The Sources of Tax law 
1. Tax Proclamations and Regulations 
Most substantive and procedural rules pertaining to taxation flow from 
tax proclamations and regulations. Tax proclamations are quite easily the 
most important sources of substantive tax obligations in Ethiopia. Some tax 
 129. Stamp Duty of 2008, Article 2(2), Proclamation No. 612, Negarit Gazeta, Year 
15, No. 9 (Eth.). 
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proclamations are bulkier and more detailed than others. Some have layers 
of subsidiary legislations under them and others are their lonely self.  
The difference between tax proclamations and regulations is more a 
matter of form than substance. To be sure, tax regulations are derivative 
legislations—issued only pursuant to the authority given in tax 
proclamations. But in terms of the subject matters covered, there is really 
very little difference between tax proclamations and regulations. We may be 
predisposed to associate tax proclamations with more substantive (not to say 
weightier) matters than tax regulations but the situation on the ground is 
really haphazard.  
In theory, tax regulations should be limited to details and technical 
matters130 but in practice tax regulations cover as many substantive issues as 
the tax proclamations. Upon reading some provisions, we wish some 
provisions in tax regulations were addressed in tax proclamations and some 
provisions in tax proclamations were relegated to the regulations.131 The 
subject matter of tax exemptions is a perfect example of how little 
difference exists between the subject matters of tax proclamations and 
regulations. Tax exemptions are found in both the tax proclamations and 
regulations. Indeed, we may attribute as many tax exemptions to the 
regulations as to the proclamations.132 In the end the one reliable and 
surefire distinction between tax proclamations and tax regulations is that the 
 130. See 2 JAMES C.N PAUL & CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 532 (Faculty of Law Haile Sellassie I University Addis Ababa in association 
with Oxford University Press Addis Ababa ed., 1972); see also K. BOELE WOELKI & J. H. M.
VAN ERP, GENERAL REPORTS OF THE XVIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
COMPARITIVE LAW—RAPPORTS GÉNÉRAUX DU XVIIE CONGRÈS DE L’ACADÉMIE 
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ (2007), reprinted in Henry Ordower, General Report,
15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 169, 177-78 (2007). 
 131. Consider the following provisions for contrast: Article 72 of the Income Tax 
Proclamation (2002) requires taxpayers to include certain details in the income tax 
assessment notification (gross income, taxable income, rates, taxes due, penalty, interest, etc) 
and Article 3 of the Income Tax Regulations (2002) lists the types of income from 
employment that are exempted from employment income tax (medical allowance, 
transportation allowance, traveling allowance, etc). Article 72 deals with a matter that is 
purely procedural and technical while Article 3 is as substantive as it can get. If we seriously 
think about it, Article 3 of the Regulations should have been included in the Income Tax 
Proclamation and Article 72 could have been safely relegated to the Regulations. The same 
subject matter is sometimes treated in tax proclamations and sometimes in tax regulations. 
The rate and method of depreciation is determined for income tax purposes in the Income 
Tax Proclamation, while the same subject matter is determined in a directive for purposes of 
exemptions from customs duties; the rate of depreciation of vehicles under the Income Tax 
Proclamation is 20% while under the customs directives, it is 10%; compare Article 23 of 
Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002 with Ministry of Revenues Directive No. 3/1996 
E.C., (in Amharic) (unpublished).  
 132. For example, the exemptions from employment income tax for transportation, 
traveling, hardship, and medical allowances are found in the income tax regulations, not in 
the Proclamations. See Income Tax Regulation No. 78, supra note 43, art. 3. 
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former pass through the scrutiny of the parliament while the latter are issued 
by the Council of Ministers.  
The whole idea of delegating power to issue regulations to an executive 
body, like the Council of Ministers, is in order to attend to details that 
cannot be dealt with in tax proclamations.133 But ironically, tax regulations 
in Ethiopia are issued almost at the same time (or immediately thereafter) as 
the tax proclamations. The Council can hardly have time to consider and 
develop the technical details needed to complete the tax proclamation in the 
interval between the issuance of tax proclamations and tax regulations. So 
the wisdom of issuing some rules in the tax regulations as opposed to in the 
tax proclamations is questionable. And the tax regulations have in the past 
been as inflexible as the tax proclamations. Indeed the regulations are 
revised less frequently than the tax proclamations, which should have been 
the other way around. One must therefore wonder if the tax regulations are 
issued for the objectives they are intended for, which is to give the 
executive some flexibility to provide for details as the changes dictate. One 
would also expect the regulations to be more numerous and voluminous, but 
in practice the proclamations actually far outnumber the regulations and 
they are more voluminous.134
2. Tax Directives 
Tax directives do not get as much attention in academic writing and 
court cases as they deserve but they are issued in large numbers by 
administrative agencies or bodies associated with taxation. In the galaxy of 
laws in Ethiopia, tax directives occupy a rank below tax regulations which 
are issued by the Council of Ministers. Both the tax proclamations and tax 
regulations of Ethiopia anticipate that the legislative field of taxes is hardly 
complete until tax directives are issued covering a wide-range of issues.135
 133. Legislative bodies delegate certain legislative powers to the executive bodies for 
different reasons: pressure of work, to achieve flexibility and for reasons of technicality. See
PAUL & CLAPHAM, supra note 130, at 532; see also Henry Ordower, General Report, 15 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 169, 177-78 (2007). 
 134. At least in the tax area, one cannot help feeling that the whole business of the 
Council of Ministers issuing tax regulations was more a matter of following the custom than 
the commitment to looking after the details and technical matters. The proof for this is that 
the regulations issued simultaneously with the Income Tax Proclamation of 2002 simply 
continued the tradition established back in the 1950s and 1960s. Compare Council of 
Ministers of 2002, Regulation No. 78 (Eth.) with Council of Ministers of 1962, Regulation 
No. 258 (Eth.).  
 135. There are many provisions in Ethiopian tax laws that delegate powers of rule 
making to executive bodies. See e.g., Income Tax Proclamation No. 286, supra note 43, arts. 
13(d)(iii), 13(e), 42, 46, 68(2), 68(3), 69(2), 114(2), 117; Income Tax Regulation No. 286, 
supra note 43, arts. 3(h), 24(3), 27; VAT Proclamation, supra note 24, arts. 8(3), 16(2), 
22(2), 22(6), 22(7), 30, 64. 
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Tax directives are issued by either ministerial bodies (most notably the 
Ministry of Finance) or other public bodies organized as authorities or 
commissions. In the past, tax directives were far and few in between, but 
directives have increased in sheer number and diversity in recent times. All 
the public bodies connected with tax administration have been busy issuing 
one or another form of directives in the area of taxes. Recent tax 
administration reforms have clearly had an impact in this regard. With the 
strengthening of the tax administration bodies, we have seen an increasing 
number of directives in taxation.  
The sheer number and diversity of these directives makes it difficult to 
classify them, but classify them we must if we wish to understand the role 
of directives in the Ethiopian tax system. In terms of the administrative 
bodies that issue these directives, we may find tax directives from 
authorities as diverse as Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education.136
Many of the tax directives hail from the Ministry of Finance, but there are 
significant numbers of directives from the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs 
Authority (ERCA or its predecessors). The tax laws authorize various 
ministries and governmental agencies to issue directives on issues related to 
taxation: the Ministry of Justice the Ministry of Justice (on the subject of the 
composition, membership, etc of the Tax Appeal Commission),137 the 
Ethiopian Investment Agency (on the subject of tax incentives accorded to 
investors), and National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) (on the subject of special 
technical reserves required of financial institutions and deductible under the 
income tax law).138
Because of the extensive delegating-provisions scattered throughout the 
tax laws of Ethiopia, the directives issued by administrative agencies cover 
a wide-range of subjects, so much so that it is difficult to pin them down 
into categories or patterns. One way of making sense of the field of 
directives is to employ a classification adopted in other tax systems. A 
useful classification may be that between “legislative,” “interpretative,” and 
“procedural” directives, as developed by the U.S. courts for “regulations,” 
which are the equivalent of directives in Ethiopia.139 In the U.S., legislative 
directives (regulations)140 are distinguished from interpretative ones in the 
 136. For directive from the Ministry of Education, see Ministry of Education Higher 
Education Institutions Cost Sharing Scheme of 1995. Directive No. 002 (Eth.) (in Amharic) 
(unpublished).  
 137. Although the law authorizes the Ministry of Justice to issue directives regarding 
the composition, membership, etc of the Tax Appeal Commission, we have yet to see one.  
 138. See Income Tax Proclamation No. 286, supra note 43, art. 26. One characteristic 
of tax directives (not a very important one) is that they are issued by diverse administrative 
bodies. Id.
 139. See FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69, at 132; See also JAMES W. PRATT &
WILLIAM N. KULSRUD, INDIVIDUAL TAXATION, 2.22 (Dame Publications, Inc. 1999). 
 140. “Regulations” in the U.S. is the equivalent of our “directives.” In the hierarchy of 
Ethiopian laws, “regulations” occupy a higher rank than directives, because while 
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sense that “legislative” directives may “create, modify or extinguish rights 
and obligations” of taxpayers, and “set down additional substantive 
requirements.”141 “Legislative” regulations have the “force and effect of 
law” unless the issuing authority has exceeded “the scope of its delegated 
power or is contrary to the law, or is unreasonable” in issuing these types of 
regulations.142 Legislative regulations that pass muster according to these 
standards are generally binding both upon the IRS and taxpayers.143
“Interpretative” regulations are not accorded the “force and effect of law” 
although courts have attached considerable weight to them arguing that 
these regulations “express a long-continued administrative practice” and 
constitute “body of experience and informed judgment.”144 “Procedural 
Regulations” (directives)—identified by the subject matters treated in 
them—give directions to taxpayers on what information they need to supply 
and how tax administration is internally organized and conducted.145
As administrative jurisprudence is yet to develop in Ethiopia, no 
distinction is drawn among directives. If we make distinctions based on 
jurisprudence developed elsewhere, it is not because the administrative 
agencies that issue directives are aware of the distinctions nor because 
Ethiopian courts know them as such but because it is a helpful heuristic 
device to make sense of the world of tax directives in Ethiopia. All types of 
directives exist in an undifferentiated mass in practice. There are as many 
legislative (perhaps more) directives as there are the interpretative and 
procedural ones in Ethiopia. If we define legislative directives as those 
issued pursuant to a specific authority in the higher ranked tax laws 
(proclamations and regulations), almost all directives in Ethiopia will 
qualify as legislative directives because we can trace the authority for 
issuing all directives to provisions in higher ranked tax laws.  
A fact that is seldom acknowledged in the Ethiopian tax system is how 
frequently the Ethiopian tax administration engages in interpretation of tax 
laws through the various directives it issues.146 There are many tax 
directives which define, restrict, and expand upon the meanings of terms 
“regulations” are issued by the Council of Ministers, “directives” are issued by individual 
ministries, authorities or commissions.  
 141. FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69, at 132; 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative 
Law and Procedure § 87 (1983). 
 142. FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69, at 132. 
 143. Id.
 144. Id.; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), cited in PRATT & KULSRUD,
supra note 139, at 2.22. 
 145. PRATT & KULSRUD, supra note 139, at 2.22. 
 146. Tax administrations have made considerable forays into the interpretative field as 
a result of the incomplete or contradictory and unworkable nature of many of the provisions 
of tax laws and the impossibility of immediate judicial clarification, but doubts are raised 
over the impartiality of the tax authorities, and courts are generally seen as the last arbiters in 
matters of interpretation. See Notes and Legislation, Judicial Review of Regulations and 
Rulings under the Revenue Acts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1163-64 (1939). 
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and concepts mentioned in principal tax legislations. These directives define 
the scope of benefits and/or obligations mentioned in principal tax 
legislations. They define technical concepts that are left undefined or 
ambiguous in the principal laws.  
An income tax directive issued in 2003, for example, states that 
“technical services,” which are mentioned as taxable in the Income Tax 
Proclamation, include “satellite services” supplied by providers abroad.147
Another income tax directive, issued by the Ministry of Revenues, clarifies 
the scope of transportation allowance excluded from the income tax and 
restricts the amount of allowance that can at any one time be excluded from 
the tax. 148
We may also find directives whose chief objective is to explain 
administrative procedures, help taxpayers understand the procedural steps 
needed to pay taxes, or simply provide details of information that taxpayers 
need to furnish in order to fulfill their various obligations. For lack of a 
better term, we may call these procedural directives.149 The role of 
procedural directives is in the main to assist taxpayers in the understanding 
of tax laws—applied to tax laws, this is no mean task. They help bring the 
technical and complex language of tax laws down to the level of the average 
taxpayer. They simplify, clarify, and explain tax proclamations and 
regulations. A directive issued in 2003, for example, simplifies the process 
of income tax computation for all the classes of income taxpayers in 
Ethiopia.150 The directive simplifies the computation of tax by providing a 
much easier table of computation for schedule A, B, C, and D taxpayers. It 
also provides directives on subjects like accounting year, tax declaration 
forms, and rewards for providing information leading to the discovery of 
undeclared income. This type of directive adds very little to the substance of 
the income tax laws, but it helps taxpayers and tax administrators wade 
through the complex structure of the tax system.151
The third types of directives– the legislative directives—are actually 
more numerous than the purely interpretative directives. We may identify 
these directives either by their targets or subjects treated in them. By their 
targets, we may distinguish specific legislative directives from general 
 147. MINISTRY OF FIN. & ECON. DEV. (1996) (Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished 
directive). 
 148. MINISTRY OF REVENUES (1995) (Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished directive). 
 149. Procedural directives may also be called “administrative” directives. See Notes 
and Legislation, supra note 146, at, 1163. 
 150. FED. INLAND REVENUES AUTH., Directive No. 1/2003 (Eth.) (in Amharic) 
(unpublished directive), available at http://www.mofed.gov.et/English/Pages/Home.aspx 
(under “Featured Information,” then click on “Directives on Finance & Property 
Administration”).
 151. For procedural directives, one may also look at Directive No. 46/2007, a 
directive issued to provide for the use of sales register machines, and Directive No. 51/2007, 
its amendment; or Directive No. 11/2008, a directive to provide for the Issue and 
Implementation of Tax Identification Numbers. 
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legislative directives. Specific legislative directives aim at specific 
taxpayers and are usually limited by time. These types of directives are most 
common among directives that grant tax exemptions. Directives that exempt 
the Ethiopian Airlines from all taxes on its aircraft purchases, Cuban 
expatriates working for the Ministry of Health from the payment of income 
tax, construction materials for low-cost housing projects of Addis Ababa 
City Administration from the payment of VAT, are all examples of specific 
legislative tax directives.152 Specific tax directives are often sent as letters or 
memos to members of the relevant tax administration for purposes of giving 
full effect to the contents of the directives. As such, these directives do not 
contain much of the formalism that characterizes legal documents. They are 
usually not made public and as such they are probably only known to the 
relevant members of the tax administration and of course the beneficiaries 
of the tax exemptions.  
General legislative tax directives, on the other hand, are easily 
identifiable as legal texts because they are couched in a language of formal 
law, with all the paraphernalia of legal jargons, definitions, and legal 
provisions (some even contain preambles stating the general objectives of 
the directives). Many of these directives are numbered by the issuing 
authorities, although they are no longer published in the Negarit Gazeta—
the official outlet of legal publications in Ethiopia. 
By the subjects commonly treated in general legislative tax directives, 
we may identify two types of directives—those that grant tax exemptions 
and those that tend to increase the obligations of taxpayers. One feature of 
Ethiopian tax system is the wide diffusion of the power of tax exemption 
powers. The Ethiopian parliament has granted a number of tax exemptions 
in proclamations, but has also delegated extensive exemptions powers to the 
Council of Ministers as well as the various administrative agencies of the 
Federal Government. The general legislative directives that exempt 
taxpayers are the result of these delegations by the Parliament. The Ministry 
of Finance has, for example, been empowered to exempt goods and services 
from VAT and the Ministry has so far issued directives to exempt imports 
or domestic supplies of medicine and medical supplies, bread and milk, 
agricultural inputs and stationeries.153 There are also general legislative 
directives which tend to increase the obligations of taxpayers. 
Administrative agencies obtain the power to issue these types of directives, 
like those that exempt taxpayers, from the tax proclamations and sometimes 
 152. See MINISTRY OF FIN. & ECON. DEV. (1998) (Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished 
directive); MINISTRY OF REVENUES (1998) (Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished directive);
MINISTRY OF FIN. & ECON. DEV. (1996) (Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished directive). 
 153. See MINISTRY OF FIN. & ECON. DEV. (1995) (Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished 
directive). 
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the tax regulations. These types of directives are particularly prominent 
among VAT directives.154
Directives that grant exemptions are virtually unknown among the wider 
population of taxpayers, presumably because their effect is to relieve some 
taxpayers from payment of taxes. They may have an impact upon the 
overall equitability of the tax system, but tax equity is too abstract a matter 
at the moment to lead to controversies. On the contrary, those directives that 
tend to increase the obligations of taxpayers (as in the examples given 
above) stir controversies among taxpayers—which is as it is to be 
expected.155
Directives have increased in sheer size and numbers in recent times, 
partly as a result of the reorganization of the tax authorities. The size of tax 
directives is estimated to be at least three times thicker than that of tax 
proclamations and regulations combined. While directives are clearly useful 
in making tax laws more intelligible to average taxpayers, a worrying 
development of recent times is that almost all of the directives remain 
unpublished and therefore inaccessible to the majority of taxpayers. 
Ethiopia has certainly regressed in this regard. In the past, all laws of the 
government, including directives and the other subsidiary forms of 
legislation like public notices, were issued in the Negarit Gazeta (the 
official legal gazette of the Ethiopian Government).156 Even appointments of 
public officials were published in the Negarit Gazeta. Nowadays, only 
proclamations and regulations are issued in the Negarit Gazeta, with most of 
other subsidiary forms of legislations kept in the files of respective 
 154. The Ministry of Revenues (the predecessor of ERCA) has issued a number of 
directives which are perceived by the taxpaying community as increasing their tax 
obligations. The Ministry has issued directives to extend the registration obligations to 
certain types of business en bloc: flour factories, jewelry stores, computer and electronic 
stores, plastic products factories, shoe manufacturers, leather products stores, and contractors 
have been subjected to obligatory registration regardless of their annual turnover as a result 
of these directives. See MINISTRY OF REVENUES, FDRE, Ref. No. 01/A29/306/45, Sene 17 
(1995) (Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished directive); MINISTRY OF REVENUES, FDRE, Ref. No. 
2A VAT—72/42, Nehassie 27, (1995) (Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished directive). 
 155. By the way, these controversies are rarely fought in courts because of the 
absence of administrative laws that show taxpayers the ways of challenging administrative 
directives. Taxpayers are therefore reduced to raising their complaints informally to the tax 
authorities or voicing their objections in newspapers. See Hilna Alemu, Business Community 
Twice Dissatisfied with Customs Authority Talks, ADDIS FORTUNE (Sept. 13, 2009), 
http://www.addisfortune.com/Vol%2010%20No%20489%20Archive/Business%20Commun
ity%20Twice%20Dissatisfied%20with%20Customs%20Authority%20Talks.htm; Over 500 
Face Tax Authorities to Question Enforcement, FORTUNE, July 2, 2009 (Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia).
 156. The Negarit Gazeta establishment Proclamation No. 1/1942 required the 
publication of proclamations, decrees, laws, rules, regulations, orders, notices and subsidiary 
legislations; it also required publication of notices concerning appointments, dismissals, 
titles, decorations, and honors and notices for the general information concerning matters of 
public interest. See The Establishment of the Negarit Gazeta of 1942, Establishment 
Proclamation No. 1, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 1 (Eth.). 
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government authorities.157 The result is that many taxpayers are unaware 
that these directives even exist let alone understand their imports. Because 
directives are no longer published in official gazettes, the tax authorities do 
not show as much attention to the language of directives as they do with the 
proclamations and regulations. A recent ruling by the Cassation Division of 
the Federal Supreme Court to the effect that directives do not have to be 
published in the Negarit Gazeta to have a legally binding effect only helps 
to entrench a disturbing development of administrative agencies issuing 
directives without having to publicize them in Negarit Gazeta.158
So far we have focused upon the content of directives and the various 
forms they may assume in practice. Another issue of perhaps no less 
importance in the field of tax directives is the procedures for issuing 
directives. The procedures for issuing tax proclamations are well-
established by law, as the Ethiopian Parliament has issued law-making 
procedures for laws approved by the Parliament.159 Some tax systems have 
well-established and detailed administrative rules for issuing tax directives 
or regulations. In the U.S. tax system, for example, the U.S. Treasury first 
publishes a proposed regulation (the equivalent of Ethiopian “directive” 
here) in the form of “Notice of Proposed Rule Making.”160 It then waits for 
at least thirty days to allow taxpayers to comment on the proposed rule. 
After a review of taxpayer comments, the proposed regulation (directive) is 
revised and re-proposed for another round of commenting by taxpayers, and 
only after that is it issued in its final form. There are no known procedures 
for issuing directives in Ethiopia. The administrative agencies empowered 
to issue directives (e.g. the Ministry of Finance) are not bound to follow any 
specific procedures before they issue directives. They may issue directives 
without consulting anybody or they may consult some of the stakeholders 
when they feel like it. It may be necessary to develop procedures so that all 
interested parties (or stakeholders, as the cliché has it) are consulted before 
a directive becomes a law and binding upon taxpayers. Consultations give 
taxpayers the opportunity to submit views, data, and arguments to the tax 
 157. This in spite of a law that requires all laws of the Federal Government to be 
published in the Federal Negarit Gazeta. See Federal Negarit Gazeta Establishment of 1995,
Article 2(2), Proclamation No. 3, Negarit Gazeta, Year 1, No. 3 (Eth.). 
 158. Eth. Revenues & Customs Auth. v. Daniel Mekonnen, file no. 43781 (Fed. Sup. 
Ct., Cassation Div. 2002) (Eth.), available at
http://www.fsc.gov.et/decisionPages/cassation/volume%2010.pdf (case is only available in 
Amharic). 
 159. See Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia House of Peoples’ Representatives 
Working Procedure and Members’ Code of Conduct of 2005, Article 14(2)(b), 15(2), 16(4), 
Proclamation No. 470/2005, Negarit Gazeta, Year 11, No. 60, available at
http://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/470-ae.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 160. See GUERIN & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 114, at 30. See also PRATT & KULSRUD,
supra note 139, 2.21ff; FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69, at 131. See Sanford M. Guerin 
and Philip F. Postlewaite, supra note 114, at 30; see also Pratt and Kulsrud, supra note 139,
pp. 2.21ff; Federal Tax Course, supra note 69, at 131. 
2012] The Ethiopian Tax System  365
authorities enabling the latter to make appropriate revisions and take 
corrective measures or even withdraw directives that are 
counterproductive.161
3. Advance-rulings 
Advance rulings, or administrative rulings, have become important 
instruments in the implementation of tax laws in many tax systems.162
Developed tax systems have had a long tradition of issuing advance rulings 
upon request.163 And many developing countries have incorporated 
procedures for seeking authoritative statements from the tax authorities 
through advance rulings.164 Advance rulings provide taxpayers with the 
opportunity “to obtain a more or less binding statement from the tax 
authorities concerning the treatment of a transaction or a series of 
contemplated future (sometimes past) actions or transactions.”165Advance 
rulings are fact-specific opinions of the Tax Administration in response to a 
taxpayer request based on contemplated transactions. Since they are fact 
specific, a taxpayer is generally required to give a full and fair 
representation of all the relevant facts.166
The practice of issuing advance rulings in other tax systems is developed 
to “avoid conflict and litigation by establishing in advance an authoritative 
interpretation of the tax law, so that a taxpayer has full security in the way 
the tax law will work out in a specific situation.”167 Rulings are similar to 
what courts would do in specific cases except that rulings make use of 
hypothetical cases or transactions and they apply to cases with similar 
factual situations set out in hypothetical case or transaction of a ruling. 
Their objective is to inform and guide taxpayers and tax officers.168 They 
inform taxpayers of the position of Tax Administration on a certain 
transaction and “help avoid future controversy and litigation” with the tax 
administration and they promote voluntary compliance by taxpayers.169
According to Frans Vanistendael,170 a systematic approach to the practice 
of advance rulings must respond to the following questions: 
 161. See GUERIN & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 114, at 30. 
 162. Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 61. 
 163. See id. (citing countries such as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States).  
 164. Countries like Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, Mauritius, and Tanzania from 
Africa have rules or procedures for obtaining authoritative advance rulings from the tax 
authorities of the respective countries.  
 165. CARLO ROMANO, INT’L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATIONS, ADVANCE TAX 
RULINGS AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN TAX RULINGS SYSTEM 78 (2002).  
 166. Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 61.  
 167. Id.
 168. 47 A.C.J.S. Internal Revenue §9 (2009).  
 169. Id.
 170. Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 61. 
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i) whether the ruling is limited to the taxpayer who requested the 
ruling, or whether others can also rely upon the ruling provided 
their factual situations fit in it; 
ii)  whether the ruling is regularly published or not; 
iii)  whether the ruling is public or private, with the distinctions; 
iv)  the administrative official issuing the advance rulings; 
v) whether the issuing of advance ruling is confined to the central 
Tax authorities or regional or local authorities can also issue the 
rulings in their respective jurisdiction (an important consideration 
in federal systems);  
vi) the procedures for requesting advance rulings, and for deciding on 
and issuing the rulings; and 
vii) the circumstances under which the tax administration may change 
its position as expressed in its advance ruling;
As it is to be expected, different tax systems approach “advance rulings” 
differently, to the extent they recognize them in their tax administrations. In 
some countries, advance rulings may be issued by a tax inspector,171 and in 
other countries, tax administration cannot issue binding advance rulings at 
all, because in these countries, the very idea of an administrative branch 
issuing binding rulings goes against the principle of legality.172 Sweden 
offers perhaps a unique example of a system in which an independent 
council is established to entertain requests for and issue advance rulings.173
In some tax systems, the practice of rule-making has developed to such 
an extent as to create various categories of rulings. The IRS (the equivalent 
of ERCA) in the U.S. issues a number of guidelines in the form of rulings 
for taxpayers. The most prominent examples of rulings are the “revenue 
rulings,” “revenue procedures,” and “private letter rulings.”174 Revenue 
rulings are issued in the form of memorandum of law (containing issues to 
be addressed, the facts pertaining to these issues and a legal analysis of the 
issues).175 Revenue rulings are official pronouncements of the IRS and are 
published in the official publication of the IRS—Internal Revenue 
 171. Id. (citing Netherlands as an example). 
 172. Id.
 173. Id. at 62. 
 174. JAMES R. LAPENTI, HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME 
TAXATION, A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 192 (3d ed. 2010). 
 175. Id.
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Bulletin.176 Revenue Procedures explain the procedural issues that taxpayers 
face in dealing with the IRS.177 Private letter rulings are addressed to a 
specific taxpayer who has requested guidance from the IRS.178 They are 
“written statements issued to a specific taxpayer interpreting and applying 
tax laws to the taxpayer’s specific set of facts.”179
In the U.S., taxpayers may rely upon revenue rulings unless the law upon
which the ruling is based has changed.180 Taxpayers other than the taxpayer 
to whom private letter rulings are addressed may not rely upon the position 
of the IRS in private letter rulings.181 Both revenue rulings and letter rulings 
mostly result from taxpayer requests for letter rulings. The difference is that 
revenue rulings are extrapolations from the private rulings and are therefore 
intended for the general population of taxpayers whose situations fall within 
the factual transactions described in the revenue rulings.182
The practice of issuing advance rulings is not as well known and 
established in Ethiopia as it has been in other countries. In fact, one cannot 
even say that they exist as distinct legal categories. However, there have 
been few occasions in which the Ethiopian tax authorities were was asked to 
furnish what can only be described as an advance ruling in the 
circumstances. It is not clear if the tax authorities were consciously engaged 
in the practice of advance rulings or doing this just as a matter of 
administrative courtesy. 
In Employees of St. Paul Hospital v. Ministry of Health, a dispute arose 
over the exclusion from taxable income of special allowances paid to 
doctors and other staff of St. Paul Hospital in consideration of their 
exposure to bad smells and other risks connected with their operation on 
dead bodies.183 St. Paul Hospital used the expression “hardship allowance” 
to refer to the special allowance paid to its employees to describe the special 
hardship faced by these employees while operating on dead bodies. The 
employees at St. Paul Hospital believed that this allowance should fall 
within the meaning of “hardship allowance” as that expression is known in 
the Income Tax Regulations of 2002 and demanded that the payments be 
 176. See FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69, at 136. See also PRATT & KULSRUD,
supra note 139, at 2.23–2.24.
 177. LAPENTI, supra note 174, at 192. See also FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69,
at 133; Individual Income Taxes, in WEST’S FEDERAL TAXATION 2-9 (Hoffman Willis Smith 
ed., 1996).  
 178. LAPENTI, supra note 174, at 192. 
 179. FEDERAL TAX COURSE, supra note 69, at 134.  
 180. LAPENTI, supra note 174, at 192. 
 181. Id.
 182. Sometimes, the IRS develops revenue rulings from technical advice to district 
offices of the IRS, court decisions, suggestions from tax practitioner groups and various tax 
publications. See WEST’S FEDERAL TAXATION, supra note 177, at 2-9.  
 183. For details, see Solomon Teshome, The Scope of Tax Exclusions under the 
Ethiopian Employment Income Tax Regime, at 15ff, (2008) (unpublished Senior Thesis) (on 
file with Addis Ababa University Faculty of Law). 
368 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2 
excluded from the base of the income tax.184 The people at the Ministry of 
Health were not so certain.  
The Ministry of Health wrote a letter to the Tax Administration asking 
for its opinion on whether the special allowance constituted “hardship 
allowance” within the meaning of the Income Tax Regulations. In an 
internal memo written by the Legal Division of the Tax Authority and 
addressed to the head of the Authority, which was eventually communicated 
to the Ministry of Health, the Tax Authority sought to rely upon the 
Amharic version of the Income Tax Regulations in which the expression 
“hardship allowance” is rendered as “yebereha abel” in Amharic, which in 
English literally means “desert allowance,” a much narrower and more 
specific rendition than the English version of “hardship allowance.”185 The 
position of the Tax Authority was that the meaning of hardship allowance 
should be limited to payments made in consideration of extreme weather 
conditions (the weather conditions may be too hot or too cold climates). 
Upon receiving the letter from the Tax Authority, the Ministry of Health 
and St. Paul Hospital decided to withhold tax due upon the special 
allowance made to employees of St. Paul Hospital. 
The case mentioned above involving the meaning of “hardship 
allowance” and many cases like it would have been an excellent opportunity 
for the Ethiopian tax administration to inform taxpayers in general about its 
position on what the scope of hardship allowance is. It would also have 
been an opportunity for developing a distinct legal category known 
elsewhere as “advance rulings.”  
The Tax Authority responds to taxpayers individually rather than 
publishing its opinion to a general population of taxpayers.186 What we can 
 184. See Income Tax Regulation No. 78, supra note 43, art. 3(c).  
 185. The position of the head of the Tax Authority is incidentally consistent with the 
rule of interpretation that gives precedence to the Amharic version in cases of conflict 
between the English and Amharic versions of the law. See Federal Negarit Gazeta 
Establishment of 1995, Article 2(4), Proclamation No. 3, Negarit Gazeta Year 1, No. 3 (Eth.), 
available at http://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/proc-no-3-1995-federal-negarit-
gazeta-establishment.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 186. There was reportedly a similar issue over the meaning of “hardship allowance”
before the St. Paul Hospital case, this time involving employees of Muger Cement Factory. 
Muger Cement Factory paid (or used to anyway) its employees a special allowance for 
undergoing exposure to the heat and dust of heavy machinery, and for lack of a better 
expression, this allowance was called “hardship allowance.” Informally, some officers of the 
Tax Authority stuck to the literal meaning of “hardship allowance” in the Amharic version of 
the Income Tax Regulations and rejected the exclusion of the allowance from the income tax. 
Solomon Teshome, who wrote his senior essay on exclusions from employment income tax, 
gives another instance in which the meaning of hardship allowance can be a source of 
controversy. He offers the example of a collective agreement in the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation in which the expression of hardship allowance is used to 
refer to payments for not just enduring the hardship of harsh weather conditions but also of 
high cost of living. The first allowance paid for harsh weather conditions (for places like 
Dalol Depression and Gambella) is rendered in Amharic as “yebereha abel”—consistent 
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say at this moment is that many of the issues surrounding advance rulings 
(including the question of its very existence) are not yet settled in the 
Ethiopian tax system. We don’t know if these rulings are binding or even 
persuasive, whether they should be published (and be available in the public 
domain), which administrative unit should issue these rulings, and questions 
of that nature.  
Granted that these practices are not yet fully developed in the Ethiopian 
tax system, there is a lot to be said for their development in Ethiopia. Even 
where they are merely persuasive, advance rulings have a lot of advantages 
to commend them. They cut down future conflicts considerably by 
informing taxpayers in advance of the position of the Tax Authority on 
certain transactions. They cut down costs arising from litigation, helping the 
courts to concentrate only on matters over which there is disagreement on 
the ruling. They also build the capacity of the Tax Authority to expand on 
the jurisprudence of taxation in the country. Advance rulings can also be 
used as precursors to what the Tax Administration may legislate through 
directives, if need be. What is originally couched in the advance rulings 
may crystallize into directives, putting the rules on a firmer and more solid 
ground than hastily concocting rules to suit the times.  
4. Administrative Publications, Tax Guides, Tax Forms, and 
Public Notices 
It has become an unavoidable feature of modern tax administration to 
assist in tax administration with voluminous administrative commentaries, 
manuals, guides, and circular letters. Some of these administrative 
commentaries, manuals, guides, and circular letters are available for internal 
use only while others are published as exegesis for the taxpaying 
community. Whether they go by the name of “statement of revenue 
practice” (as in the U.K.), “interpretation bulletins” (as in Canada), “IRS 
Publications” (as in the U.S.), or in general by the names of administrative 
commentaries, instructions, guides, manuals, or circular letters, there is little 
question that these materials are interpretative documents controlling the 
behavior of countless tax administration officers and taxpayers.187 In those 
countries where their legal status has been called into question, courts have 
with the Amharic version of the Income Tax Regulations- while the second type of 
allowance is rendered as “yenuro wudenet abel”—roughly translating into English as “cost of 
living allowance.” But it is possible to render both as “hardship allowance” in English. 
Whatever our position may be in each case, issues like these could have been resolved for all 
taxpayers through the devices of “advance rulings” rather than through individual and 
informal communications between taxpayers and the Tax Authority. See Solomon Teshome, 
supra note 183, 19-20. 
 187. See Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 60; Federal Tax Course, supra note 69, at 
135. 
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held them not to be binding upon the taxpayers.188 Should taxpayers choose 
to rely upon interpretations put upon the various tax laws by the tax 
administration, however, they have been held to be binding upon the 
administration that issued them.189 If the tax administration inserts a 
disclaimer in administrative commentaries, manuals, or guides, however, it 
is difficult for taxpayers to invoke interpretation in these administrative 
documents as authority.  
Tax administration commentaries are not unknown in Ethiopian Tax 
Administration. The introduction of the Value Added Tax in 2002 for the 
first time was accompanied by the issuance of a VAT Guide for taxpayers 
(and tax administrators) both in English and Amharic.190 The Ethiopian Tax 
Authority also developed some manuals to help tax officers deal with some 
murky and technical issues in their operations.191 The administrative 
manuals are primarily for internal consumption of the tax administration 
officers, and they are usually not made available to the taxpayers. In 
addition, because Ethiopian Tax Authorities have yet to create their own 
official publications, the tax guides that have so far surfaced appear only 
informally and often remain unpublished. These manuals make constant 
reference to the tax laws, but it is naive to expect that all the terms in these 
manuals are consistent with the tax laws. 
Supposing there is a challenge on their legality, should courts have 
recourse to these manuals? And how far can taxpayers rely upon these 
manuals? How public should these internal manuals be for taxpayers not 
just to know what the tax authorities do, but also even to challenge them 
when they find them to be inconsistent with the laws? How different is a tax 
guide issued by the Tax Administration from a textbook written by a tax 
expert for classrooms in the universities or even a consultancy firm for use 
by its clients? These are, at the moment, unanswered questions because 
taxpayers have never challenged the few administrative manuals and guides 
issued by the Ethiopian Tax Administration. Besides, there are no 
 188. Courts in Belgium, Canada, Germany and Spain have specifically rejected 
administrative interpretation of tax laws in administrative manuals, circular letter or guides.
See Vanistendael, supra note 30, at 60 n.208. 
 189. Id. at 60. 
 190. The Guide was reportedly developed by the drafter of Ethiopian VAT law—
Professor Alan Shenck- who must have realized the difficulties ahead in coming to terms 
with this new form of taxation. The drafter produced the VAT Guide upon his own initiative 
and not as a consequence of some tradition to provide a guide to newly introduced tax laws. 
See Guide, Value Added Tax (VAT): Basic VAT Guide for Tax Payers, Tax Reform Office, 
VAT Sub-Program (Addis Ababa) (June 2002) (on file with author).   
 191. These manuals include Collection Manual, Value-Added Tax Audit Manual, and 
Assessment and Audit Operating Manual; See ETH. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Taxation in 
Ethiopia, Jira Jebessa, Ethiopia, 2005; Ministry of Revenue, Federal Inland Revenue 
Authority, Value-Added-Tax (VAT) Audit Manual, January 2005, Addis Ababa; Ministry of 
Revenue, Federal Inland Revenue Authority, Assessment and Audit Operating Manual, 
January 2005, Addis Ababa (unpublished).  
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administrative rules that fix the status and rank of administrative 
publications in controlling the meaning of the various taxes in Ethiopia. 
Apart from the tax guides and manuals, which are far and few between, 
we have the tax forms, which should not be underestimated as 
“interpretative” documents. More than even the tax guides or manuals, they 
are essential in the implementation of the tax laws. Tax forms are 
interpretative instruments, “perhaps the only interpretation that most people 
ever see and read.”192 They are the ones that bring taxes from the firmament 
of abstractions to the actuality of computation and payment of taxes. In the 
words of Stanley Surrey, the tax forms perform the task of “compressing the 
vast body of statutory and administrative material into the compact, readily 
understood, and readily administered set of forms required for a mass 
tax.”193
The tax forms are more numerous and widely available than the tax 
guides and manuals. Many of the tax forms are issued in the form of 
directives (for example, the directive cited above on computation of income 
tax under the different schedules of Ethiopian income tax has tax forms 
attached to it) and therefore assume the status of directives in Ethiopian tax 
law hierarchy. But there are many more that are issued or reproduced 
informally to help taxpayers cope with the many intricacies of tax laws.194
Again the legal status of tax forms in the interpretation of tax laws 
(whether they come in the form of directives or not) is shrouded in mystery. 
There has never been an occasion for challenging the tax forms in the past. 
This is certainly not because the forms are unimpeachable. In fact, an expert 
scan of these forms will reveal so many loopholes as to justify a serious 
challenge to the forms. 
Finally, we have the “public notices,” which are becoming more and 
more common in the recent practices of Ethiopian Tax Administration. Like 
the directives, public notices flow from a special provision in a higher law, 
usually a directive.195 They are issued to a group of taxpayers to inform 
them of their duty, say, of registration by a certain date. The Ethiopian Tax 
Administration does not have its own regular publications in which these 
 192. Stanley S. Surrey, Treasury Department Regulatory Material under the Tax 
Code, 7 POL’Y SCI. 517 (1976). 
 193. Id.
 194. The following tax forms are issued via directives: a Directive on VAT invoices, 
see Ministry of Revenues, (date unknown) (in Amharic, with English subtitles) 
(unpublished); A directive on the Implementation of Income Tax Proclamation No. 1/1995 
E.C., Federal Inland Revenue Authority (in Amharic, with English sub-titles) (unpublished). 
There are many directives that are used informally within the tax authorities. See Excise Tax 
Proclamation of 2002, Proclamation No. 307, Negarit Gazeta, Year 9, No. 20 (Eth.); Ministry 
of Revenues, Federal Inland Revenue Authority Business Income Tax Declaration (with 
Annex) (Eth.); Income Tax of 2002, Proclamation No. 286, Negarit Gazeta, Year 8, No. 34 
(Eth.). 
 195. See Ministry of Revenues, Directive Issued to Provide for the Use of Sales 
Register Machines of 2007, Directive No. 46 (Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished).  
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notices appear. Instead, Ethiopian tax authorities use daily and weekly 
newspapers to reach the targeted taxpayers. Presently, the public notices are 
published in Addis Zemen, the government Amharic daily newspaper.196
The question that arises with respect to public notices is once again 
whether they have any legal significance. They are not entirely devoid of 
legal significance if we examine their contents, although they look like 
simple announcements. The public notices often set a deadline for 
registration or for use of sales register machines which are connected to the 
tax authorities as information transmitters. These deadlines may be 
considered “unreasonable” or “unfair” but there are presently no 
administrative procedures available to taxpayers to challenge these 
notifications before administrative tribunals or courts.  
5. Tax Dispute Settlement: Tax Cases as Sources of Law 
As in many other countries, tax disputes in Ethiopia follow a slightly 
different channel of dispute settlement from other forms of disputes.197 The 
first opportunity taxpayers have to resolve disputes exists with the tax 
administration itself—with the assessors, where most of the errors or 
misunderstandings should be resolved. Taxpayers who find themselves in 
disagreement with the tax administration have another opportunity once 
again within the tax administration, but this time a body set up within the 
tax administration composed of four members drawn from the different 
units of the tax administration will entertain their case—the Review 
 196. One example of a public notice will suffice. Article 5 of Directive No. 46/2007 (a 
Directive to Provide for the Use of Sales Register Machines) states that the Tax Authority 
will announce the commencement period of the obligation to use sales register machines for 
each category of taxpayers. A public notice was issued following this Directive informing 
hotels, restaurants, bars, cafeterias, patisseries and supermarkets of their duty to make 
preparation for the use of the sales register machines. A second public notice was issued 
ordering all large taxpayers (with the exception of public institutions, banks, insurance 
companies and public and freight transport companies) to purchase the machines and start 
using them within one month of the notice. See Ministry of Revenues (in Amharic) 
(unpublished); Addis Zemen, Amharic daily, Tir 16, 2000 E.C; Addis Zemen, Ginbot 30, 
2001 E.C.  
 197. It is quite common to establish special dispute settlement schemes for taxation in 
many countries; in the U.K., taxpayers can appeal to General Commissioners (a body of lay 
persons assisted by a qualified clerk) or Special Commissioners (who are highly qualified 
persons). The Commissioners in the U.K. are the equivalent of Ethiopian Tax Appeal 
Commissions. A further appeal lies to High Court from the Commissioners but only on 
questions law, just like in our case. See JOHN TILEY, REVENUE LAW 75 (5th ed. 2005);
GRAEME S. COOPER ET AL, COOPER, KREVER & VANN’S INCOME TAXATION, COMMENTARY 
AND MATERIALS 891 (Thomson Legal & Regulatory Ltd., 2005) (under the Australian tax 
system, a taxpayer dissatisfied with the results of the Commissioner’s (the equivalent of the 
Tax Authority (ERCA) in Ethiopia) internal review has the right to proceed to the Federal 
Court or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal).  
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Committee.198 Members of the “Review Committee” are different from the 
tax assessors or inspectors, and in that sense they enjoy a certain level of 
autonomy and independence. But they are appointed by the head of the Tax 
Authority (and are still part of the Tax Administration in a way).  
The Review Committee has the power to receive applications of 
taxpayers and reduce or waive penalties, interest, and taxes imposed by the 
tax administration.199 The Committee is not constrained by procedural or 
judicial niceties. At times, the Committee deals with several, even disparate 
cases en masse if all the applicants in these cases request, say, waiver of 
penalties.200 In the end, the Review Committee has the power to make 
recommendations only. The head of the Tax Authority may accept the 
recommendations of the Committee, in part or as a whole or may 
completely reject it—but in a diplomatic sense, when the head of the Tax 
Authority disagrees with its recommendations, s/he simply remands the case 
to the Committee with observations for further review.201
Taxpayers dissatisfied with the recommendations of the Review 
Committee or the decisions of tax authorities may appeal to the Tax Appeal 
Commission (TAC), a tribunal set up within the executive branch under the 
Ministry of Justice.202 Although the Commission is still within the executive 
branch of government, the Tax Appeal Commission enjoys relative 
autonomy and independence as it is organized outside the Tax 
Administration. The members of the Commission are to be drawn from 
“among persons having good reputation, acceptability, integrity, general and 
professional knowledge, and from among persons who have not committed 
any offense in connection with tax and tax.”203 The composition of the 
 198. See Income Tax Proclamation No. 286, supra note 43, art. 104. There is another 
review committee, organized along similar lines, for the purpose of settling “minor customs 
regulations violations.” This Committee is established under the authorization of the 
Customs Proclamation of 1997 (now replaced). Minor customs regulations are defined as 
differences of not more than 10% between the customs declarations by taxpayers and the 
findings of inspections by the customs officers. The ostensible rationale for the establishment 
of the review committee was to save the time and the cost that would otherwise have been 
spent in litigation in courts, but the directive fixes the administrative penalties that attach to 
the minor customs regulations violations. See Customs of 1997, Article 8(2), Proclamation 
No. 60 (Eth.) (now replaced by Proclamation No. 622/2009) and Ministry of Revenues, 
Administrative Settlement of Customs Regulations Violations of 1998. Directive No. 37 
(Eth.) (in Amharic) (unpublished). 
 199. See Income Tax Proclamation No. 286, supra note 43, art. 105(1)(a). 
 200. In one case, the Committee reviewed a case involving 29 different complainants 
and forwarded its opinion that the complainants be made to be pay 10% of the penalties 
imposed on them. See A.S.G. Magdlinos ET AL. (unpublished). 
 201. See Income Tax Proclamation No. 286, supra note 43, art. 105(2). The members 
of the Review Committee have some directives to guide them on matters like waiver of 
penalties. See Ministry of Revenues, FDRE, Waiver of Tax and Duty Administrative 
Penalties Directive, No. 5/1996, in Amharic, unpublished. 
 202. Income Tax Proclamation No. 286, supra note 43, art. 107.  
 203. Id. art. 114(1).  
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Commission is to reflect the interests of the major stakeholders in tax 
administration—the government and taxpayers.  Although the composition 
of the Commission is to be determined by a directive to be issued by the 
Ministry of Justice, no such directive has yet been issued.204 Nonetheless, 
the composition of the Commission somehow reflects the diversity of the 
stakeholders in tax administration: the members are drawn from the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Finance, the Ethiopian 
Customs and Revenue Authority and the Ministry of Justice, the last 
occupying the position of a chairperson in the Commission.205
Like the Review Committee, the members of Tax Appeal Commission 
are not expected to adhere strictly to the niceties of judicial procedures—
after all, most of the members of the Commission are not necessarily 
lawyers, although the stakeholders incline to sending members with legal 
background to these kinds of tribunals. The Commission’s composition 
from the stakeholders in tax administration is in large measure designed to 
address disputes in ways that satisfy the interests and demands of the 
various stakeholders, even if that sometimes means going off the beaten 
path of judicial procedures. That is why the Commissioners in some 
instances make up their own rules as they go along particularly in cases 
where the law is silent.  
In Ghion Industrial and Commercial PLC v. IRA,206 the Commissioners 
were faced with the question, among others, of whether Ghion could deduct 
the travel expenses incurred while its top management were travelling 
abroad on trade promotions with the high officials of the Ethiopian 
Government. IRA (the Inland Revenue Authority) rejected these expenses 
on the ground that the documents presented to prove the expenses were not 
reliable. The Commissioners accepted the contention of the IRA but 
allowed a deduction of 25% of the expenses allegedly made by Ghion, 
apparently exercising their power of equity. In Metebaber Hotel v. IRA,207
the Commissioners allowed a deduction of 75% of some costs like 
transportation expenses and 50% of costs allegedly incurred for the repair of 
the Hotel, once again exercising their power of equity. 
It is difficult to assert with certainty what role the Tax Appeal 
Commissioners play in the establishment of tax norms in Ethiopia. They are 
 204. Id. art. 114(2). 
 205. In the old days, the Commission had members of the business community 
(represented from the Chambers of Commerce) in its ranks, but this was discontinued 
recently; there are apparently plans to recall the Chambers to its membership. Interview with 
Ato Dawit Teshome, Ministry of Justice (May 20, 2010). The old income tax laws required 
members of the business community to be represented in the Commission; the 1961 Income 
Tax Proclamation for example provides that ‘at least half of all members of each commission 
shall be chosen from amongst merchants and persons carrying on professional occupations.’ 
Income Tax Proclamation of 1961, Article 50, proclamation No. 173 (Eth.) (repealed).  
 206. Tax Appeal Commission, File No. 368 (in Amharic) (unpublished). 
 207. Tax Appeal Commission, File No. 523 (in Amharic) (unpublished).  
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not bound to follow the dicta of their prior rulings, but because they deal 
with issues of repetitive nature, it is hard to believe that they willfully 
disregard their prior rulings. In fact, one who reads the decisions of the Tax 
Appeal Commission cannot but conclude that the Commissioners repeat 
their prior rulings in subsequent cases without acknowledging it. 
Unfortunately, the decisions of the Tax Appeal Commission are not 
published. Taxpayers cannot therefore know how the Commissioners will 
react to certain factual situations.  
An appeal from the decisions of the Tax Appeal Commission lies to the 
High Court—the first opportunity the regular courts have to entertain tax 
cases; even then, only when an error of law (rather than fact) is found in the 
judgment of the Tax Appeal Commission.208 If the High Court finds that an 
error of law is made in the judgment of the Commission, it points the error 
out and remands the case to the Commission for review of the case based on 
the error of law found.209 The High Court cannot go into the determination 
of the merits of the case.  
Determining questions of fact from questions of law has never been easy, 
and it is not just in Ethiopia that these questions have defied clear 
distinctions.210 There are no hard and fast rules for distinguishing questions 
of fact from questions of law. There are many reported cases in Ethiopia 
addressing this issue, albeit in an inconclusive manner.211
A second appeal lies from the judgment of the High Court to the 
Supreme Court, which has the same power of finding errors of law in the 
judgments of the lower tribunals and remanding the case for further 
 208. Income Tax Proclamation No. 286, supra note 43, art. 112(1) (the cited sub-
article does not say “high court,” but the repealed tax laws specifically refer to the “high 
court” from the practice of appealing to the high court has been derived.). 
 209. Id. art. 112(2).  
 210. In the U.K., the construction of documents or statutes is considered as a question 
of law while the question of whether the document was signed on a certain date was held as a 
question of fact; similarly the question of whether a trade is being carried on is a one of fact 
but the question of the meaning of trade is one of law. In an apparent swipe at the difficulty 
of distinguishing a question of law from a question of fact, Dickinson wrote memorably that 
“matters of law” grow downwards into the roots of fact while matters of fact reached 
upwards without a break into “matters of law.” JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1927), quoted in TILEY, supra note 197, 
at 76.  
 211. See e.g., Barnadoni Guiseppe v. Inland Revenue Department (High Ct., Addis 
Ababa, 1965), 2 J. ETH. L. 334 (where the High Court quashed the decision of the TAC on 
the ground that the Commission’s decision to impose a fine on a taxpayer was based on 
allegations not made by either party to the appeal); Mulugeta Ayele v. Inland Revenue 
Department (High Ct., Addis Ababa, 1965), 2 J. ETH. L. 340 (reversing the decision of the 
TAC on the ground that the Commission increased tax assessment on its own motion in). But 
see Mosvold (Ethiopia) Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Department (High Ct., Addis Ababa, 1967), 4 
J. ETH. L. 104, in which the High Court held that the decision of the TAC that disallowed the 
deduction of a sum, as being interest on an alleged loan, was a question of fact and therefore 
not subject to review by the Court.  
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review.212 Those aggrieved with the decision of the Supreme Court (or for 
that matter, the High Court) have one last opportunity to seek review if the 
decisions of the Supreme Court or the High Court “contain fundamental 
error of law.”213
In the pure civilian tradition of the role of courts, judicial interpretation is 
not a source of binding law for other cases.214 But it may have persuasive 
power, which is acknowledged by jurists.215 Modern Ethiopian legal system 
subscribed to the civilian tradition of confining the role of courts to just 
disposing of cases before them. The interpretation of laws by courts may be 
persuasive at various levels, but because of the limited diffusion of judicial 
interpretation among courts and the academia even the persuasive power of 
judicial interpretation is limited in the best of times.  
The role of courts in the creation of legal norms through interpretation 
received a boost in 2005 when a law was passed conferring binding effect 
upon the interpretation of law by the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court in a decision involving not less than five judges.216 The 
interpretation binds both federal and regional courts at all levels except the 
Cassation Division itself, which has apparently the power to reverse and 
even contradict itself in subsequent decisions.217 Putting aside the various 
controversies surrounding this power of the Cassation Division of the 
Federal Supreme Court,218 there is little doubt that the 2005 law elevated the 
decision of the Cassation Division from one that was limited to disposing of 
cases before it to having a binding effect upon cases having similar factual 
situations before lower courts.  
The tax dispute settlement schemes all the way up to the Supreme Court 
follow the narrow strip of disputes that arise from assessment of taxes, as if 
all the disputes taxpayers may have with the tax administration arose from 
assessment only. The language of tax laws has been unwittingly restrictive 
in this regard. This has the unfortunate consequence of limiting the choice 
 212. Income Tax Proclamation No. 286, supra note 43, art. 112(3). 
 213. See Federal Courts Proclamation of 1996, Article 10, Proclamation No. 25, 
Negarit Gazeta, Year 2, No. 13 (Eth.), available at
http://ethiopianlaw.weebly.com/uploads/5/5/7/6/5576668/proc_no._25-1996_federal_courts.
pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 214. See George Krzeczunowicz, Code and Custom in Ethiopia, 2 J. Eth. L. 434 
(1965). 
 215. See M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW (12th ed. 1939, La. 
State Law Inst. trans., 1959); Vol. 1, No. 227, quoted in Krzeczunowicz, supra note 214, at 
434.  
 216. See Federal Courts Proclamation Re-amendment of 2005, Article 2(1), 
Proclamation No. 454, Negarit Gazeta, Year 11, No. 42 (Eth.), available at
http://ethiopianlaw.weebly.com/uploads/5/5/7/6/5576668/proc_no._454-2005_federal_courts 
_proclamation_reamendment_.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).  
 217. Id.
 218. See Muradu Abdo, Review of Decisions of State Courts Over State Matters by the 
Federal Supreme Court, 1 MIZAN L. REV. 66ff (2007). See also Kalkidan Aberra, Precedent 
in the Ethiopian Legal System, 2 ETH. J. L. EDUC. 1, 23ff (2009). 
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of taxpayers to challenging the actions of tax authorities only when the 
actions have something to do with tax assessment.219 The jurisdiction of the 
Review Committee is limited to reviewing requests by taxpayers to 
compromise penalties, interest, and tax liabilities—which are all related to 
assessments by the tax authorities. The jurisdiction of the Tax Appeal 
Commission is also limited to reviewing appeals from the assessment of tax 
by the Tax Administration or the decisions of the Review Committee. The 
Courts are limited to reviewing these decisions for errors of law only.  
From this restrictive channel of dispute settlement in taxation, we may be 
inclined to conclude that all disputes in taxation have something to do with 
tax assessments. Tax disputes are not confined to tax assessments. Some 
disputes may have nothing to do whatever with tax assessments. Taxpayers 
may wish to challenge the “legality” of tax directives. It may be that the 
conventional tax dispute settlement channels are never meant to 
accommodate disputes arising from the exercise of so many discretionary 
powers by the tax authorities. Even in other tax systems, these rights to 
challenge decisions of the tax authorities other than those related to tax 
assessments are often clarified and stipulated in other laws, like 
administrative and constitutional laws. We may take the U.K. and 
Australian tax systems for illustration.  
In the U.K., taxpayers may challenge the actions of tax authorities on 
grounds of “illegality,” “procedural impropriety,” or “irrationality.”220 These 
kinds of disputes follow the ordinary dispute settlement schemes for 
administrative disputes.221 Under Australian legal system, the actions of the 
tax authorities may be reviewed on grounds of “denial of natural justice,” 
“failure to observe required procedures,” “lack of jurisdiction or authority,” 
“an exercise of the power for improper purpose,” “the making of an error of 
law,” “a decision based upon irrelevant consideration.”222 Taxpayers have 
additional opportunities to challenge tax authorities before the office of the 
ombudsperson.223
As far as the right to judicial review is concerned, it is not yet clear if 
Ethiopian taxpayers can raise objections to, say, tax directives, and where 
they can go to raise objections. To date, none of the innumerable tax 
directives issued by the Ministry of Finance and ERCA have faced any 
challenges on grounds of being ultra vires. However, a recent case before 
Ethiopian courts, though not on tax directives, promises that Ethiopian 
 219. All cases that appear before courts have something to do with assessment; there 
have never been cases challenging the other actions of the tax authorities. Interview with Ato 
Mustafa Ahmed, Federal High Court, Tax Division (June 22, 2010). 
 220. See TILEY, supra note 197. 
 221. Id.
 222. COOPER, supra note 197, at 895. 
 223. Id.
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courts might be open to challenges to directives.224 It is also legally possible 
to bring these kinds of challenges to the Ethiopian Office of Ombudsperson, 
which has the authority, among others, “to supervise that administrative 
directives . . . by executive organs . . . do not contravene the constitutional 
rights of citizens and the law. . . .”225 However, the fact that no cases have 
yet been filed in this regard shows how narrowly tax disputes are viewed in 
Ethiopia.  
CONCLUSION AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
With all its imperfections, there is a system underlying all of the taxes in 
Ethiopia. This article has attempted to bring to light the patterns that 
undergird the Ethiopian tax system, albeit through the prisms of tax systems 
elsewhere. It was the modest aim of this article to go beyond the usual 
suspects—tax proclamations and tax regulations- to understand how the 
system works from top to bottom. In all candor, many aspects of the 
Ethiopian tax system are yet to be worked out and some recent 
developments promise that the system is working on some of its gaps. 
Having said that, however, there is still a long way to go before we spell and 
pronounce every word in the “Ethiopian tax system.” The attempt to look at 
the system as a whole should not blind us to the major gaps of the Ethiopian 
tax system. We can only mention here some of major gaps and problems of 
the Ethiopian tax system. 
The first problem is the accessibility of tax laws. This problem is not 
limited to tax laws, of course, but because of the nature of taxes the problem 
is more pronounced. The first problem of accessibility is the whole 
organization of tax laws. The legislative field of taxes is so chaotic and 
disorganized that it is difficult for an average taxpayer to have a clear idea 
of her obligations under the various tax laws of Ethiopia. There are many 
pieces of legislation for one tax type of tax alone. Amendments are made 
piecemeal, and the tax administration has so far made no attempt to 
organize these systematically and logically in order to make them accessible 
and intelligible to taxpayers.  
 224. See National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) v. Hibret Bank S.C., Ato Iyesuswork Zafu, 
and Workshet Bekele Demissie, Federal Supreme Court, Cassation Division File No. 44226, 
Tahsas 15, 2003 E.C., in Amharic, unpublished. In this case, the respondents challenged a 
directive issued by the National Bank of Ethiopia as ultra vires, and the lower courts 
concurred with their arguments, but the Cassation Division of the Supreme Court overruled 
the decisions of the lower courts in the regard, holding that directives can override an earlier 
Proclamation as long these directives are issued pursuant to the power given in a later 
Proclamation.  
 225. See Institution of the Ombudsman Establishment of Ethiopia of 2000, Article 
6(1), Proclamation No. 211, Negarit Gazeta, Year 6, No. 41. 
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The other problem on the subject of accessibility is that some of the laws 
are not available in official publications. Although the law requires 
publication of all laws of the Federal Government in the Federal Negarit 
Gazeta, directives and other subsidiary legislations have stopped coming 
through the Negarit Gazeta. In the old times, even appointments of public 
officials and some other weighty notices were published in the Negarit 
Gazeta. Nowadays, all we get from the Negarit Gazeta are Proclamations 
and Regulations. A large body of rules issuing from different administrative 
agencies is simply kept in the files of the respective agencies with the public 
kept in the dark about the extent and content of these directives. To their 
credit, the Ethiopian Tax Authorities have put most of the directives 
online,226 but how many people know that these directives are available 
online and how many in Ethiopia have access to the internet to be able to 
access these directives? Since these are official documents, the proper place
for them is the official gazette for legal publications- Negarit Gazeta. The 
least the Ethiopian Tax Administration can do for taxpayers is to publish 
them in the Negarit Gazeta. Of course, it should do more than that. It should 
provide a compendium of all tax legislations and regulations in force, with 
updates on regular basis.  
Another area of concern is the issue of delegation of taxing authority to 
unrepresentative administrative agencies. There can be little question that 
administrative agencies should have rule-making power. The only question 
is whether administrative agencies should have wide discretion and be able 
to determine whether one should pay tax or not, or by what rate one should 
pay tax. Great historical battles (from the Magna Carta onwards) were 
fought on this question of whether unrepresentative branches of government 
can impose taxes or exercise the power of exemption. Blanket exemption 
powers are often delegated to executive bodies with little restraint over how 
these important powers are exercised in practice. These exemption powers 
have far-reaching implications on the equitability of the tax system in 
general and must not be seen lightly. Tax laws that delegate to the executive 
the power to define the nature and the rate of taxes are even more of a 
concern than those that grant the executive the power to grant tax 
exemptions.  
Tax directives (in all forms) have proliferated in recent times. The size of 
directives is estimated to be three times thicker than the tax proclamations 
and tax regulations. The subject matter of directives is as diverse as the 
number of directives out there. We must recognize that directives affect the 
lives of taxpayers as much as (if not more than) tax proclamations and 
regulations. Their numbers and volumes are only going to increase as the 
Ethiopian tax administration gains experience and resources. It is therefore 
about time that we direct our attention to directives- the procedures, the 
 226. Information is available at ETHIOPIAN REVENUES AND CUSTOMS AUTHORITY,
www.erca.gov.et (last visited June 18, 2011). 
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issuing authorities, and the like. Except in some purely technical matters, 
directives should be preceded by consultative forums and invite comments 
from the taxpaying community and even think-tanks (if there are any in the 
tax field) before they are written into law. Consultations overcome many a 
rancor and create a tax compliance environment based on voluntary 
compliance rather than compulsion.  
The role of the Ethiopian Tax Administration in the area of facilitating 
uniform interpretation of tax laws through such tools like advance rulings or 
letters and manuals has been quite negligible. If anything, the Ethiopian Tax 
Administration has been tentative, sometimes making forays into the field 
and then ceasing these kinds of services to the taxpaying community. Much 
of it is understandable, given the resource constraints of the Ethiopian Tax 
Administration. Again as the authority gains in strength (as it should), it 
should take advantage of these avenues of “tax awareness” and facilitate 
“voluntary compliance” by taxpayers as its goal is or should be. 
More importantly, the status of advance rulings and other subsidiary 
legal documents should be clarified. How much can taxpayers really rely 
upon the advance rulings of the Tax Authority in their future dealings? A 
strong tradition of challenging the procedures and rules of the Tax Authority 
has not taken root in Ethiopia, with the result that we do not know how 
courts will view some trailblazing administrative developments, particularly 
in the area of advance rulings.  
The channels of tax dispute settlement seem to restrict the appeal process 
to cases having something to do with assessment by the Tax Authority. This 
has the tendency of discouraging taxpayers from challenging the actions of 
the Tax Authority that are not in the nature of assessment. There is a 
plethora of directives issuing from the Tax Authority in recent times. These 
directives affect the rights and obligations of taxpayers in one way or 
another. Taxpayers should be able to challenge these directives, their 
legality and consistency with higher laws.  
Almost all cases that appear before the Tax Appeal Commission and the 
courts have been in reaction to assessment of tax and of penalties. It is 
surmised that the tax laws may have been responsible for this state of 
affairs. Even if a taxpayer contemplates challenging the other actions of the 
Tax Authority, she would not know where to start and to go. A strong 
tradition of judicial review of administrative directives, interpretations, and 
actions has not developed in Ethiopia to give taxpayers the opportunity to 
challenge the tax authorities on matters that have little to do with tax 
assessments. Although this is not a matter of taxation per se, the need for 
administrative law and procedure in order to challenge the various actions 
of the tax authorities is probably more urgently felt in taxation than in any 
other area of governmental action. 
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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the term “nuclear disarmament” within Art. VI of 
the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and it offers 
a new interpretation that accepts as compliance a full spectrum of partial 
disarmament steps. Historically, the U.S. legal position has emphasized the 
view that the NPT fails to require more than the pursuit of nuclear 
disarmament talks. This view has contributed to a disarmament process that 
many states characterize as too slow and too slight. This Article proposes 
that a shift in emphasis, from an occasional pursuit of negotiations, to a 
more ongoing and detailed discussion of potential measures, should 
neutralize this complaint and yet preserve U.S. flexibility. This outcome 
would better position the U.S. to address its most urgent nonproliferation 
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concerns. In short, this Article examines a term that American scholars and 
practitioners have neglected in an important respect, and it provides an 
understanding of that term beyond what other legal writers have offered, 
with significant diplomatic and strategic implications.  
INTRODUCTION
From the vantage point of 2011, a torrent of nuclear arms curtailment 
proposals now surges forth from a series of news articles penned by four 
distinguished statesmen.1 Though radical, the principles enumerated therein 
have since gained currency across the political spectrum, in the U.S. and 
abroad.2 Such momentum3 offers perhaps some hope for movement on our 
most urgent nonproliferation matters.4 This paper explores the important 
linkage between the success of U.S. nonproliferation efforts and the 
perception of U.S. conduct under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT).5
This linkage has two aspects. First, other states find it difficult to support 
U.S. nonproliferation efforts, because America is perceived as avoiding its 
 1. See MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, A SKEPTIC’S CASE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 1-2, 
145 n.1 (2010) (describing the Global Zero movement initiated by one hundred signatories in 
Paris in 2009, President Obama’s 2009 speech on in Prague, U.S. and Russian reductions 
under the New START Treaty, and an arguably lesser reliance on nuclear forces in the April 
2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review). See, e.g., George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. 
Kissinger & Sam Nunn, A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007, at 
A15; Shultz et al., Toward A Nuclear-Free World, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008, at A13; 
Shultz, et al., How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2010, at A17; 
Shultz et al., Deterrence In The Age of Nuclear Proliferation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2011, at 
A15.  
 2. See Strobe Talbot, Foreword to O’HANLON, supra note 1, at 3. 
 3. See Compliance and Growth—NPT Review Conferences—2010 REVIEW
Conference, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter04_01.html#2010 (last visited April 6, 
2011) (“While some disappointment continues to exist . . . with regard to lack of a more 
concrete commitment . . . , it was obvious that the change of U.S. policy was directly 
reflected in the result of the disarmament action agenda. Moreover, pursuing policies to 
achieve a world without nuclear weapons was articulated in the first action item.”).  
 4. See, e.g., Karen DeYoung, Pakistan Doubles Its Arsenal: As India is Surpassed 
by Rival, U.S. Faces a Diplomatic Quandary, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2011, A1, 10 (discussing 
the South Asian arms race; U.S. economic, political, and defense ties with India; the 
Pakistani role in the U.S. war in Afghanistan; and U.S. nonproliferation concerns) 
(“Adoption of . . . the ‘fissile materials cutoff treaty’ . . . requires international consensus . . . 
[and] ‘[p]atience is running out.’”).  
 5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 
1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR 
AND CONTEST: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 529 (2008) (“The states of 
consent must conform their strategic behavior to the rule of law; and the law to which they 
conform must be reformed to take into account changes in the strategic context.”). This 
linkage reflects “the growing union of strategy and law,” despite the emphasis, here, on 
clarification rather than reform. Id. at 545.  
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own disarmament obligations under NPT Article VI.6 Second, negotiated 
reductions and other measures not only satisfy such obligations, but 
diminish the probability of accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized use.7 Thus, 
properly understood, Article VI contains the key not only to removal of this 
diplomatic stumbling block but to an improved security environment.8
Indeed, this paper will consider the impact of such measures on U.S. 
alliances and security guarantees, recalling that the status quo carries its 
own pronounced risks.9
Here, it is necessary to emphasize four limitations to the scope of this 
undertaking. First, this paper does not argue that satisfaction of the 
complaint of U.S. non-performance under the NPT will beget automatic 
progress on U.S. nonproliferation concerns. However, it should neutralize 
that complaint, which has been used with some success to deflect U.S. 
nonproliferation concerns.10 Thus, to the extent that the U.S. can be seen as 
living up to its obligations under the NPT, the odds of addressing U.S. 
nonproliferation concerns necessarily improve. 
Second, this paper’s investigation into the meaning and interpretation of 
Article VI is not, in an important sense, complete. Though authoritative, the 
sources canvassed in support of this interpretation are limited to those 
printed in the English language, while the Chinese, French, Russian, and 
Spanish versions of the treaty are equally authoritative.11 Nevertheless, the 
interpretation set forth here must inform subsequent Article VI analysis.12
Third, though the “nuclear disarmament” prong of Art. VI has not 
received intense scrutiny, the same cannot be said for Article VI as a 
whole.13 Rather than recast the entire provision, this paper seeks instead to 
clarify this particular facet. Fourth, the conclusions reached in this paper are 
 6. Andrew Grotto, Why Do States That Oppose Nuclear Proliferation Resist New 
Nonproliferation Obligations?: Three Logics of Nonproliferation Decision-making, 18 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 5 (2010); Graham Allison, Thinking About Zero, in
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION 5, 10 (2010) Shultz et al., Deterrence In 
The Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1, at 2. 
 7. Shultz, et al., Deterrence In The Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1, at 2. 
 8. See Allison, Thinking About Zero, supra note 6, at 11 (“To be preferable to the 
current path, an alternative has only to have a higher expected value than the near certainty 
of the spread and use of nuclear weapons in regional wars and by terrorists . . . .”). 
 9. See Shultz et al., Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1, at 
1 (“It is not possible to replicate the high-risk stability that prevailed between the two nuclear 
superpowers during the Cold War . . . . The growing number of nations with nuclear arms 
and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and 
increased instability.”). 
 10. See Allison, supra note 6, at 10.  
 11. NPT, supra note 5, art. XI. 
 12. The English version is, after all, authoritative in its own right. 
 13. See, e.g., Christopher A. Ford, Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of 
the NPT, 14 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 3 (2007); David Koplow, Parsing Good Faith: Has 
the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?, 1993 WIS. L.
REV. 301 (1993). 
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aimed to encourage, but not resolve, the inquiry into how much 
nonproliferation progress to expect in return for reductions of varying sizes. 
With these objectives and limits in mind, Part II will introduce the NPT, 
posit an interpretation of Article VI, and summarize the implications of this 
interpretation for recent and longstanding nonproliferation initiatives, U.S. 
security guarantees, and U.S. strategy going forward. Part III subjects this 
interpretation to legal analysis under relevant principles of international law. 
Part IV concludes with a final, overarching policy rationale for accepting 
some meaningful reduction in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Basic Bargain in the NPT 
Signed in 1968, the NPT entered into force in 1970. “The basic pact is 
simple: 183 nations have pledged never to acquire nuclear weapons; in 
addition, the five nuclear powers recognized by the treaty . . . have 
committed to reduce and eventually eliminate their arsenals.”14 Though the 
draft originally tabled by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. lacked a provision so 
committing the nuclear-weapon-states (NWS), Mexico and other non-
nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS) insisted on the inclusion of one.15 Thus, 
both NWS and NNWS have obligations under the treaty.16
B. The Meaning of “nuclear disarmament” in Article VI  
Article VI provides that “[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation 
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on 
a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.”17 On its face, Article VI applies to all states parties, 
which undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to, among other things, “nuclear disarmament.” As a state party to 
the NPT, therefore, the U.S. must pursue talks on measures relating to 
nuclear disarmament.18 To the extent it does not, America will find itself in 
 14. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 30 (2007); but c.f. Memorandum from Spurgeon Keeny for Dr. Henry Kissinger 
(Jan. 24, 1969) (on file with U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Historian), 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve02/d2 (describing Article VI as 
“an essentially hortatory statement”).  
15. CIRINCIONE, supra note 14, at 30-31.  
 16. See id. 
 17. NPT supra note 5, art. VI. 
 18. “Negotiations” and “good faith” are terms of art in this context. See generally 
Scott Sagan, Good Faith and Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, in ABOLISHING NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS: A DEBATE 203 (George Perkovich and James Acton eds., Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace 2009). 
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potentially unsanctioned noncompliance, availing its opponents of a similar 
foothold. The task, then, is to determine the meaning of “nuclear 
disarmament” and what conduct will satisfy its strictures, to deprive states 
parties of such traction.  
In usual parlance, “nuclear disarmament” is susceptible to at least two 
meanings: it can refer to one or more acts of partial disarmament, or to an 
end state of total disarmament. Article VI allows for both, for the following 
reasons. Total disarmament requires, as a practical matter, prior acts of 
partial disarmament.19 Moreover, the notion that partial measures might be 
recognized as necessary but insufficient to satisfy Article VI contravenes its 
very text, which merely requires the good faith negotiation of “effective 
measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament.” One cannot well argue that 
“measures relating to … nuclear disarmament” exclude negotiated, effective 
partial disarmament steps.  
This paper provides legal grounds for ensuring satisfaction of Article VI 
through negotiated reductions in nuclear armament. Such reductions might 
aim for fewer total warheads, fewer weapons on alert status, and lower 
overkill ratios. Compliance with Article VI does not demand total 
disarmament. To be sure, total disarmament would satisfy the “nuclear 
disarmament” prong of Article VI, but other disarmament measures can do 
so as well. With such common-sense legal support, and the prospect of 
further reductions, a political commitment to achieve greater progress in this 
area, and the current record of U.S. disarmament,20 this interpretation should 
enjoy a substantial probability of widespread acceptance by other states.  
Part III subjects this interpretation to the necessary legal analysis, but for 
now it is useful to acknowledge its security and policy implications. Besides 
contributing to the disposal of unwanted diplomatic baggage, these 
measures hold additional strategic implications that deserve mention. They 
doubtless affect recent and longstanding nonproliferation efforts, bi- and 
multilateral security relationships, and U.S. grand strategy. It should go 
without saying that the wisdom of the proposals enumerated here depends 
on whether the benefit they stand to produce overwhelms any detriment in 
these areas.  
C. Implications for Nonproliferation Initiatives 
To begin with, the impact of reductions and this interpretation of Article 
VI on longstanding nonproliferation efforts, such as the Comprehensive 
 19. Logically, the former cannot occur without the latter.  
 20. Allison, Thinking About Zero, at 13 (“Since these arsenals peaked at more than 
68,000 during the Cold War, they have been cut by almost two-thirds to approximately 
23,000 warheads today. The New START Treaty . . . will reduce active strategic warheads to 
1,550 on each side. . . . “). 
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Test Ban Treaty21 and the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty,22 should 
prove positive. Following through on partial reductions should help sustain 
momentum. Moreover, the prospect of concluding these treaties should take 
some pressure off of total nuclear disarmament for a meaningful period of 
time. However, balance is critical. The faster that reductions take place, the 
more reluctant states may grow with respect to progress on the CTBT and 
FMCT, for the simple reason that governments may prefer to preserve 
flexibility.23 This tension takes on special significance for those trying to 
chart a course to a world without nuclear weapons.24
The interpretation of Article VI espoused in this paper should not 
negatively impact the thrust of Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn’s 
proposal, for the simple reason that both are realistic, pragmatic, and 
carefully wrought. Indeed, a trajectory of partial disarmament steps and 
reductions is most of what these statesmen seek.25 Moreover, their “vision” 
of zero nuclear weapons is better understood as a vehicle for lessening 
present danger than as a short-term objective.26
In addition, they wish to ensure the quality of existing nuclear stockpiles, 
which grows all the more important as reductions occur.27 Further, the 
difficulty of practical maneuvers that must occur closer to zero should not 
 21. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439 
[hereinafter CTBT]. 
 22. See, e.g., Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/db/china/fmctorg.htm [hereinafter FMCT]. 
 23. Fred C. Iklé, Nuclear Abolition, A Reverie, NATIONAL INTEREST, Aug. 25, 2009, 
at 4-5, (“[O]nce the largest nuclear arsenals have been shrunk so much, the small arsenals of 
North Korea, Iran and other countries will become a more powerful military asset.”). 
 24. Indeed, Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn state that “as long as nuclear weapons 
exist, America must retain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear stockpile primarily to deter 
attack and to reassure our allies through extended deterrence.” Shultz et al., Deterrence In 
The Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1. Admittedly, this statement creates some 
circularity: nuclear weapons will exist as long as America retains such a stockpile, and as 
long as America retains a stockpile, nuclear weapons will exist. To be fair, prior liquidation 
of others’ nuclear weapons dismisses this conceptual difficulty, but not the practical one.  
 25. Shultz et al., A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1 (“Although 
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid 
of all nuclear weapons, they did . . . initiate[] steps leading to significant reductions in 
deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire 
class of threatening missiles. What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and 
Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical 
steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address 
the challenge posed by these two questions.” Id.
 26. Id. (“Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or 
urgent.”); see also Shultz et al., Toward A Nuclear-Free World, supra note 1 (quoting then-
Foreign Secretary of the U.K. Margaret Beckett: “‘What we need is both a vision—a 
scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons—and action—progressive steps to reduce 
warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two 
strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing.’”). 
 27. If we have fewer on which to depend, they better function well. See generally 
Shultz et al., How To Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent, supra note 1.  
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stall current progress on the margins.28 Finally, their observation that 
nuclear weapons failed to deter major wars during the Cold War, and their 
concordant willingness to explore “[t]he role of non- nuclear means of 
deterrence to … prevent conflict and increase stability in troubled regions . . 
.[,]” demonstrate a clear-eyed appreciation for the importance of security 
relationships and other means of projecting power to international relations, 
and by extension, this endeavor.29 Forewarning that the U.S. “must not 
reduce its nuclear forces too fast” is hardly inconsistent with this proposal.30
D. Implications for International Security Arrangements 
The implications of reductions and Article VI compliance are perhaps 
more significant regarding security relationships. U.S. security guarantees 
and alliances played a leading role in persuading other states to forego 
nuclear weapons in the first place.31 For states in strategically important 
regions plagued by violent conflict, a diminution in U.S. nuclear capabilities 
could reverse this state of affairs.32 Reductions must not risk the tremendous 
worth of these relationships.33 However, extending security guarantees to 
problem states could spur progress in key regions, such as South Asia, 
Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East.34 That said, such an 
extension could stress existing relationships, perhaps to their breaking point. 
As such, the value of reductions and the value of additional security 
guarantee vary directly with how successful existing and emerging great 
powers are in coordinating their efforts.35 Also, increasing multi-polarity 
could very well complicate matters.36 Great powers will tend to avoid 
 28. See supra notes 23-25; see generally Shultz et al., Deterrence in the Age of 
Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1 (discussing the importance of fewer nuclear materials 
across the board to: diminished first-strike incentives; and lower probability of catastrophe 
due to accident, mistake, and terror). 
 29. Shultz et al., Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1. 
 30. Iklé, supra note 23, at 3; see infra text accompanying note 116.  
 31. See CIRINCIONE, supra note 14, at 31, 54, 104.  
 32. See Joseph Nye, Jr., Op-Ed., Obama’s Nuclear Agenda, DAILY TIMES (Pakistan), 
Oct. 13, 2009.  
 33. See CIRINCIONE, supra note 14, at 54-55. 
 34. See Iklé, supra note 23, at 3 (“Our diplomacy might have to insulate states from 
nuclear warfare.”). 
 35. See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 79 (1994) (describing Great Power 
coordination after the Congress of Vienna, where “Europe experienced the longest period of 
peace it had ever known. No war at all took place among the Great Powers for forty years, 
and after the Crimean War in 1854, no general war for another sixty.”); see also Shultz et al., 
Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation , supra note 1 (“Achieving deterrence with 
assured security will require work by leaders and citizens on a range of issues . . . . Changes 
to extended deterrence must be developed over time by the U.S. and allies working closely 
together. Reconciling national perspectives on nuclear deterrence is a challenging problem, 
and comprehensive solutions must be developed.”). 
 36. See Shultz, et al., Deterrence In The Age of Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 1. 
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security arrangements that impinge on what they perceive as their spheres of 
interest. Furthermore, great powers’ regional security interests are not 
always reconcilable. To the extent such tendencies block desirable security 
arrangements in a particular region, limited NWS arms reductions may 
prove the ceiling—and not a gateway—for nonproliferation progress.37
Multi-polarity also begs serious questions as to the wisdom of nuclear 
arms curtailment in general. One might plausibly wonder how America can 
afford to relinquish any nuclear weapons when and as the potential for great 
power conflict may be increasing.38 Yet, the differential between American 
and competing nuclear arsenals is, as of this moment, so wide that the U.S. 
can presently afford to trade weapons for the opportunity to favorably 
circumscribe the future nuclear field of action.39 Therefore, limited 
reductions should proceed in the near-term, with the prospect of deeper 
reductions in the future depending, among other things, on the effectiveness 
of great power coordination.40
As stated at the outset, this section has posited a general interpretation of 
Article VI, and paused to consider its implications for various 
nonproliferation initiatives, recent and longstanding. In addition, it has 
touched upon concerns that reductions pose for existing U.S. security 
guarantees. Part III subjects Article VI to interpretation under international 
law, and it is that discussion to which we now turn.  
II. DISCUSSION
Preliminarily, the objective of any attempt to interpret a provision of an 
international convention is to decide, as would an independent international 
tribunal.41 Of course, for the purpose of achieving some level of certainty 
with respect to an agreed upon provision, states parties would generally not 
wish to place the full weight of their respective obligations on the discretion 
 37. This is not to say that grounds do not exist for such progress. See PHILIP 
BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 312 (2002) 
(“More than any other state in the world, [China] has grounds for alarm at the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.”).  
 38. Although what states are and are not so-called “great powers” is susceptible to 
reasoned disagreement, Michael Klare considers the following either existing or evolving 
great powers: China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, the U.S. See generally 
MICHAEL T. KLARE, RISING POWERS, SHRINKING PLANET (2008).  
 39. This is arguably the most fundamental point made by Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, 
and Nunn. It might be argued further that U.S. superiority will not prove so enduring as to 
recommend against looking for ways to convert it into real security gain. See infra text 
accompanying note 116.  
 40. See BOBBITT, supra note 37, at 160-75; see also KISSINGER, supra note 35, at 76-
77, 78-102. 
 41. RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 110 (2008) (“The test which 
many lawyers use in giving advice on matters of international law is what an independent 
tribunal would find the law to be.”). 
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of such a tribunal.42 It would be preferable that the content of a provision 
would flow as much as possible from the direct application of settled 
principles of treaty interpretation.43 Though elusive, this ideal should prove 
useful to bear in mind while applying the rules of interpretation found in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).44
A. Applicability and Rules of the Vienna Convention  
Although applicability of the VCLT to agreements concluded by the U.S. 
government is not in every case a certainty, it is generally perceived as 
such.45 The VCLT provides that pacta sunt servanda: “treaties are binding 
on the parties and must be performed in good faith.”46 Further, Articles 31 
and 32 set forth explicit rules of interpretation. Article 31 provides, in 
relevant part, the general rule that a treaty must be interpreted “in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”47 The “context” 
comprises the treaty’s text, preamble, and annexes.48 In addition, “any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions . . . shall be taken into account, 
together with the context.”49
For its part, Article 32 lists “supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion.”50 Such means may be used to either “confirm the meaning 
resulting from . . . Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to Article 31 . . . leaves [it] ambiguous or obscure; 
or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”51 Notably, 
parties’ preference for certainty corresponds with an implicit partiality 
 42. See id. at 29 (describing the VCLT as providing a nuanced “single route” to a 
hard conclusion, as regards treaty interpretation).  
 43. See id.
 44. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. Notably, the U.S. is not party to the VCLT; however, the U.S. views 
much of it as customary international law. Office of the Legal Advisor, Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited July 13, 2011). 
 45. See BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & CURTIS A BRADLEY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-96 (4th ed., 2003) [hereinafter CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
LAW]. Moreover, applicability of the VCLT is “axiomatic” in cases before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as arbitral bodies 
constituted under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See GARDINER,
supra note 41, at 15.  
 46. See CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 104 (citing VCLT art. 26).  
 47. VCLT supra note 44, art. 31. 
 48. Id.
 49. Id.
 50. Id., art. 32.  
 51. Id.
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within the VCLT for relying principally on the general rule in Article 31.52
To that end, the operation of Article 31 is one of “progressive 
encirclement,”53 or a cycle through considerations of ordinary meaning, 
context, and the treaty’s object and purpose, which iteratively closes in upon 
the proper interpretation.54 Thus, the terms and their ordinary meaning are 
“the starting point” the context “moderat[es] selection of that meaning;” and 
“the object and purpose illuminat[e] the process.”55
Returning to the provision at hand, Article VI provides: “Each of the 
Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”56 A natural 
reading reveals an undertaking with the following structure:57
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith 
• on effective measures relating  
– to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and  
– to nuclear disarmament, and  
• on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control. 
The use of the prepositions “to” and “on” renders this sensible.58 In 
addition, that a comma separates out the undertaking to pursue negotiations 
in good faith “on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament” means 
that that undertaking must be distinguished from the pursuit of good faith 
negotiations “on effective measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament.” 
Though the meaning of Article VI in its entirety is in one sense beyond the 
 52. The VCLT does not in all cases privilege any of the factors within Article 31 or 
32, except that Article 31 provides the initial inquiry, while Article 32 provides secondary 
“supplementary means.” See GARDINER, supra note 41, at 10; see also infra text 
accompanying notes 91-92. 
 53. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 141-42.  
 54. Id.
 55. Id. at 144.  
 56. NPT, supra note 5, art. VI. 
 57. According to the principle of “actuality” or “textuality,” treaties are to be 
interpreted primarily as they stand, and on the basis of their actual texts. GARDINER, supra 
note 41, at 63-64. Similarly, “the principle of natural and ordinary meaning” provides for 
words and phrases to be given their normal, natural and unstrained meaning. Id.
 58. Though not to be exclusively relied upon, grammar and syntax can prove 
essential to interpretation. See id. at 178, 187. Cf. Review Conference of the Parties to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 5-30, 1975, Final Document, at 7, 
U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF /35/I, Annex I (May 30, 1975), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/1975%20-%20Geneva%20-
%20NPT%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Part%20I.pdf 
[hereinafter NPT 1975 Final Document]. 
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scope of this paper, the relation of the term “nuclear disarmament” to the 
Article as a whole nonetheless affects its meaning.  
B. VCLT Article 31—Ordinary Meaning and Context 
Applying Article 31, the ordinary meaning of “nuclear disarmament” 
could be two different things: (1) disarmament of the entirety of the parties’ 
nuclear weapons arsenals; or (2) the act of disarming such arsenals.59
“Nuclear disarmament” could therefore require negotiations of total nuclear 
disarmament, partial disarmament steps, or both. If both, then the good faith 
pursuit of negotiations on effective measures relating to either one could 
satisfy the “nuclear disarmament” component of Article VI.60 Here, 
therefore, is the VCLT’s “starting point.”61 The next task is to examine as 
context the remaining treaty language to “moderate” that meaning.62
Looking to the remainder of the NPT, no other article sheds light on the 
meaning of “nuclear disarmament.” Article VII provides that nothing in the 
NPT affects the right of any states parties to conclude other regional treaties 
“to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories.”63 “Total absence” indicates a permissible objective but of other 
treaties, not the NPT or Article VI in particular. While it would be strange 
to permit an objective inconsistent with the purposes of the NPT, the 
conclusion of regional nuclear-free zones is not necessarily inconsistent 
with a requirement that states parties engage in disarmament steps. Thus, we 
are left with the Preamble.64
 59. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 161 (“The difficulty [with ordinary meaning] is that 
almost any word has more than one meaning. The word ‘meaning’ itself has at least sixteen 
different meanings.”). Nevertheless, “[o]ne has to start somewhere . . . [and this] almost 
axiomatically involves giving them the meaning which the reader takes to be usual.” Id. at 
162.  
 60. That “nuclear disarmament” is a disjunctive requirement that obliges states to 
engage in either partial or total disarmament is crucial in this regard. If the term were 
conjunctive, that is, if both total disarmament and partial disarmament were necessary to 
satisfy this requirement, there would be no point in allowing room for partial disarmament in 
the first place. Accordingly, the very allowance of partial disarmament measures entails that 
either total or partial measures satisfy this prong of Article VI.  
 61. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 62. See id.; see also GARDINER, supra note 41, 59-60, 63 (discussing the primacy of 
the text, and, the context as extending beyond a particular part of the instrument to the whole 
instrument). 
 63. NPT, supra note 5, art. VII.  
 64. The NPT itself lacks annexes, rendering that source of interpretation under 
VCLT Article 31 inapplicable in this case. It is also important to note that a preamble 
typically lacks specific, legally binding obligations, containing instead aspirational 
statements relating to performance of the obligations set forth in the body of the treaty. See 
VCLT, supra note 44, art. 31(2); see also DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR 
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 29 (2011).  
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The pertinent preambular language includes a declaration of “intention to 
achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the arms race and to 
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.”65
Thus, the states parties declared their intent to stop the arms race and to take 
measures “in the direction of nuclear disarmament.” Certainly, “measures in 
the direction of nuclear disarmament” cannot be read to exclude reductions 
in nuclear armament. More broadly, this declaration of intent cannot but 
reflect a precise understanding of the states parties at signing, that 
intermediate steps would be required before reaching an end state of total 
nuclear disarmament. Finally, although “nuclear disarmament,” here, could 
very well refer exclusively to this end state, it could just as well refer to 
partial reductions.  
The preamble also includes a desire to “facilitate . . . the liquidation of all 
. . . existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear 
weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control . . . . “ 
To be sure, this language provides much to analyze, but for now it suffices 
to observe (1) that the states parties explicitly included their desire to 
achieve total nuclear disarmament, and (2) that this statement used terms 
other than “nuclear disarmament.” Thus, this language provides for a 
desirable trajectory and end state, but not necessarily anything more.66
Furthermore, the very different—and physically separate—treatment 
given to “nuclear disarmament” versus “liquidation,” “elimination,” and 
“general and complete disarmament” indicates that these could be 
overlapping but not coextensive or coterminous concepts. Any divergence 
would provide “context” for understanding Article VI, and reflect the two-
fold meaning of “nuclear disarmament” in Article VI. Indeed, this aspect of 
the Preamble could demonstrate that the states parties intended partial 
disarmament steps to satisfy the “nuclear disarmament prong of Article VI.  
C. Object and Purpose 
The object and purpose of the NPT must now be considered to shed 
further light on the ordinary meaning of “nuclear disarmament.” Object and 
purpose are in fact two different things: the former involves the legal rights 
and obligations created under a provision; the latter, the general result that 
the parties want to achieve.67 In divining object and purpose, the whole text 
of the treaty is taken into account.68 To bear on the interpretation of “nuclear 
 65. NPT, supra note 5, pmbl. ¶ 8 (emphasis added).  
 66. See JOYNER, supra note 64 (citing VCLT). 
 67. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 191-92. Importantly, the U.S. does not subscribe to 
this division, viewing the object and purpose as a single, unified consideration. See David S. 
Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive 
Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565 (2010). 
 68. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 192. 
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disarmament,” an exhaustive inquiry into the NPT’s purpose should prove 
unnecessary. The sole question is whether the proposed interpretation of 
“nuclear disarmament” clearly runs afoul of the general result the states 
parties wished to achieve. Here, partial nuclear disarmament would not 
contradict any of the relevant preambular language.69 The question posed 
with regard to the treaty’s object is not so easily disposed of, however.  
A treaty’s object involves the legal bundle of rights and obligations 
agreed to in the particular provisions of a treaty.70 Here, the states parties 
have agreed to some notion of “nuclear disarmament” in Article VI. 
Because this aspect of Article VI is squarely at issue, as an analytical 
matter, consideration of its object within the treaty is too circular to be of 
much use. Put differently, leveraging the nature of an obligation to provide 
context for understanding a particular provision is of no help if the initial 
problem is uncertainty regarding the nature of the obligation. In this 
instance, the uncertainty-generating problem is linguistic: “disarmament” 
cannot be used to clarify the meaning of “disarmament;” we do not yet 
know disarmament’s meaning. Thus, we turn to the final consideration 
under VCLT Article 31.  
D. Subsequent Agreement of the Parties  
A subsequent agreement of the parties can in certain circumstances 
derive an authentic interpretation that must thereafter be read into the initial 
treaty.71 In this case, a review conference has taken place every five years 
since the NPT’s entry into force in 1970. Though states parties did not reach 
consensus in 1980, 1990, 1995, or 2005,72 the documents agreed to in 1975, 
1985, 2000, and 2010 are instructive at least to show political commitment, 
and to “moderate” the ordinary meaning described supra, in addition to the 
NPT’s context and object and purpose.73
The 1975 review conference resulted in various references to Article VI. 
First, the conference expressed its conviction that the objective of 
preventing proliferation remained relevant to averting nuclear war, and that 
“more rapid progress was required towards cessation of the arms race and 
the ‘limitation and reduction of existing nuclear weapons with a view to 
their eventual elimination, pursuant to a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament . . . . ‘“74 Confirming that the parties clearly envisioned partial 
reduction steps in order to reach an end state of nuclear disarmament, the 
conference reaffirmed the undertaking of “effective measures in the 
 69. See NPT, supra note 5, pmbl.  
 70. See GARDINER, supra note 41, at 191-92.  
 71. Id. at 204-05.  
 72. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Compliance and Growth—NPT Review 
Conferences, supra note 3.  
 73. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 74. NPT 1975 Final Document, supra note 58, at 1 (emphasis added).  
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direction of nuclear disarmament.”75 Third, the conference “welcom[ing] 
the various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament . . . over the last 
few years as steps contributing to the implementation of Article VI . . . .” 76
The 1985 review conference called for the “progressive and balanced 
reduction of stockpiles . . . leading to their ultimate and complete 
elimination.”77 In addition, the conference “welcome[d] . . . bilateral 
negotiations . . . [and ] hope[d] that these negotiations will lead to early and 
effective agreements aimed at . . . limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at 
strengthening strategic stability.”78 The conference thus evinced an 
appreciation for the logical progression of partial disarmament reductions 
ultimately leading to total disarmament, as well as an understanding of the 
relevance of strategic stability.  
Although the 1995 review conference failed to yield a consensus-based 
final document, it did produce a “decision” on nuclear disarmament.79 At 
least as a political matter, the conference found important to the full 
implementation of Article VI, “[t]he determined pursuit … of systematic 
and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons . . . with the ultimate 
goals of eliminating those weapons . . . .”80 Thus, the conference considered 
“progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons” critical to 
“implementation” or satisfaction of Article VI. Importantly, this relationship 
of disarmament steps to Article VI compliance received recognition again in 
2000, where the conference took the unusual step of agreeing upon 
“practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement 
article VI . . . .”81
 75. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  
 76. Id. at 7. 
 77. Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, Aug. 27-Sept.21, 1985, Final Document, at 11, U.N. Doc. 
NPT/CONF.III/64/I, Annex I, (Sept. 25, 1985), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/1985%20-%20Geneva%20-
%20NPT%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Part%20I.pdf 
[hereinafter NPT 1985 Final Document]. 
 78. Id. at 13.  
 79. See Compliance and Growth—NPT Review Conferences—1995 Review and 
Extension Conference, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter04_01.html#1995 (last visited April 6, 
2011) (discussing “Decision 2, [the] ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament’”).  
 80. 1995 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, Apr. 17-May 12, 1995, Final Document, at 10, U.N. Doc. 
NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex I, Decision 2 (June 1995), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/1995%20-%20NY%20-
%20NPT%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Part%20I.pdf 
[hereinafter NPT 1995 Final Document]. 
 81. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, April 24-May 19, 2000, Final Document, at 13-15, U.N. Doc. 
NPT/CONF.2000/28, (Parts I and II) (2000),  
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Welcoming what it termed “significant progress achieved in nuclear 
weapons reductions made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear 
disarmament,”82 the conference expressed “deep concern” with the fact that 
“despite the achievements in bilateral and unilateral arms reduction, the 
total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpile still amounts to 
many thousands.”83 More pointedly, however, the conference unveiled a 
disarmament wish list that included thirteen steps, four of which dealt with 
disarmament directly.84 Generally speaking, the conference restated the 
states parties’ “unequivocal undertaking . . . to accomplish the total 
elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament,” while 
calling for “further reduction” and a “process leading to the total elimination 
of . . . nuclear weapons.”85
Finally, the 2010 conference noted again “with concern that the total 
estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts 
to several thousands.”86 On this issue, however, the conference failed to 
achieve consensus on disarmament progress.87 Thus, the Secretary-General 
appended a five-point proposal,88 which included: (1) multilateral 
disarmament efforts, a resumption of U.S.-Russia negotiations aimed at 
achieving deeper and verifiable reductions, and verification research and 
development; (2) P5 discussions of security issues pertinent to the 
disarmament process, such as security assurances for NNWS; (3) 
effectiveness of CTBT, FMCT and IAEA safeguards;89 (4) increased 
accountability and transparency; and (5) complementary measures regarding 
other WMD, terrorism, and conventional arms.90 Clearly undergirding this 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/2000%20%20NY%20-%20NP
T%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Parts%20I%20and%20II.pdf 
[hereinafter NPT 2000 Final Document]. 
 82. Id. at 14.  
 83. Id. at 13.  
 84. See generally id. at 14-15. 
 85. Id. at 14, 15. 
 86. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, May 3-28, 2010, Final Document, at 12, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/50 
(Vol. I), Part I (Jun. 18, 2010), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/ 
CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I) [hereinafter NPT 2010 Final Document]. 
 87. See Compliance and Growth—NPT Review Conferences—2010 Review 
Conference, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapte 
r04_01.html#2010 (last visited April 6, 2011) (discussing the “Review of the operation of the 
Treaty”). 
 88. See id. (discussing the Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for 
nuclear disarmament).  
 89. Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary General, Address to the East-West Institute: The 
United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World (Oct. 24, 2008), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/sg5point.shtml [hereinafter Five Point 
Proposal on Nuclear Disarmament].  
 90. Id.
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proposal is a common understanding that disarmament refers to a process as 
well as an end state.  
E. VCLT Article 32—Supplementary Means  
Last, supplementary means include the preparatory work and the 
circumstances of conclusion of a treaty. Recourse to supplementary means 
of interpretation may be had either in order to confirm a meaning 
determined in accordance with the general rule in Article 31, or, to 
determine the meaning if the general rule leaves the term ambiguous.91 It is 
important to note that international tribunal decision-making in this area has 
proven somewhat opaque. While parties often reference preparatory work, 
and tribunals may call attention to such sources,92 the actual extent of 
tribunals’ reliance on such means is far from clear.93
With respect to the NPT, negotiations on disarmament consisted, more or 
less, of three positions: (1) some states insisted that the treaty list specific 
disarmament obligations binding on NWS;94 (2) other states sought to avoid 
this at all cost;95 and (3) still other states desired to add as much weight to 
the obligation of nuclear disarmament as they could without jeopardizing 
conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty.96 On disarmament, these camps in 
 91. As to whether such recourse may be had, “in almost every case involving the 
interpretation of a treaty, one or both parties seeks to invoke the preparatory work.” 
GARDINER, supra note 41, at 301. However, “[t]hat a word has various dictionary definitions, 
while raising the ordinary notion of ambiguity, does not necessarily mean that there is 
ambiguity in the sense of article 32 of the Vienna Convention.” Id. at 328. “The Vienna rules 
look to ambiguity that remains after the application of the general rule . . . of article 31 . . . . “ 
Id.
 92. See GARDINER, supra note 41, at 301, 337-39. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See U. S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS xi, xiii 
(1969) [hereinafter ACDA Negotiations Summary](discussing the original Sept. 15, 1965 
ENDC joint memorandum calling for “tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race”); see also 
id. at 87 (discussing the Burmese-proposed article containing “tangible steps toward nuclear 
disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban, a fissionable materials production cutoff, a 
halt to weapons production, a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles, and the progressive 
reduction and final destruction of stockpiles”). 
 95. See id. at xv (discussing the U.S. and the Soviet Union’s Jan. 18, 1968 
submission of identical tests of a revised draft treaty with a disarmament article that avoided 
specific disarmament measures); see also id. at 88 (noting the Soviet Ambassador’s 
expressed willingness to negotiate on nuclear disarmament measures, but without linking 
them to the treaty). Further, in response to other calls for disarmament obligations, the Soviet 
Ambassador replied “that there would be ‘definite negative consequences’ in linking 
nonproliferation to complete nuclear disarmament.” Id. at 107.  
 96. See ACDA Negotiations Summary, supra note 94, at 86-87 (discussing the 
Mexican amendment, which, though it listed specific measures, narrowed to an 
“undertak[ing] to negotiate disarmament agreements in the future”). In the Thirteenth 
Session of the ENDC, the conference noted the weakness of Article VI of the revised draft 
treaty, as compared with the Mexican amendment, because it lacked specific disarmament 
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fact entertained an entire spectrum of disarmament obligations, ranging 
from the gradual elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles,97 to a 
manufacture ban,98 total nuclear disarmament,99 and a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament.100 How each of the three negotiating positions 
ultimately came to agree upon the language in the NPT Preamble and 
Article VI is instructive, since each state proffered measures most in line 
with its initial position.  
Part of the explanation for the compromise owes to the allocation of 
bargaining power: all states parties wanted to limit the risk of “nuclear 
catastrophe” that was “bound to increase with every new addition to the 
nuclear club,”101 but the U.S. and the Soviet Union had to agree to whatever 
instrument was intended to achieve this.102 Yet, the nature of disarmament 
obligations entertained by the parties also mattered a great deal. 
Individually, proposed obligations ran the gamut from “complete nuclear 
disarmament”103 to an “undertaking of disarmament,”104 but even states that 
demanded the former recognized from the outset the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of partial disarmament and reductions.105 Thus, such piecemeal 
measures formed part of the very fabric of the bargain reached on July 1, 
1968. 
measures. However, the conference concluded that listing such measures would prove 
“counterproductive.” See id. at 106-07. Most fundamentally, U.S. Ambassador de Palma 
warned against insisting on specific and timely measures to halt vertical proliferation, 
because “[a]t this late stage in our work it would be a rather serious matter if we were asked 
to reopen the choice most of us have already made in deciding to pursue seriously . . . the 
conclusion of this treaty.” Id. at 108.  
 97. Id. at 6.  
 98. Id. at 76. 
 99. ACDA Negotiations Summary, supra note 94, at 86.  
 100. Id. at 86.  
 101. See id. at 123 (describing the United Arab Republic representative’s statements) 
(“Even with the treaty’s limitations, it is rightly assumed that the impact of concluding the 
treaty would have a favourable and far-reaching implication on all future disarmament 
negotiations.”).  
 102. See id. at 117 (The Ethiopian representative faulted, for the shortcomings of the 
treaty, “the world situation” and “the choice . . . ‘between making a little progress or no 
progress at all.’”). 
 103. See id. at 116.  
 104. ACDA Negotiations Summary, supra note 94, at 115.  
 105. See e.g., id. at 119 (While it did not insist on complete disarmament, India did 
not consider Article VI sufficiently strict in its requirement of phased disarmament.); id. at 
118 (The Brazilian Foreign Minister “saw ‘no real tangible commitment’ to nuclear 
disarmament”); id. at 113 (Britain perceived “the preambular declaration of intention on 
disarmament [as] . . . wider than article VI[,]” and thus asked the ACDA to agree that the 
review conferences would “consider whether the purposes of the preamble and the provisions 
of the treaty were [together] being realized.”).  
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F. Summary 
Synthesizing the results reached by applying VCLT Articles 31 and 32 to 
Article VI, the NPT, the product of the review conferences, and the 
preparatory work,106 several conclusions follow: 
i. The ordinary meaning of “nuclear disarmament” and Article VI 
indicate that partial disarmament steps could satisfy Article VI; 
ii. The NPT as context provides evidence that the states parties 
intended partial disarmament measures, in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament, to satisfy the “nuclear disarmament” prong of Article 
VI; 
iii. Partial disarmament measures are implicit in, and not contrary, to the 
NPT’s purpose; 
iv. Nuclear disarmament refers to a process as well as an end state, and 
progress on either front helps satisfy Article VI; 
v. Reductions were originally intended as part of the fabric of Article 
VI and the NPT. 
Thus, this paper’s application of international rules of interpretation comes 
to a close, leaving only the “progressive encirclement” required of an 
independent tribunal.107 Even a quick glance at the conclusions derived 
above reveals but one legitimate interpretation of the term “nuclear 
disarmament.” It encompasses partial as well as total nuclear disarmament. 
Therefore, reductions short of total nuclear disarmament fall within its 
scope and satisfy the “nuclear disarmament” prong of Article VI.108
 106. This section omits reference to “the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion,” 
mainly because the variable is so expansive, referring to the “legal, political, and social” 
background of a treaty. GARDINER, supra note 41, at 60. Arguably, the most major 
circumstance, within this background, was Mexico’s last-minute effort to add substantive 
disarmament measures to Article VI. That such measures were rebuffed reflects Mexico’s 
ultimate satisfaction with the prevailing language of the treaty. See “The Impulse towards a 
Safer World”—40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, July 1, 2008, n.13, 
The Nuclear Vault, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/index.htm (citing MOHAMMED I. SHAKER,
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION, 1959-1979 383 
(1980)). 
 107. See GARDINER, supra note 41, at 41, 59-60, 63, 144. 
 108. See NPT, supra note 5, pmbl.  
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G. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons  
Finally, in handling a matter as delicate as the interpretation of a key 
term in an international agreement, pronouncements of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) on topics relevant to that agreement warrant 
consideration. Indeed, in an oft-cited 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,109 the ICJ offered several such 
pronouncements, including the following unanimous statement: “There 
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion 
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict 
and effective international control.”110 Some consider this an “elaboration” 
on Art. VI;111 others, a call for the opinion’s enforcement.112 Regardless of 
which view prevails, the express objective of “nuclear disarmament in all its 
aspects” hardly forecloses our interpretation of “disarmament.” To the 
contrary, “nuclear disarmament in all its aspects” cannot be read to exclude 
partial disarmament steps that lead to total disarmament.  
Moreover, the real contribution this opinion ostensibly makes to nuclear 
disarmament law is that it “sets forth an obligation to bring the specified 
negotiations to a conclusion.”113 In addition, the opinion does not touch 
upon “general and complete disarmament,” the third objective expressed in 
Art. VI.114 Some leverage this omission to argue that the ICJ intended to 
remove from the field any argument that general and complete disarmament 
might somehow condition nuclear disarmament.115 This may be correct as 
far as it goes, but it merely commences the analysis undertaken in this 
paper. Nuclear disarmament encompasses partial as well as total 
disarmament, and achievement of the latter presupposes the former’s 
occurrence.  
CONCLUSION 
Thus ends the case giving legal scope for the contention that reductions, 
followed through upon, should shift diplomatic pressure onto other states. 
After all, Henry Kissinger once asked, “‘What in the name of God is 
strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, 
 109. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8). 
 110. Id. ¶ 105(F) (cited in NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ILLEGAL: THE HISTORIC OPINION 
OF THE WORLD COURT AND HOW IT WILL BE ENFORCED 76 (Ann Fagan Ginger ed., 1998)). 
 111. VED P. NANDA & DAVID KRIEGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT
113 (1998). 
 112. See NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ILLEGAL, supra note 110, at 12. 
 113. NANDA & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 113 (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. at 113-14.  
 115. Id.
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operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?’”116 This 
is what you do with it: you exchange it for durable security gain.  
Even though strategic superiority can still increase the reluctance of 
potential adversaries to initiate nuclear or other violent conflict, and can still 
achieve actual victory in nuclear or other conflict, it is equally true that 
when the number of nuclear weapons deployed rises high enough, victory in 
nuclear conflict ceases to carry much meaning. Furthermore, above a certain 
threshold, large arsenals can actually destabilize relations between nuclear-
armed states and defeat the very purpose of their deterrent mission. Thus, 
the size and characteristics of a nuclear arsenal matter: appropriate limits 
can preserve victory in some real sense, and they can prevent deterrence 
from breaking down.  
Of course, deterrence and victory still require ab initio a lower number of 
nuclear weapons controlled by hostile entities. The overarching objective is 
strategic superiority at numbers that both preserve deterrence and avoid 
nuclear holocaust. Depending on geopolitical realities, and leaving specific 
numbers for planners, at a minimum, partial disarmament steps should serve 
both victory and deterrence better than an equal measure of arms build-up 
or improvement. In response to very real concerns over giving up too much, 
it is useful to recall that “[w]orld peace [once] hinged on a stable 
relationship between the U.S. and Soviet arsenals, and . . . on apparently 
tiny details.”117 Perhaps coordinated, calculated reductions can take us back 
to an insistence on tiny details, which can drive stability just as it did during 
the Cold War. If so, then Article VI, properly understood, makes it easier 
for states to find it in their interests to observe the NPT.  
Surveying the terrain from this height, specific caps, reciprocal reduction 
ratios, and so on seem to lose much of their meaning, when full stock is 
taken of the sheer magnitude of the geopolitical challenges we confront. 
Threatening nuclear conflict and outwardly impervious to navigation, these 
will prove the crux of the twenty-first century. Though other options must 
not be discounted, clever combinations of nuclear disarmament could open 
a route through.  
 116. NICHOLAS THOMPSON, THE HAWK AND THE DOVE 245 (2009) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Henry Kissinger).  
 117. Id. at 230.  
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According to Greek mythology, Prometheus incurred the wrath of Zeus 
by stealing heavenly fire for men. As a result, Prometheus was chained to 
Caucasus with shackles forged by Hephaestus.2 Every day at noon, 
Prometheus saw his liver, which is a symbol of life in many cultures, 
devoured by an eagle sent by Zeus. At night, Prometheus’s liver would 
regenerate, and on the following day his suffering would start anew. His 
plight only came to an end when Hercules set him free. 
In its first few decades of existence, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), like Prometheus, found itself imprisoned not by the shackles of 
Hephaestus but by the excessive use of veto. Because of this 
“imprisonment,” the UNSC was unable to provide mankind with something 
that could have been as valuable as Prometheus’s fire. With more freedom, 
the UNSC could have helped maintain international peace and security in a 
century plagued by conflicts. Instead, the Council remained inert, and wars 
claimed countless human lives. 
 1. Professor of Law, Federal University of Minas Gerais (Universidade Federal de 
Minas Gerais), Brazil. Ph.D. (International Law), Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil. 
LL.M. (International Trade Law), University of Arizona. The author acknowledges support 
from the Federal University of Minas Gerais..   
 2. See BRANDÃO JUNITO DE SOUZA, MITOLOGIA GREGA 166 (Vozes 18th ed. 
2004).  
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The end of the Cold War set the Council free from the binding power of 
the veto. In the first five decades of the Council’s existence, the veto was 
used 244 times.3 In the following 10 years, the veto was only used on 13 
occasions.4 This new freedom brought forth not only a greater quantity of 
resolutions and actions but also a number of new practices from the UNSC. 
These practices include the extradition of terrorist suspects,5 the 
establishment of international tribunals,6 the creation of a committee to 
demarcate international boundaries,7 the institution of a safe area free from 
any armed attack or any other hostile act,8 the establishment of a military 
flight ban zone,9 and the freezing of funds and other financial assets of 
individuals accused of terrorism.10
If action was expected of the UNSC in the past, then the profusion of 
activities from the Security Council today leads us to the following 
question: is the UNSC subject to any type of legal restraint? As with so 
many other legal issues, this question, although simple, draws complex and 
contradictory answers. Several highly regarded commentators, such as Hans 
Kelsen,11 argue that there are no legal restrictions to the Security Council’s 
powers. In this article, we will hold that the Security Council is subject to 
certain legal limitations. We will seek to expose the myths upon which the 
contrary argument is founded. 
I.  THE MYTH OF THE POLITICAL ORGAN LEGIBUS SOLUTUS
Some scholars argue that because the Security Council is a political 
organ with a distinct modus operandi from juridical organs, such as the 
International Court of Justice, it can ignore international law.12
Kelsen expresses this argument in different terms by holding that the 
Security Council’s resolutions, which are based on Chapter VII of the 
Charter, do not have to conform with the law because “the purpose of the 
enforcement action under Article 39 is not to maintain or restore the law, 
 3. For a detailed breakdown of the United Nations Security Council’s use of veto, 
see Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, GLOBAL POLICY 
FORUM, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/data/vetotab.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
 4. Id.
 5. S.C. Res. 748, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992).  
 6. S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 7. S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
 8. S.C. Res. 819, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Apr. 16, 1993). 
 9. S.C. Res. 781, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (Oct. 9, 1992). 
 10. S.C. Res. 1333, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000). 
11. See generally Hans KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS (Frederick A. Praeger 5th ed. 1966) (1950). 
 12. Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by 
the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1970). 
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but to maintain or restore peace, which is not necessarily identical with the 
law.”13
The classification of the Council as a political institution rests upon a 
false dichotomy between “political” and “juridical.” In fact, both national 
and international public organs have components that can be regarded as 
either “juridical” or “political.” A system that classifies institutions as one 
or the other is likely to be artificial and arbitrary. 
More importantly, one must not lose sight of the fact that such organs are 
legally constituted and ruled. In other words, their functions, composition, 
procedures, powers, and limitations are defined by and derived from a legal 
instrument. 
The Security Council was created by the U.N. Charter. Thus, the 
Council’s powers and discretion, although considerable, are based on and 
restricted by this instrument. Accordingly, Mohamed Bedjaoui, the former 
judge of the International Court of Justice, writes, “It is self-evident that an 
organ created by a treaty is subjected to that instrument in its very existence, 
its mission and its power.”14
We return to the aforementioned proposition by noting that the treaty is 
included within a larger set of norms (i.e., the normative order). Thus, in the 
final analysis, all organs created by a treaty (or by other legal instruments), 
including the Security Council, are subject to law. Judge Jennings expounds 
upon this point in the Lockerbie case:  
All discretionary powers of lawful decision-making are necessarily 
derived from the law, and are therefore governed and qualified by the law. 
This must be so if only because the sole authority of such decisions flows 
itself from the law. It is not logically possible to claim to represent the 
power and authority of the law and, at the same time, claim to be above the 
law.15
In other words, the Council is not exempt from the law simply because 
the Council is based on Chapter VII of the Charter of the U.N. Even if the 
Council is struggling for “the maintenance of restoration of peace,” as 
Kelsen puts it, its mission was still given to it by law.  
 13. KELSEN, supra note 11, at 294. 
 14. MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
TESTING THE LEGALITY OF ITS ACTS 14 (1994). 
 15. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 1999 
I.C.J. 105 (June 29). 
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II.  THE MYTH OF THE PROLIX ARTICLE
An analysis of the Charter reveals and delimits, with relative clarity, the 
main powers of the Security Council. Nevertheless, when confronted with 
such limits, those who favor the thesis of the Council legibus solutus 
provide an incoherent reading of the spirit and text of the Charter. 
As the source of obligatoriness for the Council’s decisions, Article 25 of 
the Charter declares that “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter.” Thus, there is no obligation for members of the 
United Nations to accept and carry out decisions that are not in accordance
with the Charter.16
However, the authors who believe that the UNSC is legibus solutus 
argue that the text is ambiguous. These writers claim that one cannot know 
if the phrase “in accordance with the present Charter” refers to the 
members’ obligations or to the decisions of the Council.17
Although the wording of Article 25 is imprecise, a fundamental rule of 
interpretation is that no phrases or words are presumed to be useless in legal 
texts.18 This rule is known as the principle of effectiveness and is 
summarized by the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat (“That the 
matter may have effect rather than fail”). The principle of effectiveness has 
appeared in decisions produced by the International Court of Justice and its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice,19 commentaries 
 16. See Derek Bowett, The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute 
Settlement Procedures, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 89, 92 (1994) (stating that “[t]he Council decisions 
are binding only in so far as they are in accordance with the Charter”). See also Eric Suy & 
Nicolas Angelet, Article 25, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR 
ARTICLE 909, 912 (Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet & Mathias Forteau eds., 3d ed. 2005).  
 17. See Bernd Martenczuk, The Security Council, the International Court and 
Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie? 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 517, 535 (1999); Gabriel 
Oosthuizen, Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The United Nations Security Council is Unbound 
by Law, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 549, 555 (1999) (Neth.). 
 18. JOÃO CASTRO MENDES, INTRODUÇÃO AO ESTUDO DO DIREITO 230 (Pedro Ferreira 
1994). 
 19. In the Corfu Channel case (referring to the interpretation of a Special 
Agreement), the Court stated, “It would indeed be incompatible with the generally accepted 
rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort occurring in a special agreement 
should be devoid of purport or effect.” Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 
4, 24 (Apr. 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1/1645.pdf. The Court also 
cites a previous decision from the Permanent Court of International Justice, where the court 
stated, “In case of doubt, the clauses of a special agreement by which a dispute is referred to 
the Court must, if it does not involve doing violence to their terms, be construed in a manner 
enabling the clauses themselves to have appropriate effects.” Free Zones of Upper Savoy and 
District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), Order, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22, at 13 (Aug. 19), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_22/68_Zones_franches_Haute_Savoie_et_ 
Pays_de_Gex_Ordonnance_19290819.pdf. In the Corfu Channel case (referring to the 
interpretation a Special Agreement), the Court stated, “It would indeed be incompatible with 
the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort occurring 
2012] Is the Security Council Legibus Solutus? 405
of the International Law Commission (ILC) to the “draft articles on the law 
of treaties,”20as well as in decisions of international trade law panels.21
Furthermore, if the Council makes decisions that are not in accordance 
with the Charter, then the Council will violate the Charter and, 
consequently, the principle of specialty. On this point, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) states, “International organizations are governed by 
the ‘principle of speciality,’ that is to say, they are invested by the States 
which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the 
common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them.”22 In other 
words, any decisions made by the Council that are not in accordance with 
the Charter are ultra vires.
Some commentators argue that if this view was the prevailing 
interpretation, then the member states would be bound only by those 
Security Council (SC) decisions that the member states believed conformed 
with the Charter.23 However, an ICJ advisory opinion shows that a 
resolution adopted by an organ of the United Nations (U.N.) in accordance 
with the organ’s procedural rules is valid.24 That is, although the member 
states must presume that the UNSC’s decisions are valid, the decisions may 
not be deemed invalid a posteriori by, for instance, the ICJ. 
III.  A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES
Article 24 also outlines the important limitations imposed on the Security 
Council by the U.N. Charter. The first part of the Article asserts that 
in a Special Agreement should be devoid of purport or effect.” Corfu Channel (U.K. and N. 
Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Reports 24 (Dec. 19). The Court also cites a previous decision from 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, where the court stated, “In case of doubt, the 
clauses of a special agreement by which a dispute is referred to the Court must, if it does not 
involve doing violence to their terms, be construed in a manner enabling the clauses 
themselves to have appropriate effects.” Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex (Fr. 
v. Switz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22 (Aug. 19). 
 20. Reports of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft
Article on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.l (1966), reprinted 
in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l. [hereinafter 
International Law Commission]. It is stated in the commentaries that “[w]hen a treaty is open 
to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have 
appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the 
former interpretation should be adopted.” Id. 
 21. For more information about the application of the principle of effectiveness in 
1947 GATT/WTO panels, see James Cameron & Kevin Gray, Principles of International 
Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 248 (2001).  
 22. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1994 I.C.J 
66, 78 ¶25 (Jul. 8).  
 23. Oosthuizen, supra note 17, at 556. 
 24. Legal Consequences for States of the States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 22, at para. 20 (June 21). 
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“member States confer to the Security Council the main responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. . . .”25
Some authors claim that Article 24 (I) in general and the verb “confer” in 
particular reveal that the Security Council’s authority stems from the U.N. 
members. As the grantors, members have the power to “determine that the 
grantee has exceeded its authority and ultimately to withdraw the authority 
which has been granted.”26 Gill suggests that the word “confer” and its 
consequent “grantor/grantee” relation imply a “superior or hierarchical 
relationship.”27
However, we find that the delimitation of powers referred to in Article 
24 (2) of the Charter, which establishes that “the Security Council shall act 
according to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,” is more 
relevant.28 In the next section, we examine these principles and purposes in 
greater detail. 
IV.  THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE U.N. CHARTER THAT LIMIT 
THE UNSC’S POWERS
In addition to maintaining international peace and security, the U.N. also 
aims to accomplish the following: develop friendly relations based on 
respect for equal rights and the self-determination of peoples; facilitate 
international cooperation in solving economical, social, cultural, and 
humanitarian problems around the world; and promote human rights and the 
fundamental freedoms for all people without discriminating against race, 
sex, language, or religion.29
The principles of the U.N. Charter encompass equality, good faith, the 
peaceful resolution of disputes, the ban of threats, or the use of force and 
non-intervention in internal affairs. Moreover, in Article 2, we find that the 
members are obligated to assist the U.N. and to compel the states that are 
not U.N. members to act in accordance with the principles of the Charter for 
the sake of maintaining international peace and security. 
For some authors, the scope of the Charter’s purposes and principles 
hinders any “tangible constraint.”30 Martenczuk asserts that “the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations as laid down in Articles 1 and 2 of the 
Charter are extremely vague and general in nature” and that “the standard of 
 25. U.N. Charter art. 24.  
 26. Terry D. Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN 
Security Council to Exercise Its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 26 
NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 33, 68 (1995). 
 27. Id.
 28. U.N. Charter art. 24. 
 29. U.N. Charter art. 1. 
 30. Matthew Craven, Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions, 13 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 43, 51 (2002). 
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review of the Security Council resolutions cannot be sought in the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations.”31
Such criticism appears to stem from a misunderstanding of the 
principles’ content and functions.32 Because principles are naturally more 
general than rules, principles are less defined and dense by nature.33 This 
latitude allows principles to organize and integrate the other norms in a 
system such that the norms are no longer partial, fragmentary or conjectural 
in nature.34
V.  PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
In the preamble and Article 1(1) of the Charter, the U.N. explicitly 
rejects war and dedicates itself to the preservation of peace. Although the 
preamble affirms that “[w]e the peoples of the United Nations, determined 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our 
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,” Article 1(1) describes the 
U.N.’s purpose as the following: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace. 
In the Charter, the expression “international security” is always 
accompanied by the word “peace,”35 whereas the word “peace” occasionally 
appears by itself.36 Given the context of the preamble and Articles 1(1), 2 
 31. See Martenczuk, supra note 17, at 537 for the complete text. 
 32. Luis Roberto Barroso stresses the role of principles, especially in a postpositivist 
paradigm: “The acknowledgement of the normativity to the principles and their quality 
distinction in relation to the rules is a symbol of post-positivism. Unlike rules, principles are 
not commands immediately descriptive of specific conduct, but they are like norms that 
cherish determined values or indicate public goals to be attained by different means.” Luis 
Roberto Barroso, Neoconstitucionalismo e constitucionalização do direito, 1 REVISTA DA 
ESCOLA NACIONAL DA MAGISTRATURA, 26, 36 (2006) (Braz.).  
 33. JORGE MIRANDA, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 142 (1995). 
 34. Id.
 35. See U.N. Charter preamble; art. 1, para. 1; art. 2, para. 3, 6; art. 11, para. 1, 3; art. 
12, para. 2; art. 15, para. 1; art. 18, para. 2; art. 23, para. 1; art. 24, para. 1; art. 26; art. 33, 
para. 1; art. 34; art. 37, para. 2; art. 39; art. 42; art. 43, para. 1; art. 47, para. 1; art. 48, para. 
1; art. 51; art. 52, para. 1; art. 54; art. 73; art. 76; art. 84; art. 99; art. 106.  
 36. See e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl. (“live in peace”); art. 1, para. 1 (“avoid threats to 
peace”; “disturbance of peace”); art. 1, para. 2 (“strengthening of universal peace”); art. 1, 
para. 4 (“lovers of peace”); art. 1, para. 39 (“threat to peace, breach of peace”). 
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and 3, one may infer that peace is not limited to the absence of war.37
According to this perspective, peace has a connotation that is close to “the 
construction of peace,” which consists of activities undertaken to assemble 
“the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building upon those 
foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”38 In other 
words, the search for peace necessitates the construction of a more just and 
united international society in which more opportunities for economic and 
cultural advancement exist. 
This interpretation enables us to understand that the Charter struggles not 
only “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom,”39 but also to promote respect for human rights by employing the 
“international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social 
advancement of all peoples.”40 Additionally, the Charter aims to resolve 
“international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character”41 and support international “justice.”42
VI.  THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
As articulated in Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter, the principle of self-
determination is not only difficult to define but also to apply to real-world 
situations. Baldi avers that “generally, we regard self-determination or self-
decision as the capacity that populations sufficiently defined ethnically and 
culturally possess to coordinate themselves and the right that a people of a 
State has to choose the system of government.”43 Baldi also distinguishes 
between two conflicting notions in the following: 
An international aspect, that consists of the right of a people of not to be 
subject to the sovereignty of another State against their will and to secede 
from a State which they don’t want to be subject to (the right to be 
politically independent) and an aspect of internal order, which consists of 
the right of each people to choose their preferred system of government.44
 37. Rudiger Wolfrum, Article 1, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 39, 40-41 (Bruno Simma ed., Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2002).  
 38. See U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., agenda item 87 at 2, U.N. Doc. A/55/305 (Aug. 21, 
2000), available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/a_55_305.pdf. 
The concept used here was the same as that of the Brahimi report with only a slight change. 
We replaced reassemble with assemble. We did so because the concept used in the report 
only referred to post-conflict societies, and we believe that such change makes this concept 
applicable to other societies. See id. 
 39. U.N. Charter pmbl.  
 40. Id.
 41. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.  
 42. See U.N. Charter pmbl.; art. 1, para. 1.  
 43. Carlo Baldi, Antodeterminação, in DICIONÁRIO DE POLÍTICA 70 (Norberto 
Bobbio, Nicola Matteucci & Gianfranco Pasquino eds., UnB 11th ed. 1998) (1983). 
 44. Id.
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As a corollary of the principle of self-determination, neither the Security 
Council nor any other U.N. organ can impose a system of government on a 
population of a State or any other entity.45
The greatest difficulty with interpreting the principle of self-
determination is determining the extent to which we should recognize a 
group’s right to “secede from a State to which it does not want to be subject 
to.”46 Cassese states, “indiscriminately granting the right to [external] self-
determination to all ethnic groups would pose a serious threat to peace and 
bring about the fragmentation of States into a myriad of entities unable to 
survive.”47 Imprudent support for (external) self-determination may 
multiply the number of conflicts, as shown by the case of the former 
Yugoslavia. Regarding this point, a Yugoslav once put it, “Why should I be 
a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?”48 In an 
advisory opinion of great relevance to the study of self-determination and 
secession, the Supreme Court of Canada stated:  
[T]he right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through 
internal self-determination -- a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, 
social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. 
A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes 
the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only 
the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined 
circumstances.49
To validate a State’s existence and, more importantly, to promote 
international peace and security, the desideratum of the International 
Community cannot be to create a State for each ethnic group but to 
guarantee the rights and the coexistence of all ethnic groups within the same 
State. This task is easier said than done.  
Another relevant issue is the verification of the legitimacy of those who 
evoke the principle of self-determination. In the case of Rhodesia, the 
Security Council did not breach the right to self-determination. Rather, Ian 
 45. Gill, supra note 26, at 75. 
 46. Baldi, supra note 43, at 70. 
 47. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (2001). 
 48. RICHARD HOLBROKE, TO END A WAR 31 (Modern Library 1999) (1998). 
 49. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 126 (Can.). In the 
same decision, the Canadian Supreme Court lists the “cases” that may lead to a “right of 
secession”: “where ‘a people’ is governed as part of a colonial empire; where ‘a people’ is 
subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where ‘a people’ is 
denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it 
forms a part.” The Canadian Court further adds: “In other circumstances, peoples are 
expected to achieve self-determination within the framework of their existing state.” Id. at 
pmbl.    
410 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2
Smith’s minority group did so when it seized power against the will of the 
majority.50
VII. THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH
Article 2(2) of the U.N. Charter states, “All Members, in order to ensure 
to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill 
in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the 
present Charter.”51
At first reading, the demand for good faith appears to refer only to U.N. 
members. However, when we examine the article’s chapeau,52 we notice 
that this demand applies to members not only while they are acting in their 
individual capacities but also while they are acting as members of U.N. 
organs.53
In the advisory opinion entitled “Conditions of Admission of a State to 
membership in the United Nations,” the ICJ recognizes that the principle of 
good faith represents a limitation to the members’ discretion.54 In their 
dissenting votes, Judges Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair, and Read 
emphatically state that all U.N. members, under any circumstances 
(including the occasions when they are taking part in the works of U.N. 
organs, such as the Security Council or the General Assembly), have “the 
obligation to act in good faith . . . with the goal of accomplishing the 
purposes and principles of the Charter.”55
The principle of good faith was also included in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.56 The International Law Commission stressed that 
the concept of good faith is applicable to international relations as a whole.57
The ILC specifically noted that  
 50. DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER 
CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER 1, 169-70 (2001). 
 51. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2. 
 52. U.N. Charter art. 2. The chapeau reads: “The Organization and Its Members, in 
pursuit of the purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following 
Principles.” (emphasis added). 
 53. ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL 195 (2004). 
 54. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 
4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 63 (May 28). 
55. Id. at 91–92 (joint dissenting opinion). 
 56. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S 331 (All treaties in force bind the parties and must be fulfilled by them in good 
faith); id. art. 31, para. 1 (A treaty must be interpreted in good faith according the common 
sense attributable to the terms of the treaty in its context and in light of its objective and 
goal); id. arts. 46, 69. 
 57. International Law Commission, supra note 20, at 211. The report states, “The 
motif of good faith, it is true, applies throughout international relations; but it has a particular 
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The rule that treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in 
good faith — is the fundamental principle of the law of treaties. Its 
importance is underlined by the fact that it is enshrined in the Preamble to 
the Charter of the United Nations. As to the Charter itself, paragraph 2 of 
Article 2 expressly provides that Members are to “fulfill in good faith the 
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”58
Additionally, the ILC asserted that, although some members favored 
stating that a State should “abstain from acts calculated to frustrate the 
object and purpose of the treaty,” the Commission felt that this notion was 
“clearly implicit in the obligation to perform the treaty in good faith.”59
Thus, we may infer that the principle of good faith is not only applicable 
to the UNSC but also dictates the Council’s obligation to act in accordance 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Additionally, the good faith 
principle demands that the Council avoid adopting any act that may frustrate 
the Charter’s principles and purposes because doing so will breach the 
principle of good faith, indicate an abuse of power (excès de pouvoir), and 
render the act null and void. In the advisory opinion entitled “Certain 
Expenses of the UN,” Judge Gaetano Morelli expounded upon this notion in 
the following:  
It is only in especially serious cases that an act of the Organization could 
be regarded as invalid, and hence an absolute nullity. Examples might be a 
resolution which had not obtained the required majority, or a resolution 
vitiated by a manifest excès de pouvoir (such as, in particular, a resolution 
the subject of which had nothing to do with the purposes of the 
Organization).60
Therefore, the principle of good faith strengthens the demand for 
observance of the Charter’s principles and purposes, whereas the abuse of 
power induces sanctions against manifest transgressions. 
importance in the law of treaties and is indeed reiterated in Article 27 in the context of the 
interpretation of treaties.” Id.
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), 
Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J 151, 223 (July 20) (separate opinion of Judge Morelli). The 
original text in French reads as follows:  
C’est seulement dans les cas d’une gravité particulière qu’un acte de 
l’Organisation pourrait être considéré comme un acte invalide et, par 
conséquent, absolument nul. On pourrait faire l’exemple d’une 
résolution qui n’aurait pas obtenu la majorité requise ou d’une 
résolution entachée d’excès de pouvoir évident (telle, notamment, 
une résolution ayant un objet tout à fait étranger aux buts de 
l’Organisation). 
Id. 
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Additionally, the principle of good faith and its implications are 
demonstrated in the nuclear tests case (Australia v. France). In this case, the 
Court recognized that “one of the basic principles governing the creation 
and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle 
of good faith”61 and that “trust and confidence are inherent in international 
cooperation, in particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is 
becoming increasingly essential.”62 Consequently, in the Court´s view, 
States are obligated to respect the expectations that they create.63
VIII. RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
Article 1(3) of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the U.N. is 
“to promote and to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” 
Other articles in the Charter, especially Articles 55 and 56, and the principle 
of good faith emphasize these concerns about human rights.64
With regard to the issue of human rights, Gill writes, “[B]y acting, the 
Security Council must take into consideration the impact of the sanctions on 
the population of target countries and assure that civilians and military 
observe the rules of human rights in conducting their operations.”65
Nevertheless, some authors reject the notion that Article 1(3) limits the 
UNSC’s actions. For example, Craven claims that a statement such as “the 
Council is obliged to promote the respect for human rights” depends not 
only on one’s perceptions of the relations among the Charter’s objectives 
but also on one’s conception of the content of human rights.66 In the same 
vein, Hans Kelsen argues in the following that the lack of a definition for 
human rights impeded their protection: “[T]he Charter does, in no way, 
specify the rights and freedoms to which it refers. Legal obligations of the 
Members in this respect can be established only by an amendment to the 
Charter or by a convention . . . ratified by the Members.”67
We believe that these objections are groundless. The first issue raised by 
Craven (i.e., one’s perception of the relations among the Charter’s 
objectives) is probably more pertinent to a legal reasoning debate than to 
current discussion. However, Craven’s argument requires additional 
 61. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J., 253, 268 (Dec. 20). 
 62. Id.
 63. Id. See also WET, supra note 53, at 197. 
 64. In 1948, Philip Jessup stated: “It is already the law, at least for Members of the 
United Nations, that respect for human dignity and fundamental human right is obligatory. 
The duty is imposed by the Charter, a treaty to which they are parties.” PHILIP C. JESSUP, A
MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 91 (1948).  
 65. Gill, supra note 26, at 78. 
 66. Craven, supra note 30, at 51. 
 67. KELSEN, supra note 11, at 342. 
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considerations. First, in casu, no antinomy68 or incompatibility exists among 
the rules. There is no determination of an objective in one sense (say, 
forbidding something) as opposed to another (say, allowing something). 
Instead, the rules can and must be harmonized in the factual case. This task 
is not a prerogative of the U.N. Charter. Moreover, both domestic and 
international normative texts have rules that need to be harmonized with one 
another in certain factual situations.
With regard to the second objection (i.e., the “absence of specification” 
in the “concept of the content of human rights”), an elementary examination 
of the norms produced under the auspices of the U.N. shows that, in reality, 
the content of human rights is being continually and effectively specified by 
international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1979), the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
Two statements from the ICJ help clarify this point and reinforce the 
arguments employed in this article. In the following, we reproduce the first 
statement, which appears in a decisum of a dispute involving the United 
States and Iran: “Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and 
to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself 
manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”69
The other statement appears in the advisory opinion “Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970)” and reads as follows: “To establish instead, and to enforce, 
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on 
grounds of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute 
a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes 
and principles of the Charter.”70
An analysis of these statements demonstrates the Court’s understanding 
that the members of the U.N. have a duty to respect human rights because of 
 68. Bobbio explains that an antinomy is a “situation in which two rules exist and one 
of them enforces a conduct whereas the other one forbids it, or one obliges a conduct and the 
other one permits it, or one prohibits a conduct and the other permits it.” BARDO 
FASSBENDER, TARGETED SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS 23 (2006) (report prepared for the 
Council of Europe). Bobbio adds that the rules must belong to the same normative order and 
possess the same validity ambit (i.e., temporal, spatial, personal and material). Id.
 69. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 
1980 I.C.J. 42, at § 91 (May 24). 
 70. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 57, ¶ 131 (June 21). 
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the Charter.71 Furthermore, the Court affirms that a connection exists 
between the duty to respect human rights and the “infra-constitutional” 
instrument (i.e., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
The observance of the instruments produced by the Organization, besides 
being an issue of coherence, is a legal duty deriving from the principle of 
good faith. As the U.N. steps up the production and adoption, by its 
Members, of normative texts protective of human rights, it creates an 
expectation as to the respect for such rules by the Organization itself. 72
Moreover, the principle of good faith binds the Member States when they 
take part in organs of the U.N., to comply with the expectations created in 
the ambit of the U.N. which are legally relevant in the field of Human 
Rights. 73
Additionally, the U.N. cannot lecture its members to respect human 
rights and simultaneously fail to observe their behaviors. Doing so would 
signify a transgression of the principle expressed in the maxim venire 
contra factum proprium (“Nobody should act contrarily to and 
inconsistently with his/her own behavior”).74
IX.  JUS COGENS
We find limitations to the UNSC’s power not only in the U.N. Charter 
but also in the imperative norms (i.e., jus cogens). According to the 
definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, these norms are 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.75
The basic idea behind the concept of jus cogens is rather simple. Jus
cogens is based on the notion that the freedom that States and organizations 
possess for entering into pacts is limited under international law. Thus, they 
 71. See Egon Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights 
Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 337 (1972).  
 72. WET, supra note 53, at 200. 
 73. Id.
 74. BARDO FASSBENDER, TARGET SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS 23 (2006) (report 
prepared for the Council of Europe). 
 75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 
331. With regard to jus cogens and constitutionalism, Michael Byers stated the following:  
Some of the most obvious examples of constitutional rules in 
international law are rules of jus cogens. Nowhere else in the 
international legal system is the ability of some rules to limit the 
ability of States to develop, maintain or change other rules, or to 
prevent them from violating fundamental rules of international public 
policy, so clear. 
Michael Byers, Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes
Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 211, 220 (1997). 
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cannot conduct transactions involving certain rules (i.e., jus cogens) because 
these rules are not revocable by an inter partes agreement.76 The 
international community’s collective interest prevails over the individual 
will of a State. 
The notion of jus cogens is largely recognized today by modern legal 
doctrine77 and jurisprudence78 but remains surrounded by doubts and 
controversies.79 Although the Vienna Convention’s definition is the most 
quoted by international doctrine,80 this definition is still criticized in many 
 76. Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM.
J. INT’L L. 55 (1966). 
 77. For a skeptical analysis of jus cogens, see Anthony D’amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a 
Plane, It’s Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1990). The most remarkable rejection of the 
concept of jus cogens is provided by Rosalyn Higgins. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS &
PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 21 (1994).  
 78. References to jus cogens can be found in both the judgments of the ICJ and 
domestic courts. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 
3, ¶ 70 (Feb. 20). In the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua, the Court cited with approval the IDC’s statement that a ban against the use of 
force would constitute an “example of jus cogens.” See Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). We must note that 
various individual judges of the ICJ mention jus cogens in numerous cases, including ad hoc
Judge Fernandes in the case concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. 
India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 135, ¶ 29 (Apr. 12); South West Africa (Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 
1966 I.C.J. 6, 298 (July 18) (Judge Tanaka) and ad hoc Judge Lauterpacht in Application 
of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. 
& Montenegro), Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 325, 440 (Sept. 13) (separate opinion of 
Judge Lauterpacht) [hereinafter Lauterpacht opinion]. All of the decisions and votes are 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited May 15, 
2011). For International Criminal Court decisions regarding the former Yugoslavia that 
mention jus cogens, see e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 520
(Jan. 14, 2000).Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶¶ 144, 153–156 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). References to jus cogens can be 
found in both the judgments of the ICJ and domestic courts. See, e.g., North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 70 (Feb. 20); Az Alkotmànybirosg Hatà 
rosatai, Hungarian Constitutional Court, 1994, in CASSESE, supra note 47, at 428. 
 79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 
102 (1987) (“Although the concept of jus cogens is now accepted, its content is not 
agreed.”). 
 80. For commentators who use the definition of jus cogens given by the Vienna 
Convention on Treaty Law, see for example, MICHAEL AKEHURST, MODERN INTRODUCTION 
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (Peter Malanczuk ed., 7th ed. 1997) (1970); IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 489 (6th ed. 2003); MANUEL BECERRA RAMÍREZ,
MANUAL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 43 (1991); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL &
HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (1990); CASSESE, supra note 47, at 140; 
JOAQUIM DA SILVA CUNHA & MARIA DA ASSUNÇÃO DO VALE PEREIRA, MANUAL DE DIREITO 
INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 347 (Almedina, 2d ed. 2004); EDUARDO JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA,
EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL CONTEMPORÂNEO 80 (1980); ANDRÉ GONÇALVES PEREIRA &
FAUSTO QUADROS, MANUAL DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 280 (3d ed. 1997); 
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corners. Jiménez de Aréchaga ponders that the concept of jus cogens is
faulty because it is based on legal effects and not on the intrinsic nature of 
the imperative rule.81 He concludes that “it is not that certain rules are jus 
cogens because they do not permit agreement against them, but that 
contrary agreements are not permitted to certain rules because they possess 
a jus cogens character.”82
Aréchaga points out the greatest difficulty with the jus cogens rule. That 
is, when can a rule be considered jus cogens? To date, no universally 
accepted criterion exists for defining a rule as imperative.83 Consequently, 
L.A. PODESTÁ COSTA & JOSÉ MARIA RUDA, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 138 (6th ed. 
1985); NGUYEN QUOC DINH, PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL 
PÚBLICO 185 (2d ed. 1999); ANTONIO REMIRO BROTÓNS ET AL., DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
279 (1997); JOSÉ FRANCISCO REZEK, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO: CURSO ELEMENTAR
116 (10th ed. 2005); ROBERTO LUIZ SILVA, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 49 (Del Rey 2d 
ed. 2002); JEAN TOUSCOZ, DIREITO INTERNACIONAL 211 (1993); GRIGORII IVANOVICH 
TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154–55 (William E. Butler trans., 1974).  
 81. JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, supra note 80, at 81. 
 82. Id.
 83. See Antônio Gómez Robledo, who states that the following:  
The determination of the content of ius cogens, or it used to be said, 
the identification of its rules, is, without a doubt, as Sinclair put it, 
the most controversial aspect of its investigation, its genesis, its 
nature and function. With the exception of a minimum content 
normative core and by all recognized (the hypothesis of school, as 
Rousseau would say), the radiating zone of this core is full of 
uncertainties and in the list of imperative rules made by the authors, 
some with great profusion, the mark of subjectivism is frequently 
seen, and, at any rate, these lists are, as Sztucki said, both impressive 
and confusing. Each author elects this or that rule as imperative rule 
or absolutely inderrogable, for it seems to them that the very 
structure of the international society or the supreme human interest 
hinge on the observance of such rules.  
ANTONIO GOMEZ ROBLEDO, EL JUS COGENS INTERNACIONAL 153 (UNAM 2003). The text in 
Spanish reads as follows:  
La determinación del contenido del ius cogens, o como acostumbra 
también decirse, la identificación de sus normas, es sin duda, como 
dice Sinclair, el aspecto más controvertido (most controversial) de la 
investigación en torno a él, su génesis, su naturaleza, su función. Con 
excepción de un núcleo normativo de contenido mínimo y de todos 
reconocido (las hipótesis de escuela, como diría Rousseau), la zona 
irradiante de este núcleo está llena de incertidumbre, y en las listas 
de normas imperativas que suelen hacer los autores, algunos con 
gran profusión, puede verse a menudo la impronta del subjetivismo, 
y en todo caso estas listas son, como dice Sztucki, tan impresionantes 
como desorientadoras (both impressive and confusing). Cada cual 
erige esta o aquella norma en norma imperativa o absolutamente 
inderogable, por parecerle que de su observancia depende la 
estructura misma de la sociedad internacional o los supremos 
intereses del hombre.  
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controversy accompanies even concrete examples of situations forbidden by 
the imperative rule.  
Because a more profound analysis of jus cogens is beyond the scope of 
this work, we will simply recognize the examples accepted by the majority 
of the members of the International Law Commission (ILC) as peremptory 
rules: the unlawful use of force, genocide, slavery, and piracy.84
Martenczuk argues that the definition of jus cogens is based on Article 
53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and that this definition 
cannot be easily grafted into the U.N. Law.85
Nonetheless, we must remember that the International Law 
Commission’s objective is “the promotion of the progressive development 
of international law and its codification.”86 By proposing such a rule, the 
Commission codified (i.e., materialized in a treaty) an already existing rule, 
which can be verified in the commentaries of the ILC to the “draft articles 
on the law of treaties”: “[T]he Commission concluded that in codifying the 
law of treaties it must start from the basis that today there are certain rules
from which States are not competent to derogate at all by a treaty 
arrangement, and which may be changed only by another rule of the same 
character.”87
Thus, the jus cogens rules exist independently and do not depend on the 
Vienna Convention.88 In Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, ad hoc Judge 
Lauterpacht states, “The concept of jus cogens operates as a concept 
superior to both customary international law and treaty.”89 According to this 
opinion, in the case of an antinomy between jus cogens and treaties, UNSC 
Id. Additionally, the following comment found in the draft project of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties conveys the difficulty of defining a criterion: “[T]here is no simple 
criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus 
cogens.” 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 172, 247-48, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l.  
 84. International Law Commission, supra note 20, at 248.  
 85. Martenczuk, supra note 17, at 545-46. 
 86. Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), at Art. 1 (Nov. 
21, 1947), as amended by resolutions 485 (V) of 12 December 1950, 984 (X) of 3 
December 1955, 985 (X) of 3 December 1955 and 36/39 of 18 November 1981, 
available at untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf.
 87. International Law Commission, supra note 20, at 247 (emphasis added). 
 88. In the decision Nicaragua v. United States, the Court refers to the consuetudinary 
character of the ban against the use of force in the following:  
A further confirmation of the validity as customary international law 
of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in 
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations may be 
found in the fact that it is frequently referred to in statements by 
State representatives as being not only a principle of customary 
international law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such 
law.  
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 100 (June 27).  
 89. Lauterpacht opinion, supra note 78, at 440. 
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resolutions, consuetudinary rules, or other rules of International Law, the jus 
cogens norm prevails.  
It should be noted that the European Court of First Instance (CFI) also 
took the view that jus cogens is a legal restraint to the powers of the UNSC. 
According to the CFI,  
International law thus permits the inference that there exists one limit to 
the principle that resolutions of the Security Council have binding effect: 
namely, that they must observe the fundamental peremptory provisions of 
jus cogens. If they fail to do so, however improbable that may be, they 
would bind neither the Member States of the United Nations nor, in 
consequence, the Community.90
We note that the topic of jus cogens still exhibits many difficulties both 
for the existing legal doctrine and jurisprudence. However, because the 
existence and normative hierarchical superiority of jus cogens are widely 
recognized, we find that jus cogens indisputably limits the Security 
Council’s power to impose sanctions. 
X.  CUSTOMARY RULES AND ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER
There might be another potential legal limitation to the Security 
Council’s actions in the customary rules. Specifically, Article 103 of the 
U.N. Charter establishes the superiority of the members’ obligations under 
the Charter over an “obligation under any other international agreement.” 
In the Lockerbie case, Francisco Rezek, a former ICJ judge, wondered 
why Article 103 does not “operate to the detriment of customary 
international law and even less so to the detriment of the general principles 
of the law of nations.”91 Rezek states that only the U.N. Charter (not a 
resolution by the UNSC, nor a recommendation by the General Assembly, 
nor a decision made by the ICJ) enjoys the preeminence outlined in Article 
103.
However, we believe that in the event of a conflict between the Charter 
and the customary rules, both the criterion of speciality (lex specialis 
derogat generali) and the criterion of chronology (lex posterior derogat 
priori) shall be applied. With respect to the distinguished judge’s second 
statement, we conclude that Articles 24(1) and 25 of the Charter outlines the 
 90. Judgments of 21 September 2005 in Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v. Council and Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission; 
Paragraphs 227 to 231 of Kadi were drawn up in terms identical to those of paragraphs 278 
to 282 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat. However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) later 
overruled the decision Court of First Instance. See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, 
Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council of the European Union, 3 C.M.L.R. 41 (2008).
 91. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, 1998 
I.C.J. 115, 153 (Feb. 27), (separate opinion of Rezek, J.).  
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members’ obligations to execute the UNSC’s decisions that are in 
accordance with the Charter. This obligation may enjoy the preeminence 
conferred by the aforementioned Article 103 as long as the UNSC’s 
decisions are in harmony with the U.N. Charter. 
XI.  IN SUM, THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS NOT LEGIBUS SOLUTUS
After these considerations, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the 
UNSC is subject to legal limitations derived not only from the Charter itself 
but also from jus cogens and other pertinent treaties. The Chamber of 
Appeals of the ICC for the former Yugoslavia also drew this conclusion in 
the Tadic case, as shown by the following:  
The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, 
established by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that 
organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to certain 
constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution 
may be. Those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits of the 
jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention other specific 
limitations or those which may derive from the internal division of power 
within the Organization. In any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the 
Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by 
law).92
Therefore, having overcome the myth of Prometheus, we should now 
dispel the myth that an organization created by law can be above it. 
Moreover, the expectations of an acting Security Council are perfectly 
compatible with the notion that men and organizations are subject to the 
law.  
 92. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶ 28, Decision on Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 28 Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
(Oct. 2, 1995). 
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INTRODUCTION – GAY RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL SCENE                              
Because of all the news coverage about New York State’s recent passage 
of a law making gay marriage legal2 and the adoption of similar laws in 
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   1.   I use the word “gay” here to refer to gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and the 
transgendered, sometimes also referred to as the “LGBT” community. 
 2. Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, 
Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/nyregion/gay-marriage-approved-by-new-york-
senate.html.
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Mexico City3 and Argentina,4 many people might not be aware that 
something perhaps even more momentous just occurred internationally, 
namely, the United Nations’ (U.N.) passage of a resolution proclaiming that 
discrimination against gay people and the transgendered is a serious 
problem worldwide.5 The resolution calls for the first ever global U.N. study 
on the state of the problem.6 It has important implications for many 
countries, especially in the rest of Latin America, where attitudes about gay 
rights are still conservative.7
While some Latin American countries will no doubt be figuring out how 
to respond to the U.N. resolution, others have already passed laws offering 
some measure of protection to gays. One such country is Costa Rica, a 
Central American country that is a popular tourist destination for gay 
travelers.8 Costa Rica banned the criminal prosecution of adult gay sex in 
1971,9 something the United States did not do until 2003.10 Costa Rica’s 
 3. Gay Marriage Law Comes into Effect in Mexico City, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8549400.stm. 
 4. Argentine Senate Backs Bill Legalising Gay Marriage, BBC NEWS (July 5, 
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10630683. 
 5. Frank Jordans, UN Group Backs Gay Rights for the 1st Time Ever, Associated 
Press, June 17, 2011, available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=138651 
33#.TtZlGDBLWIk. 
 6. Id.   
 7. See, e.g., Gay Marriage in Argentina: A Queer Calculation, ECONOMIST (July 
15, 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2010/07/gay_marriage_argentina. 
Also, a recent nationwide survey on attitudes about gay rights in Costa Rica showed that 
“[a]bout 70 percent of Costa Ricans disagreed (the majority strongly disagreeing) that gays 
should be permitted to marry in civil union or should have the right to adopt children.” 
Chinchilla Says She Would Not Oppose Legalization of Gay Marriage in Costa Rica, TICO 
TIMES (Costa Rica), May 17, 2011, http://www.ticotimes.net/Current-Edition/News-
Briefs/Chinchilla-says-she-would-not-oppose-legalization-of-gay-marriage-in-Costa-
Rica_Tuesday-May-17-2011.  
 8. A Google search on the words “gay-travel-costa-rica,” produced 1,780,000 
results. A commentary for “about.com,” the second hit on the Google search, has this to say 
about foreigners traveling to Costa Rica:  
As for gay-owned or simply gay-friendly guest houses and 
accommodations, Costa Rica has plenty of them. It’s a very 
comfortable place for gay travelers, and most of the foreigners who 
have moved there to open inns and accommodations (i.e., 
Americans, Canadians, Europeans, etc.) tend to be on the left-
leaning, eco-conscious, and gay-friendly side. So in that sense, it’s 
hard to go wrong.  
Andrew Collins, Planning a Summer Trip to Costa Rica - Advice on Gay Travel in Costa 
Rica, About.com, http://gaytravel.about.com/od/readergaytravelquestions/qt/CR_letter.htm 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2012). But see also infra Part Three of this article which counters these 
views, especially in relation to the experiences of local gay Costa Rican citizens, as opposed 
to foreign tourists visiting the country.  
 9. EDDIE BRUCE-JONES & LUCAS PAOLI ITABORAHY, INT’L LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL,
TRANS & INTERSEX ASS’N, STATE SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA 9 (2011), available at 
http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2011.pdf.   
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constitution is also inspired by broad human rights principles that have and 
can be used in the future to protect its gay citizens. However, a strong 
culture of machismo, a phenomenon associated with what one law scholar 
has called a “harsh brand of gender subordination,”11 and resistance on the 
part of conservative Christian groups have made expansion into the area of 
gay marriage and the actual implementation of current laws more 
challenging than gay activists might have hoped. Some of that resistance, 
both legal and cultural, has been successful, while some of it has not.  
This article will explore the state of gay rights law in Costa Rica, 
particularly against this backdrop of conservatism, by looking at how the 
courts have interpreted and enforced the law and how certain cultural 
dynamics — particularly machismo and the role of the Church — have 
informed their development. Its findings can be used to examine whether or 
not Costa Rica’s experience can be used as a model for other Latin 
American countries.          
Part One will provide a theoretical framework for various approaches to 
understanding how gay rights law in Costa Rican is situated within the 
larger legal framework of critical race, lat crit, feminist, and human rights 
law theory. Part Two will describe the international legal context within 
which Costa Rica operates, with a particular focus on United Nations and 
Latin American protocols to which Costa Rica is a party. Part Three will 
explore the large role that the Christian religion and the culture of machismo
have played in shaping societal and legal debates about gay rights in Costa 
Rica. Part Four will cover relevant laws, policies, and gay rights court cases 
in Costa Rica that reflect and/or challenge some of these dynamics. Part 
Five will explore the lessons that can be learned from these developments.  
 10. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 11. Martha I. Morgan, Taking Machismo to Court: The Gender Jurisprudence of the 
Colombian Constitutional Court, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 253, 267 (1999). But see 
also Morgan’s point that it is shortsighted to equate machismo with the resistance to pro gay 
rights laws in Latin America  
[w]hile the machismo culture might be a driver behind violence against homosexuals, it is 
another question, to be addressed infra, whether politicians and judges creating law have 
machismo attitudes. Although Catholicism and machismo culture might be compatible with a 
system that does not grant same-sex couple rights, they are not necessarily drivers of the law. 
For example, Latin America’s high birth rate has been attributed to Catholicism and 
machismo, but studies have shown that it is the unemployment rate and illiteracy rate of 
women that drives birth rates. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATT’Y GENERAL’S COMM’N ON 
PORNOGRAPHY FINAL REPORT 197-223 (1986). 
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I.  USING HUMAN RIGHTS THEORY TO FRAME THE UNDERSTANDING OF 
GAY RIGHTS LAW IN COSTA RICA
A.  Feminism Theory – Homophobia as a Form of Sexism 
A tremendous amount of gay rights law scholarship focuses on the extent 
to which laws guaranteeing civil rights protections to citizenry, particularly 
laws prohibiting sex discrimination, should be used to prohibit 
discrimination against gays.12 This is due in part to the fact that countries 
like the United States were historically so resistant to appeals for protection 
for gays under basic constitutional protections guaranteeing equal treatment 
that activists looked to sex discrimination law as an analogous source of 
redress.13
One of the main arguments posed was that homophobia is the conscious 
or unconscious belief that gays are perverse because they do not conform to 
cultural ideas about how men and women should look and act.14 As such, 
the argument goes, gays are stepping outside the prescribed norms for their 
biological sex and should be penalized for doing so.15
In my own work I have argued that when such beliefs are used to target 
gay workers, this should be prohibited under sex discrimination law.16 This 
kind of analysis directly stems from traditional feminist thought, with its 
emphasis on critiquing the role that patriarchy plays in keeping women in 
limited and less powerful societal roles.17 By analogy, lesbians are unfairly 
penalized for daring to reject heterosexuality, and gay men, often typed by 
mainstream culture as being overly “feminine” and therefore not “natural” 
 12. See generally Toni Lester, Protecting the Gender Nonconformist from the 
Gender Police — Why the Harassment of Gays and Other Gender Nonconformists As A 
Form of Sex Discrimination in Light of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Oncale v. 
Sundowner, 29 N.M. L. REV. 90 (1999); See also Nicole Anzuoni, Note, Gender Non-
Conformists under Title VII: A Confusing Jurisprudence in Need of a Legislative Remedy, 3 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 871 (2002); Sandi Farrell, Reconsidering the Gender-Equality 
Perspective for Understanding LGBT Rights, 13 LAW & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 605 (2004); Meredith Render, Misogny, 
Androgyny and Sexual Harassment: Sex Discrimination in a Gender-Deconstructed World,
29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99 (2006); Clare Diefenbach, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment After 
Oncale: Meeting the “Because of . . . Sex” Requirement, 22 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
42 (2007). 
 13. Lester, supra note 12 at 91, 92.  
 14. See generally SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM (1997), 
available at http://suzannepharr.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/homophobiaaweaponof 
sexismcondensed.pdf. 
 15. Lester, supra note 12, at 98 n.52, 103.  
 16. See generally id.
 17. For a good historical piece on this analysis, see Veronica Beechy, On Patriarchy,
FEMINIST REV., Autumn 1979, at 66, 66 (citing KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS (1969)), 
available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/fr/journal/v3/n1/full/fr197921a.html (“At the 
most general level patriarchy has been used to refer to male domination and to the power 
relationships by which men dominate women.”). 
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men, are both subjected to different forms of patriarchy, all of which are just 
another kind of sexism at play.18 Some scholars of Latin American gender 
relations have even argued that in certain countries this vilification of the 
feminine leads to more active (sexually penetrating) males who engage in 
sex with other men in passive (sexually receptive) roles less socially 
stigmatized than their passive counterparts.19
B.  Human Rights Theory 
While some human rights law theorists continue to frame the argument 
about gay rights within the context of sex discrimination,20 there is a 
growing body of law scholarship that places the question of gay rights into 
the larger context of human rights, with an emphasis on general rights that 
should be guaranteed to all people, as opposed to just women or any 
particular minority group. In a discussion of how this has played out in 
Latin America, scholar Omar G. Encarnación has said:  
Promoting gay rights as human rights in Latin America predated the 
acceptance by the international community of the popular argument that 
“gay rights are human rights.” This view holds that gays are entitled to 
freedom from discrimination by virtue of being human; accordingly, what 
is being advanced with gay rights is humanity rather than a “gay 
agenda.”21
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina may have had this 
in mind when she proclaimed her support of gay marriage in 2010 by using 
the language of human rights, not gay rights per se. “We are a more humane
and equitable society this week than last week,” she said, “thousands of 
Argentines have conquered rights I already had.”22 As a strategy, this 
approach may prove to be a more effective way of wooing voters than 
focusing on gays as a distinct minority group since it may appeal to peoples’ 
sense of the common humanity in all of us. 
Human rights theory has a long and tested legacy with deep roots in the 
now famous 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human rights, passed just 
 18. Lester, supra note 12 at 104.   
 19. Martin Nesvig, The Complicated Terrain of Latin American Homosexuality, 81 
HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 689, 692 (2001). 
 20. See Anthony R. Reeves, Sexual Identity as a Fundamental Human Right, 15 
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215 (2009); James Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence 
against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence: An International and Comparative Law 
Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REV. 989 (1997). 
 21. Omar G. Encarnación, Latin America’s Gay Rights Revolution, J. DEMOCRACY,
Apr. 2011, at 105, 106 (footnote omitted).  
 22. Id. at 109 (citing Gisele Sousa Dias, Cristina Promulgo la ley de Matrimonio 
Homosexual en un Clima de Festejos, CLARÍN, July 22, 2010, www.clarin.com/sociedad/ 
titulo_0_303569767.html) (emphasis added). 
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after the end of World War II. 23 Key provisions of the Declaration include 
Article I, which states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights,”24 and Article II which provides that “[e]veryone is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”25 Further, 
Article VII provides: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without 
any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and 
against any incitement to such discrimination.”26
Many “critical race”27 and “lat crit”28 scholars have argued that the U.S. 
legal system in particular tends to unfairly pigeonhole people into distinct 
identity categories based on their race, ethnicity, or gender, etc., which can 
produce the effect of not taking into account the varied and nuanced 
dimensions that are inherent in all identities and experiences. For instance, 
white judges applying a law like Title VII in the U.S., which prohibits 
employment discrimination based on race and sex, have generally been 
reluctant to recognize that African American female complainants subjected 
to both kinds of discrimination simultaneously should be entitled to redress 
for both.29 As a counter to this legally myopic viewpoint, lat crit law 
scholar, Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, has said: Human rights 
analysis can offer “the foundation for challenging the incoherent uni-
dimensional construct of law that seeks to atomize a person into her/his 
component parts rather than engage the person as a whole.”30 Such 
sentiments are echoed in the Values Statement of the Latin American gay 
rights group, Malabai, which says: “[s]exual rights are an inalienable part of 
human rights, and therefore, are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent.”31
 23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].  
 24. Id. art. I. 
 25. Id. art. II. 
 26. Id. art. VII. 
 27. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1996). 
 28. See generally Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, The Gender Bend: Culture, 
Sex, and Sexuality — A LatCritical Human Rights Map of Latina/o Border Crossings, 83 
IND. L.J. 1283, 1318 (2008).  
 29. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989). See also Toni Lester, Race, Sexuality, and the 
Question of Multiple, Marginalized Identities in U.S. and European Discrimination Law, in
GENDER NONCONFORMITY, RACE, AND SEXUALITY: CHARTING THE CONNECTIONS 84 (Toni 
Lester ed., 1998). 
 30. Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, supra note 28, at 1318. 
 31. Values, MULABI – ESPACIO LATINOAMERICANO DE SEXUALIDADES Y DERECHOS,
http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&langpair=es%7Cen&rurl=translate
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As the following discussion will show, this human rights approach to 
securing recognition for the struggles of Latin American gays has produced 
some significant results.  
II.  THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR GAY RIGHTS IN COSTA RICA
In 2008, both Panama and Nicaragua struck down laws making 
homosexuality a crime, joining every other Spanish-speaking nation in 
Latin America that had already done the same.32 All of this was the result of 
long years of activism and advocacy by gay rights groups both domestically 
and globally. Starting in the 1990s, gay rights groups engaged in lobbying 
efforts before several international bodies, including the U.N., the 
Organization for American States (“OAS”), and the Southern Cone 
Common Market (the free trade association of Latin American, called 
“SCCM”) to get these organizations to take a stance on this issue.33 The 
European Union had already taken up the question long before this in the 
2000 Equal Treatment Directive,34 which states that “any direct or indirect 
discrimination based on . . . sexual orientation as regards the areas covered 
by this Directive should be prohibited throughout the Community.”35
By 2007, the SCCM adopted a statement condemning discrimination 
against gays in its member states and endorsing gay marriage.36 And in 
2008, the OAS adopted a resolution declaring that discrimination against 
gays was a human rights violation.37 Further, in 2010, the OAS’s main 
judicial body, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, rendered a 
judgment in a case brought to it by Karen Atala, a Chilean judge, who said 
she had been illegally separated from her children because she was involved 
with another woman.38 The Court ruled in favor of Atala and said that Chile 
should develop policies designed to end all forms of state sanctioned sexual 
orientation discrimination.39
Finally, as was mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the U.N. 
adopted a resolution condemning discrimination against gays in 2011, to 
which Costa Rica was a signatory. As of now, Mexico City and Argentina 
.google.com&u=http://www.mulabi.org/&usg=ALkJrhjbFz4dkFfq0y1bRNeilzCISHTszA 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (emphasis added).  
 32. Encarnación, supra note 21, at 104. 
 33. Id. at 107. 
 34. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, Establishing a General Framework for Equal 
Treatment in Employment and Occupation 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:EN:NOT.
 35. Id. at 12.
 36. Encarnación, supra note 21, at 107. 
 37. Id. at 107-08. 
 38. Id. at 108. 
 39. Id.
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are the only places in Latin America where gay marriage is legal.40 Same 
sex civil unions, however, have been allowed in Uruguay since 2008, 
Ecuador since 2008, Columbia since 2009, Brazil since 2004, and in some 
states in Mexico.41
Many of these global developments are the direct result of lobbying and 
testimony by gay rights groups about the extent of the violence and 
discrimination against gay people in these countries, including Costa Rica.42
The next section will explore some of those accounts and engage in a 
cultural analysis of their causes.  
III.  THE CULTURE OF MACHISMO, THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH AND 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GAYS IN LATIN AMERICAN AND COSTA 
RICA
A.  Machismo and Homophobia  
As one Latin American Studies scholar has explained, “[a] host of social 
factors account for Latin America’s traditional hostility toward 
homosexuality, including the hegemonic influence of Catholicism, the 
centrality of the family, and ‘the’ cult of masculinity that is called 
machismo.’”43 The popular chain of tour guide books for international 
travelers, Frommer’s, perhaps gives one of the most straightforward 
description of this state of affairs: 
Costa Rica is a Catholic, conservative, macho country where public 
displays of same-sex affection are rare and considered somewhat 
shocking. Public figures, politicians, and religious leaders regularly 
denounce homosexuality.44
As discussed in Part Two, supra, misogyny and homophobia are often 
interconnected. It should therefore come as no surprise that Frommer’s also 
tells women traveling to Costa Rica that “[f]or lack of better phrasing, Costa 
Rica is a typically ‘macho’ Latin American nation. Single women can 
 40. Germán Lodola & Margarita Corral, Support for Same Sex Marriage in Latin 
America, AMERICAS BAROMETER INSIGHTS (Latin Am. Public Op. Project, Vanderbilt Univ., 
Nashville, Tenn.), 2010, at 1& n.2, available at
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0844.enrevised.pdf. 
 41. Id.
 42. NATASHA JIMÉNEZ & SOLEDAD DÍAZ PASTÉN, SITUATION OF LESBIAN, BISEXUAL,
TRANSNATIONAL, TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX WOMEN IN COSTA RICA IN REGARDS TO 
DISCRIMINATION 4, 5 (2011), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/IGLHRC_for_the_session_en_Costa
Rica_CEDAW49.pdf. 
 43. Encarnación, supra note 21, at 117 n.4. 
 44. Tips for Gay and Lesbian Travelers, FROMMER’S,
http://www.frommers.com/destinations/costarica/0219028778.html (last visited Jan. 12, 
2012). 
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expect a nearly constant stream of catcalls, hisses, whistles, and car horns, 
especially in San José. Women should be careful walking alone at night 
throughout the country.”45
Further, as one law scholar maintains, “until recently, it was traditional 
in much of Latin America to stigmatize only the so-called ‘passive’ partner 
in male same-sex sexual activity. The penetrator’s actions were not viewed 
as inconsistent with the power dynamics of machismo.”46 Thus, the 
comingling of these two attributes — homophobia and the degradation of all 
things feminine, especially certain stereotypes associated with femaleness 
like passivity, comprise a big part of machismo culture in Latin American 
countries. Other writers, however, object to this perspective, asserting that 
any kind of same sex behavior is anathema in Latin American culture, 
regardless of whether someone is an active or passive participant. 47 Scholar 
Martin Nesvig adheres to this view. 48 He has said, “even a man who takes 
an active role would generally be expected to keep this information a secret 
and to condemn homosexuality even if he were personally engaged in it.”49
Regardless of which view most accurately depicts gay life in Latin 
America and Costa Rica, the discussion later in this section will show that 
discrimination and violence against gay citizens is still prevalent, even as 
greater legal protections for gays are occurring throughout the region. In 
addition to a strong culture of machismo, the influence of conservative 
strands of the Christian Church in Costa Rica is another cause of this 
problem. 
B.  The Role of Religion 
The Catholic Church has a long history of denouncing gay people. Just a 
few years ago it pronounced that “[m]arriage exists solely between a man 
and woman . . . while homosexual acts go against the natural moral law.”50
As recently as 2010, the Vatican’s secretary of state, Cardinal Tarcisio 
Bertone, announced while on a visit to Latin America that homosexuals 
were to blame for the current global crisis regarding allegations of the 
 45. Tips for Women Travelers, FROMMER’S,
http://www.frommers.com/destinations/costarica/0219028784.html (last visited Jan. 12, 
2011). 
 46. Martha Morgan, supra note 11, at 294 (citing ROGER N. LANCASTER, LIFE IS
HARD: MACHISMO, DANGER AND THE INTIMACY OF POWER IN NICARAGUA 235-78 (1992) and 
K.J. DOVER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY (1989)). 
 47. Nesvig, supra note 19, at 721. 
 48. Id.
 49. Id.
 50. Vatican Fights Gay Marriages, CNN (July 31, 2003), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2003-07-31/world/vatican.gay.marriages_1_gay-marriages-civil-
unions-gay-couples?_s=PM:WORLD. 
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sexual abuse of children by priests.51 Pursuant to the Costa Rican 
Constitution, the Catholic Church is the country’s official religion. Many 
Costa Rican Catholics hold similar views to the Church’s official stance. In 
a recent study of over 3000 Costa Ricans on their attitudes about gay rights, 
“[a]bout 70 percent of Costa Ricans disagreed (the majority strongly 
disagreeing) that gays should be permitted to marry in civil unions or should 
have the right to adopt children.”52 Catholics comprised two thirds of the 
study respondents.53 The public stance of the conservative group, the
Citizen Observatory, captures these sentiments. In a 2010 ad placed in the 
Costa Rican papers, it said: “‘Legally recognizing homosexual unions 
would turn them into a model for society. This is contrary to the 
fundamental values we Costa Ricans believe in . . . and that are enshrined in 
articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution.’”54
Further, a 2010 survey of 42,238 respondents on general Latin America 
attitudes on gay marriage conducted by the American Public Opinion 
Project showed that “[e]vangelicals, compared to individuals who profess 
other religions, are significantly less likely to support same-sex marriage, 
while those who say that they are Atheists or agnostic about religion are 
more likely to support gay marriage.”55 Thus, some experts believe that 
there is a chance that overall antigay attitudes, at least with regard to 
marriage, will be difficult to eradicate in Costa Rica because non-Catholic 
Christians, like Protestants, Evangelicals, Mormons, and Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, are becoming more prevalent in Costa Rica than Catholics, and 
these groups are even less tolerant towards gays than Catholics.56 On the 
other hand, the Costa Rican study also shows that some conservative views 
about gay people might be changing in Costa Rica since 88 percent of the 
survey respondents also said they believed that homosexuals should be able 
to work wherever they want.57 However, the study did not ask questions 
about levels of tolerance towards the transgendered, a group subjected to a 
great deal of discrimination in Costa Rica (see the next section for a 
discussion of this problem).                                    
 51. Rory Carroll & John Hooper, Vatican Attacked Over Cardinal’s Claim of 
Homosexuality and Paedophilia Link, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 13, 2010, at 22, available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/13/vatican-homosexuality-paedophilia-claim-
condemned.  
 52. Chinchilla Says She Would Not Oppose Legalization of Gay Marriage in Costa 
Rica, supra note 7. 
 53. Id.
 54. Alex Leff, How Costa Rica is Battling for Gay Rights, GLOBALPOST (Aug. 29, 
2010), available at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/costa-rica/100817/gay-marriage-
same-sex-civil-unions (last visited July 1, 2011) (footnotes omitted). 
 55. LODOLA & CORRAL, supra note 40 at 4. 
 56. Encarnación, supra note 21, at 115. 
 57. Chinchilla Says She Would Not Oppose Legalization of Gay Marriage in Costa 
Rica, supra note 7.
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Despite some of the conservative attitudes towards gays described above, 
Costa Rica is often described as “the most gay friendly country in Central 
America.”58 In an interesting case from Canada in which a gay Costa Rican 
was seeking political asylum on the grounds that his life was threatened 
because of virulent homophobia in the country, the hearing examiner 
disagreed with the applicant, observing that “the documentary evidence 
indicates that there is an abundant gay community thriving in Costa Rica 
and it is not the target of systemic persecution by the authorities or society 
in general.”59
One thing the examiner failed to recognize, however, is that it can be 
quite different to be a tourist visiting a country on a temporary basis versus 
someone who is born and permanently resides there. Tourists are outsiders 
who do not have the same kind of ties to local culture and politics that are 
held by a country’s citizens. Further, as one researcher on gay tourism 
suggests, it is possible that gay tourists “feel an additional sense of freedom 
while holidaying because they go away from their everyday lives and, in 
this way, have a possibility for escaping constraints on their behaviour.”60
This would not be the case for Costa Rica’s gay citizens, who may be 
subjected to harsher treatment than gay tourists for the very reason that they 
are seen as violating proscribed local cultural norms about how men and 
women in their culture should be and act in the traditional sense of what that 
means. Thus, the continued prevalence of machismo and religious 
conservatism in Costa Rica may explain why, even though the country has a 
recent history of taking some steps in favor of gay legal rights and is seen as 
a gay friendly tourist destination, there are still many instances of 
harassment and hate crimes committed against Costa Rica’s gay citizens.  
C.  Discrimination Against Gays in Costa Rica 
According to political science scholars Bruce Wilson and Juan Carlos 
Rodriguez, gays in Costa Rica are still targeted by street gangs,61 and the 
police tend to equate gay crime victims with their perpetrators   —  
“‘perverts who have chosen to embark on a life of crime, the same way that 
 58. Jennifer Meyer, Gay Rights in Costa Rica: Pura Vida?, COSTA RICA NEWS (Feb. 
14, 2011), http://thecostaricanews.com/gay-rights-in-costa-rica/5650. 
 59. In Private Decision TA0-15870, [2003] Immigration and Refugee Bd. of Can., 
available at http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/pol/juri/Pages/ta0-15870.aspx. 
 60. Nina Ballegard & Jane Chor, Gay and Lesbian Tourism: Travel Motivations, 
Destination Choices and Holiday Experiences of Gays and Lesbians 16 (Nov. 7, 2009) 
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Copenhagen Business School & University of Southern 
Denmark), available at http://studenttheses.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10417/811/nina_ballegaa 
rd_og_jane_chor.pdf?sequence=1. 
 61. Bruce Wilson & Juan Carlos Rodríguez Cordero, Legal Opportunity Structures 
and Social Movements: The Effects of Institutional Change on Costa Rican Politics, 39 
COMP. POL. STUD. 325, 334 (2006). 
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burglars have learned to steal.’”62 As one Costa Rican police officer stated, 
“‘Nobody is born with an inclination to steal. The same is true of drugs or 
homosexuality.’”63 Further, there is a great deal of workplace harassment 
and discrimination is targeted against gay people, who are not inclined to 
file discrimination claims for fear of being outed.64 One study showed that 
lesbians in particular are highly likely to stay closeted at work, fearing that 
their employers will discover their true orientation and be fired.65
The transgendered are also especially vulnerable to violence and 
discrimination in Costa Rica. In a 2011 report for the United Nations on the 
state of discrimination against women in Costa Rica prepared by the 
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, the study 
convener’s found that:  
Police have been known to arrest transgender women by invoking laws 
prohibiting ‘public scandal,’ laws prohibiting ‘indecorous dress,’ 
complaints by neighbors and/or defiance of authority. These are 
ambiguous laws that define what are considered to be ‘good manners’ and 
can be applied at the discretion of the police. (Human rights advocates 
argue it is not discretion but arbitrary and discriminatory treatment). For 
instance, there is a misinterpretation of Article 385 of the Penal Code, 
which speaks of exhibitionism, drunkenness and touching others and are 
used as an excuse to arrest transgender women.66
It is against this backdrop of discrimination that Costa Rican gay rights 
activists have forged a battle to get the legal system to be more responsive 
to their plight. Structural and procedural changes in the system adopted in 
the 1990s helped further their aims.  
IV.  THE COSTA RICAN CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS EFFECTING GAY
RIGHTS
A democratic republic, Costa Rica achieved independence from Spain in 
1821 and adopted its current constitution in 1949.67 The constitutional 
provisions most relevant to gay rights are Title IV, Article 20, which states 
that “all men are free within the Republic,”68 and Title IV, Article 28, which 
 62. Id. (quoting JACOBO SCHIFTER, PUBLIC SEX IN A LATIN SOCIETY 152 (2000)). 
 63. Id. at 152. 
 64. Id. (citing Richard Stern, Costa Rican AIDS Patient Coalition Wins Drug 
“Cocktail” in High Court Ruling, 10 PSYCHOL. INT’L 3, 3-4 (1999)). 
 65. Ursula Rehaag Kopanke & Daria Gabriela Suárez R., Final Remarks, JUSTICE 
FOR ALL WOMEN — DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LESBIANS IN COSTA RICA.
 66. JIMÉNEZ & DÍAZ PASTÉN, supra note 42, at 4.  
 67. U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Notes: Costa Rica (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2019.htm.  
 68. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA art. 20, as amended by 
Ley No. 7880, May 27, 1999, available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Costa/costa2.html. 
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provides that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and there shall be no 
discrimination against human dignity.”69 With its references to freedom and 
human dignity, Costa Rica’s constitution evokes language found in the 1948 
Universal Declaration, passed one year before the country adopted its 
constitution.70 This is not surprising, since Costa Rica was a signatory to the 
Declaration.71 As I said earlier, some law scholars writing about the 
connections between Latin gay identity and individual rights and liberties in 
the U.S. have said that human rights theory is better suited for the kind of 
advocacy that is needed on behalf of gays of Latin descent. This approach 
has certainly been true in Costa Rica, where, as the discussion below will 
show, gay rights advocates have argued that the country’s gay citizens 
should be afforded equal rights based on this promise of freedom and 
human dignity for all.  
In addition to the constitutional provisions just mentioned, Costa Rica 
also passed a law decriminalizing homosexual sexual acts in 1971.72 Well 
ahead of its time, this took place thirty-two years before the U.S. Supreme 
Court declared similar laws unconstitutional, and long before other Latin 
countries like Chile (1999), Colombia (1981), Cuba (1979), Ecuador (1997), 
Nicaragua (2008), and Panama (2008) did so.73
Despite recent victories on the gay marriage front in Mexico City, 
Argentina, and Brazil, to date there is no recognition of same sex marriage 
in Costa Rica – a very Christian country where, as discussed earlier, recent 
public opinion polls show that marriage between a man and a woman is 
sacrosanct. As is the case with most debates about gay rights around the 
world, two of the most common arguments against their promotion are that 
they run counter to the tenets of Christianity and that gay marriage is against 
church doctrine. These views are strongly reflected in cultural attitudes and 
debates about gay rights in Costa Rica, evidenced as recently as the summer 
of 2011 when the Episcopal Church of Costa Rica announced that gay rights 
“[threaten] the strength of the family as the basic unit of society.”74 The 
Church said it was aligning itself with the Catholic Church and called upon 
the government to refuse to approve gay marriage because to do so would 
 69. Id. art. 33. 
 70. Universal Declaration, supra note 23, arts. I, II. 
 71. 1948-49 U.N.Y.B. 535, U.N. Sales No. 1950.I.II.  
 72. BRUCE-JONES & PAOLI ITABORAHY, supra note 9, at 9. 
 73. Id. Dates for other Latin countries that have decriminalized gay sex are as 
follows: “Argentina (1887), Bahamas (1991), Bolivia, Brazil (1831), Costa Rica (1971), 
Chile (1999), Colombia (1981), Cuba (1979), Dominican Republic (1822), Ecuador (1997), 
El Salvador (1800’s), Guatemala (1800’s), Haiti (1800’s), Honduras (1899), Mexico (1872), 
Nicaragua (2008), Panama (2008), Paraguay (1880), Peru (1836-37), Suriname (1869), 
Uruguay (1934), Venezuela (1800’s).” Id.
 74. Bishops of Costa Rica Warn that ‘Rights’ to Same-sex Unions Undermine the 
Family, ACIPRENSA (July 8, 2011), http://translate.google.com/translate? 
hl=en&langpair=es%7 Cen&u= http://www.aciprensa.com/noticia.php%3Fn%3D21902. 
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constitute a failure “in its duty to promote and defend an institution essential 
to the common good, as is the marriage.”75
Opponents of gay rights in Costa Rica have been able to rely with some 
success on those aspects of the constitution that relate to the role of religion 
in the country and the role of the family. Unlike the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, which overtly separates the role of the church and the 
federal government,76 the Costa Rican constitution gives the Church great 
prominence within its legal structure. Title VI, Article 75 provides that the 
Roman Catholic Church is the religion of the State.77 The State will support 
and maintain the Church, as long as it does not prevent the free exercise of 
the Republic or other forms of worship, as long as those other forms of 
worship are not opposed to universal morality and good customs.78 Further, 
Title IV, Article 28, implicitly restricts so-called immoral behavior that 
some conservative groups might associate with gay sexuality by stating that 
“private actions which do not harm the morals or public order, or which do 
not cause any damages to third parties are outside the scope of the law.”79
Finally, Article 51 of Title V states that “[t]he family, as a natural 
element and foundation of society, is entitled to State protection,” and 
Article 52 of Title V says that “[m]arriage is the essential basis of the family 
and rests on equality of the rights of spouses.”80 These sentiments are 
further reflected in Paragraph 6 of Article 14 of the Costa Rican Family 
Code, which explicitly prohibits same sex marriage.81
Given the strong historical hold that the Church has had on the legal 
system, between 1971 and the early 1990s it was virtually impossible for 
gays to get any kind of legal respect or recognition in Costa Rica.82 Registro 
Nacional, the government’s registering body for new entities, would not 
even award gay rights organizations any kind of entity legal status during 
that time, which hindered their ability to mobilize into a movement,83 and 
police raids on gay bars and harassment of attendees were common.84 The 
 75. Id.
 76. Cornell Univ. Law Sch. Legal Info. Inst., Wex, First Amendment, Aug. 19, 2010, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/First_amendment. 
 77. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA art. 75, available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Costa/costa2.html.   
 78. Id. 
79. Id. art. 28.  
 80. Id. arts. 51, 52.
 81. Cynthia Rothschild, WRITTEN OUT: HOW SEXUALITY IS USED TO ATTACH 
WOMEN’S ORGANIZING 129 (Scott Long & Susan T. Fried eds., 2005), available at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/faculty_franke/Gender_Devel/WrittenOut-FINAL.pdf (“The 
Family Code prohibits marriage between persons of the same sex, and the special law of de 
facto unions only recognizes unions between a man and a woman. This means that the right 
to inherit, to share property in common, or to have access to insurance or pension is reserved 
for heterosexual couples.”). 
 82. Wilson & Cordero, supra note 61, at 333.  
 83. It did not begin doing so until 1996. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 84. Id.
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first gay activist organizations started to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s in 
response to this oppression and also because of the AIDS epidemic.85 Then 
just as this activist momentum began to build, something fortuitous 
happened that would help support the work of gay rights proponents 
exponentially.  
In 1989, the government restructured the court system in Costa Rica for 
the first time since 1949, adding a seven member team of judges tasked with 
addressing constitutional issues.86 This new body, which is called “Sala 
Constitucional” or “Sala IV,” aggressively sought cases through major 
public education campaigns while simultaneously relaxing many of the 
previously rigid legal requirements to file a case.87 As a result, gays, who 
had previously not had a voice in politics or in the courts, began to take 
advantage of their easier access to the legal system and bring a series of 
cases that called upon the courts to stand up and fairly apply the human 
rights language already present in the constitution to them.  
Costa Rican gay rights legal claims generally fall into two categories – 
those that demand basic recognition for the right to be gay without fear of 
discrimination, retribution, or denigration in general, and those that seek 
constitutional protections for same sex marriage. The results have been 
mixed. For instance, a landmark claim that addressed the former was 
successfully brought under Sala IV in 1994 by the owner of a gay bar 
seeking to challenge police harassment and abuse. The Court decided 
against the police and ordered that they develop a training program on how 
to better treat gay people.88 However, in another case in this category that 
took place in 1998, gay rights proponents were not as successful. In that 
case, the gay activist group, Asociación Triángulo Rosa, filed a claim 
against San Jose archbishop Román Arrieta Villalobos for making negative 
statements in the press about a gay and lesbian festival that was supposed to 
take place in the country.89 The court concluded, however, that the 
archbishop was not guilty because “he had spoken in accordance with the 
Catholic Church’s doctrine on homosexuality.”90
One of the most well known cases to address this issue of recognition of 
gay relationships and gay marriage involved a claim brought to the Costa 
Rican Supreme Court by gay rights activist, Yashin Castrillo Fernandez. 
Fernandez demanded that the Court recognize same sex marriage pursuant 
to international human rights protocols and the Costa Rican constitution. 
 85. Id.
 86. Id. at 331. 
 87. Id.
 88. Wilson & Cordero, supra note 61, at 336 (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia — 
Sala Constitucional, Ruling No. 4732-94). 
 89. Id. at 335-36 (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia — Sala Constitucional, Ruling 
No. 4732-94). 
 90. Id. (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia — Sala Constitucional, Ruling No. 3808-
98). 
436 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2
The Court, which ruled in the negative, said: “the concept of marriage 
embraced by the Political Constitution stems historically from a context 
where it is understood to be between a man and a woman.”91 The family 
court ruled in the negative and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court 
in 2003, which took the unusual step of soliciting public opinion in a 
hearing on the issue before rendering its decision. It ruled that the plaintiff 
could not marry his partner because the law was never intended to apply to 
same sex marriage but instead only to traditional male-female marriages 
sanctioned by the Church.92   
In another unsuccessful bid at pushing the judicial envelope on gay 
relationships, a claim was brought before the Court in 2008 on behalf of a 
gay prisoner who was being denied conjugal visits that were allowed for his 
heterosexual counterparts.93 The prison had originally approved the visits 
between the man and the male lover he met while in prison but then decided 
to end them. The Court gave little explanation for its ruling, save for its 
saying that the prison’s decision fell “within the scope of their rights, duties 
and powers.”94
Most recently, in 2010 anti-gay rights groups successfully lobbied for a 
public referendum on same sex civil unions by obtaining the requisite 5 
percent of the electorate’s vote.95 Responding to a challenge to the 
referendum by gay rights groups, the Court halted the referendum but 
implied that history was on the side of the civil rights activists.96 It said: “the 
rights of minorities borne out by struggles against majorities cannot be 
subjected to a referendum process where the majority rules . . . . People in 
same-sex relationships are a disadvantaged group and the object of 
discrimination who need support from public powers to recognize their 
constitutional . . . rights.”97 Similar language was used in the 2003 U.S. 
Supreme Court case, Lawrence v. Texas,98 when the Court declared the state 
 91. Costa Rican Supreme Court Rejects Gay Marriage,CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY
(May 28, 2006, 12:00 AM),  
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/costa_ricas_supreme_court_rejects_homosexual_
marriage/ 
 92. David Brown, Note, Making Room for Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 
International Human Rights Law: An Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles, 31 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 821, 866 (2010) (citing Corte Constitucional, sent.1634-02, exp.02-001547-651-VD 
(Nov. 29, 2002)(Costa Rica)). 
 93. Costa Rica Denies Gays Conjugal Prison Visits, EDMONTON J., Aug. 10, 2008, at 
A7, available at http://www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=b04ec27c-
8b71-4abb-8e7a-31cdc6804a31&k=44327&utm_source=feedburner&utm_%20medium=%2 
0feed&utm_%20campaign=Feed%3A+canwest%2FF264+(Edmonton+Journal+-+News). 
 94. Id.
 95. Leff, supra note 54. 
 96. Sala IV da Curso al Amparo Sobre Referéndum de Uniones del Mismo Sexo 
[Sala IV Gives Way Under Referendum on Same Sex Unions], EL PAÍS (Jan. 7, 2010), 
http://www.elpais.cr/frontend/noticia_detalle/1/27806. 
 97. Leff, supra note 54. 
 98. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 579 (2003). 
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of Texas’ laws criminalizing gay sex unconstitutional. Former U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor said in the ruling:  
The State cannot single out one identifiable class of citizens for 
punishment that does not apply to everyone else, with moral disapproval 
as the only asserted state interest for the law. The Texas sodomy statute 
subjects homosexuals to ‘[a] lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative 
classification that threatens the creation of an underclass . . . cannot be 
reconciled with’ the Equal Protection Clause.99
In addition to the constitutional reforms discussed with respect to Sala 
IV, Costa Rica also passed an employment discrimination law in 1998 
making it illegal to discriminate against people who are HIV positive with 
the insertion of the words “sexual option,” into the list of protected identity 
categories covered by the law.100 The law provides: 
Whoever applies, arranges or practices discriminatory measures because of 
race, nationality, gender, age, political, religious or sexual option, social 
position, economic situation, marital status or by any suffering of health or 
disease, will be sanctioned with penalty of twenty to sixty days fines. The 
judge will be able to impose, in addition, the disqualifying penalty that 
corresponds, of fifteen to sixty days.101
By way of comparison, the U.S. Congress has yet to pass a nationwide law 
prohibiting employment discrimination against gays such as this.   
CONCLUSION – THE GIVE AND TAKE OF SOCIAL CHANGE MOVEMENTS
This article shows that, even after a Latin American country has adopted 
specific laws preventing discrimination against gays, the courts can be slow 
to interpret those laws in a light most favorable to gays, and the general 
populace can remain unwilling to honor those laws in day to day 
interactions with gay people. Thus, there is still much work that needs to be 
done. As the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission 
Report discussed earlier explains, Costa Rica “proclaims the equality of 
[minority] . . . rights. However, under the surface, it maintains an 
environment of condemnation, rejection and inequality. The myth of Costa 
Rica as a country that is completely respectful of human rights is belied by 
the large number of problems, both major and minor, that people who are 
different have to confront there every day.”102
 99. Id. at 584 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (omission in original) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 100. Law No. 7771, Apr. 29, 1998, art. 48 (Costa Rica), available at
http://www.pasca.org/sites/default/files/ley_sida_cr.pdf. 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
 102. Kopanke & Suárez R., supra note 65, at 1. 
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This should come as no surprise, for as social change movements gain 
political traction, often there is a conservative backlash to return things to 
the status quo. For instance, in the United States, soon after the state 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled that gays could marry in the state,103
the U.S. Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act,104 and individual 
state legislatures around the country started passing amendments to their 
own constitutions banning gay marriage.105 Similar reactionary 
developments are taking place in Latin America in such countries as 
Honduras, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, which all passed laws 
defining marriage as an institution designed solely for a man and a woman 
over the last few years.106 Sometimes violence against oppressed groups 
seems to rise in direct proportion to an increase in their rights. Grupo Gay 
da Bahia, an activist organization in Brazil, for instance, reports that “260 
gays were murdered in 2010 in Brazil, up 113 percent from five years ago, 
including recent high-profile cases that made headlines,” all of this taking 
place just before the country’s Supreme Court declared that gay marriage 
was constitutionally protected.107                             
All of the above is not to say that gay rights proponents in Costa Rica 
should be disheartened. As the discussion here also shows, with the 
adoption of the Sala IV reforms to the Costa Rican court system, 
tremendous inroads have taken place for gays in everything from increased 
protections at work and greater legal sensitivity to the plight of people with 
AIDS to the recent suggestion by the Constitutional Court that there should 
be a nationwide discussion about the pros and cons of gay marriage. At one 
time, such a suggestion would have been unheard of and viewed as bizarre 
and immoral. Even former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias admitted at 
the end of his term in 2010 that he believed that gay unions “[should have 
legal recognition . . . [and that o]ne doesn’t choose one’s sexual orientation. 
It’s given by nature or God.’”108 And his successor, President Laura 
Chinchilla, recently changed the anti-gay marriage stance that helped make 
her campaign a success and now maintains that while she is still personally 
against it, she would support any judicial decision in favor of it.109
 103. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
 104. Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1966) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2010). 
 105. Brad Knickerbocker, Tug of War Intensifies on Gay-Marriage Issue, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, May 5, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0505/p02s02-uspo.html. 
 106. Encarnación, supra note 21, at 115-16.  
 107. Bradley Brooks, Brazil Approves Same-Sex Civil Unions Despite Catholic 
Protests, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/06/brazi 
l-same-sex-civil-union_n_858515.html. For information on increased violence against gays 
in other parts of Latin America, see also Michael Jones, The Coup in Honduras and the Rise 
in LGBT Violence, CHANGE.ORG (July 23, 2009), http://news.change.org/stories/the-coup-in-
honduras-and-a-rise-in-lgbt-violence.  
 108. Leff, supra note 54.   
 109. Chinchilla Says She Would Not Oppose Legalization of Gay Marriage in Costa 
Rica, supra note 7. 
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Clearly, gay people in Costa Rica live in a cultural and legal climate that 
is a complicated mixture of open mindedness and bigotry. In this respect, 
they are not unlike their counterparts in most of the western world. As the 
polls suggest, however, attitudes about many aspects of gay life, especially 
with respect to workplace rights, have softened over time. And while people 
still seem to hold fairly conservative views about the rights of gays to 
marry, one can only hope that, as has been the case with Mexico City, 
Argentina, and Brazil, Costa Rica’s legislature and judiciary will continue 
to use the liberatory promise of international human rights protocols and 
their own Sala IV to help shape their country into a welcoming place for 
people from all walks of life.  
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INTRODUCTION
On February 5, 2011, the latest nuclear arms reduction treaty between the 
United States and Russia—the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
START)2—entered into force.3 New START includes provisions for 
reducing strategic warheads, nuclear launchers, and heavy bombers;4 it also 
mandates inspections and demonstrations to guarantee compliance with the 
 1. Article by H. John Goodell and Alexander T. Simpson. Captain Goodell is a 
graduate of Vanderbilt University and the University of Wisconsin School of Law. Having 
just completed a tour as an Army prosecutor, he currently serves as a Recruiting Officer for 
the JAG Corps. Mr. Simpson is a graduate of Kenyon College and the University of 
Maryland School of Law. He is the law clerk for the Honorable James A. Kenney III of the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals. 
The views expressed herein are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the official 
policy or position of the Army Judge Advocate Recruiting Office, the United States Army, 
the U.S. Department of Defense, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, the State of 
Maryland or the U.S. Government. Captain Goodell wishes to thank his wife, Cara, for her 
assistance in the editing of the initial drafts. Mr. Simpson wishes to thank his family for its 
support. 
 2. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-
Russia, Apr. 8, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-5 [hereinafter New START Treaty], available 
at www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf.  
 3. Press Release, Dep’t of State, New START Treaty Entry into Force (Feb. 5, 
2011) [hereinafter New START Press Release], available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/156037.htm. 
 4. New START Treaty, supra note 2, art. II. 
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parameters of the treaty.5 While New START is in effect until 2021 with the 
possibility of a five-year extension,6 ultimately it affords the United States 
only a modicum of immediate security, for the arms reduction of Russia is 
simply not the critical priority it once was. Although NEW START is 
undoubtedly a positive step towards nuclear arms control, if the world is to 
become a truly safer place, the United States must either include other 
nations in this quest or take unilateral action. 
I. HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES LEADING TO NEW 
START 
As long as war and the escalation of the use of force have existed, there 
have also been attempts at appeasement and peace. In 1955, Harold Stassen, 
President Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Disarmament, presciently 
concluded that the elimination of nuclear weapons was an “impractical 
goal.”7 Initially, it appeared that global momentum supported that position: 
in 1958, President Eisenhower, prompted by the environmental problems 
caused by nuclear fallout announced a unilateral nuclear testing 
moratorium,8 and the Soviet Union, the United States’ longtime nuclear 
adversary, soon followed suit. But—predictably—the United States 
resumed its weapons testing via “Operation Nougat,”9 after the Soviets 
changed course to execute the largest nuclear test ever conducted.10
The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 brought the United States and the 
Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war.11 While the Cuban Missile Crisis 
was a time of endemic fear, its resolution was also a watershed, acting as a 
catalyst for future nonproliferation and arms control treaties. Although the 
terms of its conclusion did not force either side to accept significant changes 
in its planned nuclear forces, the formal negotiations were often one of the 
few channels for communication between the United States and Soviet 
5. Id. art. XI. 
6. Id. art. XIV. Of course, an alternative option would be to create a successor 
treaty upon NEW START’s expiration. 
 7. David S. Jonas, The New U.S. Approach to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: 
Will Deletion of a Verification Regime Provide a Way Out of the Wilderness?, 18 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 597, 606 (2006) (citing GUY B. ROBERTS, U.S. AIR FORCE INST. FOR NAT’L SEC.
STUDIES, THIS ARMS CONTROL DOG WON’T HUNT: THE PROPOSED FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF 
TREATY AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 16-17 (2001)). However, Stassen also urged 
a full accounting of the past production of nuclear material for all nations with nuclear 
weapon capability. 
 8. David S. Jonas, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Current Legal 
Status in the United States and the Implications of a Nuclear Test Explosion, 39 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 1007, 1011 (2007) [hereinafter CTBT Current Legal Status] (citing GALLERY 
OF U.S. NUCLEAR TESTS, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/ Usa/Tests/ (last visited Jan. 20, 
2012)). 
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Union.12 Indeed, by 1963, the United States, the Soviet Union, and England 
had agreed the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT),13 which prohibited nuclear 
weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater,14 although it 
did not address underground testing.15
The United States and the Soviet Union signed their first formal nuclear 
limitation agreements in May 1972.16 This set of agreements, known as the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I),17 produced two important arms 
control accords: the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect 
to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement on 
Offensive Arms) and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Systems.18
The Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms contained serious inequities 
for the United States in terms of the number of arms control concessions 
made to the Soviet Union.19 The Agreement placed a freeze on the number 
of launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that the United States and Soviet Union 
could deploy, and the parties settled that they would not begin construction 
of new ICBM launchers after June 1972.20 Both countries also acquiesced to 
a hold on the production of SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile 
submarines, though they could add SLBM launchers if they retired old 
ICBM launchers.21 But when the Agreement was signed, the United States 
had 1,054 ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union had 1,618 ICBM 
launchers.22 Clearly, by both raw numbers and percentiles, there was a 
tremendous imbalance in the arms control concessions made by the United 
States compared to those made by the Soviet Union.  
 12. AMY F. WOOLF, MARY BETH NIKITIN & PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 33865, ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION: A CATALOG OF TREATIES AND 
AGREEMENTS 2 (2010). 
 13. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. 
14. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Chronology of Key Events, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY 
AGENCY, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/npt_chrono.html (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Nuclear Nonproliferation]. 
15. CTBT Current Legal Status, supra note 8, at 1011. 
 16. WOOLF, NIKITIN & KERR, supra note 12, at 4. 
 17. Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462 [hereinafter SALT I], 
available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt1/text/salt1.htm.  
 18. WOOLF, NIKITIN & KERR, supra note 12, at 4. 
 19. Ronald F. Lehman II, International Arms Restraint By Treaty, Law, and Policy,
in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 523, 564 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 
2005). 
20. See WOOLF, NIKITIN & KERR, supra note 12, at 4 (“A protocol to the Treaty 
indicated that the United States could deploy up to 710 SLBM launchers on 44 submarines, 
and the Soviet Union could deploy up to 950 SLBM launchers on 62 submarines.”). 
21. Id.
22. Id.
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These startling disparities spurred the passage of the Jackson 
Amendment23 by Congress.24 The amendment mandated that all future arms 
control agreements would have to contain equal limits for the United States 
and Soviet Union.25 In reality, the Jackson Amendment set the tone for all 
future agreements on nuclear arms control between the United States and 
the Soviet Union/Russia,26 including a second Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty (SALT II).27
During the seven years of negotiations that ultimately led to the signing 
of SALT II in June 1979, the United States sought limits on quantitative as 
well as qualitative changes in Soviet forces.28 Like those leading to SALT I, 
the SALT II negotiations prompted contentious debates in Congress—
debates that were likely just as furious as their counterparts in the Russian 
Duma.29 Ultimately, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an 
agreement that placed a “numerically equal limit on each nation’s nuclear 
forces.”30
Both countries agreed to a total of 2,400 ICBM launchers, SLBM 
launchers and heavy bombers, with this number declining to 2,250 by the 
end of 1980.31 Within this total, the treaty contained sublimits for weapons 
with multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), such as MIRVed 
ICBMS, MIRVed SLBMs, MIRVed air-to-surface ballistic missiles 
(ASBMs), and heavy bombers.32 SALT II also limited each country’s ability 
to create the new, modern missile programs that might encourage a 
resumption of the arms race.33
Dr. Randall Forsberg, Cardinal John Krol, Coretta Scott King, and 
various other religious leaders promoted this disarmament, testifying before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that strategic equivalence was not 
an absolute necessity when both countries have thousands of nuclear 
warheads.34 But these supporters of SALT II were assailed by their 
 23. Jackson Amendment to FY1972 Congressional Defense Authorization and 
Appropriation Budget Act, September 11, 1972. H.R.J. Res. 1227, 92d Cong. 746, 86 Stat. 
746 (1972). 
24. Id.
25. Id.
 26. Lehman, supra note 19, at 567. 
 27. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979 [hereinafter SALT 
II], available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-1.html.  
 28. WOOLF, NIKITIN & KERR, supra note 12, at 5. 
 29. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, LEADING LEADERS: HOW TO MANAGE SMART, TALENTED,
RICH AND POWERFUL PEOPLE 144 (2006) (citing WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO:
NEGOTIATING WITH DIFFICULT PEOPLE 61-62 (1991)). 
 30. WOOLF, NIKITIN & KERR, supra note 12, at 5.  
 31. SALT II, supra note 27, art. 3. 
 32. WOOLF, NIKITIN & KERR supra note 12, at 5. 
33. See SALT II, supra note 27. 
34. See The Salt II Treaty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th 
Cong. 127 (1979) (statement of Cardinal John Krol of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), available 
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opponents as comprising a “sort of priesthood” who believed ratification of 
SALT II to be an absolutely necessary step to avoid Mutually Assured 
Destruction for both countries and thus the world at large.35
Critics of SALT II were greatly concerned with submitting to what they 
perceived as a Soviet threat that could not be trusted.36 According to 
Professor Eugene Rostow, one-time Dean of Yale Law School and future 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:  
The notion that Soviet-American relations have improved in recent years, 
that the Cold War is over, and that negotiation has been substituted for 
confrontation is a dangerous symptom of auto-intoxication. The Cold War 
is not over. On the contrary, it is worse than ever, featured by Soviet 
threats and thrusts on a far greater scale than those of the simple days of 
the Berlin airlift and the crisis in Greece. But as things get worse, many 
Americans insist on telling each other that they are getting better. SALT II 
is a case in point. If ratified in its present form, it would be an act of 
submission on our part, legitimizing Soviet superiority—a great Soviet 
victory in the Cold War, and so perceived everywhere in the world. But 
this [Carter] Administration keeps repeating that SALT II would be a step 
towards stability, detente, and peace.37
Ultimately, the opposition to SALT II was victorious: although both 
countries signed the treaty, it never received the advice and consent of the 
Senate once President Carter withdrew it due to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.38 However, both governments agreed to abide by its 
principles.39
In the intervening years between SALT II and the New START Treaty, 
the United States and Russia engaged in several other important treaties that 
led to New START.  
at http://www.archive.org/stream/saltiitreatyhear04unit/saltiitreatyhear04unit_djvu.txt (“Are 
we not justified in asking today, is strategic equivalence an absolute necessity?”).  
35. See Peter Hannaford, Remarks at the Phi Beta Kappa N. Cal. Ass’n, Presidential 
Leadership and the Nature of Change (Feb. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.pbk.org/home/FocusNews.aspx?id=245 (describing the proponents of arms 
control and START II, including President Jimmy Carter, Hannaford alludes to a superiority 
complex on the part of these proponents against opponents of the treaty, such as future 
President Ronald Reagan). 
36. The Salt II Treaty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th 
Cong. 31 (1979) (statement of Eugene V. Rostow), available at 
http://www.archive.org/stream/saltiitreatyhear04unit/saltiitreatyhear04unit_djvu.txt.  
37. Id. at 32. It is worth noting that Professor Rostow was the highest-ranking 
Democrat at one point in President Reagan’s Administration, and that many Democrats did 
not share his views on the subject of SALT II—a concept that becomes especially obvious 
during the question and answer session between he and then-Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) in the 
referenced portion of these hearings. See id. at 7-11.  
 38. Lehman, supra note 19, at 568-69. 
39. Id. at 569. 
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While SALT I and II and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INF) took considerable steps towards reducing the intermediate and short 
range threats, they did not directly address the issue of nuclear weaponry. 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I),40 ratified by the U.S. 
Senate on October 1, 1992,41 was the first nuclear arms reduction treaty, 
successfully slashing both the United States’ and Russia’s arsenal of nuclear 
warheads—from over 10,000 to 6,000.42 Amid the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, enabling START I’s success was the Lisbon Protocol,43 which 
offered a coherent structure whereby participating former Soviet republics44
could safely return nuclear weapon material to the Soviet Union for 
dismantlement.45
Under the terms of the treaty, each side limited its deployment to 4,900 
warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs.46 In particular, the United States 
emphasized restrictions on the heavy ICBMS feared to threaten a first strike 
against the U.S.47 As was the case with the INF Treaty that preceded it, 
START I contained a fairly complex and thorough implementation and 
verification regime.48
START I, unlike many of its arms control predecessors, did not face 
intense scrutiny (and was sufficiently desirable to trigger attempts at a 
START II Treaty).49 Its painless enactment was partially due to the global 
security crisis following the breakup of the Soviet Union, as observers 
wondered what would happen to the former Soviet Union’s nuclear 
 40. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 
1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. Treaty Doc. 102-20 (1991) [hereinafter START I Treaty], available 
at http:// www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/start1.html.  
 41. WOOLF, NIKITIN & KERR, supra note 12, at 8. 
 42. Leah Pettitt, Weapons of Mass Destruction Stockpiled in Russia: Should the 
United States Continue to Implement Programs Designed to Reduce and Safeguard These 
Weapons?, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. 169, 181, (2002) (citing Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, 
Statement on the Achievement of the Final Reductions Under the START Treaty (Dec. 5, 
2001)). The Treaty thus accomplished its goal of decreasing both countries’ nuclear 
stockpiles by 30-40 %. See Background Briefing for Reporters: The START Follow-On 
Agreement and Beyond, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (June 19, 2009), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3711.  
 43. Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 
23, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-32, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/start1/protocols/lisbon.htm.  
 44. Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan became signatories. Id.
45. Id.
 46. START I Treaty, supra note 40. 
 47. START I restricted each nation to 1,540 such warheads, a “50% reduction in the 
number of warheads deployed on the SS-18 ICBMs in the former Soviet republics.” WOOLF,
NIKITIN & KERR, supra note 12, at 9. 
 48. Pettitt, supra note 42 (asserting that the parties to the treaty will continue to meet 
with the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in order to resolve issues of 
compliance and further implementation). 
49. Id.
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weapons.50 While today that fear has largely abated, for Presidents George 
H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton it was of great concern.51
The momentum of START I led both countries to pursue START II, 
whose arms reduction measures served as a bellwether of the conclusion of 
the Cold War: priority had moved away from crisis stability and toward 
reductions and control.52 But in June 2002, Russia withdrew from the 
START II treaty in response to U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty (ABM).53
In the end, the failure of START II appears to have had minimal 
impact, as President George W. Bush set into motion a plan to reduce U.S. 
missile forces dramatically.54 The aborted START II treaty was officially 
superseded by the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT),55 agreed 
to by Presidents Bush and Putin in November 2001 and signed at the 
Moscow Summit on May 24, 2002.56 Without having to compromise on the 
50. See, e.g., The Former Soviet Union: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus,
FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif96/fsu.html (last visited Jan. 21, 
2012), http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif96/fsu.html. Under the Goals and Interests section 
of the article, it states: 
The fundamental interests of the United States regarding Russia and 
the independent states of the former Soviet Union, as articulated by 
President Clinton, are to reduce the nuclear threat, to support the 
development of these states as stable democracies, and to assist them 
to establish market economies. Within these broad foreign policy 
goals, the United States has five primary national security interests in 
this region: implementing START I and II and all other arms control 
agreements, and safeguarding the enormous nuclear arsenal that is 
the legacy of the Cold War; deterring the use of nuclear weapons 
should a strategic reversal occur in the former Soviet Union and a 
regime emerge which is hostile to U.S. interests; preventing the 
proliferation of NBC weapons; maintaining regional stability in and 
among the nations of the former Warsaw Pact; and avoiding 
reestablishing an antagonistic global rivalry with Russia. 
51. Id.
 52. Lehman, supra note 19, at 580. 
53. Id. at 581. Facing the new security threats posed by a post-9/11 world as those of 
the Cold War past dissipated, the Bush Administration sought to withdraw from the ABM, 
for, under the provisions of the ABM, the United States could not defend itself from a missile 
attack. See Press Announcement, Office of the Press Secretary, Announcement of 
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (Dec. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/ABMwithdrawal.htm (noting that “[p]rincipal among 
these [new] threats are weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means wielded by 
terrorists and rogue states”). Simply put, September 11, 2001 changed the way that the Bush 
Administration viewed arms control outside the confines of the nuclear arena. 
 54. Lehman, supra note 19, at 581. 
 55. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Strategic Offensive Reductions, U.S.-Russ., May 24, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-8 (2002) 
[hereinafter SORT], available at http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/sort.  
56. See Lehman, supra note 19, at 581. 
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issues that doomed START II,57 both countries agreed to reduce 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 from 2,200 by 
2012.58 Several years later, with the SORT Treaty set to expire, the Obama 
Administration began working on an extension of SORT that would 
eventually become New START.59
II. PROVISIONS FOR A NEW START 
 On February 5, 2011, the latest nuclear arms reduction treaty between the 
United States and Russia, New START, entered into force.60 The New 
START Treaty deserves praise for containing key provisions that compel 
the nuclear arms reduction of both countries and verify compliance. 
 New START decreases to 1,550 the number of deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads of both Russia and the United States from the post-SORT number 
of 1,700,61 although both countries retain the right to determine the 
composition of their own strategic offensive arms.62 The deployed and non-
deployed strategic launchers and heavy bombers are limited to 800 for each 
country,63 while, within those limits, the deployed strategic launchers and 
heavy bombers are cut to 700—modest cuts by the standards of previous 
nuclear arms reductions treaties.64 The treaty also re-establishes a 
comprehensive verification protocol providing for eighteen on-site 
inspections per year,65 which advocates of New START claim as perhaps 
 57. “[T]wo factors were to determine the fate of START II. One was the continuing 
difficulty the Russian Federation believed it would have maintaining forces that would reach 
the START II ceilings without the MIRVed ICBMs banned by START II. The Second was 
that while the United States was divided internally over whether to withdraw from the ABM 
Treaty, some deployments seemed more probably in time no matter which political party 
controlled the White House.” Id. 
 58. SORT, supra note 55.  
59. See President Obama, Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates & Admiral Mullen, 
Briefing on the Announcement of the New START Treaty (Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter 
Announcement of New START], available at http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1345 
(describing New START as an extension of the nuclear arms reduction started under the 
previous SORT and START Treaties). 
 60. New START Press Release, supra note 3. New START received Senate 
ratification on December 22, 2010 despite twenty-six Republicans voting against passage. Eli 
Lake, Senate Ratifies New START; Obama Gets ‘Reset’ with Russia, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/22/senate-ratifies-new-start-obama-
gets-reset-with-ru/. 
 61. New START Treaty, supra note 2, art. II. 
62. Id. The Second Provision under Article II states, “Each Party shall have the right 
to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.” Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
 65. New START Press Release, supra note 3 (outlining how the New START Treaty 
requires each country to exchange updated nuclear databases every six months for the 
duration of the treaty). The Fact Sheet also outlines how the New START Treaty requires 
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the most critical aspect of the treaty.66 Two types of inspections are 
permitted.  
 Type One Inspections concentrate exclusively on weapon sites that hold 
deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms.67 The inspections 
confirm the accuracy of declared data on deployed and non-deployed 
strategic offensive arms, ascertain the total number of nuclear warheads 
situated on designated deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, and verify 
the number of nuclear armaments declared by each country to be on their 
respective designated deployed heavy bombers.68 Type Two Inspections 
focus solely on sites with non-deployed strategic offensive arms, and can 
also include confirmation of the conversion/elimination of strategic 
offensive arms, and ratification that certain facilities have been eliminated.69
According to the New START Treaty language, each side is allowed to 
conduct ten Type One inspections and eight Type Two inspections 
annually.70
Unless superseded by a subsequent agreement, New START will 
remain in force for the next decade.71 Both Russia and the United States 
have the right to seek, with the agreement of the other country, an additional 
five-year extension.72 And both parties have the right to withdraw from the 
treaty, “if [either decides] that extraordinary events related to the subject 
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”73 While 
arguably not as relevant of its Cold War era predecessors, New START has 
captured much of the framework that made those predecessors successful. 
III. AS A CONTINUED START WITH RUSSIA, NEW START HAS SOME 
POSITIVE COMPONENTS
Advocates of New START argue that the treaty will make the United 
States and the world safer74—but to what degree? Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates submit that New START 
will create “a more stable, predictable and cooperative relationship between 
that each country will exchange updated nuclear databases every six months for the duration 
of the treaty. 
 66. Hillary Rodham Clinton & Robert M. Gates, Op-Ed., Why the Senate Should 
Ratify the New START, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/11/150878.htm.  
 67. New START Treaty, supra note 2, art. XI. 
68. Id.
69. Id.
 70. New START Press Release, supra note 3. 
 71. New START Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIV. 
72. Id.  
73. Id. 
74. See, e.g., George P. Schultz et al., Op-Ed, Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear 
Proliferation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2011, available at http://cisac.stanford.edu/news/william_ 
j_perry_why_we_need_a_new_deterrence_strategy_20110307.  
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the world’s two leading nuclear powers. . . It will help solidify the ‘reset’ of 
U.S. relations with Russia, which has allowed us to cooperate in pursuit of 
our strategic interests.”75 Other exponents cite a broader focus. Former 
Secretaries of State George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary 
of Defense William Perry, and former Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) effectively 
argue that there is 
no basis for maintaining a structure of deterrence involving nuclear 
weapons deployed in ways that increase the danger of an accidental or 
unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon, or even a deliberate nuclear 
exchange based on a false warning. Reducing the number of operationally 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles with 
verification to the levels set by the New Start Treaty is an important step in 
reducing nuclear risks.76
However, they also recognize that while nuclear arms reduction is in the 
best interest of the United States’ national security, for “as long as nuclear 
weapons exist, America must retain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear 
stockpile primarily to deter a nuclear attack and to reassure our allies 
through extended deterrence.”77 Critics of New START argue that the treaty 
undercuts this very concern. Spearheaded in Congress by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-
AZ), they take aim at New START as being “in the service of a utopian 
ideal of nuclear zero.”78 Sen. Kyl believes that the President’s plan 
underfunds missile defense and every delivery system except next-
generation nuclear submarines, amounting to a continuation of a weak 
policy of missile defense.79 Secretaries Clinton and Gates disagree: New 
START “will not restrict [the United States’] ability to modernize our 
nuclear forces. On the contrary, the United States will continue to maintain 
a robust nuclear deterrent based on [a] ‘triad’ of delivery systems: 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 
heavy bombers for nuclear armaments.”80
 75. Clinton & Gates, supra note 66. 
 76. Schultz et al., supra note 74. Similarly, during the 2004 Presidential election 
debates, both President George W. Bush and Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) endorsed the 
assessment that nuclear proliferation was the “single most serious threat to the national 
security of the United States.” Transcript: First Presidential Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 
2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_0930.html. 
 77. Schultz et al., supra note 74. 
 78. Jon Kyl, Op-Ed., The New START Treaty: Time for a Careful Look, WALL ST. J. 
(July 8, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487042936045753 
43360850107760.html.  
79. Id.
 80. Clinton & Gates, supra note 66. The article concludes by discussing the Obama 
Administration proposed fiscal support for the United States’ nuclear weapons program, 
which is an estimated in the several hundred Billion Dollar range:  
To sustain and modernize these systems, the administration has 
proposed spending well over $100 billion during the next decade . . . 
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More broadly speaking, while staunch supporters of U.S. nuclear 
proliferation and defense may claim that the United States needs more than 
1,500 nuclear warheads, the reality is that even modest reductions in nuclear 
stockpiles afford DoD the ability to continue to fund a wartime military 
while sacrificing little of America’s “power projection.” As Secretary 
Clinton acknowledged, “We do not need such large arsenals to protect our 
nation and our allies against the two greatest dangers we face today: nuclear 
proliferation and terrorism.”81
In fact, Sen. Kyl maintains that there is actually no need for this type of 
treaty at all: “The treaty’s main purpose is to oblige Russia and the U.S. to 
make specified reductions in their nuclear arsenals. But Russia would be 
making the reductions for financial reasons anyway, so we’ve agreed to 
concede something for nothing.”82 Given Russia’s public desire to reduce its 
nuclear arsenal, as both maintenance and complex verification regimes 
place a heavy burden on Russia’s treasury,83 Sen. Kyl’ position is not 
without merit. But in claiming that the United States has conceded 
something for nothing, Sen. Kyl overlooks the financial realities of nuclear 
disarmament, as the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear arsenal costs more 
than $52 billion each year84 and ultimately promotes the distrust of a fading 
old foe.  
Former Assistant Secretary of State Paula DeSutter, now of the Heritage 
Foundation, also attacks New START as being an ineffective verification 
system perpetrated by the Russians and coalesced to by the Obama 
. The administration has proposed spending $7 billion for this 
purpose in the current fiscal year—a nearly 10 percent increase—and 
more than $80 billion to modernize our nuclear weapons complex 
over the next decade, including a major life-extension program for 
current warheads. In all, the administration proposes spending more 
than $180 billion on the infrastructure that sustains our nuclear 
weapons and the means to deliver them—a substantial investment in 
the credibility and efficacy of America’s nuclear deterrent. 
Id.
 81. Announcement of New START, supra note 60. 
 82. Kyl, supra note 78. 
 83. SUSAN WILLETT, COSTS OF DISARMAMENT—DISARMING THE COSTS: NUCLEAR 
ARMS CONTROL AND NUCLEAR REARMAMENT 28 (2003), available at
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-154-8-en.pdf (stating that the Russian 
Defense Budget shrunk by 62% during the 1990s after the U.S.S.R. dissolved, and even a 
moderate reduction in the Russian Strategic Rocket Force would yield a long term savings of 
19 billion roubles over 15 years.). See also New Start: Russia and America Agree to Sharp 
Cuts in Their Deployed Warheads and Delivery Systems, ECONOMIST, May 27, 2010 
http://www.economist.com/node/15796394. 
84. See STEPHEN I. SCHWARTZ & DEEPTI CHOUBEY, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INT’L PEACE, NUCLEAR SECURITY SPENDING: ASSESSING COSTS, EXAMINING PRIORITIES
(2009), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nuclear_security_spending.pdf 
(detailing the spending for fiscal year 2008). 
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Administration.85 She contends that the under the terms of the treaty it will 
be more difficult than ever to verify which warheads have been previously 
inspected: 
[T]he ID number assigned to each warhead and launcher will be assigned 
by the Russians—in whatever way they choose. They could assign the 
same number to multiple mobile missile launchers and warheads, and 
when U.S. inspectors determine that the number of warheads on, say, the 
fourth missile they inspect, is the same as on the first, the Russians need 
only assert that the U.S. happened to request an [accountability of] a 
missile they had already inspected.86
To Secretary DeSutter and others, prematurely forcing New START 
through Congress only exacerbated these defects, as it foreclosed the Senate 
from conducting due diligence on the effectiveness of the verification 
regimes created by New START.87
But these arguments fall flat: “the goal of verification is to confirm the 
data that is provided by each country in the mandatory data exchanges 
required by the treaty,” not to haggle over minutia like the assignment of 
Identification Numbers.88 “Unlike START I, New START requires each 
country to declare the actual number of rockets that each individual missile 
carries, rather than simply setting the maximum number of rockets that a 
particular type of missile could carry.”89 Consequently, the data gathered as 
a result of New START may be “much more accurate than [that collected] 
under START I, since it eliminates the over-counting of warheads on 
missiles.”90 And finally, the Senate had ample time—more than six 
months—to provide advice and consent on the treaty; it was not “forced” 
through the legislature.91
IV. ALTHOUGH A POSITIVE STEP, NEW START IS BASED ON AN OUTDATED 
THREAT; THE U.S. MUST CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
While possessing some merit, New START is emblematic of a dated 
approach to strategic arms control that–with its heavy focus on formal 
 85. Paula DeSutter, Don’t Expect New START to Fill the Gaps Left by START 
Termination, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/244007/don-t-expect-new-start-fill-gaps-left-start-
termination-paula-desutter. See also Mark Donaldson, New START Verification: Inspecting 
the Critics’ Arguments, ALL THINGS NUCLEAR (Aug. 27, 2010), 
http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/1020155049/new-start-verification-inspecting-the-critics#. 
 86. DeSutter, supra note 85. 
 87. Michaela Bendikova, Stop Rushing New START!, THE FOUNDRY (Nov. 15, 2010, 
3:00 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/?p=46618.  
 88. Donaldson, supra note 85. 
89. Id.
90. Id.
 91. Announcement of New START, supra note 59. 
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treaties, contentious negotiations, rigid warhead and launcher ceilings, and 
immense, detailed verification regimes—in practice does not efficiently 
safeguard America.92 The expense of the treaty, coupled with the 
unwillingness of other nations to make similar commitments, ultimately 
renders New START a well-intentioned but poorly executed attempt at 
nonproliferation. In its stead, the United States should explore new 
options—both multi- and unilateral—capable of addressing a modern 
reality: the rise of nuclear states with links to terrorism.  
The impetus behind New START is based on a diplomatic blueprint that 
presupposes Russia to be a dangerous, Cold War enemy. But the posture of 
the United States’ one-time adversary has dramatically changed. Today, 
Russia’s nuclear policy is no longer based on aggression, but rather on 
deterrence and defense.93 It is through this lens that the costs of New 
START must be scrutinized. Like its forbearers, it required many years to 
complete at a great expense to U.S. taxpayers—from the manpower 
expended in drafting and negotiating,94 to the actual maintenance of the 
warheads themselves.95
Meanwhile, despite the strengthening of relations between America and 
Russia in the time since SALT I, non-traditional terrorism threats have 
arisen. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, only four nations had full 
nuclear weapon capabilities: the United States, the Soviet Union, England, 
and France.96 Today, there are nine nations believed to possess nuclear 
weapons,97 including Israel,98 North Korea, and Pakistan.99 Recognizing this 
 92. NAT’L INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, RATIONALE AND REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S.
NUCLEAR FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL 12 (2001), available at
http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Archives/Publication%20Archive%20P
DF/volume%201%20complete.pdf.  
 93. ALEXI ARBATOV, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, GAMBIT OR 
ENDGAME? THE NEW STATE OF ARMS CONTROL 5 (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/51933099/Gambit-or-Endgame-The-New-State-of-Arms-Control 
Today. “Russia maintains nuclear forces to retaliate against [(1)] a nuclear strike,” (2) “a 
chemical, biological, or radiological attack,” or (3) “a conventional attack that threatens the 
existence of the state.” Id. at 10. 
94. See WILLETT, supra note 83, at 109 (stating that the United States has spent more 
than $7 billion negotiating the various START Treaties with Russia). 
95. See Stephen I. Schwartz & Deepti Choubey, Op-Ed., The Cost of Nuclear 
Security, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/12/opinion/oe-
schwartz12 (asserting that it costs the U.S. $29 billion annually to maintain its nuclear 
arsenal).  
96. Nuclear Nonproliferation, supra note 14. China would soon follow suit, testing 
its first nuclear bomb on October 16, 1964. Id.
97. Status of World Nuclear Forces, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS,
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html (last visited Jan. 21, 
2012). 
 98. Luke Harding & Duncan Campbell, Calls for Olmert to Resign After Nuclear 
Gaffe, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 12, 2006, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/12/germany.israel.  
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development, in their article, Reformulating the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime: Al-Qaeda, Global Terrorism, and the Rogue State Paradigm,
authors David S. Jonas and Christopher Swift presciently envision two 
nuclear weapon scenarios that could eventually cause tremendous instability 
to world peace: 
In the first scenario, Islamic extremists from the North Caucasus or 
Central Asia might seize fissile material or even an operational warhead 
from aging Soviet-era installations. In the second, Taliban supporters 
operating within Pakistan’s Pashtun-majority Northwest Frontier Province 
could potentially penetrate that state’s military command structure and 
launch a coup d’état, thus bringing that nation’s nuclear arsenal under the 
control of Islamic extremists with alleged ties to al-Qaeda. In each 
instance, non-state actors would overcome the logistical challenge of 
developing weapons by appropriating existing assets from weak or 
negligent nation-states.100
With the rise of nuclear states with links to terrorism, the United States 
must move away from costly, bilateral treaties with Russia and instead 
embrace alternatives to stamp out the danger posed by these new threats. 
The United States can so act (1) by initiating multilateral treaty talks with 
the countries which wield great influence over these upstarts—such as 
China, which holds sway over North Korea—or (2) by forsaking the 
expensive and cumbersome treaty process for the voluntary, unilateral 
disarmament of many of the nuclear weapons which languish at great 
taxpayer expense.101
In order to aggressively pursue total nuclear disarmament in accordance 
with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)102—and if greater 
global security is to be achieved by limiting the availability of nuclear 
material to terrorist sources—the United States and Russia must encourage 
other nations, like China, to hold multilateral talks. Secretaries Schutz, 
Kissinger, et al. understand that eventually there must be nuclear arms 
control action by other members of the “nuclear club,” for “[t]here is an 
inherent limit to U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions if other nuclear 
99. N. Korea Paid Pakistan for Nuclear Weapons Tech, CBC.CA, July 7, 2011, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/07/07/nuclear-pakistan-nkorea.htmlhtml.html. 
 100. David S. Jonas & Christopher Swift, Reformulating the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime: Al-Qaeda, Global Terrorism, and the Rogue State Paradigm, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L.
& FOREIGN AFF. 337, 343 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 101. Although given today’s financial climate, the costs of such maintenance may 
actually compel a nuclear reduction prematurely. 
 102. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. VI, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, available at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty 
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general 
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”). 
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weapon states build up their inventories or if new nuclear powers 
emerge.”103 Indeed, as the United States and Russia reduce their stockpiles, 
other nuclear states make no such commitments.104 And for the United 
States to be certain as to whether other nations are increasing their nuclear 
arsenals—or in the case of Iran, constructing them105—there must be 
multilateral treaty initiatives with reliable verification regimes that include 
nations other than the United States and Russia. Moreover, common sense 
suggests that unilaterally reducing its nuclear weaponry while only Russia 
follows suit is not an efficient means of diplomacy for the United States. 
This approach would serve the United States and Russia particularly well 
in regard to their mutual security concerns about China.106 For their part, the 
Chinese have stated that they will not consider multilateral arms reduction 
negotiations until the United States and Russia achieve “drastic” or 
“substantial” reductions—i.e., more than 50%—in their own nuclear 
arsenals.107 With this in mind, the United States might propose a sharp cut in 
its nuclear arms ratio in order to tempt China to the bargaining table, for 
example, a 5:1 nuclear arms reduction if China were to exert its 
considerable sway over North Korea and Pakistan. As an incentive, the 
United States could also offer to encourage the participation of Pakistan’s 
enemy, India, in these multilateral talks.  
The goals of multilateral negotiations would be a comprehensive 
verification regime among all nations, and a reduction of nuclear arms by all 
parties involved. But perhaps more importantly, by encouraging China to 
 103. Schultz, Perry, Kissinger & Nunn, supra note 74. 
104. See Status of World Nuclear Forces, supra note 97. The Federation of American 
Scientists provides an estimate of each country’s nuclear arsenal as follows: 
Country
Operational 
Strategic
Operational 
Nonstrategic Reserve
Military 
Stockpile
Total 
Inventory
 Russia 2,430  0 5,500 8,000 11,000 
 United States 1,950 200 2,850 5,000 8,500 
 France 290 n.a. ? ~300 ~300 
 China  0 ? ~180 240 240 
 United Kingdom 160 n.a. 65 225 225 
 Israel  0 n.a. 80 80 80 
 Pakistan (all estimates)  0 n.a. 90-110 90-110 90-110 
 India (all estimates)  0 n.a. 80-100 80-100 80-100 
 North Korea (all 
estimates) 
 0 n.a. <10 <10 <10 
 105. Catherine Philp, Barack Obama Accuses Iran of Attempt to Build a Nuclear 
Bomb, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 10, 2010, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7021192.ece.  
 106. It may especially benefit Russia, who views its geographical proximity to China 
as a relevant security concern. See ARBATOV, supra note 93, at 6-7. 
107. Country Profiles: China, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/db/china/darmpos.htm (last updated Dec. 2011).  
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bring Pakistan and North Korea to the bargaining table, the United States 
could assert greater control over two dangerous nations with nuclear 
weapon capabilities.  
Of course, it is entirely possible that China has no intention of 
weakening its nuclear arsenal and is posturing on the global stage—a belief 
held by some opponents of American nuclear arms control.108 Regardless, 
the United States stands to lose very little by reaching out to nations like 
China if the expenses associated with the maintenance of its nuclear arsenal 
may force a reduction anyway. If the United States does not attempt to bring 
more nations to the negotiating table and a terrorist organization gains 
control of a nuclear weapon, the political consequences of a nuclear attack 
on American soil may very well be much more damaging than the political 
cache surrendered by agreeing to reductions with China or other nations at 
5:1 ratio (or higher). 
Alternatively, the President of the United States could propose to 
unilaterally reduce the United States’ nuclear arsenal. The heavy 
expenditures on weapons maintenance, verification regimes, and treaty 
negotiations mean that it may be more economical to reduce our nuclear 
arsenal alone. Although the President would likely be labeled weak on 
defense issues, he or she could present this plan as a cost-saving endeavor 
designed to reduce the budget. If ever it was politically plausible to 
encourage peaceful nuclear arms reductions, the current economic downturn 
and bipartisan accord as to the necessity of budget cuts109 present the perfect 
opportunity.110 Of course, it would also be a positive step toward American 
compliance with Article VI of the NPT. 
Unilaterally reducing its nuclear stockpiles in lieu of the treaty track 
would not only reduce U.S. spending, it would also serve as a signal to the 
world that nuclear arms control is not merely a U.S.-Russian endeavor,111
108. Id.
109. See Alan Silverleib &Tom Cohen, Democrats, Republicans Agree on a Budget 
Deal, CNN (Apr. 9, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/04/08/congress.budget/in 
dex.html.  
 110. Whether this realpolitik resonates with Congress remains to be seen. At least one 
member of the U.S. Senate, is aware of this reality. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) actually cited 
the expensive maintenance costs as a reason why he broke party ranks and voted for 
ratification of New START. See Press Release, U.S. Sen. Dick Lugar, Lugar: Romney 
Misinformed on New START Treaty (July 8, 2010), available at 
http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=326277 (stating that New START helps us “focus our 
defense resources effectively”). 
 111. It may also encourage other nations, including Russia—the United States’ partner 
in the SALT and START Treaties—to curtail their stockpiles without the lengthy and often 
contentious process of bilateral or multilateral treaties. 
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but something to which all nations should aspire pursuant to Article VI of 
the NPT.112
 Currently, with only the United States and Russia committed to treaties 
like New START that require an accurate accounting and decommissioning 
of nuclear weapons, it seems less likely that the other countries with nuclear 
weapons will ever disarm in accordance with the NPT, absent a change of 
course by the U.S. or Russia. 
CONCLUSION
If countries such as China, Pakistan and North Korea have no intention 
of complete nuclear disarmament, treaties like New START arguably 
function less to reduce the nuclear stockpiles of the United States and 
Russia and more to continue the dialogue between two nations that have 
already appeared willing to support transparency and a nuclear drawdown. 
While this is certainly a positive step toward greater nuclear disarmament, 
the United States–as a global leader–does not need expensive bilateral 
negotiations with Russia to encourage global nuclear arms reductions. 
Unprompted American nuclear arms reduction would say as much, if not 
more, about the United States’ commitment to the principles of the NPT.  
By unilaterally reducing its nuclear arms with the hope that others follow 
suit, or alternatively, by striving to bring more parties to the negotiation 
table, the United States could drastically alter the world’s nuclear landscape 
and achieve long-term and meaningful nuclear arms control. In doing so, the 
United States could save substantial sums of money on the nearly $53 
billion it spends per year on nuclear weapons and maintenance.113 While 
New START is a positive step in the direction of nuclear arms control, it is 
based on an outdated model of diplomacy and is responsive to a Russian 
nuclear threat that has long since faded. Ultimately, New START is less 
efficient and effective than these other means of diplomacy.  
 112. At some point, the United States, Russia, and the other members of the “nuclear 
club” will face the crossroads of whether to abandon completely their nuclear stockpiles in 
accordance with the NPT. 
 113. SCHWARTZ & CHOUBEY, supra note 84. 
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INTRODUCTION
This note will start where many other papers analyzing private military 
contractors (PMCs) start, with a description of the general problems 
associated with the use of contractors. The use of PMC personnel in such 
mission critical situations as security operations is no doubt a complex 
issue. However, the consensus seems to be that there is too little 
accountability stemming from a lack of oversight and that some fairly 
substantial changes will be required to correct the situation. This note 
proposes the adoption of a U.S. Foreign Legion as one possible solution to 
the overreliance on PMC personnel in Afghanistan. 
The solution proposed in this paper is in no way intended to be an 
immediate resolution to all issues associated with the use of PMCs. Those 
who have analyzed the overreliance on PMCs seem resigned to the fact that 
no one, short-term solution is available.2 The proposed solution in this note 
is offered only as one part of a solution to the complex issue that 
overreliance on private security contractors presents. This note specifically 
examines the implementation of a formalized, structured, U.S. Foreign 
Legion, which would build on current U.S. laws, borrow from other 
formalized foreign military institutions, and would reduce some of the 
problems currently associated with reliance on PMC personnel by 
incorporating these same individuals into the existing U.S. military 
command structure. 
 2. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG. INTERIM REPORT NO. 2, AT
WHAT RISK?: CORRECTING OVER-RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
9 (2011) [hereinafter CWC, AT WHAT RISK?] (“Reducing this over-reliance will take resolve, 
zealous attention, resource investments, and time.”). 
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I. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT U.S. RELIANCE ON PRIVATE MILITARY 
CONTRACTORS
A. Overreliance on Private Contractors Generally 
“Though some organic capability still exists, agencies cannot 
successfully self-perform for the length of time and with the breadth of 
responsibility required in Iraq and Afghanistan.”3 What was initially a quick 
fix use of contractors for an immediate need in mission critical situations 
where tight deadlines necessitated immediate action has now become a 
more or less permanently “default option.”4 The bottom line is that if the 
military needs a job done and cannot handle it with its own personnel, the 
job gets contracted out.5
PMCs are supposed to help “[r]educe the need to hire and train new 
federal civilian employees[, and] [p]rovide flexibility in expanding and 
reducing support personnel quickly and as needed.”6 Essentially, PMC 
personnel are at-will employees who can be hired on or laid off as the 
situation dictates. Assuming that this flexibility actually leads to cost 
savings—something that will be analyzed later—this system comes with 
some substantial drawbacks for mission-critical functions. Namely, PMC 
personnel are also free to walk away from a mission any time they want.7
As Peter Singer succinctly puts it, a contractor can simply say to himself: 
I’m not being “paid enough for this #%&.”8 These private entities may 
abandon a specific mission or task and there is no way that the U.S. military 
can force them to stay.9 Contract employees simply do not face the same 
sanctions for defecting from service that regular soldiers do.10
“The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen unprecedented reliance on 
contractors to support American operations and objectives.”11 Truly, 
“relying on contractors has become the ‘default option’ for many functions, 
including security for convoys and persons, even if it may not be a 
legitimate or preferable option.”12 Despite the fact that it may not even be a 
legitimate option, U.S. dependence on and use of PMCs persists and the 
 3. Id. at 13. 
 4. Id. at 14. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 8. 
 7. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY 160-61 (2008). 
 8. Id. at 162. 
 9. Id. at 160-61 (citing Stephen Zamparrelli, Contractors on the Battlefield: What 
Have We Signed Up For?, AIR FORCE J. LOGISTICS, 19 (1999)). 
 10. Id. at 160. 
 11. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 6. 
 12. Id. at 10. 
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conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are now “the most contractor-dependent 
armed conflict in U.S. history.”13
How did the United States get to this point? Some have suggested that 
the “combination of reduced government staffing and increased government 
responsibility” may have essentially “opened a breach into which 
contractors have stepped,”14 by the hundreds of thousands it would seem. 
The increased government responsibility comes from the obvious strain 
of fighting two simultaneous wars lasting nearly a decade each. The lack of 
government staffing can potentially be explained, over the long term at 
least, by the fact that the United States currently relies on an all-volunteer 
army and has since Richard Nixon’s 1973 announcement of a shift away 
from conscription in response to opposition to the draft during Vietnam.15
This paper in no way advocates for conscription. Even if that were the most 
logical solution to filling the thousands of spots that would be left by 
contractors, it would likely be political suicide for any politician to suggest 
it, let alone act on it. 
However, there is something unsettling about the fact that “[c]ontractor 
employees—U.S. citizens and foreign nationals—at their peak represented 
nearly half of the total force deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.”16 In 2010, 
this meant that nearly 200,000 contractors, 199,78317 to be more precise 
than the data may actually allow, “were supporting U.S. and allied 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.”18 Department of Defense (DoD) reports 
place the estimate of the number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan at the same time to be 202,100.19
As the numbers above suggest, there is some uncertainty in calculating 
exactly how many contractor personnel are currently at work in theater, but 
a round number of 200,000 is useful for understanding the scope of 
contractor reliance. This 200,000 figure is also useful for getting a sense of 
the level of reliance on non-citizen foreign contractor personnel when one 
considers that over 150,000 of these contractors are either Iraqi nationals, 
Afghan nationals, or third-country nationals, with another 1,209 individuals 
of unknown or apparently undeterminable nationality.20 Simple math tells us 
that, conservatively, this means that over 75% of our military force now 
consists of non-citizen foreign nationals. 
This note in no way suggests that the United States should immediately 
abandon reliance on all 200,000 contract personnel, or even that it abandon 
 13. Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice,
SERV. CONTRACTOR, Sept. 2010, at 16, 18.  
 14. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 13. 
 15. CYNTHIA A. WATSON, U.S. MILITARY SERVICE 125 (2007). 
 16. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 24. 
 17. Id. at 7 (citations omitted). 
 18. Id.
 19. Id. at 8. 
 20. Id. at 7 (citations omitted). 
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the use of the 150,000 or so non-citizen personnel; it simply couldn’t be 
done. To do so would mean that the United States would somehow need to 
mass, train, equip, and transport an additional 150,000 to 200,000 personnel 
to fill all the combat and non-combat positions that would be left by a purge 
of contractors of this magnitude. 
The United States currently uses PMC personnel to “guard bases and 
diplomatic facilities, escort convoys and personnel, wash clothes and serve 
meals, maintain equipment and translate local languages, erect buildings 
and dig wells . . . . “21 To get to a more manageable number, this note will 
set aside those PMC personnel who work in logistics, food service, etc. and 
focus on those actively engaged in armed security functions. CENTCOM’s 
Armed Contractor Oversight Division estimates that as of May 2010 this 
subset of PMC personnel operating on contracts/subcontracts in 
Afghanistan numbered approximately 26,000, the vast majority of which are 
Afghan nationals.22
Ideally PMC personnel can be used to “[f]ree up military personnel for 
combat or other critical missions.”23 However, at least one PMC executive 
has suggested that the more politicized rationale behind reliance on PMCs 
could be to take focus off of the U.S. body count by drawing down troops 
and replacing where needed with PMC personnel.24 Regardless of the 
reasons, some PMCs now have “skills and experience that government 
agencies lack or possess only to a limited extent,”25 often because PMCs 
have been the default and have had opportunities to develop knowledge and 
skills that others have not.26
B. Cost Concerns 
With such heavy reliance on contractors, it is no wonder that “[f]or 
federal fiscal years 2002–2010 . . . . the reported value of funds obligated 
for contingency contracts for equipment, supplies, and support services is at 
least $154 billion for the DoD, $11 billion for the Department of State, and 
 21. Id.
 22. Sen. Carl. Levin (D-MI) Press Conference on Private Security Contractors in 
Afghanistan (C-SPAN television broadcast Oct. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Levin Press 
Conference], available at http://www.c-span.org/Events/Sen-Carl-Levin-D-MI-Press-
Conference-on-Private-Security-Contractors-in-Afghanistan/19234-1/. 
 23. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 8. 
 24. Frontline: Private Warriors (PBS television broadcast June 21, 2005), available 
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/view/ (interview by Martin 
Smith with Andy Melville, Project Director, Erinys Iraq, in Red Zone of Baghdad in which 
Mr. Melville suggests that Erinys may have been used extensively by the Army Corp of 
Engineers as part of an overall troop drawdown by replacing U.S. troops with PMC 
personnel). 
 25. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 8. 
 26. Id. at 14.  
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$7 billion for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).”27
When one adds the “$5 billion in grants and cooperative agreements 
awarded by State and USAID” the total value becomes $177 billion.28 To 
put these figures in more comprehensible, concrete terms, the average cost 
per U.S. household for contractor support of contingency operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2010 was $1,505.29
Truly, there seems to be less consideration for costs and more 
importance placed on simply trying to get the task accomplished;30 however, 
with the reliance on contractors, the U.S. has essentially introduced another 
step where money can get lost or shuffled into the wrong hands. While there 
is no “single, definitive accounting of the extent of contingency-contract 
waste, fraud, and abuse,”31 the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq 
and Afghanistan recently estimated the number to be, conservatively, tens 
of billions of dollars.32 The Commission determined that estimates of fraud 
alone account for $12 billion,33 while recognizing that waste, while not as 
easily quantified, may account for substantially more U.S. taxpayer funds 
that have not reached their intended use.34
The reduced government staffing and increased responsibility mentioned 
above have aggravated what the Commission on Wartime Contracting calls 
the “toxic interplay [between] huge sums of money” and the 
“unprecedented reliance on contractors” in relatively small states.35 To put it 
bluntly, this interplay is made toxic because of “a decimated federal 
acquisition workforce; a military downsized in the 1990s, but now facing 
expanded and extended missions; limited deployability of federal civilians; 
and inadequate operational planning for using and monitoring 
contractors.”36 This toxic interplay has resulted in the convictions and guilty 
pleas of some contractor personnel for “bribe[s] solicitation[s], kickbacks, 
false invoicing, theft of government property, and money laundering in 
connection with contracting.”37
 27. Id. at 6 (citing Commission calculation from Federal Procurement Data System-
Next Generation data for Defense, State, and USAID contracts performed in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar). 
 28. Id. (citing Commission calculation from the www.USAspending.gov database 
(based on data from the Federal Assistance Award Data System, for grants and cooperative 
agreements performed in Iraq and Afghanistan)). 
 29. Id. at 10 fig.2. 
 30. Id. at 14. 
 31. CWC, At What Risk?, supra note 2, at 6. 
 32. Id. at 7. 
 33. Id. (applying an estimated 7% loss-of-revenue-to-fraud metric, established by the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners in its 2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational 
Fraud and Abuse, to the $177 billion in contingency contracts and grants at issue in Iraq and 
Afghanistan). 
 34. Id.
 35. Id. at 9. 
 36. Id. 
 37. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 8. 
2012] Legitimizing a de facto U.S. Foreign Legion In Afghanistan 465
According to Senator Levin’s remarks at an October 2010 press 
conference, General Petraeus specifically warned a bipartisan commission 
that spending contracting funds too quickly, without sufficient oversight, 
would likely cause funds to be lost through corruption and criminal 
patronage and that some of these funds could even unintentionally end up in 
the hands of insurgents, thereby undermining U.S. objectives in 
Afghanistan.38
Kickbacks and bribes are bad enough, but having U.S. taxpayer dollars 
diverted to those who would kill U.S. troops is quite another matter. Yet, 
according to a recent bipartisan report, this has happened repeatedly in 
Afghanistan, and two task forces are currently investigating the matter.39
In his October 2010 press conference on the matter, Senator Levin 
provided some insight into these examples of U.S. taxpayer funds going to 
the Taliban and al Qaeda through Afghani warlords.40 One instance 
involved a U.S. Air Force contract with ArmorGroup (a subsidiary of G4S) 
in which funds went directly from contractor to subcontractor to Afghan 
warlords who then supplied personnel for a contracted security guard 
force.41 In that particular case, one warlord killed another (murder and 
bribery), and one warlord was killed in a U.S. military raid on a Taliban 
meeting that happened to be held at his house (U.S. funds flowing to those 
who would undercut U.S. objectives).42 A second instance involved a 
contract with EOD Technology in which one Afghan warlord was 
reportedly “playing both sides” in appearing to be supportive of both the 
Taliban and the U.S. military. 
Preventing U.S. funds from going to Afghan warlords or insurgents 
through patronage or poorly monitored contracts is essential, but there are 
concerns that removing such patronage payments to Afghan 
warlords/strongmen might make the situation on the ground in Afghanistan 
more dangerous for civilians and International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) troops.43 Senator Levin acknowledges that there may very well be 
times when military officials will have to utilize an individual or group that 
is not ideal but may be the “best that we can do” in a given situation.44
However, Levin insists that such a decision should not be left to those lower 
down in the military chain of command; if the U.S. military is to utilize 
strongmen, it must be a conscious decision from the very top.45 Senator 
Levin indicated that General Petraeus shared the concern that these types of 
 38. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 39. Id.
 40. Id.
 41. Id.
 42. Id.
 43. Id.
 44. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 45. Id.
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decisions should not be left to lower level military officials,46 which is the 
case under the current system. 
C. Perceived Illegitimacy of Use of Force by PMCs 
Assuming that PMCs are the most “cost-effective for performing certain 
support functions,”47 which is certainly open for debate,48 and assuming that 
the military could properly oversee the formation and execution of contracts 
while still tending to their other, core objectives, there still remains the 
policy concern of whether or not the U.S. wants to continue to rely on 
PMCs. 
U.S. policy has historically evinced a preference for the citizen-soldier 
who, rather than being a professional soldier for hire, would be called upon 
when needed to resolve a conflict on behalf of his or her country and then 
return to civilian life after completing military service49 and take back up a 
life in business, agriculture, etc.50 In this way, the citizen-soldier represented 
the most effective compromise between an effective fighting force and a 
military that is least likely to interfere in the internal affairs of the nation.51
While this note does not suggest that the United States is in any immediate 
danger of PMCs staging a coup d’état, there is concern within the U.S. 
military that traditional military principles are being eroded by the 
increasing use of PMCs, even those comprised largely of former U.S. 
soldiers; the argument put forward by some of our own military officers has 
essentially been that associating the U.S. armed forces with commercial 
enterprises could compromise their professionalism.52 U.S. Army Colonel 
Bruce Grant is quoted as saying, “When former officers sell their skills on 
the international market for profit, the entire profession loses its moral high 
ground with the American people.”53 Legitimizing the security functions 
these contractor personnel perform by incorporating their tasks into the 
current military command structure, as this note suggests below, would 
arguably help to alleviate some of these concerns. 
 46. Id.
 47. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 48. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24 (e.g., meals at $20 per plate that get 
prepared and thrown away, the presence of multiple kinds of ice cream, or the presence of all 
manner of fast food options). 
 49. WATSON, supra note 15, at 12. 
 50. Id. at 28 (citation omitted). 
 51. Id. at 298. 
 52. SINGER, supra note 7, at 204 (citations omitted). 
 53. Id. (quoting BRUCE GRANT, ARMY WAR COLLEGE, U.S. MILITARY EXPERTISE FOR 
SALE: PRIVATE MILITARY CONSULTANTS AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY (1998), available at
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA344357). 
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D. Lack of Public Consciousness of Contractor Sacrifices 
Scholars have discussed the fact that the American public does not have 
a true sense of the scale of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan because 
contractor injuries and fatalities are not well reported or properly considered 
in the debate over the true cost of the war.54 For example, “[b]etween 
September 2001 and December 2010, over 2,200 contractor employees of 
all nationalities have died and over 49,800 were injured in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.”55 Even by early 2010, while U.S. contractor fatalities had 
reached only 2,008, it was estimated that adding these fatalities brought the 
total U.S. fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan to over 7,500.56 This figure is 
believed to be even higher, since the best estimate of contractor fatalities 
comes from the Labor Department’s Division of Longshore and Harbor 
Worker Compensation, which only tallies contractor deaths where families 
or employers file for insurance benefits.57 According to Steven Schooner, a 
professor at The George Washington University School of Law who has 
authored numerous works on the subject, these contractor fatalities should 
be considered more seriously.58
E. Coordination & Communication Issues with PMCs 
The decisions of PMC personnel can directly impact U.S. military 
operations, and yet PMC personnel are able to make and execute plans 
wholly outside of the existing military command structure. Take, for 
example, the widely reported killing of four American Blackwater 
contractors and the horrific mutilating of their bodies in Fallujah.59 The 
decision to send these contractors through Fallujah was made without 
regard to U.S. military strategy in the area and ultimately led the U.S. 
Marine Corps to enter the city on terms other than those they had 
 54. See, e.g., Schooner & Swan, supra note 13.  
 55. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 8 (“Actual casualties are undoubtedly 
higher, because federal statistics are based on filed insurance claims, which may not apply to 
many foreign contractors’ employees.”) (citing OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
PROGRAMS, DEP’T OF LABOR, DEFENSE BASE ACT CUMULATIVE REPORT BY NATION 
(09/01/2001—12/31/2010), available at www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm). 
 56. Schooner & Swan, supra note 13, at 16. 
 57. Id. at 17. 
 58. See generally Steven L. Schooner, Why Contractor Fatalities Matter,
PARAMETERS, Autumn 2008, at 78; Steven L. Schooner, Op-Ed., Remember Them Too: 
Don’t Contractors Count When We Calculate the Costs of War?, WASH. POST, May 25, 
2009, at A21; Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined 
Effect of Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity, J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y
(forthcoming 2012). 
 59. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24. 
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determined were best for the overall mission.60 As Marine Col. John Toolan 
puts it: 
[The U.S. Marine Corps has] a tendency to want to be a little bit more sure 
about operating in an environment. We’re going to do the risk analysis, 
and we will, in most cases, opt to reduce the amount of violence. Whereas 
I think some of the contractors are motivated by the financial remuneration 
and the fact that they probably want to get someplace from point A to 
point B quickly, their tendency [is] to have a little more risk. So yes, we’re 
at odds [with contractors], but we can work it out. But it requires….having 
a joint coordination center where everybody is aware of the rules. And 
somebody has to be the big dog, and that needs to be us.61
Further muddying the waters in the above situation was the difficulty in 
tracking down who was ultimately responsible for the Blackwater 
contractors being in Fallujah when they were killed. Doing so would 
involve figuring out who was working for whom and it appears that 
Blackwater was contracted to provide security for ESS, the dining service 
subcontractor who was in turn hired by KBR through a Kuwaiti company 
named Regency.62 ESS claims that it was not working for KBR on March 
31st during the Fallujah attack and that the Kuwaiti company, Regency, has 
been reluctant to release any documentation.63 So ultimately it has been 
difficult to establish why those American contractors were even in Fallujah 
that night. 
To deal with the coordination and communication issues involving 
PMCs in Iraq, the U.S. brought in Aegis, itself a British PMC, to try to 
unify the other private security contractors.64 Even assuming that another 
private contractor could properly oversee the multitudes of other private 
contractors, cooperation between these private entities is still voluntary and 
is still outside the military chain of command. Additionally, this outsourcing 
to solve the problem of outsourcing seems counterintuitive65 and 
exemplifies how ingrained the reliance on private contractors has become. 
 60. Id. (Marine Col. John Toolan, reveals his frustration at having to change his 
plans to enter Fallujah: “The only reason why [going into Fallujah] bothered me is because 
we had developed a pretty detailed plan on how we were going to address the problem [of 
insurgency within the city]. And by those contractors being killed, that really forced us to put 
that aside and to opt for the more direct approach.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.
 65. See SIMMS TABACK, THERE WAS AN OLD LADY WHO SWALLOWED A FLY (1997) 
(providing a simple, poignant, yet absurd example of how solving one problem with more of 
the same merely perpetuates an undesirable cycle). 
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F. Chain of Command & Accountability Issues with PMCs 
Retired USMC Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, a former base commander 
in Iraq, has expressed concern that private security contractors operating in 
Iraq create unsafe conditions; he believes that to the Iraqi population, these 
contractors represent the United States and that Iraqi civilians know that 
when these individuals kill civilians in the process of accomplishing a 
specific task they will not be held accountable.66 It stands to reason that 
Afghan civilians would have similar reactions. 
Andy Melville, Project Director for Erinys, Iraq, when asked who his 
company was accountable to, said that Erinys is accountable to coalition 
forces and insisted that Erinys is a “very professional and disciplined 
company.”67 However, Lawrence Peter, formerly in charge of regulating 
private security in Iraq for the U.S. government, and now a Private Security 
Association Representative (note the irony), admits that typically, any 
reprimand of private contractor personnel that does make its way back to 
the military would be handled between the contracts officer who hired that 
private security company and the private security company itself and not 
necessarily between the individual PMC employee and the military.68
Again, difficulties arise here in that the military must rely on cooperation 
from the PMC in order to even begin to determine which PMC employees 
may be responsible; the system simply does not provide the same checks 
and balances for PMC actions as it does for more traditional, public military 
forces.69
Congress has made several attempts to bring contractors into the fold of 
more traditional military accountability. For example, the 2007 Defense Bill 
sought to apply the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to private 
contractors accompanying the military in the field.70 Section 552, of 3510 
total sections in that bill, amends 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (article 2(a) of the 
UCMJ) by replacing the word “war” with the phrase “declared war or a 
contingency operation.”71 Additionally, Congress passed the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), which could have applied civilian 
law to contractor crimes in war zones; however, MEJA simply has not been 
used to that end because of the difficulties that civilian prosecutors here in 
the U.S. have in determining what is illegal activity in a conflict zone 9,000 
 66. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24. 
 67. Id.
 68. Id.
 69. E.g., SINGER, supra note 7, at 220-21. 
 70. Peter W. Singer, Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ Change and its 
Applicability to Private Military Contractors, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 12, 2007), 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0112defenseindustry_singer.aspx. 
 71. Peter W. Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries                                
Embeds, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 04, 2007),  
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/0104defenseindustry_singer.aspx (emphasis added).
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miles away and because of the funding and logistical problems associated 
with trying such a remote case.72 The reality is that from the inception of the 
war in Iraq until early 2007, “[n]ot one contractor of the entire military 
industry in Iraq [had] been charged with any crime . . . . let alone prosecuted 
or punished.”73 Similarly ineffective from a civil liability standpoint, the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) has found little use in holding private 
security contractors accountable in the United States because of the 
“government contractor defense.”74
G. Security Concerns 
Proper record keeping and vetting of security personnel is essential as 
evidenced by recent attacks by Taliban from within the Afghan security 
forces.75 Even some security companies, like U.K. based ArmorGroup, have 
admitted that the industry as a whole needs to take greater care in properly 
vetting potential employees.76 Yet, a recent DoD audit by the Inspector 
General (IG) examining the life cycle of contractor Common Access Cards 
(CACs) found weaknesses in the system that could “result in unauthorized 
access to DoD resources, installations, and sensitive information 
worldwide.”77 As a specific example: 
DoDIG auditors found that better Army oversight is required for a KBR 
Realtime Automated Personnel Identification System site that issued 
25,428 CACs to contractors deploying to Southwest Asia. According to 
the audit, a KBR subcontractor did background checks with no Army 
oversight; a contractor facilitated a CAC approval process that bypassed 
Contractor Verification System; and nearly half of revoked CACs were not 
recovered. Furthermore, contractors were misclassified as government 
employees on their CACs. Specifically, 40,055 contractor CACs indicated 
the holders had General Schedule pay grades, and 211,851 had e-mail 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.
 74. DAVID ISENBERG, SHADOW FORCE: PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ 129 
(2009) (describing the failed attempts by Iranian citizens to hold U.S. government 
contractors civilly liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for civilian deaths resulting from 
the U.S. Navy’s 1988 downing of an Iranian passenger with a contractor built ship and 
weapons system). 
 75. The Situation Room: Man Opens Fire on Americans in Kabul (CNN television 
broadcast Apr. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/04/27/afghanistan.violence/index.html?hpt=T2 
(describing attacks by insurgents in official Afghan police uniforms, the large numbers of 
uniforms that had been confiscated on raids in and around Kabul, the Taliban’s stated 
priority of infiltrating security forces, and the woefully inaccurate records—181,000 Afghan 
police in the national database as compared to only 125,000 actual personnel). 
 76. ISENBERG, supra note 74, at 105 (citing Thomas Catan, Call to Vet Security 
Companies Working Overseas, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sep. 29, 2004). 
 77. INSPECTOR GEN. GORDON S. HEDDELL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SEMIANNUAL REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS 29 (2011) (discussing control of Common Access Cards). 
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addresses that improperly identified the holders as U.S. government 
employees.78
In some cases, the improper background checks of foreign nationals 
working on U.S. military bases or for the U.S. military in the region are a 
result of the lack of accurate records in the individuals’ home countries, 
where such records of the kind typically used simply do not exist.79
Given the security card issue above, would it be so far-fetched to 
imagine that an individual or group determined to harm U.S. interests or 
personnel in the region would potentially be able to get a hold of one of 
these cards or evade a proper background check and drive a car loaded with 
explosives through the gate at some forward operating base? If the author of 
this work has thought of it, it seems plausible that someone with much more 
sinister motives may have thought of it as well. 
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Overview 
While President Obama’s administration and Afghani President Karzai 
share a stated goal of a 2014 transfer of security operations to the Afghan 
government, Secretary of Defense Gates has indicated that this does not 
necessarily mean a complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops by 2014.80 Even 
as the U.S. prepares for initial troop drawdowns beginning in July 2011, it is 
likely that there will be a continued need for U.S. presence to train and 
support Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for years to come.81 In 
fact, the Commission on Wartime Contracting, in its recently released fifth 
special report, recommends immediate actions be taken to secure the gains 
in security, infrastructure, and programs that have been made to date in 
Afghanistan or else risk wasting years of hard work and sacrifices and 
billions of dollars as U.S. troops withdraw before the Afghan government 
has the capacity to maintain those gains on its own.82
 78. Id.
 79. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-351, CONTINGENCY CONTRACT 
MANAGEMENT: DOD NEEDS TO DEVELOP AND FINALIZE BACKGROUND SCREENING AND 
OTHER STANDARDS FOR PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS 1 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09351.pdf  
 80. Viola Gienger, Afghan ‘War-Weariness’ in U.S. Won’t Damp Intention to 
Succeed, Gates Says, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2011, 6:35 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-04/afghan-war-weariness-in-u-s-won-t-damp-
intention-to-succeed-gates-says.html. 
 81. See id.; COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., SPECIAL REPORT 
NO. 5, SUSTAINABILITY: HIDDEN COSTS RISK NEW WASTE 1 (2011) [hereinafter CWC, 
SUSTAINABILITY], available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_SpecialRepor 
t5.pdf. 
 82. See CWC, SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 81. 
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It is in light of the projected need for continued U.S. presence in 
Afghanistan through at least 2014 and the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting’s “extensive deliberation[s]” calling for “sweeping reforms” to 
the current PMC structure that this note suggests a U.S. Foreign Legion as 
one possible method to bring about fundamental change that the 
Commission on Wartime contracting suggests “must be made.”83 The 
Commission specifically suggested increasing “responsibility and 
accountability for contracting outcomes” as a way to correct for the negative 
results of U.S. overreliance on private contractor personnel.84 The 
Commission then goes through and proposes over thirty changes, most of 
them alterations within the current contractor-reliant scheme.85
This note focuses narrowly, and builds on two of the most fundamental 
suggested changes; first, the growth of “organic capacity”86 on the part of 
government agencies which currently rely on contractors and secondly, a 
specific corollary to this increase in organic capacity, “restricting [the] 
reliance on contractors for security.”87
Former General McChrystal, in statements to Senate Armed Services 
Chairman Levin, made it clear that he did not believe PMCs were 
appropriate for a country like Afghanistan that is trying to grow law and 
order.88 Secretary of State Clinton has pointed out that “[s]ometimes 
contracting makes sense and does make us more efficient and flexible. But 
there are core governmental functions that should always be performed by 
public servants, not private companies.”89 This note takes the position that 
security operations are one of these core governmental functions that should 
not be handled by private contractors. As such, this note suggests expanding 
the responsibility and accountability of what is now being handled by 
contractors by removing security functions entirely from the sphere of 
contracting and placing them squarely within the existing U.S. military 
command structure where such core governmental functions belong. 
Certainly this would constitute a “sweeping reform[],”90 that the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting suggests is needed. Although, it is 
admittedly a more fundamental change than simply retooling an existing 
contractor centered approach. 
 83. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at Foreword. 
 84. Id.
 85. See generally id.
 86. Id. at 2 (recommending increased organic capacity as the very first of over thirty 
proposed solutions to over-reliance on contractors). 
 87. Id. (recommending restrictions on use of contractors for security as the third of 
over thirty proposed solutions to over-reliance on contractors). 
 88. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 89. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 12 (quoting Sec’y of State Hillary 
Clinton, Briefing on Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (Dec.15, 2010)). 
 90. Id. at Foreword (quoting the Commission in its determination that only 
“sweeping reforms” will be enough to make necessary changes to reduce overreliance on 
contractors). 
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Any suggestion that the U.S. incorporate security functions back into its 
own military must address the reality that many of these positions are now 
held by PMC employees who are non-citizen foreign nationals.91
Recognizing that one of the underlying causes for reliance on PMCs for 
security is a lack of organic capacity,92 and further recognizing that it may 
not be possible to grow this capacity rapidly enough to fill the void that 
would be left by abandoning the use of PMCs, this note proposes that if the 
U.S. is to remain in Afghanistan and a continued reliance on non-citizen 
private security contractor personnel is required, that the U.S. bring these 
individuals within the purview of the existing U.S. military command 
structure via the proposed “U.S. Foreign Legion.” Doing so would serve to 
legitimize the roles that these individuals currently fulfill, would more 
accurately reflect the sacrifices being made by these individuals, more 
appropriately reward them for their service, and is in keeping with current 
trends in domestic U.S. laws. 
B. How Proposed Solution Addresses Problems Within Current PMC 
System 
1. Legitimizing use of force 
International perception of private security contractors must be balanced 
against U.S. security concerns. Late in 2010, President Obama welcomed 
criticism from President Karzai regarding the perception of “heavy-
handedness” on the part of private security contractors in Afghanistan. 
However, while President Obama recognized President Karzai’s concerns as 
“perfectly appropriate,” he stated that he “can’t send U.S. aid workers or 
civilians into areas where [he] can’t guarantee their safety.”93 President 
Obama stressed that he had to “think practically” about operations in 
Afghanistan.94
Thinking practically, the need for continued security will likely persist. 
Until Afghanistan is capable of handling security internally, utilizing a 
formal U.S. military force would meet the practical needs of securing a 
nation while avoiding some of the harshest criticisms about the 
accountability of PMC personnel. A U.S. Foreign Legion would hold 
Legionnaires to the same high standards as other U.S. military personnel 
 91. See id. at 7 (citations omitted). 
 92. Id. at 13-15, 17. 
 93. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks at the NATO 
Summit Presidential Press Conference (Nov. 22, 2010) [hereinafter NATO Press 
Conference], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2010/11/20/nato-summit-presidential-press-conference (President Obama 
responding to a question from Karen DeYoung regarding President Karzai’s concerns over 
private security contractors in Afghanistan (beginning at 15:07)). 
 94. Id.
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and would likely avoid some of the criticisms of “heavy-handedness.” 
Where problems arose, they could be dealt with under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice in the same way disciplinary actions are handled for U.S. 
military personnel. 
2. Increased Accountability Through Chain of Command 
Some scholars have expressed concerns that “certain tasks, such as 
prisoner interrogation, are too sensitive to be outsourced to the private 
sector without proper government oversight.”95 Pratap Chatterjee, a Visiting 
Fellow at the Center for American Progress, testified on May 2, 2011 at a 
public forum before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and strongly suggested that the U.S. needs better methods of 
tracking personnel, funding, and supplies.96 Mr. Chatterjee has spent a 
considerable amount of time studying the issue and is specifically 
concerned with “the lack of inventory tracking of weapons and ammunition 
that were supplied by contractors, and the theft and misuse of the weapons 
by security forces” as well as “the unqualified translators [the U.S.] hired 
through L-3/Titan, the inexperienced police officers through DynCorp, and 
the payments that Third Country Nationals have to make to labor brokers to 
get jobs on bases.”97
When asked about U.S. actions in Fallujah, Iraq following the death of 
four Blackwater PMC personnel, Marine Col. John Toolan suggested that 
the military’s original plans for working with local leaders in Fallujah to 
minimize violence were thrown to the wayside when those contractors 
drove through the city without communicating their intent or location to the 
military. This was a highly publicized example of what can go wrong in the 
interplay between PMC and military actions through a lack of 
communication. 
The U.S. military works to minimize these issues through a regional 
command structure, which brings multiple military branches together to 
work under a single, unified regional commander.98 In Afghanistan, this 
duty falls to Central Command, which has responsibility for gathering and 
 95. ISENBERG, supra note 74, at 136 (describing the lesson learned from the Abu 
Ghraib prison scandal as being that the potential for human rights violations require prisons 
to be staffed by military, rather than PMC, personnel while lamenting the continued reliance 
on PMC staff resulting from shortages of qualified military personnel). 
 96. Pratap Chatterjee, Visiting Fellow, Center for American Progress, Statement 
before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (May 2, 2011), 
available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/forum2011-05-02_statement-
Chatterjee.pdf (“We need accurate data on everything from the workers we use to the goods 
and services we purchase.”). 
 97. Id.
 98. WATSON, supra note 15, at 7. 
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disseminating data and coordinating efforts in that region.99 While there 
have been attempts to contract out a similar function for PMCs that would 
both coordinate the actions of the multitudes of PMCs amongst themselves 
and between PMC actions and those of the military, such efforts have not 
been widely successful.100 This note suggests placing PMC personnel 
directly under U.S. Central Command thereby potentially avoiding the 
action-reaction scenario seen in Fallujah; the military would be able to plan 
its moves without having to react directly to the actions of PMC personnel 
or indirectly to the repercussions of PMC personnel actions. 
3. Improved Coordination Toward Accomplishing Mission 
Objectives 
The proposed U.S. Foreign Legion is a unique solution to the concerns of 
military command and those who study these issues because, instead of 
trying to supplant the large numbers of PMC personnel, it would overlay a 
proper chain of command and increased accountability atop of an existing 
force. The U.S. Foreign Legion would be structured and incorporated into 
the existing U.S. military and in this way would have the type of top-down 
decision making that Senator Levin and General Petraeus suggest is 
necessary to avoid compromising overall mission strategy at the lower 
levels of military command.101
Additionally, since some of the current contractor personnel have more 
experience in theater than U.S. military personnel,102 the proposed solution 
here is to essentially co-opt that expertise and bring it into the folds (or back 
into the folds where PMC personnel are former military personnel) of the 
existing military command structure. Regardless of whether or not the initial 
contracting was a sound decision, this solution takes the best of what has 
come from it and moves forward. 
Instead of spreading these experienced personnel across dozens of 
different organizations with different objectives and no real central 
command,103 the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion would provide a means by 
which the U.S. could channel the efforts of these individuals toward major 
objectives. Placing these individuals under one command structure would 
put the overall mission command back in the hands of senior military 
officials whose job it is to guide the overall mission towards success rather 
than leaving the bulk of the decision making to private entities and lower 
 99. Gen. James N. Mattis, Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
About the Posture of U.S. Central Command (Mar. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/posture-statement/. 
 100. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24. 
101. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 102. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 15. 
 103. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24 (describing the contracting out of 
attempts to organize contractors). 
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level military officials with disparate interests and goals.104 An added 
benefit from this system might well be further cost savings as fewer funds 
may be lost to waste, fraud, etc. and where efforts can be streamlined and 
duplicated efforts could be avoided. 
4. Reductions in Overall Cost, Waste, and Fraud 
As described above, the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) 
estimates that U.S. taxpayers have lost $12 billion to fraud by using PMCs 
to support contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.105 The CWC 
suggests that waste, while not necessarily quantifiable, may well cause even 
more U.S. taxpayer funds to be diverted from their intended uses.106
This note suggests essentially removing the middleman from the 
equation. Instead of having prices set by a corporation looking to profit 
from conflict, the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion would pay its members 
directly for their services and in this way reduce the chance that funds 
would be squandered in the process. Additionally, the opportunity to “pad 
accounts” would likely be reduced if the money was kept “in-house.” 
Of course, the tighter controls on funds would likely also help avoid 
blatant abuses akin to instances where Blackwater personnel cashed in on 
fraudulent receipts for fuel or expensed prostitution.107 While some 
individual U.S. Foreign Legionnaires might inevitably spend their pay on 
illicit activities,108 an individual’s choices would reflect less negatively on 
an institution than when the vice is expensed and billed directly to Uncle 
Sam. 
Costs for proposed U.S. Foreign Legion could be roughly approximated 
by multiplying pay for individual U.S. Foreign Legionnaires by number of 
Legionnaires needed. For purposes of this note, a very crude approximation 
could be made by taking the number of PMC personnel currently devoted to 
security functions and assuming a similar number of U.S. Foreign 
Legionnaires would be needed to replace the PMCs. To approximate this 
cost, the U.S. could look to its own internal pay scales,109 to pay scales of 
 104. See Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 105. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 7 (applying an estimated 7% loss-of-
revenue-to-fraud metric, established by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners in its 
2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, to the $177 billion in 
contingency contracts and grants at issue in Iraq and Afghanistan). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Suit: Prostitute, Strippers Part of Blackwater Fraud, CNN JUSTICE (Feb. 12, 
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/12/blackwater.suit/index.html?iref=allsearch. 
 108. See, e.g., ADRIAN D. GILBERT, VOICES OF THE FOREIGN LEGION: THE HISTORY OF 
THE WORLD’S MOST FAMOUS FIGHTING CORPS 85—88 (2010) (describing rampant 
prostitution accompanying the French Foreign Legion on campaign). 
 109. Basic Pay: Active Duty Soldiers, U.S. ARMY,
http://www.goarmy.com/benefits/money/basic-pay-active-duty-soldiers.html (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2012) (listing baseline Army pay); 2011 Pay Table, DEF. FIN. & ACCOUNTING SERV., 
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similar foreign military forces,110 and to current pay for PMC personnel111 in 
order to estimate the pay for U.S. Foreign Legionnaires. 
As a baseline, current pay for enlisted non-officer U.S. military 
personnel in the Army and Navy ranges from $17,611 ($1,467 per month) 
for an E1 with less than 2 years’ experience up to $34,088 ($2,840 per 
month) for an E6 with 6 years of experience.112 Using these figures, a low-
end annual estimate for the salaries of a 150,000 strong113 U.S. Foreign 
Legion would be anywhere from about $2.6 billion to $5.1 billion. 
The French Foreign Legion currently pays its Legionnaires a similar 
range based upon years of service, rank, and division within the Legion.114
The pay for French Foreign Legionnaires starts at €1,043 (approximately 
$1,345) per month and goes up to €1,205 to €3,567 (approximately $1,554 
to $4,601) per month for Legionnaires with between 10 months and 3 years 
of service.115 Comparing these numbers to those for members of the U.S. 
military makes it clear that the French Foreign Legionnaires are generally 
compensated at a level the U.S. is comfortable with. 
Many other factors would impact the ultimate cost of this proposed 
solution, but these figures provide a baseline estimate and the potential for a 
more definite and quantifiable cost structure. Additionally, the proposed 
U.S. Foreign Legion would solve some of the disparity in pay for 
individuals in positions now occupied by PMC personnel where Nepalese 
Gurkhas make around $50 per day while other PMC personnel make $500 
or more.116
5. Improved Recognition for PMC Personnel and Their 
Sacrifices 
Historically, pay for French Foreign Legionnaires was abysmal and 
brought out all manner of infighting and divisive behavior that would not 
serve to improve unit cohesion or morale.117 A more equitable pay scale in 
the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion would more adequately recognize the 
http://www.dfas.mil/dms/dfas/militarymembers/pdf/MilPayTable2011.pdf (listing baseline 
Navy pay). 
 110. See, e.g., Pay, FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION, http://www.legion-
recrute.com/en/salaires.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (detailing the basic pay range for 
French Foreign Legionnaires). 
 111. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24. 
 112. Basic Pay: Active Duty Soldiers, supra note 109. 
 113. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 7 (citations omitted). 
 114. Pay, FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION, supra note 110. 
 115. Id.; World Currencies, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/data/currencies/ (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2012) (showing last trade conversion rate at 1 euro to 1.29 U.S. dollars). 
 116. See, e.g., The Baghdad Boom, ECONOMIST (Mar. 25, 2004), 
http://www.economist.com/node/2539816; Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24. 
 117. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 74. 
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efforts and sacrifices of some members while trying to build a more 
cohesive environment among the Legionnaires as a whole.
Some in this country even have concerns that the U.S. military generally
operates as a vehicle for the less educated and less wealthy to protect the 
interests of the wealthy, with a disproportionate number of minorities 
enlisting.118 The proposed U.S. Foreign Legion would likely have many 
individuals from less well developed nations and from economically 
depressed backgrounds. However, without minimizing this concern, the 
proposed U.S. Foreign Legion is not creating this problem. These 
individuals already serve in large numbers as PMC personnel and would 
receive more adequate recognition and compensation for their actions 
through the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion. Not to mention that many 
foreign nationals currently serve on active duty within the existing branches 
of the U.S. military.119
Improved compensation for foreign nationals who serve the U.S. would 
help properly recognize their efforts. Providing citizenship options to those 
who take up arms for the U.S. would potentially represent an even greater 
recognition of their sacrifices. Extending improved citizenship options to 
those U.S. Foreign Legionnaires who were interested would also be more in 
keeping with the theoretical ideal of the citizen-soldier. While this concept 
is not universally accepted, general historical concepts of citizenship in the 
United States have involved the notion that one “cannot be a fully 
functional citizen without being willing to put down the plow and take up 
the rifle to defend one’s home, standard of living, and life.”120 This note 
suggests offering the option of citizenship to those who already put down 
their proverbial plows and pick up rifles to defend our way of life without 
such recognition. 
The suggestions in this paper are intended to be narrowly tailored and 
pragmatic, not xenophobic. If one believes that the underlying system is 
fundamentally flawed, which is in no way the thrust of this note, the 
suggestions contained in this paper still represent a marked improvement by 
compensating private contractor personnel in a manner that does not span a 
10 plus fold disparity based on national origin,121 ensures that all personnel 
have access to basic equipment,122 and that more commensurately 
recognizes the sacrifices that these individuals are increasingly making on 
 118. See WATSON, supra note 15, at 17-19. 
 119. See discussion infra Part III.D.i. 
 120. WATSON, supra note 15, at 13. 
 121. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24 (describing pay for former Gurkha 
private security personnel at $50 per day versus U.S. & U.K. pay contractor personnel 
earning up to $500 to $1000 per day). 
 122. SHADOW COMPANY (Purpose Films 2006) (highlighting disparity in equipment 
between PMC personnel and official U.S. military personnel). 
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behalf of the United States.123 This is especially important in Afghanistan 
where contractor fatalities increased from 36 percent of 2009 fatalities to 56 
percent of 2010 fatalities.124 Furthermore, formally recognizing the actions 
of these individuals and supporting these non-citizen soldiers and their 
families would not leave them to rely on private aid organizations for 
support when they retire from service or are killed or wounded in action.125
6. Improved Security via Proper Vetting of Personnel 
The U.S. military conducts numerous physical, medical, and criminal 
background checks on recruits before even allowing them to enlist.126 The 
goal is to ensure that the U.S. military is comprised of strong, healthy troops 
with good moral character who are dedicated to the defense of the nation.127
PMC personnel on the other hand take no oaths, often do not need to pass 
the same physical tests, and certainly are not always held to the same 
stringent standards for background checks that U.S. military personnel are 
held to.128
These individuals already serve in many of the same areas, and indeed 
inside many of the same secured facilities, as U.S. personnel. It is only 
logical to require that they be vetted in the same manner as their military 
counterparts. While there is no guarantee that proper screening of security 
personnel would prevent any and all sabotage,129 a lack of proper screening 
unnecessarily subjects U.S. personnel, and the greater U.S. mission, to 
 123. Schooner & Swan, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing the increasing percentage of 
fatalities that contract personnel represent in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years; from 4% 
in 2003 to 53% in the first half of 2010). 
 124. Id. at 18 (based on the first half of 2010). 
 125. See, e.g., GURKHA WELFARE TRUST, http://www.gwt.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 21, 
2012) (an organization created to support former Gurkhas who fought bravely for the U.K. 
without any formal support thereafter). 
 126. See “A Day at the Meps,” U.S. MILITARY ENTRANCE PROCESSING COMMAND,
http://www.mepcom.army.mil/dayatmeps/transcript.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2012). 
 127. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 6-22, ARMY LEADERSHIP: COMPETENT,
CONFIDENT, AND AGILE viii (2006); “A Day at the Meps,” supra note 126. 
 128. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 7, at 160, 162; CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, 
at 8; Levin Press Conference, supra note 22 (discussing U.S. taxpayer funds being funneled 
to the Taliban and al Qaeda through Afghani warlords); Frontline: Private Warriors, supra 
note 24 (interviewing USMC Col. John Toolan, who contrasts USMC operations with those 
of private contractors within his area of command; retired USMC Col. Thomas X. Hammes, 
who expresses concerns that Iraqi civilians see PMC personnel as unaccountable for civilian 
casualties; and Lawrence Peter, a Private Security Association Representative, who admits 
that accountability for PMC personnel misconduct would be handled between a contracts 
officer and the PMC firm rather than between the PMC employee and the U.S. military). 
 129. See, e.g., Steve Inskeep & Quil Lawrence, Karzai’s Half-Brother Assassinated in 
Kandahar (NPR radio broadcast July 12, 2011), available at
http://www.npr.org/2011/07/12/137784161/karzais-half-brother-assassinated-in-kandahar 
(describing the assassination of President Hamid Karzai’s brother by a trusted security 
official inside a secure compound). 
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threats that could be reduced if those security personnel were cleared in the 
same way their current U.S. counterparts are. 
Subjecting all would-be U.S. Foreign Legionnaires to more stringent 
screening processes than those faced by current PMC personnel may pose 
some difficulties where recruits hale from parts of the world with less 
thorough record-keeping, but a good faith effort must be made even if it 
means losing some otherwise qualified personnel in exchange for improved 
security. Worth noting is that the French Foreign Legion already subjects all 
of its potential recruits to roughly three weeks of assessment which includes 
physical, intellectual, and psychological testing, as well as a rigorous 
security screening process.130
C. Examples of State Military Units Comprised of Foreign Nationals 
In implementing a U.S. Foreign Legion, the U.S. should review 
historical examples of military forces comprised of non-citizen foreign 
nationals. The two most prominent examples are the French Foreign Legion 
and the British and Indian Gurkhas. These military units both have long, 
storied histories and are still seeing active duty today.131 Studying the 
success and failures of these organizations would help the U.S. in 
structuring its forces by borrowing from them what works and avoiding 
what has proven problematic. 
1. French Foreign Legion 
When individuals think of a national military unit comprised of non-
citizen soldiers, the first thought is probably of the romanticized French 
Foreign Legion. Historically, the French Foreign Legion has been made up 
of individuals seeking a fresh start,132 individuals looking for a unique 
challenge,133 or those for whom the Legion offered a reprieve from absolute 
poverty;134 even today, the French Foreign Legion still provides the 
opportunity for some to escape and make a fresh start.135
 130. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 20-22 (quoting a former French Foreign Legionnaire 
who described the security screening as a series of Gestapo-like interrogations where “if any 
aspect of your story didn’t gel, you were out”). 
 131. See generally id. (history of the French Foreign Legion); DAVID JORDAN, THE 
HISTORY OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION FROM 1831 TO THE PRESENT DAY 92—109 (2005) 
(history of the French Foreign Legion); JOHN PARKER, THE GURKHAS: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE WORLD’S MOST FEARED SOLDIERS (1999); TONY GOULD, IMPERIAL WARRIORS: BRITAIN 
AND THE GURKHAS (1999); E.D. SMITH, JOHNNY GURKHA: ‘FRIENDS IN THE HILLS’ (1985); 
SANDRO TUCCI, GURKHAS (1985). 
 132. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 16. 
 133. Id. at 13-16.
 134. Id. at 16-17.
 135. Neil Tweedie, The French Foreign Legion—the last option for those desperate to 
escape the UK, TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 3, 2008, 
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While French Foreign Legionnaires were historically not allowed to 
operate in regular French army artillery or cavalry units because of fears 
that they would abandon these critical posts,136 the modern Legion has 
proven itself a loyal and capable force in modern hostilities.137
To the extent that the French Foreign Legion was created by royal 
ordinance,138 it may not provide the best legal framework for a similar 
fighting force under the U.S. legal system. However, as a force with such a 
lengthy history that still sees active combat operations around the world,139
it provides a unique case study and this note borrows from the French 
experience often in discussing the potential for a U.S. Foreign Legion. 
2. British and Indian Gurkhas 
“If a man says he is not afraid of dying, he is either lying or he is a 
Gurkha.”140
Historically, Gurkha troops have fought bravely for the British in 
Afghanistan.141 Active duty Gurkha troops have continued to serve in 
Afghanistan with the British military142 and many former Gurkhas work 
with PMC contractors.143 However, despite their renown for valor and 
courage, even former Gurkha soldiers have been known to abandon a 
mission when working as private contractors.144 Compare, for example, the 
withdrawal of ex-Gurkha private contractors from hostilities in Sierra Leone 
following the mutilation of their commander145 with the resolve of colonial 
British Gurkha troops to continue fighting in a historic battle in Afghanistan 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/3546207/The-French-Foreign-
Legion-the-last-option-for-those-desperate-to-escape-the-UK.html. 
 136. SINGER, supra note 7, at 302 n.47. 
 137. JORDAN, supra note 131 (giving a brief overview of French Foreign Legionnaire 
involvement in widely varied and highly specialized missions across the globe). 
 138. Id. at 8, 19 (describing the initial creation of the French Foreign Legion by royal 
ordinance in 1831 and the subsequent founding of the ‘modern’ French Foreign Legion by 
royal ordinance in 1835). 
 139. See generally GILBERT, supra note 108; JORDAN, supra note 131.
 140. Who Are Gurkhas, GURKHA WELFARE TRUST, http://www.gwt.org.uk/about-
gurkhas/what-are-gurkhas/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2012) (quoting former Chief of Staff of the 
Indian Army, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw). 
 141. See, e.g., TONY GOULD, IMPERIAL WARRIORS: BRITAIN AND THE GURKHAS 126 
(1999); PARKER, supra note 131 64, 116-17. 
 142. See, e.g., Prince Harry Made Honorary Gurkha by Fearsome Warriors He 
Served with in Afghanistan, MAIL ONLINE,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1082172/Prince-Harry-honorary-
Gurkha-fearsome-warriors-served-Afghanistan.html (last updated Oct. 31, 2008). 
 143. See, e.g., The Baghdad Boom, supra note 116. 
 144. SINGER, supra note 7, at 112-13 (describing a PMF comprised of primarily ex-
Gurkha fighters breaking a contract and abandoning the contracted mission after they 
suffered heavy casualties and had their commander killed and mutilated in combat against 
the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone in 1995). 
 145. Id.
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despite similar mutilation of their commander.146 This comparison 
highlights the disparity in dedication to mission accomplishment between 
private security contractors and officially sanctioned military operations. 
With the Gurkhas as a prominent example, it seems that troops are more 
dedicated to a mission if more than money is at stake. 
While both the French Foreign Legionnaires and the British and Indian 
Gurkha Regiments are formal military forces comprised of foreign 
nationals, there are significant differences. Where French Foreign 
Legionnaires are soldiers from around the world, the Gurkha regiments of 
the British and Indian Armies are exclusively composed of Nepalese 
nationals147 with some British or Indian officers.148
Additionally, whereas the French Foreign Legion was created by a royal 
ordinance,149 the terms and conditions under which the Gurkhas served were 
initially left entirely up to the Indian authorities and were not codified under 
British law150 until the “Tripartite Agreement of 1947 between the UK, 
India and Nepal” more formally laid down these terms and conditions.151
While the Tripartite Agreement of 1947 (TPA) does not address every detail 
of Gurkhas’ service, it is a “series of documents comprising a 
Memorandum, a number of Annexes and several trilateral and bilateral 
exchanges between the three Governments” that addresses major aspects of 
service, including “pay, pensions and allowances, leave, children’s 
education and provisions to meet religious, national and cultural 
observances.”152
Under the TPA, British Gurkha basic pay rates are linked directly to the 
Indian Army Pay Code (IPC); formal reports every 10 years are used to 
update that pay scale while any interim changes to the Pay Code are made 
as India notifies the U.K.153 Cost of living allowances for Gurkhas serving 
outside of Nepal, known as Universal Addition (UA), are also given in 
 146. PARKER, supra note 131, at 116-17 (recounting the take-no-prisoners response 
that came from a platoon of Gurkha soldiers who found the castrated and mutilated body of 
their British officer following a battle in the Khyber Pass region in the summer of 1935). 
 147. See CLAIR TAYLOR, INT’L AFFAIRS & DEFENCE SECTION OF HOUSE OF COMMONS,
GURKHAS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE, 2009, H.C. 4671, at 4 (U.K.) [hereinafter 
GURKHAS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS], available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/SN04671.pdf. 
 148. E.D. SMITH, JOHNNY GURKHA: ‘FRIENDS IN THE HILLS’ 166-69 (1985); see also
PARKER, supra note 131, at 39-42, 105-07; TONY GOULD, IMPERIAL WARRIORS: BRITAIN AND 
THE GURKHAS 236 (1999) (describing historical WWI command structure in Gurkha 
battalions as having only British officers). 
 149. JORDAN, supra note 131, at 8, 19. 
 150. GURKHAS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 147, at 4. 
 151. Id. at 1, 4. 
 152. Id. at 4. 
 153. Id. at 5. 
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order to try and ensure that net take-home pay is the same for Gurkhas 
independent of where they serve.154
Pensions are handled in much the same way, with periodic adjustments 
tied to the Indian Army Pension Code with annual increases for cost of 
living.155 Additionally, the British and Indian militaries have established 
systems for doling out pensions to retired Gurkha servicemembers in ways 
that try to accommodate their location. Those who live close to the major 
Nepalese cities of Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Itahari either receive pensions 
through direct deposit or collect regular checks from one of three regional 
Pension Paying Offices.156 Those in more remote communities are able to 
collect their pensions quarterly from one of 24 Area Welfare Centres dotted 
throughout Nepal near ex-Gurkha population centers.157
Under the original TPA, Gurkhas remained Nepalese citizens and were 
required to resettle in Nepal at the conclusion of their service in the 
Brigades.158 There was virtually no real citizenship option for retiring 
Gurkhas to settle in the U.K.159 In 2009, after several years of legal 
wrangling, the U.K. provided all Gurkhas with the right to apply to settle in 
the U.K. at the end of their service, presuming they have served for at least 
four years.160
Despite the routine adjustment of pensions and cost of living allowances, 
there are still criticisms of the pension structure; the British Gurkha Welfare 
Society contends that an estimated 24,000 Nepalese Gurkhas who served 
the British before 1997 currently receive only one third of the typical British 
military pension.161
While the existing Gurkha pension system provides an interesting case 
study, the implementation of a pension system for the proposed U.S. 
Foreign Legion presents a very real cost concern and would require in-depth 
analysis. Any system would need to be carefully structured to be sustainable 
while appropriately recognizing those who have served. 
 154. Id.
 155. Id.
 156. GURKHAS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 147, at 6. 
 157. Id.
 158. ARABELLA THORP & JOHN WOODHOUSE, HOME AFFAIRS SECTION OF HOUSE OF 
COMMONS, IMMIGRATION: SETTLEMENT AND BRITISH CITIZENSHIP FOR DISCHARGED GURKHAS 
AND COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, 2009, H.C. 4399, at 1 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter HOUSE OF COMMONS, IMMIGRATION], available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/SN04399.pdf. 
 159. Id. at 1, 7. 
 160. See id.
 161. UK Hails Ruling on Gurkha Pensions, EKANTIPUR.COM (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://202.166.193.40/2010/01/11/capital/uk-hails-ruling-on-gurkha-pensions/306206.html. 
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D. Current Domestic Support for U.S. Foreign Legion 
1. Building on the Status Quo 
This proposal is not a new concept; “non-citizens have fought in the U.S. 
Armed Forces since the Revolutionary War.”162 Nor is this a concept 
relegated to historical accounts. Currently, Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC) places the estimated number of non-citizens serving on active duty 
with the U.S. military at 35,000, with 12,000 more serving in either the 
National Guard or the and Reserve.163 Broken down by military branch, 
approximately 15,800 non-citizen personnel serve as Sailors with the U.S. 
Navy, 6,440 Marines are non-citizens, the Army is home to 5,596 non-
citizen Soldiers, and the Air Force has a contingent of 3,056 non-citizen 
Airmen,164 all of this with an estimated 8,000 additional non-citizens with 
green cards enlisting every year.165
The reality is that the suggestion in this paper does not represent as 
radical a departure from the status quo as it may seem. This note suggests a 
U.S. Foreign Legion that draws on the experiences of all branches of the 
U.S. military with non-citizen servicemembers. The Army has already 
engaged in a limited initiative to recruit 1,000 individuals nationwide in 
order to test the feasibility of a subsequent increase in the number of such 
recruits and an expansion to all other branches of the military with the end 
goal being upwards of 14,000 non-citizen recruits—the equivalent of one in 
six recruits—per year.166 The truth is that as the U.S. has fought two wars on 
two fronts, “recruiters [have] struggled to meet their goals for the all-
volunteer military” while at the same time recruiting officers have been 
turning away “thousands of legal immigrants with temporary visas who 
tried to enlist” simply because they did not have the required “permanent 
green cards.”167
The proposed U.S. Foreign Legion builds on suggestions from the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting168 and is generally in keeping with 
statements made by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl 
Levin that the U.S. transition away from heavy reliance on contractors and 
use them as needed, and only where properly vetted, in the meantime.169
 162. ANITA U. HATTIANGADI ET AL., CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS, NON-CITIZENS IN 
TODAY’S MILITARY: FINAL REPORT 6 (2005). 
 163. Id. at 6-7; see also Julia Preston, U.S. Military Will Offer Path to Citizenship,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/us/15immig.html 
(approximating the number of foreign-born non-citizen military personnel at 29,000). 
 164. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 7. 
 165. Id. at 6; see also Preston, supra note 163. 
 166. Preston, supra note 163. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See discussion supra Part II (analyzing overreliance on PMC personnel). 
 169. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
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Senator Levin suggests that the U.S. move some of the current PMC 
personnel into the Afghan army/security force with proper vetting.170 This 
note does not oppose handing off as much responsibility to the Afghan 
security force as is feasible. However, this note does recognize that a 
complete transition is not likely going to be immediate and suggests the 
U.S. Foreign Legion be implemented to address the continued need for U.S. 
presence. 
2. Support in Existing Domestic Laws 
U.S. law already provides options for non-citizens who wish to serve. 
However, under previous immigration laws, an individual typically had to 
obtain permanent residency before being able to serve in the U.S. armed 
forces.171 Now, that requirement has been reduced such that temporary 
immigrants who have lived here for 2 years or more can enlist.172 Moreover, 
“[u]nder a statute invoked in 2002 by the Bush administration, immigrants 
who serve in the military can [start the application process] to become 
citizens on the first day of active service, and they can take the oath in as 
little as six months.”173 As this quote from the New York Times indicates, 
Executive Order 13269174 made it substantially easier for non-citizens to 
serve in the U.S. military and rewarded those who served with expedited 
citizenship. Generally, the benefits that are described in Executive Order 
13269 were reserved for those individuals who had served honorably or are 
enlisted to serve in the U.S. military for at least 12 years.175 Executive Order 
13269 of July 3, 2002176 significantly expedited citizenship options codified 
in section 329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).177
Executive Order 13269 of 2002 was not the end of these types of 
changes. The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act 
[r]educed the peacetime waiting period for U.S. citizenship application[s,] 
[a]llowed applicants to be granted emergency leave and priority 
government transportation to complete citizenship processing[,] 
[e]liminated all application fees for non-citizen servicemembers[,] 
 170. Id. 
 171. 10 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006) (describing who may legally enlist in the U.S. armed 
forces); see also HATTENGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 10 tbl.1, 27. 
 172. Preston, supra note 163. 
 173. Id.
 174. Exec. Order No. 13,269, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,287 (July 8, 2008), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid=02-
17273-filed.pdf. 
 175. 8 C.F.R § 245.8(a) (“Benefits under this section are limited to aliens who have 
served honorably (or are enlisted to serve) in the Armed Forces of the United States for at 
least 12 years . . . .”). 
 176. Executive Order 13,269, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,287. 
 177. Immigration and Nationality Act § 329, 8 U.S.C. § 1440 (2006). 
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[a]llowed for the finalization of military citizenship applications to take 
place at U.S. consulates, embassies, and overseas U.S. military 
installations[, and] [g]ave special immigration preference to the immediate 
family of non-citizens awarded posthumous citizenship.178
Thus, the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act seems to suggest a 
willingness to move in the direction that is proposed in this note.  
The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act specifically addressed the 
immigration benefits for military personnel and their families described 
above by amending portions of the INA.179 Specifically, section 1701 of the 
2004 National Defense Authorization Act addressed naturalization 
requirements for non-citizen servicemembers and reduced the period of 
service that was required before an individual could apply for citizenship 
under section 328(a) of the INA180 from 3 years to 1 year,181 essentially 
codifying what President Bush had done via Executive Order 13269 in 
2002.182 Section 1701 further amended the INA to provide that “no fee shall 
be charged or collected from the applicant for filing the application, or for 
the issuance of a certificate of naturalization upon being granted citizenship 
. . .”
183
 Section 1702 provided naturalization benefits for members of the 
Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve.184 Section 1703 also extended 
posthumous benefits to surviving spouses, children, and parents of non-
citizen service-members while section 1704 expedited the process for 
grating citizenship posthumously to those non-citizen servicemembers who 
gave the ultimate sacrifice in service to the United States.185 The enabling 
legislation for the U.S. Foreign Legion should build on this existing legal 
framework. 
As discussed above in Part II.F, Congress has already attempted to 
impose more traditional military accountability on contractor personnel with 
little success.186 By bringing PMC personnel serving in such operations 
more directly under existing military authority, the proposed U.S. Foreign 
 178. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 1- 2. 
 179. National Defense Authorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-136, 117 Stat. 1392 
(2003).  
 180. National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 § 1701, 8 U.S.C. 1439(a) (2006) 
(amended 2008). 
 181. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 1-2. (providing an overview of the 
changes to section 328 of the INA that were made by the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 2004). 
 182. National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 § 1701; see also Bush Speeds 
Citizenship for Military, CNN (July 3, 2002), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/07/03/bush.military.citizenship/index.html?related. 
 183. Immigration and Nationality Act § 328(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1439 (2006). 
 184. National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 § 1702. 
 185. Id. §§ 1703-1704.  
 186. See discussion supra Part II.F. 
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Legion would be in keeping with the intent behind the 2007 UCMJ 
amendments.187
E. Implementing the U.S. Foreign Legion 
As described above, one major hurdle to implementation of the proposed 
U.S. Foreign Legion would be the enactment of legislation required to 
create the Legion. Additional issues related to implementation would 
include how to organize the Legion, what type of functions the Legion 
would be responsible for, and the type of training that would be required. 
1. Organizing 
In terms of logistics, the first issue might be whether to create a wholly 
separate military branch or to place the U.S. Foreign Legion under one of 
the existing U.S. military branches. Based on a successful pilot program in 
the U.S. Army for non-citizen soldiers,188 as well as the fact that the U.S. 
Navy has the greatest number of non-citizen active duty members of any 
branch,189 this note suggests initially placing the proposed U.S. Foreign 
Legion under one of these two branches. 
One of the next major logistical concerns would be how many troops 
divided into how many divisions. One anonymous U.S. Army Captain 
posted his suggestion to a forum on a military community website in 2004, 
suggesting that a U.S. Foreign Legion should consist of three 8,000 member 
infantry divisions for a total of 24,000 active duty members.190
2. Recruiting 
This note suggests incorporating current PMC personnel into the new 
U.S. Foreign Legion to the extent possible. Based on the current numbers of 
PMC personnel,191 a force of 24,000 seems relatively conservative. 
Assuming an eventual drawdown in U.S. presence in Afghanistan, a force 
numbering somewhere between the anonymously suggested 24,000 and the 
more than 150,000 non-citizen PMC personnel currently serving in Iraq and 
Afghanistan192 provides a very crude range for the number of U.S. Foreign 
 187. Singer, supra note 70. 
 188. Preston, supra note 163.
 189. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 7. 
 190. Wayne Hommer, Guest Column, An American Foreign Legion, MILITARY.COM
(Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Defensewatch_012104_Forei 
gn,00.html (reposting an article from DefenseWatch, a publication put out by Soldiers for the 
Truth). 
 191. See discussion supra Part II.A (estimating the number of PMC personnel serving 
in theater at around 200,000 with around 150,000 being foreign nationals). 
 192. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 7 (citations omitted). 
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Legionnaires that may be needed. Since approximately 26,000 PMC 
personnel are currently devoted to security operations in Afghanistan,193 a 
force near this size may likely be suitable for a more narrowly tailored 
solution. 
Given the large numbers of PMC personnel already in theater who could 
potentially be absorbed into an American Foreign and the fact that around 
8,000 new non-citizen recruits already join existing U.S. military branches 
each year,194 it is likely that the U.S. would be able to sustain a sufficiently 
large troop force without much difficulty. Additionally, there are nearly 1.5 
million Legal Permanent Residents of recruitable age (18 to 24) living right 
here in the U.S.195 who may be interested in the benefits that military service 
in such a unit would offer.  
However, if active recruiting is required, the U.S. could look to the 
French Foreign Legion or the Gurkha Brigades for guidance in recruiting 
foreign citizens or absorbing those already in theater. After all, these 
fighting forces have certainly managed to create sufficient draw to keep 
their forces fully staffed, with the French Foreign Legion accepting only 1 
in 8 applicants196 and the Brigade of Gurkhas accepting only 230 of roughly 
28,000 applicants annually.197
3. Training 
This note suggests that the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion be designed to 
address the current security functions now being handled by PMC 
personnel. This note does not suggest that the U.S. create a new military 
force comprised entirely of foreign nationals who are trained for purely 
combat missions. Instead, U.S. Foreign Legion troops should be trained for 
the modern security functions that our military has been forced to outsource. 
Even the French Foreign Legion has had to retool for the twenty-first 
century to focus on peacekeeping operations.198 This is not to suggest that 
U.S. Foreign Legionnaires would not need to be well trained but that such 
training should focus on the needs at hand—the needs currently filled by 
PMC personnel. Training for U.S. Foreign Legionnaires should thereby 
focus on providing security for military installations (bases, airfields, etc.), 
diplomats and politicians, and reconstruction projects. 
Effective communication on the battlefield would be essential to the 
success of a U.S. Foreign Legion. Just as the French Foreign Legion 
 193. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 194. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162; see also Preston, supra note 163, at 1. 
 195. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 6, 11. 
 196. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 21- 22 (quoting a Major in the French Foreign 
Legion who explains that the large number of would-be legionnaires means that the Legion 
has the ability to be selective in who it accepts). 
 197. GURKHAS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 147, at 7. 
 198. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 254 (2010). 
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requires all recruits be functionally proficient in French, all U.S. Foreign 
Legionnaires would need to have a common language. Currently, the U.S. 
military requires that all new recruits have a basic level of English 
proficiency,199 and the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion would be no 
exception. A recent Army test program to recruit certain non-citizens with 
temporary visas did not change this requirement. “[Recruits] will have to 
pass an English test.”200
The same anonymous U.S. Army Captain who posted on Military.com 
regarding troop divisions suggested an intensive six-week English language 
course to ensure effective communication skills in the field.201 All other 
aspects of training should be used to help recruits learn via immersion, as it 
is in large part with the French Foreign Legion.202 Formalized classroom 
training may also be needed. One unique method, embraced by the French 
Foreign Legion, is to assign each new recruit a native French speaker to 
assist the recruit in language acquisition.203 Here, each new recruit could be 
assigned a native English speaker. 
Such language instruction should focus on enabling effective 
communication while still embracing the multilingual abilities that would 
come with a military force comprised of members from around the globe. 
As Lt. Gen. Benjamin C. Freakley suggested when speaking about the U.S. 
Army test program, the inclusion of foreign nationals would offer an 
increase in human capital.204
The French Foreign Legion actually points to the multilingual 
capabilities of its members as an inherent advantage of having such a 
diverse military force.205 Apparently, the French Foreign Legion has even 
been called in for translation efforts in recent peacekeeping efforts in 
Rwanda.206 In the far-reaching war on terror, “linguistic and cultural 
diversity non-citizens bring to the services are especially valuable.”207
In addition to the language training, U.S. Foreign Legionnaires would 
still face the same strict training conditions that meet U.S. recruits at bases 
all over the U.S. 
 199. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 93-94 (discussing Army and Navy basic 
English language requirements). 
 200. Preston, supra note 163. 
 201. Hommer, supra note 190. 
 202. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 41. 
 203. Id.
 204. Preston, supra note 163. 
 205. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 254. 
 206. Id. 
 207. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 7. 
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4. Equipping 
In terms of equipment, U.S. Foreign Legionnaires should be armed based 
upon the task they are assigned and should be given the best equipment to 
accomplish their tasks. This means that instead of scavenging for 
substandard weapons and ammunition in the black markets of a host nation 
like some PMC personnel have had to do,208 or riding around in improperly 
armored vehicles,209 the U.S. Foreign Legion would have the same standard 
issue firearms and armor as U.S. troops. 
F. Possible Criticism 
1. Resistance to Change from Within Military 
Some in the military may object to an influx of non-citizen soldiers. The 
logical response to that would be “look around you.” With more than half of 
the U.S. presence in Afghanistan consisting of non-citizen—and, in fact, 
non-military—personnel, and with 8,000 non-citizens joining existing U.S. 
military branches annually,210 this objection seems ignorant of the realities 
of the situation. 
2. Xenophobia 
The purpose of this paper is not to suggest that the U.S. wholly shove 
responsibility for fighting and dying off on non-citizen foreign nationals; 
the conflict in Afghanistan is our own. This note simply proposes 
legitimizing the current de facto situation. 
In looking to historical examples of non-citizen military units, this note 
does not ignore the fact that economic pressures have been major 
motivating factors.211 Some who have studied the potential inclusion of non-
citizens in the U.S. military have noted that the age and economic status of 
large portions of the world’s population mean a large potential pool of 
recruits. 
About a third of the world’s population is under age 15, and the 
overwhelming majority lives in developing countries. Because this large 
bulge of future workers will have difficulty finding work in their native 
countries, many may emigrate—either alone or with young families. Of the 
 208. See SHADOW COMPANY, supra note 122 (describing the black market as a 
workaround for PMC personnel where the permitting process and cost to import needed 
weaponry is prohibitive). 
 209. See, e.g., id.
 210. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 1; see also Preston, supra note 163. 
 211. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 16. 
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16 million foreign-born people who entered the United States between 1990 
and 2002, almost a quarter were under age 21.212
However, there are other reasons why individuals have joined units like 
the French Foreign Legion and might therefore be interested in joining the 
proposed U.S. Foreign Legion.213 Indeed, if the French Foreign Legion is 
any example, more equitable benefits for Legionnaires and the promise of 
citizenship would make service to the U.S. Foreign Legion even more 
appealing to a wider range of individuals.214
3. Duplication or Segregation of Current Forces 
This note suggests the creation of a new military force that would bring 
into the folds of the American military those positions currently handled by 
non-citizen foreign nationals. This note does not suggest placing all non-
citizens in only the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion; it does not suggest 
taking those servicemembers who are currently serving in the Marine Corps, 
Army, Navy, or Air Force and segregating them into the proposed U.S. 
Foreign Legion.215 This new military force would represent another option 
for non-citizens interested in serving on behalf of the U.S. 
4. Afghan Nationals May Not Wish to Become U.S. Citizens 
Many of the non-citizen PMC personnel working for U.S. interests in 
Afghanistan are Afghan nationals.216 These individuals may not wish to take 
advantage of the potential to become U.S. citizens through service in the 
U.S. Foreign Legion. However, the U.S. Foreign Legion would not be 
trying to capitalize on all 200,000 PMC personnel and so, assuming many 
Afghan nationals currently working for PMC’s opt out of becoming U.S. 
Foreign Legionnaires, this would mean only a reduced pool of applicants. 
Additionally, extending the offer of U.S. citizenship would give those who 
were interested a chance to gain U.S. citizenship for their service should 
they choose to pursue it. Lastly, the more equitable pay scale, better 
organizational structure, and increased accountability may be preferred even 
among those PMC personnel who are not interested in the citizenship aspect 
of the U.S. Foreign Legion. 
 212. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 5. 
 213. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 17 -18 (describing those who may desire to enter a 
military force like the French Foreign Legion for purely professional reasons—to be a 
professional soldier—and those who seek refuge from any number of political pressures in 
their native countries). 
 214. See id. at 18. 
 215. See discussion supra Part III.D.i. 
 216. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 7 (citations omitted). 
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5. End of Hostilities in Afghanistan 
Assuming an eventual conclusion of U.S. involvement in hostilities in 
Afghanistan and given the fact that many of the PMC personnel are highly 
trained, it would be logical to retain some portion of this force for security 
in other areas. An end to hostilities in Afghanistan would not necessarily 
mean a dismantling of the U.S. Foreign Legion. Looking to the French 
Foreign Legion as an example, one of the major adjustments following the 
independence of Algeria included the reduction of the Legion from 20,000 
troops to 8,000 troops.217 Currently, the United Kingdom is slated to reduce 
its elite Gurkha regiment by 700 servicemembers to a troop size of 2,900 
soldiers by 2015.218 Yet, despite troop reductions or changes in mission 
objectives, both of these military units endure and a U.S. Foreign Legion 
could likewise adapt to changing demands. 
Additionally, this criticism presupposes an end to hostilities that would 
require an augmented U.S. fighting force like the proposed U.S. Foreign 
Legion. Recent events in Syria219 and rhetoric among some in Congress220
may foreshadow the need for such a force in future conflicts. 
CONCLUSION
While undoubtedly producing new challenges, the creation of a formal 
U.S. Foreign Legion would address many of the issues caused by the 
current overreliance on PMC personnel for mission-critical functions 
described above. Such a military unit would place the use of military-style 
force squarely back within the proper control of the sovereign U.S. 
government221 and would appropriately recognize the efforts of those 
 217. JORDAN, supra note 131, at 92- 93. 
 218. UK to Reduce Gurkha Brigade Size, EKANTIPUR.COM (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://www.ekantipur.com/2011/04/04/top-story/uk-to-reduce-gurkha-brigade-
size/331977.html. 
 219. See, e.g., Anne Barnard, Syria Opposition Group Is Routed and Divided, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/middle 
east/syria-torture-report-military-maintains-assaults.html?ref=global-home; Michel Martin, 
Is There A Moral Duty To Intervene In Syria? (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 15, 2012), 
available at http://www.npr.org/2012/03/15/148678004/is-there-a-moral-duty-to-intervene-
in-syria (discussing possible intervention in Syria with professor Shaun Casey, who teaches 
“Just War” theory, and Abderrahim Foukara of Al Jazeera International). 
 220. See, e.g., Sen. John McCain, Syrians Need the U.S. to Act Now, USA TODAY,
(Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/story/2012-03-14/Syria-
John-McCain-Assad/53536942/1. 
 221. Discussions of military intervention center on the rights and responsibilities of 
sovereign states, not those of private, for-profit companies. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, 
para. 4, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml (addressing 
limits of states with respect to the use of force); U.N. Charter art. 51, available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml (addressing the right of member 
states to defend themselves); Letter dated Oct. 7, 2001 from John D. Negroponte, Permanent 
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individuals who are currently serving U.S. interests without commensurate 
benefits. Lastly, such a force would enhance U.S. security interests 
abroad—through increases in oversight and control of PMC personnel—and 
would help reign in fraud and waste at a time when the U.S. government 
can afford neither. 
Representative of the United States of America, to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001) (justifying U.S. 
intervention in Afghanistan by referencing the right of national self-defense articulated in 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) 
(reaffirming the right of collective self-defense and calling on states to act); S.C. Res. 1373, 
U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (reaffirming the right of collective self-defense and 
calling on states to act); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 338 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the international reaction to U.S. state
intervention on self-defense grounds in Afghanistan as largely supportive). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The process by which a people forge a path towards independence begins 
with their right to self-determination. Self-determination has been defined 
as the “determination by a group of people with the same social, ethnic, and 
cultural background inhabiting one area, or sometimes a group of people 
living in a territory within a state, of its own political future, including 
establishing a state of its own by a referendum or other methods.”1 It is the 
right given to people to hold referendums and pursue their independence. 
Once the people have established a desire to exercise independence through 
self-determination, they first must fulfill the criteria of a state, specifically 
* J.D. Candidate, Michigan State University College of Law, 2012; B.A., 
University of Wisconsin Madison, 2009. Many thanks to my family and friends for their 
support during the creation of this article. 
 1. Y. Frank Chiang, State, Sovereignty, and Taiwan, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 959,
1002 (2000).
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the “four qualifications prescribed in the Montevideo Convention.”2 The 
next requirement, that states must declare themselves as states to the 
international community, “is derived from international custom . . . . [and] 
may take a formal or an informal form.”3 However, without this declaration, 
a state’s assertion of independence will be unprofitable since it cannot 
expect the international community to recognize it as sovereign if it does 
not see itself as a sovereign nation.  
Once a secessionist region has fulfilled the criteria for a state and has 
made it known to the international community that it is seeking 
independence, the sovereign right of its governing state is implicated. The 
right of a sovereign state to exercise control is threatened by the right of 
self-determination. The two are forced to co-exist, however, not 
harmoniously. The tension is most visible when the international 
community applies inconsistent methods of implementation with respect to 
standards set forth in the Montevideo Convention. When they are not 
applied equally amongst the States seeking independence, they create 
unpredictable results and do not enforce the Convention’s intention of 
creating a solid set of guidelines. As a result of this unpredictability, states 
are not encouraged to alter their behavior to fit the guidelines. In contrast, 
states rely on the international community’s interpretation of when the 
standards should be applied and when other forces come into play. 
The political implications of the granting of Kosovo’s independence are 
not discounted in this article because, as law Professor Christopher J. 
Borgen states, “Kosovo presents a quintessential ‘tough case,’ 
demonstrating the ways in which political interests of States affect how the 
international law is given effect.”4 The major thrust of this paper is the 
analysis of the independence of Kosovo and adherence (or lack of) to the 
standards set forth in international law. A brief comparison and analysis will 
be made to the international community’s denial of independence for 
Quebec and Taiwan, since these two situations have been previously 
analyzed and documented in detail by other authors.  
In its Advisory Opinion of July 22, 2010 regarding Kosovo’s 
independence, the International Court of Justice stated that “the Court 
considers that general international law contains no applicable prohibition 
of declarations of independence.”5 The Court further stated that “[d]ebates 
 2. Id. at 971.  
 3. Id.
 4. Christopher J. Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-
Determination, Secession and Recognition, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 29, 2008), 
http://www.asil.org/insights080229.cfm. See generally Ian Brownlie & C. J. Apperley, 
Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law Aspects, 49 INT’L & COMP.
L. Q. 878 (2000) (discussing whether intervention by NATO states in Kosovo is appropriate 
under international law).  
 5. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 84 (Jul. 22).  
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regarding the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of 
any right of ‘remedial succession,’ however, concern the right to separate 
from a State. . . . [T]hat issue is beyond the scope of the question posed by 
the General Assembly.”6
I.  KOSOVO: SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE CLASH WITH 
SOVEREIGNTY
The ideas of sovereignty and self-determination for Kosovo have long 
been a bone of contention between the Kosovo Albanians and the former 
Yugoslavia (now Serbia). This type of struggle can be pinned as “[t]he 
underlying cause of the tragedy of Yugoslavia.”7 However, this struggle 
alone could not have led to the breakup of the region. It is in fact the “ad 
hoc rejection of the principle of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
states.”8 Specifically, “where the territorial integrity of the state is violated 
and territorial secessions are encouraged, it leads to more demands by other 
ethnic or ideological groups for the same right of secession leading to more 
violence.”9 Thus, the concern arises that once the sovereignty of a state is 
violated, manipulation of the system by groups seeking secession becomes a 
grave possibility. For example, how would the international community 
react if illegal immigrants in Arizona or Texas became the majority and 
declared secession from the United States?  
When the United Nations General Assembly enacted Resolution 2649, 
the meaning behind the concept of “self-determination” was unclear.10 In 
the Resolution, it notes the concern “that many peoples are still denied the 
right to self-determination and are still subject to colonial and alien 
domination.”11 Yet, there does not seem to be any mention of what 
constitutes this type of domination. It achieves the “speedy granting of 
independence to colonial countries and peoples” without setting the 
criteria.12 Self-determination is recalled in later Resolutions, such as 2787 
(XXVI) and 2955 (XXVII).13 Yet, the General Assembly reminds member 
States that it is “mindful that interference in the internal affairs of States is a 
violation of the Charter and can pose a serious threat to the maintenance of 
 6. Id. ¶ 83. 
 7. Raju G. C. Thomas, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Secession: Principles 
and Practice, in YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION,
INTERVENTION 3, 16 (Raju G. C. Thomas ed., 2003).  
 8. Id. (emphasis added).  
 9. Id. at 16-17. 
 10. G.A. Res. 2649 (XXV), at 73, U.N. Doc. A/8163 (Nov. 30, 1970).  
 11. Id.
 12. Id.
 13. See G.A. Res. 2787 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. 
A/8543 (Dec. 6, 1971); see also G.A. Res. 2955 (XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/8936 (Dec. 12, 
1972).  
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peace.”14 If the General Assembly is mindful that interference in the internal 
affairs of a state is a violation of the Charter, and is a threat to peace, then it 
becomes questionable why a right of self-determination, without guidelines, 
should be enforced.  
It appears enforcement of this principle in Kosovo is the true purpose 
behind the concept of self-determination, as envisioned by the General 
Assembly. The secession of Kosovo from Serbia has clouded an already 
undefined theory. The U.N. Charter leaves “self-determination” ambiguous 
with one of its purposes stated in Article 1: “[t]o develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.”15 It has made it more difficult to distinguish a 
victim from an aggressor. Within the Kosovo province, “[t]he promise of 
external support for independence encouraged the Albanians of Kosovo to 
provoke the Serbian security forces into committing human rights violations 
in order to invite NATO military intervention.” 16 This concern has been 
addressed, to a similar extent, by Satish Nambiar in the article Reflections 
on the Yugoslav Wars: A Peacekeeper’s Perspective.17 Specifically, because 
the Kosovo problem was ignored in the Dayton Accord, it was unavoidable 
that “Albanian extremist elements . . . would displace the moderate 
elements in Kosovo, assert themselves, and provoke the Yugoslav 
authorities into a heavy-handed response.”18 The blurring of distinctions 
between aggressor and victim is even more frightening when the population 
of Kosovo consisted of “75 percent ethnic Albanians and 12.5 percent 
Serbs” in 1981.19 Thus, fitting a majority population into a victim category 
becomes more difficult to accept. 
The support of the secessionist movement in Kosovo is deeply troubling 
when considered as an act of self-determination since there have been 
concerns about the majority population oppressing minorities within the 
province. The General Assembly even addresses this when it recognizes 
“the frequent instances of harassment, periodic kidnapping and murder of 
ethnic Serb, Roma and other minorities of Kosovo by ethnic Albanian 
extremists.”20 This Resolution was adopted in 2000, the same year that the 
Albanian population in Kosovo reached 85.3 percent.21
 14. G.A. Res. 2787 (XXVI), supra note 13, at 83 (emphasis added). 
 15. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.  
 16. Thomas, supra note 7, at 34 (emphasis added).  
 17. See generally Satish Nambiar, Reflections on the Yugoslav Wars: A 
Peacekeeper’s Perspective, in YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-
DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION, supra note 7.
 18. Id. at 357. 
 19. Id. at 345 (emphasis added).  
 20. G.A. Res. 54/183, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 54th Sess., Agenda Item 116(c), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/54/183, at 2 (Feb. 29, 2000).  
 21. Id.; see World Bank, Kosovo—Living Standards measurement Survey 2000, 
http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.phpcatalog/77/variable/V949 (last visited Nov. 25, 
2010).  
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Just a year prior to the General Assembly’s recognition of violence by 
Kosovo’s dominant population, Rambouillet, France hosted an international 
conference on the Kosovo issue. At the conference, “American officials 
drafted an agreement that largely favored the Albanians—demanding a 
referendum on independence after three years and free passage for NATO 
troops throughout all of Yugoslavia.”22 The process by which this 
agreement was reached has been criticized as a “violation of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of International Treaties.”23 Specifically, 
Rambouillet has been criticized as “a farce enacted to justify . . . NATO 
intervention in the form of missile and air attacks on Kosovo and other areas 
of Yugoslavia.”24 Thus, it would appear that the process undertaken to 
ensure the independence of Kosovo was a direct violation of the General 
Assembly’s own guidelines. The General Assembly “[u]rges all States to 
respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and 
the sovereign right of peoples to determine their political, economic, and 
social system.”25 The interference by NATO violated the sovereign right of 
the people of Serbia to determine their political fate. In fact, it forced the 
state to submit to the Rambouillet secessionist agreement.  
Years before the secessionist agreement was adopted by Serbia and 
Kosovo, the United States, a member state of NATO, made important 
statements regarding the situation in Kosovo. In a Department of State Press 
Statement from May 24, 1991, it stated that it “will not encourage or reward 
secession . . . . Yugoslavia’s external or internal borders should not be 
changed unless by peaceful consensual means.”26 However, in 2008 the 
United States gave its support to the secessionist movement. It is difficult to 
understand why one of the most prominent NATO states changed its 
opinion, from 1991 to 2008, to support secession and the bombing of a 
sovereign state.  
A concern specified in the Department of State Press Statement was the 
process of elections in Kosovo. Specifically, “[t]he holding of free and fair 
elections, like the free flow of information, is a measure of a government’s 
 22. Alan J. Kuperman, Transnational Causes of Genocide, or How the West 
Exacerbates Ethnic Conflict, in YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-
DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION, supra note 7, at 66 (emphasis added). See Marc Weller, 
The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 75 INT’L AFF. 211 (1999) (detailing one author’s 
interpretation of the process involved in the Rambouillet agreement).  
 23. Nambiar, supra note 17, at 357.  
 24. Id. See Jason R. Struble & Richard A.C. Alton, The Legacy of Operation Allied 
Force: A Reflection on its Legality Under United States and International Law, 20 MICH. ST.
INT’L L. REV. 293, 307-09 (2012) for a discussion of how military force was used to promote 
Kosovo independence.  
 25. G.A. Res. 46/130, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/130 (Dec. 17, 1991).  
 26. Press Release, Dep’t of State, Dep’t of State Press Statement (May 24, 1991), in
THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH DOCUMENTS 49, 50 (Philip E. 
Auerswald & David P. Auerswald eds., 2000) (emphasis added). 
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commitment to a democratic political process.”27 This is a concern that is 
also shared by the General Assembly.28 However, the General Assembly 
emphasizes that states should not provide any type of “overt or covert 
support for political parties or groups and from taking actions to undermine 
the electoral processes in any country.”29 Thus, to provide an analogy, 
Serbia and other states may not provide support for any political party in the 
Kosovo region and may not try to undermine the electoral process. If the 
electoral process is respected, then the need for intervention by other States 
is unnecessary.  
The electoral process in Kosovo was not obstructed. Following a 
referendum that was held from September 26th to the 30th, a statement was 
made by the provincial assembly that “the Assembly of the republic of 
Kosova declares the initiative a success.”30 In this election 87.01% of the 
inhabitants of Kosovo participated, of which nearly all were ethnic 
Albanians.31 It also notes that there were “1,500 polling locations,” an 
indicator that the electoral process was set in motion.32 Already the republic 
renamed itself “Kosova,” and declared itself to “be a sovereign and 
independent republic.”33 The results of the Referendum speak for 
themselves—that there was no obstruction by Serbia. There was no need for 
support or involvement by other States to ensure the fairness of the electoral 
process in Kosovo.  
Following the electoral process, the European Community considered 
the Kosovo independence issue. The European Community “refused to 
consider the request for recognition as an independent state” due to the 
constitutional principles of the former Yugoslavia.34 The constitutional 
principle of 1943 that governed the European Community’s refusal stated 
that “the status of [a] republic should be reserved for nations (narodi) as 
opposed to nationalities (narodnosti).”35 This is relevant to show that the 
Kosovar Albanians did not fit within the constitutional interpretation of a 
people that were eligible to gain independence through self-determination. 
Following from this, the “Kosovar Albanians were thus a nationality 
because they presumably had their homeland in Albania.”36 The 
Constitutional Declaration created by Kosovar Albanians declared that they 
 27. Id. at 51.  
 28. G.A. Res. 46/130, supra note 25. 
 29. Id. ¶ 6. 
 30. Press Release, Republic of Kosova, Statement by the Assembly of the Republic 
of Kosova (Oct. 19, 1991), in THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at 59. 
 31. Id.
 32. Id.
 33. Id.
 34. Richard Caplan, International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo, 74 INT’L AFF.
745, 748 (1998).
 35. Id.
 36. Id.
2012] The Right to Self-Determination 501
were “the majority of the population and one of the most numerous peoples 
of Yugoslavia, as well as the Serbs and others living in Kosova, [and] are 
considered a nation-people and not a nationality (national minority).”37 If a 
group is not a minority and considers itself numerous within the governing 
State, then justification by self-determination is a weak argument. 
If a group is a majority within an area, it has dominant control within 
that area. In Kosovo, Albanians consisted of a majority of the population. 
That same population articulated its position clearly in the Constitutional 
Declaration. The Kosovar Albanians did not feel that they were a minority 
within the greater State of Yugoslavia. The legal principles of self-
determination cannot apply to every group in the world that wants to 
separate. Self-determination cannot apply to every situation because it will 
only lead to greater border disputes, problems with national identities, and 
violence. Self-determination should, therefore, not be a loosely used 
justification for secession.  
The doctrine of self-determination itself has been criticized by 
international scholars as lacking “any firm foundation, floating as if it were 
in midair.”38 The lack of standards is evident since its supporters advocate a 
position that is in direct contradiction with rational ideas of self-
determination. Specifically, they argue “that it should be identified with 
majority rule,” an idea synonymous with a nation; yet, this is not even 
articulated in the U.N. Charter, Article 5, which “carefully avoids 
specifying that this right is vested in nations.”39 Thus, the definition of 
“majority rule” or what gives a group the right to demand secession by self-
determination remains unclear.  
The lack of specificity by the U.N. Charter, Article 5, on the subject of 
self-determination leaves the doctrine open to interpretation within the legal 
community. However, interpretation turns into a double-edged sword when 
it involves international disputes. Interpretation of disputes will always lead 
to criticism by some member of the international community. If one state is 
granted independence, then another state will require the same approval. 
However, if the other state is not granted independence and secession, then 
a lack of trust in the international political system results. It is an inevitable 
result that is the consequence of a lack of standards articulated when self-
 37. Press Release, Kos. Assembly, Constitutional Declaration Adopted by the Kos. 
Assembly (July 2, 1990), in THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 26 at 44 (emphasis added).  
 38. SABRINA P. RAMET, THE LIBERAL PROJECT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 50 (2007). 
 39. Id. at 50-51. “Majority rule, in the western world, assumes that the forces for 
cohesion are stronger than those for separation so that, in any majority decision, the 
legitimate interests of the minority may be presumed to have influenced and modified 
majority will, at least to the point where the minority does not reject or rebel.” Aleksander 
W. Rudzinski, Majority Rule vs. Great Power Agreement in the United Nations, 9 INT’L
ORG. 366, 370 (1955).  
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determination was accepted as a legal concept. Based on the analysis, this 
deficiency has led to the belief that the approval of secessionist movements 
is based on a lack of foundation.  
II.  KOSOVO’S FAILURE IN PASSING THE MONTEVIDEO “TEST” FOR 
INDEPENDENCE
The legal requirements for statehood are set forth in the Montevideo 
Convention of 1933, an agreement that has been accepted as customary 
international law.40 It remains the primary source for the determination of 
statehood and is even taught in law schools as such. The requirements are 
laid out in four points, “[t]he state as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined 
territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other 
states.”41 Therefore, in order for Kosovo to be recognized as a legitimate, 
independent state, it would have to fulfill all of the Montevideo 
Convention’s requirements. Anything less than full compliance with the 
recognized standards would be reason to decline its application for 
independence.  
Additional requirements for new states seeking independence were 
created and adopted in the European Community’s Declaration on the 
“Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union.”42 The requirements iterated that new states act with: 
[R]espect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter 
of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights; 
[G]uarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in 
accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the 
CSCE; 
[R]espect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed 
by peaceful means and by common agreement; 
 40. MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, Dec. 26, 
1933, 49 Stat. 3097,165 L.N.T.S. 19. See ERROL MENDES,                                   
STATEHOOD AND PALESTINE FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 12(3) OF THE ICC STATUTE 2, 2 
(2010) for a discussion on how the Montevideo Convention is a part of customary 
international law. 
 41. Id. art. 1.  
 42. Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union,” Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1487 [hereinafter 
Declaration] (emphasis added). 
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[A]cceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and 
nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; 
[C]ommitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by 
recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and 
regional disputes. 
The community and its Member States will not recognise entities which 
are the result of aggression. They would take account of the effects of 
recognition on neighbouring States.43
Taking the Montevideo Convention requirements into account first, 
Kosovo does not fulfill all four points. It does contain a “permanent 
population” of individuals who reside in the area, granted the entire 
population is not of the same ethnicity. This in and of itself poses problems 
because the entire population was not in favor of the secessionist 
movement. It poses concerns of what would happen to the minority group 
once total independence is granted. It creates the unfortunate reality that the 
minority group that is left in the secessionist region will be oppressed and 
discriminated against. Freedom of speech and expression will be limited in 
order to silence minority opposition. This is an unfortunate result that is not 
always contemplated when granting independence.  
The next requirement, that there exist a “defined territory,” is evident in 
this case. Kosovo has long been considered an autonomous region. 
However, there is concern by international scholars that when secession 
occurs in a country, the “former internal boundaries of the state, whether 
they are called provinces, ‘states,’ or ‘republics,’ cannot automatically 
become the boundaries of the new state.”44 Thus, when Kosovo seceded 
from Serbia in 2008, the possibility exists that it will divide into two 
regions. It would involve partitioning Kosovo into two parts, where the 
northern section would be under Serbian control and the southern region 
would be under Albanian control.45 This shows that although there may 
have been a defined territory when independence was granted, the strong 
cultural differences in the region could lead to a further division. This is a 
likely scenario since it has already occurred in other contexts: in 1992, when 
Northern Ireland separated from Ireland and when Bengal and Punjab 
divided after Pakistan’s secession from India in 1947.46 Therefore, Kosovo 
is not unified enough to retain the same “defined territory” that it held when 
it seceded.  
 43. Id. (emphasis added).  
 44. Thomas, supra note 7, at 20.  
 45. Caplan, supra note 34, at 759-60.  
 46. Thomas, supra note 7, at 20. See Roger Mac Ginty, Orla T. Muldoon & Neil 
Ferguson, No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland after the Agreement, 28 POL. PSYCHOL. 1 
(2007); see also O. H. K. Spate, Geographical Aspects of the Pakistan Scheme, 102 
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 125 (1943).  
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The greatest failure in fulfilling the Montevideo Convention’s 
requirements for statehood is in the third requirement, that of a new state’s 
“government.” In order to have a functioning government that is able to 
respond to the demands of a new state, it must be stable. Kosovo’s 
government has been anything but stable. There have been numerous groups 
that governed the province, and none have consistently held power. For 
instance, prior to the conflict, the Serbian government was active in 
Kosovo. Following this, the Albanian extremist group known as the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) took control. This group was “[t]he proximate 
cause of the 1999 Kosovo conflict.”47 This is the same group that was 
recognized to be a threat to security. The KLA’s leading members were 
considered to be “‘an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security and foreign policy of the United States’” by former President 
George W. Bush in an Executive Order signed July 2001.48 The KLA was 
influential for a number of years and it was only until 2000 that a change in 
leadership occurred when Ibrahim Rugova, an Albanian leader of the 
moderate party, was elected.49 However, the reality that an extremist party 
was able to gain enough control and support to be in power in Kosovo for a 
period of time should have been a red flag that Kosovo did not have a stable 
government. The Montevideo Convention required that all four factors be 
fulfilled, including the requirement for a “government.” The failure of this 
requirement alone should have stopped the process for granting 
independence to the unstable region.  
In an article written by author Charles A. Kupchan in 2005, the political 
situation in Kosovo is illustrated as unstable, even after Rugova took 
power.50 Particularly, the “[p]olitical and legal institutions had yet to 
mature, stymied by infighting among political parties, crime and corruption, 
and patronage systems deeply embedded in the clannish structure of 
Albanian society.”51 By this description, the political and legal system is to 
be controlled by the majority Albanian population and will disregard the 
minority populations. This shows the government’s instability, just three 
 47. Kelly M. Greenhill, The Use of Refugees as Political and Military Weapons in 
the Kosovo Conflict, in YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION,
INTERVENTION, supra note 7, at 205, 207.
 48. Gordon N. Bardos, International Policy in Southeastern Europe: A Diagnosis, in
YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION, supra 
note 7, at 139, 151 (emphasis added) (citing Exec. Order No. 13219, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,777 
(June 27, 2001). See also “UN Suspends Five Top Members of Kosovo Civil Corps,” Agence 
France-Presse, July 6, 2001,  
http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=9918). 
 49. Milica Z. Bookman, Economic Aspects of Yugoslavia’s Disintegration, in
YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION, supra 
note 7, at 117, 131. 
 50. Charles A. Kupchan, Independence for Kosovo: Yielding to Balkan Reality,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 14, 18. 
 51. Id. at 17. 
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years prior to the granting of Kosovo’s independence. A government that is 
clannish and corrupt cannot be a good representative of the entire state. In 
this type of government, a minority would not even have the opportunity to 
campaign for a position. This type of government, therefore, could not enter 
into “relations with other states,” the last requirement. These last two 
requirements are interdependent because neither can exist efficiently 
without the other. A government needs interaction with other states to 
survive economically and politically, and other states cannot trust an 
unstable government. Kosovo’s independence should not have been granted 
because these two requirements were not fulfilled.  
Although the Kosovo region could fulfill the first two requirements of 
the Montevideo Convention, it fails in the remaining two. In a sense, the 
third requirement is the most important since a government is the heart of a 
secessionist state. It is the piece that holds the independent state together 
once secession occurs. Granting Kosovo independence circumvented the 
Montevideo Convention and is an insult to the standards that were created. 
It sets a precedent for other states seeking independence to view the 
Montevideo Convention as a flexible standard instead of the customary 
international law that it was meant to be. This is a concern that the 
international community has considered to create “a redrawing of 
international borders which might awaken latent or historical claims 
elsewhere in the region.”52 Similarly, at that time the United States and 
western European states were concerned “that an independent Kosovo will 
serve as a positive example for the numerous self-determination movements 
bent on separation elsewhere in Europe.”53 This apprehension, in and of 
itself, should have been a controlling consideration in declining 
independence. However, when adding to this hesitation, Kosovo’s failure to 
present a complying state, the rejection of independence should have been a 
given. Since these factors were not considered and the international 
community granted Kosovo independence, this result was a direct violation 
of the Montevideo Convention.  
III. KOSOVO’S FAILURE TO FULFILL ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS SET 
OUT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY’S DECLARATION FOR 
EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES
The first requirement addresses the need for new states to respect the 
U.N. Charter along with other agreements. However, the U.N. Charter 
cannot be applied to Kosovo until it becomes a new state. Thus, to use this 
as part of the analysis of whether independence should have been granted is 
unnecessary.  
 52. Caplan, supra note 34, at 751.  
 53. Id. at 755.  
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The U.N. Charter may be applied to member states that became involved 
in the Kosovo independence conflict. Article 2 is of the greatest importance 
because it outlines the boundaries for member states. Article 2(4) states that 
members must “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.”54 The actions undertaken by member states, who are concurrently 
members of NATO, were a violation of the U.N. Charter. Specifically, 
states involved in the bombing campaign were in violation because this is a 
direct threat against the territorial integrity of Serbia. It was used to coerce 
Serbia into signing the agreement with respect to Kosovo’s independence. 
Such attacks have already been noted by authors as a breach of “the U.N. 
Charter and even NATO’s own charter.”55 This also interfered with Serbia’s 
domestic jurisdiction and can be attributed as an infringement of Article 
2(7), in particular that the United Nations shall not “intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”56
Kosovo may have been granted autonomy; however, it was still within 
Serbia’s jurisdiction at the time of the conflict. It was not an independent 
state and thus, any intervention on the part of United Nations members was 
an encroachment on the sovereign state’s rights.  
However, the violations did not end with these two, but in fact were 
found in other sections of the U.N. Charter. Specifically, Article 2(6) states 
that the U.N. will “ensure that states which are not Members of the United 
Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary 
for the maintenance of international peace and security.”57 States were 
required to both refrain from contributing to the violence in Kosovo and 
Serbia and to maintain the peace and security of the region, per Article 2(6). 
In fact, only the Security Council had legitimate reason to get involved in 
the crisis through its authority granted by Article 34. It states that it “may 
investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international 
friction or give rise to a dispute.”58 From all of the cited articles of the U.N. 
Charter, this analysis shows that one common theme arises: the Charter 
limits state’s involvement in matters of international disputes so that the 
broadest powers granted to outside states are those of an “observer.” This is 
a likely conclusion, since any involvement by the states with respect to 
Serbia and Kosovo is in one way or another, a violation.  
The second requirement bound new states to abide by guarantees of 
minority rights with respect to the framework set out by the Conference on 
 54. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.  
 55. Nambiar, supra note 17, at 357.  
 56. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. Intervention is controversial and can have 
unanticipated side effects. Even humanitarian intervention becomes questionable when the 
definition of ‘humanitarian’ is misapplied. See Tom J. Farer, The Ethics of Intervention in 
Self-Determination Struggles, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 382 (2003).  
 57. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 6.  
 58. U.N. Charter art. 34.  
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Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).59 This section deals 
particularly with Kosovo’s actions towards their minorities. Some of the 
most basic rights have been violated, and yet the region was granted 
independence. The concept of minority rights dates back to the Paris Peace 
Conference, which after World War I created “minority treaties . . . and 
applied to the new states of Eastern Europe that harbored substantial 
national minorities.”60 It is a guarantee particularly noteworthy where a 
minority inhabits a region populated by one dominant group. This was the 
case of Kosovo.  
In 1990, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova stated that it 
guaranteed “full human and citizen’s rights for all individuals.”61 This was a 
declaration made eighteen years prior to the region’s independence. Also, 
within the European Community “extensive provisions for safeguarding the 
rights of ethnic minorities within the boundaries of the new states” were a 
priority.62 If Kosovo upheld its promise to honor the rights of its minority 
citizens, then there should be no argument for not recognizing its 
sovereignty. Yet, the guarantees were not specifically upheld and numerous 
groups of minorities were victims of abuse. Just recently, the reality of this 
abuse has come to light when “[a] two-year international inquiry has 
concluded that the prime minister of Kosovo [Hashim Thaci] led a clan of 
criminal entrepreneurs whose activities included trafficking in organs 
extracted from Serbian prisoners executed during the Kosovo conflict in 
1999.”63 This grim reality is just another indication that it is highly unlikely 
an independent Kosovo will adhere to minority rights. It will be interesting 
to see if the international community will impose stricter standards for 
requiring new states to adhere to the requirements they vowed to follow in 
order to gain their independence.  
Even in 2004, concerns had been noted by U.N. military force 
spokesman Derek Chappell that “‘some in the Kosovo Albanian leadership 
believe that by cleansing all remaining Serbs from the area . . . and 
destroying Serbian cultural sites, they can present the international 
community with a fait accompli.’”64 This was also noted by the 
 59. Declaration, supra note 42. 
 60. Michael Mandelbaum, The Future of Nationalism, in YUGOSLAVIA 
UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION, supra note 7, at 41,
50. See Geo A. Finch, The Peace Conference of Paris, 1919, 13 AM. J. INT’L L. 159 (1919), 
for a brief historical overview of the conference that reshaped Europe after World War I.  
 61. Constitutional Declaration Adopted by the Kosovo Assembly, in THE KOSOVO 
CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 37, at 45. 
 62. Caplan, supra note 34, at 749.  
 63. Doreen Carvajal & Marlise Simons, Report Says Kosovo Prime Minister Led 
Organ Trafficking Network, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/europe/16kosovo.html.  
 64. AM. COUNCIL FOR KOS. & LORD BYRON FOUND. FOR BALKAN STUDIES, Kosovo: 
The Score 1999-2009, at 24-25 (2009), available at 
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International Crisis Group as shattering “‘international confidence that the 
Albanians were committed to a tolerant society.”‘65 The actions by 
Kosovo’s majority were a contradiction of the promises enumerated in its 
constitution from 1990. Thus, Kosovo’s constitution was not reflective of its 
actions towards minorities and therefore, there were no guarantees that 
minorities would be protected in the future if independence were granted.  
The third requirement that frontiers change by peaceful means coincides 
with the all-encompassing requirement that new states will not be 
recognized if they are the result of aggression. How can Kosovo have been 
recognized as a new state when its entire existence depended on gaining the 
international community’s attention through its means of aggression? It 
would only be logical that a petitioning state of this type should be denied. 
However, somehow it was not. If there is disbelief that it was the result of 
aggression, Kosovo’s politicians and leading media figures threatened 
violence if independence was not granted. Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Bajram 
Kosumi, threatened that “[i]f Kosovo does not become independent, there 
will be serious consequences.”66 Another politician, Adem Demaci, 
threatened that violence will occur if the “West does not grant 
independence.”67 Similarly, Veton Surroi, an editor-in-chief of a large 
newspaper in the capital of Kosovo, stated that “‘international attention can 
only be obtained through war.”‘68 These are supposed to be some of the 
leaders of the “peaceful” movement attributed to the Kosovo campaign for 
independence. However, the statements show that both the Albanian 
population and the majority leaders in Kosovo held that movement to be a 
farce.  
It should come as no surprise then that the people of Kosovo were 
willing to resort to threats as well. Richard Caplan came to the conclusion 
that “[f]ewer and fewer Albanians are now willing to settle for anything less 
than a total Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo.”69 This was stated prior to 
Kosovo’s independence, yet it is reflective of a non-native’s opinion of the 
situation. There was no chance for a peaceful resolution, especially when 
the KLA preached that the people should “mercilessly hit the enemy for it is 
http://www.balkanstudies.org/sites/default/files/newsletter/Kosovo%20The%20Score%
201999%202009.pdf.
 65. Id. at 25.  
 66. Kupchan, supra note 50, at 17.  
 67. Doug Bandow, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, A Critical Issue 
Back on the Radar Screen, Address Before the American Council for Kosovo (Sept. 28, 
2006), in AM. COUNCIL FOR KOS., RECONSIDERING KOSOVO: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HELD ON SEPTEMBER 28, 2006 IN WASHINGTON D.C. 47, 51
(2006), available at www.savekosovo.org/documents/Kosovo_Conference_Book_File.pdf.
 68. Caplan, supra note 34, at 752.  
 69. Id. at 746.  
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in this way that we are going to win our freedom.”70 It can only be described 
as a blatant and ruthless statement that shows the extent of aggression the 
secessionist group would take if their wishes were not honored. It is difficult 
to believe that these threats were unknown to decision-making states at the 
time of Kosovo’s independence discussions. Thus, it is only logical to 
assume that they were circumvented for the purposes of granting 
independence. Otherwise, it is contrary to the requirements that a state will 
not be recognized if it is formed as a result of aggression.  
Requirements four and five do not necessitate further analysis since they 
fall within the greater picture emphasized in the first three requirements. 
The fourth requirement, demanding regional stability, has been answered 
through the analysis of whether the region would have a stable government 
and whether minority rights would be protected. From that study, the fourth 
requirement would show that Kosovo could not make a commitment to 
regional stability. The fifth requirement, a commitment to settle by 
agreement issues of regional disputes and state succession, can be answered 
through the same method as that in the third requirement. It is difficult to 
believe that a state that is the result of aggression can be committed to 
peacefully settling regional disputes. You can remove the state from the 
aggression, but you cannot remove the aggression from the State.  
The European Community created the guidelines for new, Eastern 
European, independent states as a response to the conflicts between ethnic 
groups in that region.71 It appears that these guidelines were created to try 
and deter new States from engaging in additional conflict once they were 
granted independence since a state’s “commitment to these principles opens 
the way to recognition by the Community and its Member States and to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations.”72 In a sense, this could be thought of 
as a contract between the secessionist state and the European Community. 
The European Community had a reasonable expectation that the new states 
would honor their end of the bargain and refrain from any acts of violence 
or discriminatory behavior. The European Community would, in turn, grant 
them independence because of this reasonable expectation. However, how 
could the community have expected Kosovo to be able to uphold its end of 
the bargain when it did not meet the requirements in the first place? How 
could the community have even had a reasonable expectation that Kosovo 
would follow the guidelines after independence if it were not able to meet 
them initially?  
 70. Kosova Liberation Army, Statement by the KLA General Staff (Mar. 20, 1999), 
in THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 
26, at 672. 
 71. Declaration, supra note 42.  
 72. Id.
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The guidelines set forth in the Montevideo Convention have been 
accepted as “reflecting customary international law.”73 In order for law to be 
effective it must be predictable. It must contain this quality in order for 
people to have faith in the legal system. Thus, the legal standard for 
independence must be applied consistently in order for states to conform 
their behavior appropriately to fit the guidelines. If this criterion is not 
applied consistently then independence will lack legitimacy. It will be 
sporadic and based on principles that are not enumerated in writing or as 
customary international law. This was the case of Kosovo. It did not fit 
within the legal standards, and the result appeared more impulsive than 
substantiated. At this point it is important to review briefly how the 
Montevideo Convention has not been applied consistently with respect to 
both Quebec and Taiwan, since both of those regions fit the requirements 
but were denied independence.  
IV. CANADA’S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION TO SECESSION WITH 
RESPECT TO QUEBEC
Quebec is one of ten provinces in Canada and has long vowed to gain 
independence. The French Canadians are the supporters of the secessionist 
movement in Quebec. This is because they “established [a] birthright” in 
Canada when they first settled in the mid-seventeenth century.74 Their view 
of the English Canadians as having a “continuing loyalty to England” 
promoted their desires to create a state that would not forget their French 
heritage.75 One scholar has noted that this history is important when 
“assess[ing] French demands for statehood or independence.”76 The history 
is critical because of Quebec’s perception of emphasis on colonial 
domination, particularly an aversion towards English rule. The Quebecers’ 
claim for independence through self-determination fits precisely within the 
definition enumerated in General Assembly Resolution 2649 that “many 
peoples are still denied the right to self-determination and are subject to 
colonial and alien domination.”77 Quebec is fighting for its right not to be 
subject to Canadian-English governance. If this was its goal, where did it 
fail?  
Referendums in Quebec played a key role in the determination of support 
for independence. The first referendum on sovereignty, held in 1980, 
 73. LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 301 (5th 
ed. 2009). 
 74. Alan S. Alexandroff, The Never-Ending Story: Quebec and the Question of 
National Self-determination, in NO MORE STATES?: GLOBALIZATION, NATIONAL SELF-
DETERMINATION, AND TERRORISM 221, 221 (Richard N. Rosecrance & Arthur A. Stein eds., 
2006).  
 75. Id.
 76. Id.  
 77. G.A. Res. 2649 (XXV), supra note 10.  
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garnered little support, with only 40.4% of Quebecers in favor.78 However, a 
later referendum, which was held beyond 1995, found 49.4% support, a 
number that is crucial to the determination of sovereignty.79 These numbers 
are important because the Canadian government left the issue of secession 
to the Canadian court. The court declared that “a clear majority vote in 
Quebec on a clear question would constitute a moral obligation on the part 
of Canada to negotiate with a Quebec government over the country’s 
future” with respect to independence.80 This majority vote had to constitute 
51%, a number that the province had not yet attained. Yet, it also shows that 
“the court did not accept a unilateral declaration of independence by 
Quebec.”81 Support for Quebec’s independence was not high enough to 
allow negotiations. This hurt the independence movement for many years, 
and it was not until 2005 when an unofficial vote (non-referendum) showed 
54% support for sovereignty, a figure that would give hope to the Quebec 
province in the future.82
In 1998, the Canadian Supreme Court was asked to render an Advisory 
Opinion by Parliament regarding Quebec’s move towards secession. This 
was accomplished in the case of Reference re Secession of Quebec.83 An 
interesting point the court makes is that “[t]he secession of a province from 
Canada must be considered, in legal terms, to require an amendment to the 
Constitution, which perforce requires negotiation.”84 Through this statement 
Canada is binding Quebec, an autonomous province, to the strictures of the 
national constitution. It renders any secessionist action by Quebec, without 
Canada’s approval, unconstitutional. The lack of autonomy given to the 
Quebec government is shown through further statements by the court that 
declare any unilateral acts to be unlawful.85 The actions exercised by the 
Canadian Supreme Court by binding secession to the national constitution, 
at the direction of the country’s national government, could be viewed by 
Quebecers as an interference with their pursuit of sovereignty.  
 78. Alexandroff, supra note 74, at 223-24.  
 79. Id. The 1995 referendum was a pivotal point in Quebec’s quest for independence, 
and since then, there has been much analysis of how this referendum was perceived by the 
public. See Harold D. Clarke, Allan Kornberg & Marianna C. Stewart, Referendum Voting as 
Political Choice: The Case of Quebec, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 345 (2004) (analyzing the 1995 
Quebec referendum using the Nadeau, Martin and Blais Model); see also John Fox, Robert 
Andersen & Joseph Dubonnet, The Polls and the 1995 Quebec Referendum, 24 CAN. J. SOC.
411, 423 (1999) (demonstrating that, with respect to the 1995 referendum and other polls, 
“statistical meta-analysis of polling data can address questions about the trajectory of public 
opinion.”).  
 80. Alexandroff, supra note 74, at 229.  
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 82. Id. at 223 (endnote omitted).  
 83. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).  
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The court also addresses the right of secession with respect to 
international law. It supports its stance against unilateral secession by 
arguing that “international law does not specifically grant component parts 
of sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their ‘parent’ 
state.”86 With respect to self-determination, the court notes that this right 
“will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign 
states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of 
those states.”87 Self-determination for Quebec would be “internal” since it 
would be Quebecers’ “pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural 
development” within Canada.88
Further, Quebec could not be granted secession, according to the 
Canadian Supreme Court, because it did not contain a dominated people 
that could qualify under the self-determination doctrine. Specifically, 
Quebecers were not “subject to alien subjugation, domination or 
exploitation.”89 However, taking into account the historical nature of the 
region and the Quebecers’ opinions about the English land, the rejection of 
the claim of alien subjugation could be considered a point of controversy by 
Quebecers. Canadians would argue that Quebecers were not “denied 
meaningful access to government” and thus were not subjugated.90 It 
appears that Quebecer’s participation in the Canadian government is 
particularly noteworthy since history has shown that Quebec has produced 
numerous prime ministers. Thus, the court’s proposition that they can enjoy 
freedom without secession is supported by this point.  
The history of Quebec and the role played by the Canadian Supreme 
Court give credence to the theory that Canada stopped the secessionist 
movement. Canada used its constitution and court as a shield to protect 
itself against Quebec’s secessionist arguments. Through this process, it 
created hurdles that could not be overcome. However, it appears that the 
international community did not object to Canada’s involvement in Quebec 
as it did with Serbia’s involvement in Kosovo. Both states were entitled to 
enjoy its right to sovereignty, and yet only one was actually allowed to 
exercise it.  
Canada and Serbia both exercised control over their prospective 
secessionist regions. They both had integrated, within their constitutions, 
requirements set out for secessionist States. The Canadian court also relies 
on the argument that there is no legal right to unilateral secession.91 A 
 86. Id. ¶ 111 (emphasis added).  
 87. Id. ¶ 122.  
 88. Id. ¶ 126. Specifically, “[t]here is no provision in the Canadian constitution for 
using the referendum procedure, either for constitutional amendment or any other purpose.” 
Peter Leslie, Canada: The Supreme Court Sets Rules for the Secession of Quebec, PUBLIUS,
Spring 1999, at 135, 142.
 89. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. ¶ 154.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. ¶¶ 154-55. 
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consistent application of international law and standards for independence 
would dictate that both sovereign states should be accorded the right to have 
the international community honor their constitutions. Yet, this is not the 
case.  
Serbia’s constitution implemented criteria for granting an independent 
state in the same manner that Canada undertook in its constitution. Serbia 
stated, “that the status of [a] republic should be reserved for nations (narodi)
as opposed to nationalities (narodnosti),” and that the people of Kosovo did 
not apply by this definition.92 Canada similarly stated that the people of 
Quebec did not fit within their criteria. An argument stands that although 
they were not being “subjugated,” they were being “exploited” by Canada. 
Particularly, the Quebecers wanted to secede in order to enjoy greater 
political and economic freedoms outside of the confines of Canada.93 A 
similar argument can be made for Kosovo Albanians in their claim for 
independence.  
Each sovereign state is entitled to have the international community 
respect its constitution. Some critics may argue that this necessitates limits. 
I will concede to this and argue that limits should only be found when 
another sovereign State’s citizens require a more flexible interpretation of 
the constitution in order for their individual rights to be honored. However, 
at the time of attempted secession neither Kosovo nor Quebec was a 
sovereign state. Per this analysis, either both or neither should have been 
given the ability to contradict Serbia and Canada’s respective constitutions. 
This type of consistent treatment is required if a state’s constitution is to 
have any respect in the international community.  
There is hardly any debate that Quebec has fulfilled the Montevideo 
Convention’s guidelines for a state. It has also been proven in this article 
that Kosovo did not fulfill the guidelines set out by the Convention. The 
only drawback to the Quebecers’ pursuit of sovereignty is their low 
referendum results. Once they reach a number high enough to catch the 
attention of the Canadian government and court, it will be interesting to see 
whether Canada will honor its promise to negotiate regarding the 
secessionist issue. At that point, the international community will have a 
duty to not honor Canada’s constitution, which poses restrictions on 
secession. This is necessary in order for international law to have consistent 
application. There is no justification in allowing some states greater 
constitutional deference and others, none. This is one of the necessary paths 
that must be forged in order for a more stable set of requirements for 
independence to be formed and respected.  
 92. Caplan, supra note 34, at 748.  
 93. Alexandroff, supra note 74, at 222.  
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V.  CHINA’S ACTIONS THREATENED TAIWAN’S RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION
Self-determination has also proved ineffective in the case of Taiwanese 
independence. This part of the analysis will look at the justifications used to 
decline independence to Taiwan and whether it was based on the same type 
of criteria that granted Kosovo its sovereignty. In the process, China’s 
relationship with Taiwan will be examined and whether its actions 
constituted threats towards Taiwan’s right to self-determination.  
Taiwan has been autonomous for half a century and has exercised 
significant power in the economic sector along with trying to achieve 
independence.94 This pursuit has produced a “strong sense of ‘Taiwan 
identity” on the island, and has enhanced its belief that its region “merits 
international recognition as a sovereign country.”95 However, the island 
itself is not composed of only Taiwanese peoples. Its population includes a 
portion of its neighboring state, the Chinese. In the past, the Chinese have 
had substantial influence in governing the island. However, this influence 
has dissipated and a “growing separatist-leaning Taiwanese leadership” has 
emerged.96 It is this separatist movement that is encouraging other 
Taiwanese to claim their independence.  
There exists debate on whether China can even exercise any sovereign 
rights to Taiwan since Taiwan is an autonomous province. The argument 
that China does not have “sovereignty over the island of Taiwan” since it 
did not acquire title to the land through either treaty or through occupation 
of the territory is problematic if China wants to claim sovereign control over 
the region.97 If China did not occupy Taiwan through either treaty or 
occupation, then it does not have sovereignty over Taiwan. Following from 
this, “[a] state with no sovereignty over a territory cannot have sovereignty 
over the people in the territory.”98 This is significant since there exists the 
possibility that China does not even have a right to invoke sovereignty 
claims. If that were the case, Taiwan would not need to raise claims of a 
right to self-determination since it would already exist as an independent 
State.  
It has not been the case that China has stopped exercising sovereignty 
over Taiwan. In fact, the Chinese constitution regards Taiwanese 
 94. Robert S. Ross, Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-
Apr. 2006, at 141, 142. The author argues that “[t]he peaceful transformation of relations 
between China and Taiwan will help stabilize eastern Asia, reduce the likelihood of conflict 
between China and the United States, and present an opportunity for Beijing, Taipei, and 
Washington to adjust their defense postures.” Id. at 141.  
 95. Id. at 142.  
 96. Michael D. Swaine, Trouble in Taiwan, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 39, 45. 
 97. Chiang, supra note 1, at 998.  
 98. Id. 
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sovereignty as residing “with the people of ‘China.’”99 This has been a bone 
of contention in the independence movement since China is opposed to the 
drafting of a new constitution and the Taiwanese independence leader, Chen 
Shui-bian, had declared that a “new constitution [should] be drafted by 
2006.”100 This new constitution never evolved due to lack of support in the 
international community and China’s interference with any movement 
towards Taiwanese independence.  
China has been anything but supportive. It has used “provocative missile 
tests near the island, interfering with shipping to Taiwan and provoking the 
United States to deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of 
Taiwan.”101 China has asserted its claims over Taiwan through its statements 
as well. Particularly, it has made it clear that any change in the country’s 
name from “‘the Republic of China’ to ‘the Republic of Taiwan’” would be 
considered “acts of war.”102 China’s voice against independence has also 
been passed by China’s legislature in 2005 in the Anti-Secession Law, 
“which codified Beijing’s threat to go to war if Taiwan declared 
independence.”103 These codifications can be understood as nothing less 
than a deterrent to Taiwan’s pursuit of independence.  
Such actions by China have in fact produced the effect of containing the 
independence movement on the island. “Voters, reflecting Beijing’s military 
and economic hold on the island, have preferred to accommodate China’s 
opposition to Taiwan’s independence.”104 The waning of support has been 
attributed to China’s threatening response. This has also posed a problem in 
the establishment of referendums on the issue of independence. Ever since 
the People’s Republic of China government established a stronghold in 
China in 1949, there has been a threat “to use force to ‘reunite’ Taiwan with 
China . . . . [specifically] if they did not vote for the candidate of its 
choice.”105 It has been argued that under these circumstances, the “people in 
Taiwan cannot express their free will in a referendum.”106 Additionally, 
 99. Swaine, supra note 96, at 49.  
 100. Emerson M.S. Niou, Understanding Taiwan Independence and its Policy 
Implications, 44 ASIAN SURV. 555, 556 (2004).
 101. Ross, supra note 94. See Andrew Bingham Kennedy, China’s Perceptions of 
U.S. Intentions Toward Taiwan: How Hostile a Hegemon?, 47 ASIAN SURV. 268 (2007) for 
an analysis of United States’ involvement in the Taiwanese independence movement and its 
implications for Chinese diplomacy. 
 102. Ross, supra note 94, at 144.  
 103. Id. at 145.  
 104. Id. at 142. See generally Hung-Mao Tien & Chen-Yuan Tung, Taiwan in 2010: 
Mapping for a New Political Landscape and Economic Outlook, 51 ASIAN SURV. 76 (2011)
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 105. Chiang, supra note 1, at 1003. Threats against separatist movements impacted 
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“Taiwan’s electorate has consistently rejected a declaration of 
independence” because the risk of going to war with China is too great.107
This then begs the question of why the international community has not 
recognized Taiwan as an oppressed or dominated region, considering 
China’s influence over its political, economic, and societal situation.  
There seem to be three main reasons why the international community 
has not responded with vigorous force to defend Taiwan’s rights. Firstly, 
“Taiwanese independence would [likely] establish a dangerous precedent 
for other potentially secession-minded areas of the country, such as Tibet, 
Xin-jiang, and Inner Mongolia.”108 Secondly, “Washington has long 
considered Taiwan’s moves toward independence a threat to U.S. security 
because [it] could lead to war” with China over the region.109 This second 
concern brings about the proposition that had China’s role in the situation 
not been as threatening to both Taiwan and the international community, the 
right of Taiwanese self-determination would have garnered greater support. 
Lastly, the Taiwan Relations Act has been created by the United States to 
“protect the interests of Taiwan,” and thus, there is no additional need for 
the international community to come to the aid of Taiwan.110 From this, a 
conclusion can be reached that although the people of Taiwan were 
dominated by China, without the support of the international community 
they had no hope of gaining independence. The question then becomes, why 
did the international community respond so differently to Taiwan in 
comparison to Kosovo when both could bring allegations of oppression?  
There is no debate that Taiwan can be classified as a state. It fulfills the 
Montevideo Convention’s requirements and “the elements of the definition 
[of a state].”111 If that is the case, then why has it not been granted 
independence? Scholars have responded to this by putting the blame on 
Taiwan, particularly that “its authorities have not claimed it to be a state, but 
rather part of the state of China.”112 If this is true, then Taiwan has not 
recognized itself as a state for fear that China will inflict violence if it 
makes any movement towards independence.  
China’s interference through overt threats of force is visible in Taiwan’s 
inability to successfully initiate a referendum for independence. The 
General Assembly has made it clear that states cannot “undermine the 
Phenomenon in Taiwan: Solidification of Taiwan Consciousness?, 44 ASIAN SURV. 591
(2004). 
 107. Ross, supra note 94, at 146.  
 108. Swaine, supra note 96, at 41.  
 109. Ross, supra note 94, at 148.  
 110. Chiang, supra note 1, at 977.  
 111. Id. at 986.  
 112. Id. 
2012] The Right to Self-Determination 517
electoral processes in any country.”113 When using the General Assembly’s 
proclamations, it is necessary to advance the position that Taiwan can be 
considered to fit within the definition of a country with its own electoral 
process because it has exercised enough autonomy by creating its own 
government, the Republic of China.  
China has interfered with the referendum and has violated the General 
Assembly’s instructions. Yet, the international community has not come to 
support Taiwan’s right to hold a referendum. In fact, they have pulled back. 
Kosovo was able to hold a referendum without any interference from 
Serbia, and yet the international community found it necessary to come to 
Kosovo’s aid even though the electoral process was not undermined. The 
referendum is a crucial step in a state’s assertion of independence since a 
state will not be able to evidence support without it. The international 
community’s inconsistent support of referendums shows that there needs to 
be a more reliable application if all states that fulfill the Montevideo 
Convention’s requirements are to be given the ability to exercise their right 
to self-determination.  
Kosovo did not fulfill the Montevideo Convention’s requirements and 
yet it was acknowledged as an independent state. This could not have been 
accomplished without assistance by the international community. It has 
already been noted earlier that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter was violated 
when NATO inflicted a bombing campaign against Serbia in order to 
compel the country to concede to the secessionist agreement in favor of 
Kosovo.114 However, it becomes questionable why NATO or the 
international community did not exert force towards China when China 
explicitly posed the ultimatum that if Taiwan makes any movement towards 
independence it will be considered an act of war.115
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter declares that states shall not intervene 
“in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state” was also respected with China’s assertion of sovereignty over 
Taiwan.116 The international community, however, did not respect Serbia’s 
right to assert sovereignty over Kosovo. Both claimed the territories to be 
within their sovereign jurisdiction, and yet only one was allowed to exercise 
control without intervention. If a secessionist region chooses to pursue 
independence, and its governing state wishes to exercise its right of 
sovereign control, the international community cannot pick and choose 
when it will intervene. It must either consistently allow all states to exercise 
control or prevent them. By allowing China to exercise control and 
 113. G.A. Res. 46/130, supra note 25, ¶ 6. For the purposes of this analysis, a 
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preventing Serbia from doing the same, the international community has 
claimed the authority to be the ultimate arbiter of when the right to 
independence may be exercised.  
Comparing how Kosovo and Taiwan’s desire for independence was 
handled, a cynic would conclude that Taiwan was denied independence 
because China posed a greater threat if angered than would Serbia. Thus, 
the standards set forth in the Montevideo Convention are more flexible in 
the Kosovo application, since upsetting Serbia would have minimal impact 
on the international community. The opposite is true for Taiwan. 
Additionally, the international community’s involvement in ensuring the 
process for referendums is more stringent with states that are not 
threatening. These inconsistencies provide evidence that smaller and less 
powerful sovereign states are not provided with the same rights when 
secessionist states try to exercise independence. Until a more reliable set of 
standards is created, aggressor states seeking independence will consistently 
be provided with greater opportunity to exercise sovereignty.  
CONCLUSION
When reconciling the secessionist movements of Kosovo, Quebec, and 
Taiwan, and the justifications used to accept or reject claims for 
independence, the conclusion can be reached that there does not exist a 
defined set of standards that are applied on a consistent basis. Rather, as one 
scholar accurately stated, the “recognition of a people’s status as a nation-
state is conferred by the international community and is highly subject to 
the calculations and interests of the most influential powers involved.”117
Kosovo’s declaration of independence is a product of this conclusion. 
Serbia was a less influential and powerful country than both Canada and 
China, so its sovereignty was not respected. Had Taiwan or Quebec been 
given independence, the international community would have been faced 
with two powerful nations that could have destroyed the interests that were 
at stake for those countries granting independence to their secessionist 
regions.  
From this perspective, a clearer set of standards needs to be established. 
Since it is evident that the Montevideo Convention is not applied 
consistently, the international community should create new requirements 
that are more detailed and that take into account a state’s sovereign right to 
defend its territory from secession. Within these requirements, a secessionist 
state’s assertion of self-determination should be defined, keeping in mind 
that this right can be revoked if the secessionist group resorts to any threats 
or violence towards other ethnic groups within the region.  
 117. Swaine, supra note 96, at 47.  
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The overarching conclusion is that there need to be better guidelines in 
order to achieve more consistent results. Granting independence to some 
states that do not fit the requirements, while denying it to others that do fit 
the requirements, does not allow the international community to feel 
comfortable with the established standards. It in turn leads to insecurity in 
the international legal system and the belief that other factors are the basis 
for granting independence.  

